The Art of Earth and Fire:
The Aesthetics of Robin George Collingwood
and
the Craft of the Studio Potter

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The Art of Earth and Fire:
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Preamble: Beauty and The Bog

1. Clay Artistry

It is difficult to visualize labourers whose artistry is more immediately sensuous than that of potters shaping supple, moist and plastic clay as it spins beneath their hands on the potter's wheel. The embodiment of graceful and appealing forms as fingertips caress elastic and often sumptuous clay is the paragon of creative making, which is centuries old, and yet flourishes anew with every freshly fashioned pot.

Common clay, mud in less glamorous terms, is transformed right before one's eyes as if by a mysterious touch of magic. This amorphous matter is imbued with a life of its own as it whirls beneath the disciplined touch of the master potter's hand. Removed, trimmed, dried, glazed and fired, this very same mud passes through the volcanic searing heat of the kiln to emerge as an object of such permanence that only mountains and the very earth itself naturally outlast it.

No wonder that the great museums of the world house these gifts of humanity's past, and that the great archaeological treasures of the world are based in the wealth of ceramic history; no wonder that the modern studio potter continues to explore the many imaginative dimensions and facets of this endlessly expressive and useful medium.

The responsiveness of clay to the human touch provides one with the occasion to reflect on: the role of the sensitively trained hand in shaping and feeling; the developing human imagination; the invention and development of technology; the practical food and storage needs of a people; the human eye and the desire for grace and balance; the many symbolic gestures cast in permanence; the longing for forms of colour and line that express subtle and almost hidden wants and aspiration. The lengthy history of human work with clay illustrates the human drive to create and explore a medium which has almost unlimited responsiveness.

The origins of clay technology are lost in pre-history. The first halting but definitive steps which led people to shape, fire and use clay objects in daily and spiritual life have long been surpassed. Many steps in techniques, refinement, diversity, use and artistic expression have been taken since those first ones early in the dawn of our primitive technological development. Two elements have stayed constant: clay and fire. Without these two fundaments, ceramics cannot stand up. *Kéramos* -- `the fired stuff'. As remarked by Sir Herbert Read, "Pottery is at once the simplest and the most difficult of all arts. It is the simplest because it is the most elemental; it is the most difficult because it is the most abstract."[1] For my purposes, pottery is the paradigm of craft. It is amongst the oldest of the arts. There have been more shapes, colours, forms and textures made than can ever be counted. This base matter, clay, is amenable to the most sophisticated requirements of the industrial and machine age, and to this age of automated manufacture as seen in the ceramics industry's ability mechanically to shape millions upon millions of urinals (even Duchamp's *Fountain*), vases, tiles, plates, sparkplugs, cups and saucers

[1]Sir Herbert Read lived from 1893 to 1968. Herbert Read, **The Meaning of Art** (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1931) 22. Hereafter this work is designated by **MA** and will be inserted into the text of the thesis. The other work of Sir Herbert Read to which I will refer is **Art and Industry: The Principles of Industrial Design** (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), referred to as **AI**.

with barely a human touch involved. It is equally responsive to the gentle touch of a child or the guided and inspired hand of the artist.

2. The Function and The Fountain

Throughout the history of pottery there is no question that the "holding" or "containment" function has been central. Even in discussions which touch on the role of pots in burials or religious rites, the ideas of containment and carrying have their place.[2] To imagine the history of pottery without food and water would be like imagining a boat without a hull. Within a broad historical perspective, pottery is that form of ceramics which is seen as serving the function of holding.

Many of the practices developed by potters and ceramic technologists have been developed to render the making process more controlled and the finished product better for the fundamental function it was envisioned to have. Depending on the specific place and need, the word `better' might mean `more durable', `more porous', `watertight', `smoother', `rougher', `lighter', `denser', `wider', `taller', `high gloss', or `raw', etc. If one were to consider certain of the derivative functions of pottery like serving, pouring, and baking or cooking as other examples, then `better' could mean `curved this way', `balanced with weight at this focus', `open with flared lip', `uniform thickness and thermal shock resistance', and other very specific designations with respect, say, to shape or form.[3] The more precise the purpose and specific the function, the more the adept potter would know what form to give the particular piece under consideration and how to finish it. It seems that the potter's purpose and skilled work, coupled with the function a thing has in the social order, define the final actual existence of the thing. This point expresses one of the tenets of the Bauhaus and is made often by Read. "Early man, we may assume, in making his implements was governed entirely by considerations of utility. A hammer had to have a blunt head, an arrow a sharp point, and so on. Form evolved in the direction of functional efficiency."(**AI** 7)

3. What Colour Should It Be?

As has been eloquently noted by scholars, and as one is continually reminded by the astounding diversity of contemporary pottery, function is not all there is to the determination of form, finish, decoration, shape, colour, texture, etc.[4] One wonders how much of the potter's work is driven solely by the creative urges, taste, fancy, emotions, sense, impulses, expressive acts of potters and ceramic artists. What does determine the creative, imaginative, and innovative approaches to these various aspects of pottery? The symbolic references and the inspiration of the human spirit are as fundamental to this creative enterprise as are the functions and utility of the individual objects themselves. The unique input of individual artisans at the moment of creating the pot itself, the slowly changing tides of tradition, the subtle feelings, visions, insights, and the artist's brush filled with the energy of life itself, are all facets of sensuous intuition and inspiration. Putting such thoughts into an historical perspective, Read suggests, “[A] moment arrives in the development of civilization when there is a choice between equally efficient objects of different shape. The moment that a choice is made, an aesthetic judgment

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[2]Philip Rawson, **Ceramics** (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 1-22, 205-6.

[3]Robin Hopper, **Functional Pottery: Form and Aesthetic in Pots of Purpose** (Radnor, Pennsylvania: Chilton Book Company, 1986), 4-27.

[4]Robin Hopper, **The Ceramic Spectrum** (Radnor, Pennsylvania: Chilton Book Company, 1984); Peter Lane, **Studio Ceramics** (Chilton Book Company, 1983); Peter Lane, **Studio Porcelain** (Chilton Book Company, 1980).

has operated. What are the motives that lead man to prefer one shape to another?(**AI** 16)." These quotations from Read, about functional efficiency and aesthetic judgment, clearly articulate two threads of thought which dog many accounts offered about certain phenomena linked to pottery. They reflect also a certain mythic picture that underlies some explanations concerning the origins of things, shapes, textures, forms, etc.

These two accounts or pictures are held as distinct, which is to say that the one cannot explain or contribute to the other. It will become increasingly clear as my work proceeds that I think that the more committed one is to holding such pictures as deeply distinct from one another, and as having nothing to do with one another, the more one falls into an awkward entanglement expressed neatly by Wittgenstein when he notes,

> Here it happens that our thinking plays us a queer trick. We want that is, to quote the law of excluded middle and to say: "Either such an image is in his mind, or it is not; there is no third possibility!". . .So really this is a truism -- says nothing at all, but gives us a picture. . .And this picture *seems* to determine what we have to do, what to look for, and how -- but it does not do so, just because we do not know how it is to be applied.[5]

4. Craft and Creativity

This dichotomy between functional and aesthetic orientations has many homologues in the history of thought about the arts. It finds its many, diverse and eclectic counterparts in: aesthetic/non-aesthetic; feeling/thought; skill/intuition, creativity/technology; inspiration/plan; innovation/knowledge; freedom/purpose; immediacy/mediation; insight/mastery; genius/predictability; internal/external; decoration/function; matter/form; and art/craft.

There are numerous contexts within which each of these oppositional poles is alive and well. Obviously, each one is not an equal counterpart to all the others. Sets of distinctions like these have been operative in many attempts to describe and explain the fundamental fact of innovative and skilled making of objects which have aesthetic and practical value or appeal. One such particularly clear context is provided by Robin George Collingwood as he states,

> We are in point of fact familiar with a kind of activity productive of results and under the agent's voluntary control, which has *none* [emphasis mine] of the special characteristics of craft. . .We are perfectly familiar with activities of this kind; and our ordinary name for them is creation. . .To create something means to make it *non-technically* [emphasis mine], but yet consciously and voluntarily.
>
> What is a work of art, granted that there is something in art proper (not only in art falsely so called) to which the name is applied, and that, since art is not craft, this thing is not an artifact? It is something made by the artist, but not made by transforming a given material, nor by carrying out a preconceived plan, nor by way of realizing the means to a preconceived end.[6](**PA** 127-8)

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[5]Ludwig Wittgenstein, **Philosophical Investigations**, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963), 352. This work is designated PI. Note also,B.R. Tilghman, **But Is It Art? The Value and The Temptation of Theory** (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 1-24.

[6]Robin George Collingwood, **The Principles of Art** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 127-8. This work is designated PA. Collingwood lived from 1889-1943. Other central works of Collingwood which I

There are other thinkers such as Croce who operate with a similar distinction, "The work of art is always *internal*; and what is called *external* is no longer a work of art."[7] Or with a slightly different slant, "I will say at once, in the simplest manner, that art is *vision* or *intuition*. . .and it [this assertion] denies above all, that art is a *physical fact*. . .[I]f it can be intuition. . .art cannot be a utilitarian act."[8] Further examples are found in Tomas' **Creativity in the Arts**, in articles firstly by Ducasse and secondly by Spendor when they say,

> In art, on the contrary, the particular nature of that which one is in the process of creating is clearly known only after it is created. . .But in art what occurs in the creating of an object, whether real or imaginal, and of a nature not antecedently known, which in a unique way corresponds *to* something that was not an object at all viz., to a feeling. . .

and

> The answer is that everything in poetry is work except inspiration, whether this work is achieved at one swift stroke, as Mozart wrote his music, or whether it is a slow process of evolution from stage to stage. . .Inspiration is the beginning of a poem and it is its final goal. It is the first idea which drops into the poet's mind and it is the final idea which he at last achieves in words. In between this start and this winning post there is the hard race, the sweat and the toil.[9]

Isenberg states this particular set of distinctions in a less severe manner but focuses attention on what I take to be the heart of the matter. "Accomplished mastery can never account for any masterpiece; but a masterpiece *without* the basis of mastery will never be seen."[10] Continuing in this vein and referring to Croce he adds,

> So they [artists] perform exercises which teach them to handle pigments or instruments or notations or stones, and know how to produce "stimuli to aesthetic reproduction" corresponding in some manner to their visions -- means that is, whereby other spirits, if they so desire, can obtain an experience of art, identical with the author's or similar to it. All this belongs to the "activity of externalization"; and technique is nothing but "knowledge at the service of the practical activity directed to producing stimuli to aesthetic reproduction."[11]

In a broader context than that of only Collingwood or Croce, Casey asserts,

> That there is an intimate tie between imagination and creativity is an ancient theme that can be traced back at least as far as Plato, for whom the lyric poet is a person who is capable of being seized by "divine frenzy". . ."imagination" became the watchword denoting the source of all human creativity.

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use are: **Collingwood: Essays in the Philosophy of Art**, Alan Donagan, ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964); **Speculum Mentis** (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963)

[7]Benedetto Croce, **Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic**, trans. Douglas Ainslie, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1922), 50.

[8]Benedetto Croce. **The Essence of The Aesthetic**, trans. Douglas Ainslie (London: William Heinemann, 1921), 8-11.

[9]J. Ducasse, **Creativity in the Arts**, Vincent Tomas, ed. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), 73-4; S. Spendor, *The Making of a Poem*, 43-4..

[10]Arnold Isenberg, **Aesthetic and The Theory of Criticism**, W. Callaghan et al., eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 58.

[11]Isenberg, **Aesthetic**, 54.

> At the limit -- a limit most closely approached in the aesthetic doctrines of Croce and Collingwood, who bring the Romantic doctrine to its logical conclusion -- one need not concern oneself with the concrete expressions of creative imagination. Such expressions are *merely* a matter of "technique", of "externalization", and are of secondary importance compared with the activity of pure imagination, which alone is truly expressive.[12]

And with respect to the term `genius' for example, Kant claims,

> From this it may be seen that genius. . .is a *talent* for producing that for which no definite rule can be given. . .Hence, where an author owes a product to his genius, he does not himself know how the *ideas* for it have entered his head, nor has he the power to invent the like at pleasure, or methodically. . .[13]

Briskman, in discussing process and product relative to creativity, notes as well that,

> For all our valuing of creativity, it appears to be, not least of all to creative scientists and artists themselves, a kind of mystery, a kind of miracle. Thus, Mozart writes of his best musical ideas: "*Whence* and *how* they come I know not; nor can I force them." In a similar vein, Tchaikovsky writes that "the germ of a future composition comes suddenly and unexpectedly"; while Helmholtz reports that his ideas often "arrived suddenly, without any effort on my part, like an inspiration" [and still others write that answers come] "by the grace of God. . .like a flash of lightning[14]

There have been those like Collingwood or Croce who contend that skill can never make art or engender aesthetic experience. There are those that argue that art is the natural consequent or feature of technical activity.[15] One person will claim that no one could doubt that art objects are intentionally designed artifacts,[16] and others contend that purpose, function, and preconceived utility are only craft's

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[12]Edward S. Casey, **Imagining: A Phenomenological Study** (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 183-5.

[13]Immanuel Kant, **Readings in Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics**, Milton C. Nahm ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1975), 441. Also note, Zuidervaart, L. *Aesthetic Idea and the Role of Art in Kant's Hermeneutics*, **Opuscula Aesthetica Nostra**, Cloutier, C. and Seerveld, C. eds. (Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1984), 63-73.

[14]Larry Briskman, *Creative Product and Creative Process in Science and Art*, in **The Concept of Creativity in Science and Art**, Denis Dutton and Michael Krausz, eds. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981), 129-30.

[15]T.R. Martland, *Art and Craft: The Distinction*, **British Journal of Aesthetics**, vol. 14, #3, Summer 1974, 231-8; Francis E. Sparshott, *Every Horse Has a Mouth: A Personal Poetics*, in **The Concept of Creativity in Science and Art**; Paul Valéry, *The Idea of Art*, in **Aesthetics**, Harold Osborne, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 25-31.

[16]Anthony Savile, *The Place of Intention in the Concept of Art*, in Osborne, **Aesthetics**, 158-76; Joseph Margolis, **The Language of Art and Art Criticism** (Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1965), 43-5; Janet Wolff, **Aesthetics and The Sociology of Art** (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983); note the account in chapter one in particular as she poses the problem from a sociological perspective.

proper purview.[17] Still others declare that creativity is a mystery beyond the realm of the rational.[18] Still another argues that craft may be necessary as a condition for art but never sufficient. Some great philosophers assert that art is for art's sake alone and therein autonomous;[19] and equally assertive claims about art's function and its instrumentality or social status are not difficult to find.[20] One says that imagination is the source of art while another says that it is work.[21] The opposition between the two viewpoints that art is "for art's sake" and that art is integrated with many complex activities of life will not be resolved tomorrow. There have been thinkers who claim that aesthetic objects *may* not be real or physical objects, and there are others who affirm that they *never* are, while still others who contend that works of art are *necessarily* artifacts which show design.[22] Another set has claimed that art is never representational while its opponents contend the opposite; and some suggest that special modes of perception or thinking are a requisite to seeing the aesthetic object.[23] Certain philosophers argue that art should have moral impact, while others state it is autonomous as a value.[24] While there are some who would link the artist-craftsperson to industry, there are others who have fought to separate industry and hand-oriented production as much as possible.[25] To one art is a form of communication with others, to another art is the birth of knowledge and feeling. Art has been taken as

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[17]Collingwood is the most obvious example for this thesis, although, as will be noted in chapters nine and ten, a great deal of the contemporary popular literature in the crafts world accepts part of this stance as well. Note also Read's notion of the "abstract artist" in **The Meaning of Art** and **Art and Industry.**

[18]Note the interesting collection of remarks, Alfred Stern, **Sartre: His Philosophy and Existential Psychoanalysis** (New York: Dell publishing, 1967), chapters six and twelve.

[19]W. Kandinsky, *Concerning the Spiritual in Art*, **Creativity in the Arts**; Robert Yanal, *Aesthetic Value and Genius*, in **The Reasons of Art/L'Art a ses raisons**, Peter J. McCormick, ed. (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1985), 321-6.

[20]George Dickie, *The Institutional Conception of Art*, in **Language and Aesthetics**, B.R. Tilghman, ed. (Wichita, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1973), 21-30; T. J. Diffey, *Aesthetic Instrumentalism*, **British Journal of Aesthetics**, vol. 22, #4, Autumn 1982, 337-48; Jane Duran, *Collingwood and Intentionality*, **British Journal of Aesthetics**, vol. 27, #1, Winter 1987, 328; Goren Hermerén, **Aspects of Aesthetics** (London: Lund Humphries, 1984); Marienne L. Quinet, *Food as Art: The Problem of Function*, **British Journal of Aesthetics**, vol. 21, #2, Spring 1981, 159-171.

[21]Margaret Macdonald, *Art and Imagination*, **Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society**, vol. liii, 1953, 206-26; Harold Osborne, *The Aesthetic Concept of Craftsmanship*, **British Journal of Aesthetics**, #17, Spring 1987, 138-48; Anthony Sevile, *The Place of Intention*, in **Aesthetics**, 158-76.

[22]Virgil C. Aldrich, **Philosophy of Art** (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1963); Margolis, **The Language of Art and Art Criticism**, chapter one; Thomas C. *Mayberry, Pleasure and Enjoyment*, **Language and Aesthetics**, 113-29.

[23]Janet Hobhouse, *Expression's Wobble of Pain*, **Newsweek**, February 1987; Bertram Morris, **The Aesthetic Process** (New York: AMS Press, 1943); George Santayana, *The Nature of Beauty*, in **A Modern Book of Esthetics**, Melvin Rader, ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979).

[24]L. Tolstoy, **What is Art?**, trans. A. Maude (London: Oxford University Press, 1930); Stuart Hampshire, *Logic and Appreciation*, in **Aesthetics and Language**, W.R. Elton, ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954), 161-9.

[25]Bill McAlister et al., **William Morris To-Day** (London: Institute of Contemporary Arts, 1984). I shall refer to this work as **To-Day** and include references in the text. Soetsu Yanagi, **The Unknown Craftsman** (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1972).

significant form, symbol and sign, pure intuition, sensuous representation of the Idea.[26] The distinction between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic or that between the artistic/creative and the technical is accepted by some as an abyss. Given a plan, another will deny that creativity is possible.

What, may I ask, is an inquisitive person to do when confronted with this bog-like labyrinth? It is clear to me that the diversity and variety of approaches to art and aesthetics generally makes approaching this subject, or a category within it (e.g., as the role and place of craft and technology in creativity), akin to accessing a veritable maze. It often appears random, or at least undesigned, and there most assuredly is no standard way to begin. I shall not attempt to unravel its complexity and I shall certainly not be able to propose definitive solutions to the apparently inconsistent thinking in this discipline.

Many questions have arisen within the larger crafts community of North America, western Europe, Great Britain and Japan, etc., which embody the communities' attempts to redefine themselves relative to its lengthy traditions on the one hand, and to the contemporary world of artistry in the post-industrial revolution on the other. This dissertation is one of my attempts to help the larger community to define its place in the world of artistic products and creative processes. I do not, however, take on the entirety of this task, and I largely restrict myself to the work and world of the studio potter.

Some of the questions that arise in the pottery community provide a window through which one might see how its concerns link to more general questions in aesthetics are. These are: is pottery *craft* or is it *art*; is it *a* craft or is it *an* art? How can centuries old techniques give rise to creative and new expressions, forms and functions? How does this *mud* which becomes rock-like with the test and trial of the fire, give rise under many circumstances to *aesthetic* experience? What possible relationships could there be between the active imagination and the patterns of behaviour required by the ritualistic process of the potter's studio? How can these objects which have specific functions, and the manufacture of which *may* be governed by detailed plans, be seen as eloquent affirmations of emotion, symbolism and of gifted genius?

Under many circumstances, one assumes that the answer to such questions must be *this* or *that*; these matters are surely rational, or they are not, intelligible or not, systematic or not. Pottery *must* be craft or it *must* be art; it must be governed by purposes and plans, or it is creative and free; its decoration, form and colour must serve a purpose, or not be essential and thereby considered superfluous; either the process of making must follow all the techniques of its artistry, or it is original and innovative. Deeply felt human experience and the discovering edge of consciousness must find its way into this ancient art, or its art is only the following of rules and the solving of particular problems.

These words `craft' and `art' and the tangled complexes of interdependent words connected to them vary in their impact and meaning by context, metaphysic, ideology or myth within which they are presented. Overriding pictures and world views shape how they may be understood and the ranges of influence they may have.

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[26]V.A. Howard, **Artistry: The Work of Artists** (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1982), in which he discusses Goodman's contributions on this point; Nelson Goodman, *When Is Art?* in D. Perkins and B. Leondar, eds. **The Arts and Cognition** (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 11-19; Martin Donougho, *Hegel: A Turning Point in the History of Aesthetics*, in **The Reasons of Art**, 263-8.

5. Aesthetics, Art and Craft

A reasonable question to pose before moving on is, "What is aesthetics?" It is less reasonable to expect the definitive answer.

Referring succinctly and accurately to the origins of the word `aesthetic', Sparshott says "It was to form a sort of counterpart of logic. What logic did for analyzable symbols aesthetics was to do for unanalyzable symbols: logic is to ratiocination as aesthetics is to intuition."(**TA** 17)

The origin of the word in the Greek language and its root indicates `sensation' or `perception'. This meaning indeed is the foundation from which Baumgarten began and on which others have built. In the seventeenth century, aesthetics was the beginning of a theory or philosophy of perception. As the counterpart to logic (logos) as the science of thought, aesthetics was taken as the science of sense or intuition and immediacy in sense. Between the seventeenth and eighteenth century it became a theory of a type of perception and took the theory of taste or fancy as its subject. That is, the theories began to include perception of a certain value or preference.

By the mid-nineteenth century aesthetics included and was focused primarily on the notions of beauty, the perception of beauty, and the sensuous representation of immediacy in the work of Kant and Hegel. One finds the traces of this nineteenth century orientation in the early work of Collingwood, and his philosophy of art directed its attention to an analysis of concepts like consciousness, art and beauty. By the time he had written **The Principles of Art,** he had eliminated the concept of beauty from his aesthetics and focused solely on the term `art'. Aesthetics thus became his philosophy of art. In this later work, he proposed to describe what art was and to develop a theory concerning its origins.

In order to answer his question, "What is art?", Collingwood developed a theory of feeling and perception, imagination, and intellection, and of the nature of consciousness. He proposed to answer the question using the relations of these concepts. Essentially, his argument is that "art is the expression of emotion" and aesthetics is the theory which explains why this is so, and how it is that emotion is expressed. The *why* and the *how* of his claims are his theory. In **The Principles of Art**, aesthetics is thus the theory or explanation of the origins and structure of the experience of the "aesthetic object" -- "the work of art properly so-called".

It becomes clear in studying Collingwood's work that art is the experience of an activity of consciousness – an element of 'feeling'. In this respect, he is within the broad tradition of aesthetics in the traditional sense of the word and from that, his interest was to develop a theory of art.

My interest is to study the craft/art distinction and its application to studio pottery in order to contribute to a theory of craft. This distinction could be addressed and discussed with respect to other media like glass, metal, textiles, paper and wood for example, or it could be examined with respect to other arts like painting, poetry, or performance. With each of these orientations, new aspects of the contrasting or polar notions would be considered.

Bernard Leach and Shoji Hamada are the two giants in early contemporary studio ceramics and set an overall tone of the modern pottery aesthetic in the west.[27] It is to them and potters of similar stature and maturity of thought that I make reference when I illustrate my points about function and daily life, the role of craftsmanship, and the help and hindrance provided by tradition. It is also by

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[27]Bernard Leach, born 1887 and died 1979, worked systematically with his lifelong contemporary Shoji Hamada. My belief is that these two men, and from the perspective of a writer, Leach in particular, dramatically shaped contemporary craft theory. Bernard Leach, **A Potter in Japan** (London: Faber and Faber, 1960); Bernard Leach, **A Potter's Book** (Great Britain: Transatlantic Arts, 1972), hereafter designated by **PB** with references in the text;
Bernard Leach, **A Potter's Portfolio** (London: Lund Humphries & Co., 1951); Bernard Leach, **A Potter's Work** (London: Evelyn, Adams & Mackay, 1967); Bernard Leach, **Hamada: Potter** (Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd., 1975); Bernard Leach, **The Potter's Challenge** (London: Souvenir Press, 1974).

contrast to their thoughts that there have been certain recent counter reactions in the field of pottery which serve as a further rallying point for investigation of the borders of the craft/art distinction.[28]

One aspect of my present work has this active value role. In part, I want to undercut what I consider to be a basic philosophical substructure and ideology about the nature of the world and the place of human beings in it as exemplified in Collingwood's philosophy. I set out to effect this latter move because I believe that what I call the `rationalist-mechanical' model of the world and thought dominates how we in the West think about subjects like aesthetics, skill, innovation, etc.[29] Because of the model which dominates much of our thinking about the world, we are impoverished in our ability to see new values in objects which are involved in our daily lives.

I want to lay bare some of the assumptions underpinning a few core concepts and some of the language we use concerning craft and art. I want to illustrate ways in which this language inclines or encourages an orientation with certain *demeaning* connotations concerning crafts in general, and potters' work in particular. In part, I want also to shed a new light on the potter's work to show its creative and richer sides, with a view to engendering a greater aesthetic, artistic and spiritual appreciation of it.

I arrived at this point in my thinking by having made creative work in the potter's studio, by grasping insights into form, colour, texture, touch and function. These insights surpassed the classical or industrial notions of craft, art, and pottery.

6. Contexts

My present thesis work is based in my thoughts as a potter, a hand craftworker in the art of earth and fire, and as a spiritual companion to the "mud and water man". Having placed certain items from the philosophical tradition on the table by using Collingwood, I continue and outline very briefly how some of these ideas are seen in philosophy and in the modern and contemporary crafts world and in particular, in the world of reflective potters such as Leach, Yanagi and Wildenhain, for example. Having presented these two broad settings, I serve up my own fare.

In the end, I show the following: pottery is a creative and innovative, yet traditional craft; pottery expresses emotion, establishes symbols, and values of daily life. It is here that function plays a pivotal role. Pottery is not only *an* art but is art; pottery is not solely art and should not be confused with it. Art is often, and justifiably called `craft' in its various media and contexts. Craft is often called `art' and I will show settings in which this is so.

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[28]Rose Slivka, *Erasing The Line Separating The Arts from The Crafts*. **The Smithsonian (USA)**, vol. 8, pt. 12, 1978, 86-93.

[29]One of the points which will recur in some of my criticisms of Collingwood has been made in part by Thomas C. Mayberry in his criticism of Santayana's aesthetics. This criticism arises for Collingwood both with respect to the relation of the "object of art, properly so-called" to the "bodily expression", and the audience or spectator relations to these two. These issues recur throughout my thesis as subjects of significant difficulty for Collingwood. "It is a self-stultifying view that if what we enjoyed were a private mental object, we could not have common enjoyments or enjoy the same performance or object, nor could we understand one another or communicate about these." in *Aesthetic Pleasure and Enjoyment*, in Tilghman's **Language and Aesthetics**, 85-86.

7. But Is It Craft?

The word `craft' has two fundamental meanings which I would like to distinguish from one another. The first pertains to the activity of making or producing things, events, performances and the like, and the second pertains to a range of objects or artifacts which are produced by this activity. This distinction is conceptual, which indicates simply that one may talk about things, as distinct from techniques, skills, projects, actions and the like, without confusing the two.

As a result, craft is thereby relegated to the same conceptual department store as technique, predictability, or plan, and it is assigned thereby a diminished value with respect to highly regarded values such as creativity, imaginativeness, and aesthetics. In fact, these are all taken to be traits of art and derive their value from association with this term and its activity. The objects which are made by the activity of craft suffer in the modern world, and in the valuational marketplace, from a diminished value syndrome. It is interesting that excellence in technique receives high status and admiration, yet an object made by the process is still generally significantly less valued than an art object (which, as Collingwood would say, is made without technique at all). There is also a belief that there is no link between technique and art or between craft and creativity. That is, technique and craft are never gauged as giving rise to art and creativity; or that no amount of technical expertise engenders creativity; or that creativity is somehow "over and above" craft activity, etc.

I want to illustrate also that the distinctions used to categorize objects and activities are not as rigid or austere as many an argument or discussion would have us believe.[30] One should remember that a distinction may be held clearly and rigidly, but my point is that if it is, and the world it is trying to explain is full-bodied, then the distinction is poverty stricken; if one is not careful, one may conclude that the reality is false, and the austere distinction is true.

For my study to be relevant, it must begin somewhere where there is a problem, or an embryonic idea, and bring it to fruition. The issues broached int this book were born in the potter's studio in the creative process, it was nurtured in the making of objects which have rich aesthetic functional features, and which are often called `craft' or `art'. These objects and this process have never been properly recognized within the field of aesthetics either as valuable objects, as paradigmatic of the process of creative making, or as referential models by virtue of which we offer accounts of the range of value experiences. I contend that one of the reasons for this rests on what I deem to be philosophical and historical prejudices against "matter", or the human "body", as distinct from the "spirit" or "mind". The former are taken to be governed by rules from a higher order whereas the latter are taken as the seat of value, etc. Relative to my interest in pottery, there is a tacit belief that craft is *simply* the following of a rule and in no way creative.

From the time of Hegel forward, and I think as is very clearly shown in Collingwood's work, many philosophers think that craft only orders the given according to an allotted logic, and that it fundamentally *could not* contribute to the fund of knowledge because it cannot create, invent, or discover. Another consideration rests on my belief that the West generally still lives in a Cartesian world and has not yet entered post-cartesian reality. The fundamental distinction in this world view holds thought as the most important element in human life, and that in its use one lives well, happily, and with true understanding. The world of material things essentially follows its own mechanical and eternal laws, completely wanting in freedom. The mind and the body are still distinct. With such distinctions, there can be *no* link between the two: a process must be technical or creative, an object must be art or craft, etc. As has been stated in another way, but equally forcefully, by Gretton, "[f]irst it

[30]Note Morris Weitz, *The Role of Theory in Aesthetics*, **The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism**, vol. 15, 1956, 27-35.

[the current structure of art history] makes absolute distinctions between those images which are `art' and those which are not, so that not all paintings, and very few printed images, for example, qualify."[31]

As a result of this orientation, this book is structured in the following way. Chapter one succinctly presents the craft/art distinction within Collingwood's philosophy of art. It makes brief reference to others who share Collingwood's orientation. Chapter two delineates some of the main features of the terms `classical art' or `craft'; in chapter two, I give a succinct resume of some of Plato's and Aristotle's thoughts on the idea of art and then go on to deal with Collingwood. This analysis follows Collingwood's own pattern. Chapter three outlines his use of the terms `aesthetic art' or `art' in Collingwood's language. It is based almost entirely in Collingwood's aesthetics, and reveals his concepts of "aesthetic object", "aesthetic experience" and "the object of art, properly so-called". Chapters four and five are the negative analyses of chapters two and three. As a result, chapters one to five present the problem, its context, and a criticism of the main proponent's position concerning the problem. Chapter six outlines what I call `mythic' patterns, the legacies lying behind some of the thinking about the problem. Chapter seven presents an entirely different approach to the craft/art distinction by using William Morris, Herbert Read and Bernard Leach.

My primary interest is Leach and I have invoked the thoughts and arguments of Morris and Read to help place Leach's thinking into an intelligible context. Chapter eight shifts discussion closer to the studio itself by presenting a set of distinctions which I think help one understand and appreciate more fully some of the language and points of focus that are operative in that context. Chapter nine presents the first aspect of a case study using the studio potter, the studio, and a spectator as the points of reference. This chapter introduces a set of distinctions for using the craft/art distinction in a variety of ways and not solely in the highly structured way presented by Collingwood. Chapter ten is an investigation of doing, making, and creating in the studio by the individual potter, and it allows me to be constructive with respect to the idea of creative craft. Chapter eleven summarizes the overall themes and points out some of its limits and indicates further possible studies which should follow.

[31]Tom Gretton, *New Lamps For Old*, in **The New Art History**, 63.

Chapter One

1. The Craft/Art Distinction

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the craft/art distinction with the philosophy of art of Collingwood as the point of demarcation. I take Collingwood because he presented a full account of art and craft within his own thinking and he make frequent reference to the history of the distinction. I shall state Collingwood's position concerning the terms `craft' and `art' in a concise form. This shall prove helpful in chapter five as I offer criticism of his position and the expressive theory in general. I shall return to his helpful insights in chapter eleven because many of them are very exciting and profound. I think that his manner of articulating these differentiated insights coupled with the metaphysic which behind them are fundamentally faulty and should be rejected. Whether his acumen can be formulated in other language remains to be seen.

Beginning with **Speculum Mentis** and following through **An Outline of a Philosophy of Art**, **The Essays** and into **The Principles of Art**, Collingwood portrayed a fundamentally consistent concept of art. The early writing displayed the place and movement of the dialectic as the activity of consciousness, as well as the very general features of the various modes of conscious activity, whereas the later work dealt more specifically with detailed aspects, structure and definition of given modes. There were two significant changes between his early and later work that interest me. The first was that the role of beauty was central to his early work and irrelevant in the later. The second is that the later work begins to offer a phenomenological description of artistic making. The bulk of my work deals with the latter. It is only in chapters ten and eleven that I return to the former and discuss it in the context of my own contentions concerning craft. His early work was almost never interested in craft and then only insofar as it exemplified non-aesthetic activity.

> How then does Collingwood characterize this distinction?
> The question is not whether art is this or that kind of craft, but whether it is any kind at all. . .We all know perfectly well that art is not craft; and all I wish to do is to remind the reader of the familiar differences which separate the two things.(**PA** 9)

We are reminded of this distinction by Fethe in his concise and neat article, *Hand and Eye*, when he points to an aspect of the origins of the craft/art distinction,

> Although the distinction between art and craft enters the history of aesthetic thought at a fairly late date, no earlier than the seventeenth century, it is now accepted as commonplace. This is in some ways unfortunate, for the separation of art from craft has led philosophers not only to neglect craft as a subject for study but to ignore or at least undervalue the role craft plays in the creation of art.[32]

Put in the simplest language, craft and art are distinguished by Collingwood in the following way: craft is a skilled activity which realizes a preconceived end (**PA** 15-16, 15-104, etc.), and art is the expression of emotion.(**PA** 13-17, 24, 25, 109-18, 151-3, etc.) For Collingwood, craft is an activity

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[32]Charles B. Fethe, *Hand and Eye: The Role of Craft in R.G. Collingwood's Aesthetic Theory*, **British Journal of Aesthetics**, vol. 22, #1, Winter (1982), 37. Note also, Charles B. Fethe, *Craft and Art: A Phenomenological Distinction*, **British Journal of Aesthetics**, vol. 17, #2, Spring (1977), 129-37.

with features designated by something like the following terms: `planned', `intentional', `known', `repetitive', `complex', `useful', `derivative', `intellectual', `rational', `predictable', `practiced', `bodily', `material'. The value of craft is determined by the value of the objectives one has.

For him art was the activity of consciousness showing features designated by the following terms; `imaginative', `expressive', `emotional', `creative', `original', `unique', `non-technical', `good', `cognitive', `simple', `whole', `indivisible', `individual clarity' and `cleansing'. This activity is to be highly valued. It is the origin of self-knowledge.

The main reason I analyze Collingwood's concept of craft is that it has certain features which I accept as appropriate and helpful in understanding the roles and place that craft has in society, thought and making. His approach is worth studying for three reasons. He clearly defines a knowledge-based approach to art in his outline of the concept of craft. This is discussed primarily in chapters two and four. Secondly, his analysis of the technical theory of art is quite thorough even though I judge it to be inadequate in several respects which shall become clear as the thesis progresses. This item is at play throughout the thesis. Thirdly, his stance is a clear statement of the idealist and subjectivist approach to art as expression. Chapters three and five address this point.

His theory is wanting in certain features which I think *are* aspects of craft activities and objects and the language about them, namely, that at the genesis of the object, the artisan may be creative in the practice of craft, and also that the language which describes these making activities refers not primarily to states of mind but rather to products made, to comparisons of objects, and to people and classes of human action. By analyzing both the virtues and limits of his theory I hope to prepare the soil for a sympathetic understanding of what I want to say about craft and crafts. Collingwood was not alone in his thinking that craft is delineated by the features he outlined, and as having the value he gave to it, and I will refer occasionally to others in order to show the breadth of influence that this *manner* of thinking has. A detailed criticism of his ideas follows in chapters four and five.

In this chapter, I will briefly mention two points which recur throughout this thesis. Collingwood held that craft and art were conceptually and essentially distinct from one another, and consequently that the sets of language concerning the features of each were distinct from the other. It was inconceivable to him that the basic features, traits or characteristics of the one could be features of the other, or that the language describing these attributes could be properly applicable the one to the other. In this respect he is a good example of a way of thinking because he has stated very clearly the incompatibility of these poles. He is also a good example because his idealist stance is such that the definition of the concept of a thing constitutes the reality of that thing. Others have preceded and followed him in this in varying degrees of severity.[33] This conceptualist stance is one way he attempts to deal with the loss of knowledge-based art as outlined in the classical model. One of my criticisms of his work is that there is a tendency within it to gravitate to a form of aesthetic solipsism or radical relativism.

My interests are twofold. I try to determine in what ways his claims are rich, poor, helpful, hindering, insightful, tunnel-visioned, illustrative, etc., with respect to the fields of craft and art. Secondly, I analyze his claims from a perspective concerned about the roles and natures of distinctions. With respect to the former, Collingwood held that the craft/art distinction was an instance of the non-

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[33]David Best, **Feeling and Reason in the Arts** (London: George Allen Unwin, 1985); Mikel Dufrenne, *The Aesthetic Object and the Technical Object*, **Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism**, 23 (1964-5), 115; Roger Fry, **Vision and Design** (New York: New American Library, 1974); Isabel Creed Hungerland, *Once Again, Aesthetic and Non-Aesthetic*, **Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism**, 26 (1967-8), 285-95; George Santayana, **Reason in Art** (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1985); Frank Sibley, *Aesthetic and Non-Aesthetic*, **Philosophical Review**, 74 (1965), 135-159; Edgar Wind, **Art and Anarchy** (Northwestern University Press, 1985).

aesthetic/aesthetic distinction. With respect to the latter, he held that this exclusive distinction was exhaustive with respect to the activities of conscious making.

Collingwood acknowledges that certain objects like pots, paintings, and sculpture may be both art and craft, but that insofar as they display the features of the one, these features have nothing whatsoever to do with the object considered as the other. It will become clear as my thesis moves along that this may be so because both craft and art are characterized by modes of consciousness and not by objects which sit in galleries and in homes. He asserts also that all great art necessarily employs craft. He arrives at the idea that great art employs craft as a result of his previous idea that craft may be necessary but not sufficient for art. The relation of necessity and sufficiency shall be studied in due course, and throughout my thesis I propose other ways of looking at the relations of craft and art. This issue arises in discussions of the content of his philosophy, of my own contribution to a theory of creative craft, and in my several analyses of what might constitute a distinction.

With respect to polar distinctions such as the craft/art distinction, my stance is that they do not necessarily describe either natural states in the world, or the full range of human making -- whether conscious or not. From my perspective, contrasts and differentiations of this sort serve more than one linguistic and social function. They help to orient and occasionally to familiarize or accustom a person to new avenues of thought, or of ordering experiences and events. They can also blind a person to other variations within contexts, or they frequently inhibit depth of insight in others. Collingwood's manner of making the distinction is severe; and while not wholly representative of all thinkers on the subject, his assertion of the comparative merits of each of the poles and of their basic features covers a significant majority of philosophers on this subject.

> On various occasions I have suggested aesthetic experience as such a differentiating criterion. . .and whatever among artifacts is capable of arousing and sustaining aesthetic experience in suitably prepared subjects we call a work of art. . .In my own writings I have endeavoured to present aesthetic experience simply as direct awareness, perception in the wider sense of the word, undertaken for its own sake. . .[I]t underlies all apprehension and provides the material for analytical and constructive thinking.[34]

Remarks of this sort by Osborne lend breadth to the initial statement by Collingwood that art is the expression of emotion; and although this may be denied by thinkers like Edgar Allen Poe, William Morris, and much of the Bauhaus movement, it is most assuredly supported by those like Tolstoy, Croce, Reid, Bertram Morris and others.

For Collingwood,

> Art -- or, expression of emotion -- is a process of becoming conscious of a given feeling or intuition. When the artist begins his work, he possesses only a vague impression of the emotion about to be expressed . . .As the work progresses, however, the feeling or emotion seeking expression gradually assumes form in the mind or the artist. . .And when the process of expressing the emotion is finally completed and the work of art is ready, then the artist is completely conscious of the feeling that at first irritated him as a vague intuition.[35]

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[34]Harold Osborne, *What is a Work of Art?*, **British Journal of Aesthetics**, vol. 21, #1, Winter 1981, 10.

[35]Matti Häyry, *Art as Expression of Emotion: The Italian Neoidealists and the Aesthetics of R.G. Collingwood*, paper presented to the XIth International Congress of Aesthetics, Nottingham, England, August 29 - September 2, 1988, 8-9.

Collingwood profiles the features of craft, and sets out to show that although they are commonly assumed to be traits essential to art, they are not actually so.(**PA** 15-104) According to Fethe, "Collingwood's aim is to describe the difference between craft and art, so that craft and art should fall under the same genus or category."[36] He outlines characteristics of craft in order to show what art is not, although he clearly places both craft and art as species of *making*, a subject to which I shall return on several occasions throughout the thesis. In this respect, although he says that he begins with common language and with ideas with which "everyone is familiar", he is in fact about to overturn commonly held views concerning art.

Although Collingwood acknowledges that there are certain objects which may be both craft and art, he holds the position they are so only when considered from entirely different points of view. Conceptually, there is no overlap between them, and since in his view the concept defines the essence of a thing, no feature of the one could ever also be a feature of the other. As Duran has summarized,

> [W]e may conclude that at least one necessary condition for `artistic activity', according to Collingwood, is that the putative artistic endeavour should be an *expression* of the artist's emotional experience. . .Now Collingwood's insight is that, in order to qualify as a work of art, the work must not only be an expression of the artist's experience but that that expression must not be subordinated to an end.[37]

This basic distinction also may be expressed in other terms, as Dufrenne has done,

> The technical object is at first sight anonymous and abstract -- anonymous even if it bears an inventor's name, because it is not the same for Diesel to invent a new engine and for Van Gogh a new pictorial style. Even the coming of the object into history differs in both cases: the aesthetic object rises in an instant, in an unforeseen manner;. . .[whereas] the technical object proceeds from the concept since it is no longer the issue of spontaneous praxis; it calls for nothing but intelligence in the inventor.[38]

This article by Dufrenne is insightful and parallels much of what Collingwood says with an important difference: he allows that there may be overlaps in the concepts of the aesthetic and the technical *depending on the method of analysis* used in the investigation, i.e., genetic or phenomenological.

I suggest also that Osborne contributes a new and innovative slant to the distinction, and it is one to which I shall turn later in my work: the technical as differentiated from the crafted. "The sophisticated technology of the modern world has divided the functions of the craftsman between the engineer, who plans the machine, and the industrial designer, who plans the programming of the machine. The old unity of craftsmanship has been broken up in our time."[39] There is a parallel emphasis made by Mintzberg as he distinguishes the crafting process from other strategic planning within a business orientation.[40] I shall return to this type of further differentiation later in my work. The craft/art distinction hides deeper and more controversial distinctions and questions in aesthetics: the place and role of intention; the integration of the hand and the imagination; and the relations and

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[36]Fethe. *Hand and Eye*, 38.

[37]Jane Duran, *Collingwood and Intentionality*, **British Journal of Aesthetics**, vol. 27, # 1, Winter 1987, 32-3.

[38]Mikel Dufrenne, *Aesthetic Object and Technical Object*, 115.

[39]Harold Osborne, *The Aesthetic Concept of Craftsmanship*, **British Journal of Aesthetics**, vol.17, #2, Spring 1987, 141.

[40]Henry Mintzberg, *Crafting Strategies*, **Harvard Business Review**, August/September 1987, 66-75.

natures of the aesthetic versus the non-aesthetic. Duran's reminder that Collingwood clearly separated "expression" from "expression subordinated to an end", properly placed him in the tradition of philosophers like Kant, Hegel and Croce, to mention only a few.

The variations on the distinction are not legion because craft has not entered dramatically into philosophic literature as a subject for investigation. Isenberg has said, "Skills are not stereotypes. . .Yet in general it is true that by technique alone we achieve only what we have done once before. But every work of art achieves something more -- or let us say, something different."[41] Or, as strongly stated by Martland,

> Art, too, but not craft, bursts yesterday's dams with the pressures of today's experiences. Art, too, but not craft, avails that which its activities lay bare, never something which men grasp and predict beforehand. . .It [craft] is a service to categories which men already have completed, like to one which exists between a craftsman and his blueprint. It is interesting to notice that patent law distinguishes a discovery from an invention on similar grounds. . .Thus our distinction comes down to this: Insofar as certain activities serve the past, insofar as they draw men's attention, even their authors' own attention, to preconceived plans or ends they are crafts.[42]

There has been some discussion of these matters in more recent times, a great deal of it has taken place within what one would call the craft community. I shall only briefly touch on the issue of the craft community's efforts at rendering descriptions and accounts of its diverse activities.

It is common to find the following conflict in self-identification written in the Ontario Craft Council's official journal,

> Besides, I could only think of one thing I had wanted to say and hadn't:. . .art is the expression of being, craft is the expression of knowledge; both qualities are required, in delicate balance, if a work is to engender understanding or communicate in any significant way to others.[43]

And this can be seen to echo with the vibration of Collingwood's thought that,

> To create something means to make it non-technically, but yet consciously and voluntarily. . .This being the established meaning of the word, it should be clear that when we speak of an artist as making a poem,. . .the kind of making to which we refer is the kind we call creating.(**PA** 128-9)

Such statements clearly position the craft/art distinction in contexts which help clarify that there is a need and role for a thesis such as mine. Beginning with the next chapter, I will outline the first pole of the distinction, Collingwood's notion of craft placed within an historical backdrop.

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[41]Arnold Isenberg, *The Technical Factor in Art*, **The Journal of Philosophy**, vol. xliii, #1, January 1946, 8.

[42]Martland, *Art and Craft: The Distinction*, 233-4.

[43]Ted Gooden, *Thunder and Lightning*, **Ontario Craft**, vol. 13, #4, December 1988, 13.

Chapter Two

The purpose of chapter two is to clarify the idea of classical art -- what Collingwood called `craft'. There are three reasons for doing this. Firstly, this idea is the central one against which Collingwood argued, and in the shadow of which he brought his idea of art to light. Secondly, his delineation of what he took craft to be is insightful and clearly stated. I think it embodies a commonsense view of our time. The third is that it is with this idea in view that I propose to develop my concept of creative craft.

1. Craft: Classical Art

In the course of my thesis, and in particular while discussing the terms `classical' and `romantic' or `expressive', I often recall Wittgenstein's remarks that,

> The words we call expressions of aesthetic judgment play a very complicated role, but a very definite role, in what we call a culture of a period. . .What we now call cultured taste perhaps didn't exist in the Middle Ages. An entirely different game is played in different ages. . .What belongs to a language game is a whole culture.[44]

In the course of his historical explanation of the word `craft', Collingwood claims that this word is the most appropriate one to replace the traditional word `art'. He contends that the word `art' as it was used throughout the ages is no longer applicable in the twentieth century. That is, he contends that what is now considered to be `art' is not what was previously considered to be `art'. For him, the one significant change is that the classical idea describes "a craft or specialized form of skill"(**PA** 5) and the modern word expresses an "aesthetic sense [which] is very recent in origin".(**PA** 5) His point is that the word `art' of the classical age with its links to *techné* and related terms does not express the emotional and aesthetic component of "art, properly so-called".

Collingwood's point, which I accept for the purposes of this thesis, is that the idea of art as *techné* remained fundamentally unchanged for many centuries until the modern age. In this chapter, I plan to summarize some of the links between *areté* and *techné* and then return to Collingwood's work. I keep my account of the word *techné* simple and succinct because I wish to use this description only as an illustration of an idea and of a way of looking at things and the world, and not as an argument. To do so I will refer not only to Collingwood but also to Plato and Aristotle. My references to Plato and Aristotle are perforce cursory and should not be taken as profoundly definitive. Just as Collingwood used references to the classical period to help define craft and art, I refer to it in order to provide a context for understanding Collingwood.

Imagine sandal-makers or potters in the **Republic**.[45] These artisans know not only what sandals and pots are and what purpose they serve, but they know also how to make them. They know their intended function and they know the materials required to produce the goods. To know how to make them they must know not only the correct set of procedures for doing certain actions which direct them to finishing the product, but they know also the natures of the materials with which they work. In the case of true artisans, this knowledge is quite clear and precise: the image the

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[44]L. Wittgenstein, **Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief**, Cyril Barrett, ed. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), 8.

[45]Plato, **The Collected Dialogues of Plato**, E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, eds. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1961). The dialogues are noted in the text of my thesis.

artisans have of the sandals they make guides them as they employ procedures according to their knowledge of their materials and tools. We say that they know what they are doing because they know not only what they set out to make, but also the means of making and the means of verifying that what they do make is what they set out to make. This knowledge and action are their virtue (*areté*), that is, that which *defines* them as sandal-makers. If they fail in making what they set out to make, either they were not sandal-makers (i.e., they only appeared to be someone with knowledge) or something more powerful than they interfered with their actions.

Techné, *areté* and *telos* are interdependent ideas each of which adds scope to the others as they fit into the language, culture and basic philosophical outlook of Plato. In modern English we usually use the word `virtue' for *areté*, but in doing so certain cautions must be taken with its use; we use `end' or `goal', and occasionally `perfect' in place of *telos*; and we use `art' or `craft' and a variety of technique words for *techné*. Simply put, the relation is as follows: artisans (*technion*) are virtuous if they practice their art to achieve the end appropriate to their virtue. The sandal-makers are virtuous if they make sandals in keeping with the knowledge which they have by virtue of which they are sandal-makers. Their art is what they know relative to what they are and coordinated with what they do. This relationship is reciprocal: being, knowing, and doing are interwoven, mirror images of one another, and can be seen as aspects of the same thing, viz., the *psyché*, or soul, of the worker. I would add that these interdependencies are best understood in the context of the whole society and cultural outlook, a significant expression of which we see in Plato's **Republic**. As noted by Mitcham, there are some human actions which are not classified in this manner. "On the other hand, those human actions devoid of art, which are the nontechnical *atechnos*, are activities such as cooking and persuading -- each being a mere knack or routine way of operating, a *tribé* based simply on experience."[46]

In the **Republic** for example, if the state correctly performs its appropriate function, then it is *just*, which is its virtue/end. For my purposes, `virtue' seems to have two related meanings in the **Republic**: firstly, it is the result of ordered work (*techné*).(**Republic** 353b) Secondly, it designates the nature of the agent itself; the order of this nature determines or sets the path (*techné*) for the work. An agent's virtue seems to be its ability and power to perform a function, the nature of which is determined by the nature of that agent. Simultaneously, the virtue of the agent seems also to be the adequate realization of this ability and power in its proper work. In view of this we read in Wild, "The true craftsman does nothing at random, but imposes upon his behaviour a certain orderly arrangement, which he `has in view' from the very beginning. Thus, first of all, the true technician must know the nature of what he is about."[47] In other words, artisans must know the nature of the thing they will make and the means necessary to accomplish the making.(**Republic** 332cff.) The skilled worker (*technikon*) knows the proper order and application of the art in order to achieve the end by having a measure.(**Phaedrus** 271d-e)

The picture which most renders this acceptable is that of workers who have an image in mind of a thing which they want or are instructed to make, and who know how to make it. As they make, one envisages that they cross-check the work in progress with the clear image which they have in mind, to see that they are on the right track. They stop when the thing which they have made accords with the thing which they imagined. In other words, the craftworker has the thing in mind and the

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[46]Carl Mitcham, *Philosophy and the History of Technology*, **The History and Philosophy of Technology**, Bugliarello, George and Doner, Dean B., eds. (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1979), 173.

[47]J. Wild, **Plato's Theory of Man** (New York: Octagon Books, 1964), 47.

means wherewith to make it; as and when artisans make the thing for which they are best suited, they are virtuous as this particular *kind* of artisan.

The thing which the artisan makes is not simply *thing*. It is always *this* thing or *that* thing and so must be considered as of *this* or *that* material and of a given form. This is the case because the art and knowledge which the makers or artisans have, is knowledge of the craft and the material with which they are naturally endowed to work. Their craft is the knowledge of how to make a given product or state. The potter makes pots; the sandal maker makes sandals; the warrior protects a safe state; the philosopher orders the just state. In a straightforward sense, the action they do is simply the natural product of the artisan's virtue. Knowledge, function, and excellence are interconnected parts of a whole. In this way of thinking, classical art or knowledge exists on some account, namely, the achievement of the given end or goal. If art is to achieve its end, namely the bringing into existence of the particular thing, then knowledge must be artfully applied in accordance with the order or structure of the thing. There is a technical procedure (the application of the art) and there must be something to which the order and action are directed. Plato does suggest that art is always susceptible to a degeneration into technique (*tribé*), of which sophistry is the most famous example. In summary, as Robinson says,

> (*[T]echné*) is necessary to *areté*. In this sense, art (*techné*) is the rational control over some special phase of human life or the environment. It is by art that man subordinates external nature and his own nature so as to achieve his rational aims. . .Without art, **man** could not exist.[48]

The Aristotelian model presents the assumption that a mind may think the essence of a thing and impose this essence onto matter. As Aristotle says in the **Metaphysics**,

> . . . [A]ll other productions are called `makings'. And all makings proceed either from art or from a faculty or from thought. . .[F]rom art proceed the things of which the form is in the soul of the artist. . .Of the productions or processes one part is called thinking and the other making -- that which proceeds from the starting point and the form is thinking and that which proceeds from the final step of thinking is making. . .The active principle then and the starting point for the process. . .if it happens by art, it is that, whatever it is, which starts the making. . .Therefore, as the saying goes, it is impossible that anything should be produced if there were nothing existing before. . . Obviously some part of the result will pre-exist of necessity.[49]

That is, things which are natural things come to be as the agency of a thing's nature informs matter. For Aristotle, matter may also be given form by the action of an artisan; artisans may inform matter with a form which they have thought. "Now art is a principle of movement in something other than the thing moved, nature is a principle in the thing itself."[50] Aristotle goes on to say of art,

> Now art arises when from many notions gained by experience one universal judgment about a class of objects is produced. . .We think that *knowledge* and *understanding* belong to art rather than to experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience. . .Hence we think that master-workers in each craft are more honourable and know in a truer sense and are wiser than the manual workers, because they know the

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[48]T. M. Robinson, **Plato's Psychology** (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 46.

[49]Richard McKeon (ed.), **The Basic Works of Aristotle**, (New York: Random House, 1941). References to Aristotle's works are to sections; **Metaphysics: Book VII, Ch. 7**, 1032a, 25-1033a. "We may think of the manual workers as like certain lifeless things which act indeed, but act without knowing what they do." 981b.

[50]**Metaphysics**, Bk. XII, Ch. 3, 1070a, 7-8.

> causes of the things done. . .And therefore we think art more truly knowledge than experience is.[51]

There are four ideas which Collingwood uses from the thinking of these philosophers, namely: first, craftworkers have knowledge which conforms to an end or goal which they have in mind; second, the craftworker imposes an ideal or imaginary form onto an unstructured or primitive material; third, in some significant sense the product of the craft work is the result, consequent, or inevitable outcome of a reasoned and skilled course of action. That is, there is a form of practical necessity in the relation between outcome and forethought. Fourth, Collingwood accepts that there is an inherent hierarchy of value in the different orders of making.

I will briefly draw attention to two other categories of ideas because they will play a role in the latter half of the thesis. The first category pertains to the world view within which these ideas are posited, and the second has to do with some of the range of values implicit in these orientations. The world views within which these models find their home is one which I characterize loosely as rational-mechanical, a model within which knowledge is regarded as inherently valuable. Virtuous action is said to follow from thought, or the *psyché*, and is governed by thought. On a value scale, the value of the object of thought governs the place and value of the action and agent. For example, philosophers are honoured and revered in a way that artisans are not. Craftworkers are regarded as being incapable of certain forms of thinking, and the forms of thought which are peculiar to them are evidently on the lower end of the knowledge hierarchy, dealing only with appearances and individual things.(**Phaedrus** 248, 249c, 250c; **Republic** 614, **Phaedo** 72)

This particular philosophic stance is central to the classical model as presented in Plato's work. Particular things are deemed to have forms of reality only insofar as they are instances of the Idea of which they are an instance. Because the particular can *never* be identical with the Idea, it is judged to be inferior to it and never perfect or fully real. Things are deemed to have more reality according to the fidelity of their imitation of the Idea. Philosophers are seen as performing freer and more exalted thought and of contemplating that which is pursued for its own sake, which indicate their autonomy and independence. At the same time, one sees that artisans are bound by instructions from without, or by the constraints of either material, natural or social necessity. Further, at what I would call the `mythic' level, artisans are themselves seen as more material, more immersed in the mud of existence, and they are in some way taken to be more base because of their involvement in the world of sense and sensuous reality.

2. Collingwood

> Of the language pertinent to his discussion concerning the word `art', Collingwood asserts, These impediments, the improper meanings [of words] which distract our minds from the proper one, are of three kinds. I shall call them obsolete meanings, analogical meanings, and courtesy meanings. . .Applying this to the word `art', we find its proper meaning hedged about with well-established obsolete, analogical, and courtesy meanings. The only obsolete meaning of any importance is that which identifies art with craft.(**PA** 7-9)

In order fully to understand why Collingwood gave so much detailed thought and constructive attention to the idea of craft, one should remind oneself that his goal and purpose in **The Principles of Art** is to define art. In the process of determining the various parameters for his definition, he exposed what he would *not* include in his account in order that certain debris not be mistaken for the

[51]**Metaphysics**, 981a, 981b.

real thing. My objective in what follows is to show the extent of Collingwood's thinking on the concept of craft because it is my goal to show facets of craft which are creative.

2.1

Collingwood calls the theory of craft based on these classical ideas the "technical theory of art" where the word `art' is used improperly. It would be clearer to say that, in Section II of Book I of **The Principles**, he is describing the technical theory of craft.

> Of the six characteristics of craft he enumerates, they are not all of equal importance.
> (1) Craft always involves a distinction between means and end, each clearly conceived as something distinct from the other but related to it. . .
> (2) It involves a distinction between planning and execution. The result to be obtained is preconceived or thought out before being arrived at. . .
> (3) Means and end are related in one way in the process of planning; in the opposite way in the process of execution. . .
> (4) There is a distinction between raw material and finished product or artifact. A craft is always exercised upon something, and aims at the transformation of this into something different. . .
> (5) There is a distinction between form and matter. The matter is what is identical in the raw material and the finished product; the form is what is different, what the exercise of craft changes. . .
> (6) There is a hierarchical relation between various crafts, one supplying what another needs, one using what another provides.(**PA** 13-17)

It is generally accepted that he did not think that the characteristics which he listed were the necessary and sufficient conditions for craft.[52] I would point out, however, that the traditions within which this language falls are such that certain very influential fundamental pictures are operative which orient one's understanding. This language, some of which Collingwood discussed more fully than others, is embedded in world views that accepted that true definitions of things outline the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing's being what it was. He did accept that it was possible to give such a definition of art but appeared to be less certain with respect to craft.

As I understand his work, at least the first, the second and third characteristics are necessary conditions for craft, and the fourth and fifth are of significant value. These latter two would not be essential because of two considerations: firstly, that the purpose for which the activity is undertaken may be to produce an emotional state; and secondly, that the end product of the craft activity may be a performance of music, a poem and the like, which he does not view as being informed "matter". The fourth feature is clearly necessary for the fabrication of artifacts in his philosophy. The sixth condition seems to me to be an invariably accompanying feature of craft in Collingwood's schema, but he himself did not dwell on it.

Another way of looking at Collingwood's set of characteristics for craft is as follows: a preconceived end is achieved through planned and skilled activity. This activity may produce a preconceived thing or artifact or it may influence someone to experience a preconceived emotion. If the artifact is made in order to evoke an emotion the former alternative is reducible to the latter. His example of bridge building serves to focus an operational image. I will deal with it in order to go on to further and more contentious, difficult and obscure examples of craft.

> The engineer, as we saw, when he made his plan in his own head, may proceed to something else which we call `making his plans'. His `plans', here, are drawings and

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[52]A. Donagan, **The Later Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood** (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Fethe, *Hand and Eye*, 37-51, and Fethe, *Craft and Art*, 129 -37; note also Martland, *Art and Craft*, 231-5.

> specifications on paper, and these are artifacts made to serve a certain purpose, namely, to inform others or remind himself of the plan. The making of them is accordingly not imaginative creation; indeed, it is not creation at all. It is fabrication, and the ability to do it is a specialized form of skill, the craft of the engineer's draughtsmanship.(**PA** 134)

This example is a good place to start. The manner in which he sets up the definition and example for craft sets the tone of his subsequent arguments, and it draws a picture which entraps the mind into a certain way of thinking by virtue of which certain questions can be answered *only* in the negative. I will use this example, however, as a first way of presenting the theoretical problem linking craft to creative imagination. In the course of this summary, I occasionally indicate what I regard to be problem areas, although I present the example from Collingwood's perspective.

Engineers imagine a bridge which is to span a river that someone wants to cross. They can make a drawing of the imagined bridge by using techniques; this drawing is simply a drawn plan of that one which the engineer had "in his head"; it is a form of copying, or a representation of the thought or image. From the drawing the engineer can fabricate a maquette which shows in some detail the actual features of the bridge whose construction will be overseen. In consultation with others who have the appropriate skills and materials, engineers direct and control the construction of the bridge itself, and voilà - a bridge. The engineer is considered to be good if each of these steps is done in "the right way".[53] This example satisfies a number of the conditions drafted by Collingwood, namely, the need or desire has been satisfied by the skilled fabrication of an artifact. The various raw materials were shaped and controlled; a plan was followed; there was a series of means/ends relations governed throughout by the preconceived end; certain artifacts played a role in a hierarchy of artifacts and tools. The well-crafted bridge was put into a specific place at a specific time and spanned a specific expanse. This is no abstract bridge. I call the actual bridge an `artifact' to use Collingwood's language.

In order to make this artifact, engineers must have had specific knowledge which was necessary for its construction. At each step of the way the engineers knew what to do, when to do it, how to do it, and with what to do it, and if they did not, then they were not good engineers. In this process, each step follows the others in some obvious sense -- given the knowledge. Although there may be many diverse and complex steps to follow, and they may occur within different levels and patterns, `a' is necessary to get `b' which is necessary to get `c', and so on until the preconceived thing becomes a reality. There is, according to Collingwood, a path to follow and a right way to proceed; this right way to proceed is the one that is specified.(**PA** 28) We also are led to think that one of the features of craft is its problem-solving characteristic. The application of this set of ideas to the example of the engineer is straightforward and one grasps immediately that the engineer is an artisan or craftworker whose *areté* is bridge-building, and whose *techné* is knowing the rules of application of the complex forms of knowledge and action, and whose *métrion* is the plan which Collingwood describes.

The sandal-maker and potters of Plato's **Republic**, and modern engineers work in hierarchical systems; the former get leather from elsewhere, tools or parts of them from some other maker, the size of the foot, the shape of the sole, from elsewhere (either from a particular person, or from the

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[53]The importance of "the right way" when envisioned as part of a plan need not be the same as the "rightness" of a studio potter's decision concerning a certain pot, a stage of the firing, a given curve in a bowl. This latter is more of an affirmation that an action feels appropriate, or that *this* particular movement *makes* something right, but not as part of a preconceived plan. It may affirm a sense of balance, of integrity, of harmony which seemed not to have been there just an instant before.

way the society looks at feet; they do not invent either the idea or the pattern). The engineer is given cement, wood, steel, tools etc. all of which have been produced by someone else and based on another system of production and craftsmanship.

These workers work with and transform one or more raw materials as the basic stuff with which they work. The material does not become something else even though its form, function, and finish change significantly. Sandals are still leather, pottery is still clay and cement bases to steel bridges are still the stones, the sand, the silica, the limestone, etc. The various techniques appropriate to the specific needs are applied to materials, the finished product is the result of action applied to materials, and the product can be conceived as quite distinct from the materials considered by themselves. That is to say, although the bridge is made of cement and steel, one does not confuse it with either stones in a quarry, marl in the lake, or the process of building the bridge. As a result of craft, i.e., the application of skill to material, the object has a function and one does not confuse the function with the skill or the raw material.

In planning, artisans begin with the idea of the artifact that they wish, want, or expect to make and then they appropriate the requisite knowledge for action. Conceiving the artifact is primary. As they make the object, this process is reversed; that is, the artifact is arrived at, at the end of the process. This is the point of feature number three of Collingwood's outline. I would regard an inspection of this two-way street as vital to grasping more fully the archetypal picture Collingwood has assumed as the operating model of explanation for the *means-end* and *planning-execution* relationships. Skill is the "knowledge of the necessary means".(**PA** 28) This relation of necessity is something I discuss at length under another guise in chapters nine and ten as I explore the case study and the instances of making, doing, and creating.[54]

2.2

In order to render Collingwood's thinking about craft fuller, I will treat what Collingwood called a skill of a special kind: representational art.(**PA** 42-45, 112-13) This example is helpful because it uses an example which would *commonly* be thought to be art, viz., a portrait, but which Collingwood clearly classified as craft.

> If art proper is not any kind of craft, it cannot be representative. For representation is a matter of skill, a craft of a special kind. . .I therefore propose. . .to treat the representational theory of art as if it were a separate theory. . .A portrait, for example, is a work of representation. What the patron demands is a good likeness; and this is what the painter aims. . .at producing. . .It makes no difference, again, whether the representation is individualized or generalized.(**PA** 42)

The image which the artisan holds as a model or plan, according to which an artifact is made, is like the representational portrait; as the painting is like the real subject, so the final artifact is like the artisan's image. Each *reproduces* what has been previously seen, imagined, or apprehended.

Collingwood held that representation is either literal, selective, or emotional. He maintained that for representation, craft fabricates an artifact which resembles a model, and this is literal representation, or craft creates an artifact which evokes a specific emotion, and this is emotional representation. Both may be selective insofar as the maker chooses from what was known in advance.

A portrait painter who faithfully portrays a sitting model uses the appropriate techniques to satisfy the demands of the situation. Collingwood assumes that the objective in representational art is to reproduce a likeness of the original. This is paradigmatic literal artistic representation and

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[54]Note also my article, *Collingwood, Craft and Creativity*, presented to **A Centenary Conference on The Thought of R.G. Collingwood**, October 20-22, 1989, Trent University, Peterborough, Canada.

requires considerable skill. The landscape painter, who illustrates a sweet and gentle pastoral scene in order to show the emotion he or she experienced in seeing this scene, or to induce others to experience a similar emotion, presents a case of emotional representation.

Let me illustrate with a simple example. Imagine that we have before us a painting called `The Master of the House'. This painting is a good likeness of the Master. Everyone who sees it recognizes him. The painting is an example of representative art. In fact, this type of straightforward visual similarity is often used as the basis for discussions about art. The painting is a picture of the Master: what one sees in the Master, one sees in the painting. The painting corresponds to the real thing. This red in the painting is (corresponds to) that red in his hair.

The type of representation which Plato indicates the painter can master generally serves as a model for copying, imitating, and representing and superficially conforms to Collingwood's point of view about representation. The core of Plato's thought asserts that painters can imitate only the visual appearance of an object because they have no knowledge of the object's Form. This is a model of representation as imitation.[55] The basic assumption about literal representation is that the painting is excellent by virtue of the correspondence of detail and item in the painting with item and detail in the Master himself. A representational painting is taken as good or excellent if the reproduction in the painting is exact.

In this discussion the tacit assumption is that there is an essential nature to representation, namely, similitude between model and artifact. The artifact is a representation of its model if it replicates the model in some way. The engineer's drawing represents the plan he has in his head; the drawing serves as a type of criterion for skilled action and the drawing bears a schematic relationship to the finished thing. It is a two-way representational object.[56]

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[55]A contemporary example is found in the naturalist work of Bateman. Robert Bateman, "Bateman on Bateman", **Equinox**, 24, November/December 1985, 46.

[56]The whole web of questions concerning the nature of art as imitation, copying, replicating, representing, informing, and the like is much too complex to enter in this thesis. I do make frequent reference to the idea that classical art appears to take the form of replicating or copying of a previously known model or reality. Later in the thesis, as I distinguish between a spectator and an agent in the process of creative making, I will also draw attention to the activities of an apprentice. In part, I do so to show where in all of these considerations the point about copying or imitating *does* have its place.

From my perspective, one understands contentious distinctions by placing them into a concrete situation and working from that context to other contexts until the fabric of understanding can no longer be contained by what is being said. In the industrial context, such a point is made by Donald Schon in **Invention and The Evolution of Ideas** (London: Tavistock Publication, 1963). This work was originally published by Tavistock in 1963 as **Displacement of Concepts**.

On a more convoluted note, one could consider the following illustration of difficulties concerning the notion of copying. Jefferson David Chalfant's painting, *Which Is Which?*, poses this question in an interesting fashion. The canvas on which the artist painted had a small item attached to the canvas; this item was a stamp. The painting on the canvas is a painting of the stamp which is attached to the canvas. One might say that the painting and the stamp of which the painting is a painting, are beside one another (i.e., without wondering whether the *whole* work of art is not actually *whatever* is on the canvas). The painting is an (almost) indistinguishable copy of the stamp. The stamp itself is a copy, or duplicate from the metallic plate, which itself was an etched copy of a photo-reduced copy of an original painting which itself was a painting of a person. The person had at one time been alive and well. M.L. d'Oronge Matsai, **Illusion and Art: Trompe l'Oeil: History or Pictorial Illusionism** (New York: Abaris Books, 1975).

2.3

Using the six features of craft he outlined in **The Principles**,(**PA** 42) Collingwood categorized painting, sculpture, pottery, music, literature, film, industrial production, colour, sound, forms and many other things as craft. One asks often, "Does he actually mean to do this?" In the next few pages, I outline some of the various activities and things which he designates as `craft' and indicate why he did so. As well as activities and things, he included within the concept of craft what I would call `postures' towards things and activities. I will outline some of these postures as well because it is often the case with Collingwood that the difference between something's being considered craft, rather than art, is reduced to the emotion-knowledge orientation of how it is approached, ordered, classified, valued, or used. Any questions concerning the appropriateness of these applications should await further study later in the dissertation.

> Which of them is the music? The answer is already implied in what we have already said: the music, the work of art, is not the collection of noises, it is the tune in the composer's head.(**PA** 139)
>
> Music does not consist of heard noises, paintings do not consist of seen colours, and so forth. Of what, then, do they consist? Not, clearly, of a `form', understood as pattern or a system of relations between various noises we hear or the various colours we see. Such `forms' are nothing but the perceived structures of bodily `works of art', that is to say, `works of art' falsely so called. . .The distinction between form and matter, on which [these formalist theories of art] are based, is a distinction belonging to the philosophy of craft, and not applicable to the philosophy of art.(**PA** 141-2)

It is usually with reference to this quotation that objections are rallied against the idealism so evident in Collingwood's theory of art. Statements like those just quoted above focus on one of the philosophically weakest points in Collingwood's theory of art. I do not want simply to jettison this idealism as so much flotsam, however, without trying to elucidate some of its strengths. In general, I take its main strength to be that it focused intellectual attention on the role of consciousness in the creative process. It also provides a station from which to embark on an investigation of the role of intention in art and craft. Making frequent references to Croce helps to clarify certain obvious interpretations of Collingwood's thinking in this regard.[57] I think the central idea which he picked up from the idealist tradition is that of the "immediately sensuous", and it is only in light of this tradition that a somewhat sympathetic understanding of his work may be forged. Underlying the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, and thereafter anyone governed by the idealist movement, is the notion of "immediacy of sensation" or the "intuition of sense". These phrases are designed to communicate the idea that consciousness is passive with respect to the sensory aspect of human life. That is, that human beings are aware of feeling and sensation but do not themselves create or originate it. Feeling or sense is a given, and as such, is arational, i.e., not deducible or inferable from another idea.

Collingwood accepted that all intellectual or conceptual knowledge rested on, and was logically preceded by, intuitions or "feeling". He further accepted that art was the emotional aspect of the activity of consciousness imagining, ordering, capturing, or ideating this feeling. The activity called `art' was somehow subsumed in all further thought and knowledge but was itself non-

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Note also Daniel Albright, **Representation and the Imagination** (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), for a broad perspective on this type of problem.

[57]Merle Elliot Brown, **Neo-Idealist Aesthetics: Croce-Gentile-Collingwood** (Detroit: Wayne State University, 1966); A. Donagan, *The Croce-Collingwood Theory of Art*, **Philosophy**, vol. xxxiii, April 1958, 162-7; Angelo A. De Gennaro, *Croce and Collingwood*, **Personalist**, vol. xlvi, April 1965, 193-202, etc.

conceptual and non-truth functional. On the other hand, Collingwood was not a man simply prone to dismissing the vast and eclectic history of art as "external [and which] is no longer a work of art".[58] Unlike Croce, he contended that physical works of art could come into existence as the "conscious bodily expression" of imagination.(**PA** 235ff.) One of the particularly obscure aspects of Collingwood's theory of expression is the role of this "bodily expression", and I deal with it in my review of his concept of art in chapters three and five. However incomplete and muddled it is, it manifests his recognition that forms of idealism and certain phenomenological accounts were not in themselves adequate acknowledgements that human life is lived in concrete places at concrete times by human beings, and not only as "consciousness", or as disembodied awareness centres, or monads.

This implicit recognition is stated in another and clearer form by Tilghman when he says, "What can be salvaged from the requirement that aesthetics be derived from metaphysics is the reminder that works of art can, and I believe must, have connections with other aspects of life and the world."[59] Collingwood effectively overrides Croce by having expression signify a movement out of one phase of awareness to another; he circumvents the trap of intentionality by affirming that art is not an idea of something, existing or non-existent, but rather it is the expression of emotion as consciousness formulates images of sense experience, therein creating the base to knowledge. Collingwood was concerned to distinguish creative and imaginative activity from repetitive, mindless, and derivative activity. With this interest in mind he placed an unbridgeable abyss between art and craft.[60] It is, however, in light of these fairly extreme views that one must probe what it is that Collingwood's theory of craft purports to claim, on both the negative and positive sides.

"A building or a cup, which is primarily an artifact or product of craft, may also be a work of art; but what makes it a work of art is different from what makes it an artifact."(**PA** 43) What makes *it* a product of craft is the type of conscious activity by which the making of it is classified. Insofar as the object is treated as a thing in the real world, as something assembled from materials that were at hand, as a product functioning as part of a sequence of purposeful thought, as an article having an assigned function, or as a means to some other event or artifact, this item is called an `artifact', i.e., the *product* of craft. Music, therefore, is craft if one recognizes that the sounds one hears are made as the result of the skilled playing of a score under the direction of a conductor, i.e., if the musicians *reproduce* what the composer had created. And from the orientation of spectators, the music is considered to be craft if the spectator were to approach music *knowing* what to expect. But even acknowledging some differences with Croce for example, Collingwood still took the distinguishing feature of a thing to be the state or type of consciousness identified with the making of that thing.

There are two ways in which craft could be "means": firstly, as practiced *skill*, craft produces artifacts which themselves are judged to be works of art. This is noted in Collingwood's remarks concerning all great works of art.(**PA** 27) Secondly, craft may be the *object* which presents a spectator with the opportunity to express emotion.(**PA** 300-24) Skill and technique are seen as necessary for the production of "great works of art", but they are not sufficient to make them. For the latter, any particular art object in the world may be the occasion for a particular expression of aesthetic emotion for any particular person. The object is necessary for this experience because it

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[58]Croce, **Aesthetics**, 50-51.

[59]Tilghman, **But Is It Art?**, 17-8.

[60]Francis Sparshott, **The Theory of The Arts** (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), 515, hereafter designated TA.

engendered it, but the object would not be taken as sufficient to the aesthetic experience because only the consciousness of the individual could be so.

As an aside, it should be noted that Collingwood was unable to render certain of his thoughts about craft and art compatible even though there were indicators that he was aware of certain difficulties. The place of craft in what he called "conscious bodily action" is virtually unexplored.(**PA** 292-6) I will survey the case of studio pottery to examine some of this territory. It may be that he was too preoccupied by his conceptual analysis and by the depth of his distinction to explore the intertwining of these concepts, or to offer a phenomenological account of this activity the way he did for his theory of perception. He makes occasional reference to such interlocking of activities but does not pursue them at length.(**PA** 228-34, 292-9, 302-5, 307)

It would be helpful in all of this to keep a distinction in mind: there are products which are craft and there are processes which are craft. This distinction is more fully examined in chapter eight. Things and performances are craft insofar as they *exemplify* the characteristics of craft noted above in section 2.1, or insofar as they are the *result* of actions which conform to these conditions. The exemplification approach shows the phenomenological aspect of Collingwood's thinking; the craft product is characterized by an intentional pattern of thought and not by other products, social roles or other diverse functions it might fulfil or perform. The product is taken to be the *result* of the process which exemplifies the thought. The craft process is the activity which brings about or produces the thing or the performance; it begins *after creative imagination* and concludes with production. Process, product, performance are all called `craft'.

Craft is also "means" when considered as the process for the achievement of the product. Craft may also be considered to be the product itself simply considered as the result of the activity called `craft'. This is the case because the product exemplifies the process of making, or because it is seen as the result of this type of process. If one were to ask the question "How did this bowl come to be what it is?" and the answer dealt with the type of clay, descriptions of throwing techniques, the following of a prototype, firing manners, glaze technology, etc., then this type of answer shows the manner in which the object is appropriately handled -- as the result of skill. In the course of extolling the virtues of such a bowl, if one were to note the difficulty the potter must have had in making it, in controlling the endlessly variable conditions of production, or in achieving such precise line etc., then this discourse about the object reveals that the object is seen as the outcome of a sequential procedure of deliberate actions. The product is called `craft' because it instantiates the characteristics of the process.

2.4

"Making an artifact, or acting according to craft, thus consists of two stages. (1) Making a plan, which is creating. (2) Imposing that plan on a certain matter, which is fabricating."(**PA** 134) This quotation points to the fact that for Collingwood there certainly *may* be a creative element in the *whole* process of making, if one accepts that the first step in the process is that "act" of imagining the bridge. This step creates the image upon which the enactment of all the other steps must rest, and he argues that there could be *no* knowledge which is necessary to this step. Indeed, given his statement concerning the order of perception and intellection, and their places in consciousness, he could think nothing else. This initiating step is *not* craft for which there could be the appropriate or corresponding skill of technique. Beardsley outlines a similar structure to the process of making and creating art. For example, he says,

> Though there are no universal *stages* of the creative process, there are two clearly marked *phases*, which constantly alternate throughout. They involve the interplay between conscious and preconscious activities. There is the *inventive* phase, traditionally called *inspiration*, in which new ideas are formed in the preconscious and appear in

> consciousness. And then there is the *selective* phase, which is nothing more than criticism in which the consciousness chooses or rejects the new idea after perceiving its relationships to what has already tentatively been adopted.[61]

In this world picture, craft is the post-imaginative, post-creative mode of consciousness, the production of which enacts a given course of action to fulfil a predetermined purpose. This inspiration/selection or design/fabrication distinction relegates quite clearly the activity of the craftsperson to repetition. This shall play an important role later in my work as I return to the relations of terms like `craft designer', `studio potter', `humanist artist', `artist-craftsperson', etc. In the present context, suffice it to say that Collingwood placed the activity of design as an artistic rather than craft activity, and he allowed that craft was simply the activity of implementing the design as a given.

This chapter has summarized a concrete slant on the notion of craft, as rooted in the classical philosophies of Plato and Aristotle; it has outlined in some detail Collingwood's theory of craft and given a number of illustrations from **The Principles of Art** to give more detailed meaning to the language about craft. In the next chapter, I shall undertake a similar analysis for Collingwood's notion of art as the expression of emotion.

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[61]Monroe Beardsley, *On the Creation of Art* in Albert Rothenberg and Carl Haussman, eds., **The Creativity Question** (Durham: Duke University Press, 1976), 308-9.

Chapter Three

In this chapter I am going to profile the dominant features of Collingwood's notion of art. To do so, I touch briefly on his early work in **Speculum Mentis** and the **Essays** because certain parameters are established in these works which direct his later thinking. My primary objective is positively to articulate the scope and meaning of the phrase "art is the expression of emotion" in Collingwood's theory. In doing so, I shall refer to other notions of expression than just his. Overall, however, I shall use his work as typical of thinking relative to expressive theories. My secondary objective is to use this account to explain how he viewed a variety of terms which I shall later use in conjunction with my concept of craft, viz. `imagination', `creativity', `beauty', `immediacy', `expression' and the like. Collingwood restricted the use of these terms to the activity of consciousness which he called `artistic consciousness'. His use of this language epitomizes the romantic or expressive orientation in aesthetics. As I develop my own theory of creative craft, I shall have recourse to this language as well, but shall delineate my own use at that time.

1. Collingwood and Aesthetic Art

In **Speculum Mentis**, Collingwood established a general doctrine of concept definition which helps one to understand some of what is going on in **The Principles**. He says

> To define a philosophical concept, therefore, it is necessary first to think of that concept as specifying itself in a form so rudimentary that anything else would fail to embody the concept at all. This will be the minimum specification of the concept, the lower end of the scale. . .later phases will modify this minimum definition by adding new determinations, each implied in what went before.(**SM** 101)

In what follows I shall scout throughout the various "specifications" of Collingwood's concept of art before exploring weaknesses and limits of it relative to a concept of creative craft.

In popular language, art most assuredly does express emotion, and Collingwood makes reference to this fact as one of his starting points.(**PA** 105) In general, we might say that Collingwood kept the following ideas from his immediate philosophic predecessors: art is an autonomous, non-purposive and inherently valuable human activity generated by consciousness from within immediately sensuous experience; and it is expressed from the immediacy of sense into consciousness as the emotional charge on an idea. He contends as well that "bodily" works of art *are* art if they are produced by bodily actions which are the "counterparts" to the activities of imagination.

In what follows I shall restate certain themes from Collingwood's position and illustrate ways of looking at them. My primary focus is **The Principles**. The themes are that art is a form of consciousness; that art is the expression of emotion; that there is an object of art, properly so-called; that art is language; and that there is a phenomenon called art as conscious bodily expression.

By now outlining his early thought that art is a form of consciousness, I shall show in what artistic consciousness is said to consist, and in what way this clarifies the relations of expression, immediacy and imagination, for example. Secondly, by presenting his account of the building blocks of thought and their relation to feeling, the specific meaning of the locution `expression of emotion' becomes clearer relative to his notion of consciousness. In this context, I refer also to the sense of moral imperative which seems inherent in his idea of expression, and I address briefly the

place of the corrupt consciousness as the *radix malorum*.(**PA** 217-19, 282-5) Thirdly , I give a brief explanation of his belief that art is language, and relate this to the ideas of expression, immediacy, pure activity, and structure. Fourthly, I offer a brief explanation of his notion of conscious bodily expression and indicate its place in the theory. The fourth part of this description shows one of the weak elements of Collingwood's aesthetics, albeit one richer in possibilities than other aspects of his theory, and I shall return to it in chapters five, eight and ten because I regard the place of bodily action as central to all making. I think that he could not explain the complexity of bodily action because he used forms of knowledge and consciousness as his only valid models of explanation, whereas I propose as part of my thinking that bodily action relative to a *person's life* and *human projects* is centrally important if one wants to understand creative yet traditional making.

2. Art as a Form of Consciousness

Although many of the details of his later work on the philosophy of art changed relative to his early work, I find it useful to get a sense of Collingwood's early position. This is so for two reasons. The first is that the concept `expression' gets its background meaning by resting on his ideas about the activity and nature of consciousness. Secondly, one can glean the basic structure of his position from this work. The various features or characteristics of art, like creativity, originality, uniqueness, imaginativeness, etc., get their primary meaning from his early work, and are only more fully expressed in the later work.

What does it mean to say that art is a form of consciousness? In **Speculum Mentis**, Collingwood proposed that consciousness had five fundamental aspects. These aspects outlined what he called the "map of knowledge". They were "art", "religion", "science", "history" and "philosophy". Knowledge is said to be constituted by these stances of consciousness, and each has its place as a moment in the development of consciousness into full self-consciousness. He contended that each of these facets could be considered either as a state of consciousness per se, or as states of consciousness from the point of view of another consciousness, i.e., self-reflective consciousness. That is, in analyzing any given aspect of consciousness, one may consider how its world or structure is constituted for *that* form of consciousness itself, or as it appears to another form of consciousness. Consciousness is the awareness of coming to know, and of knowing. So to speak, one may consider modes of knowledge from an internal to the mode point of view, or from an external to the mode point of view.

Grosso modo, he held that the most elemental form of consciousness was the artistic and that the most self-reflective or self-conscious was the philosophic. He did contend that there was an inner dialectic which led consciousness through its various moments from bare feeling to self-reflective knowledge, and that each moment which was surpassed or overcome was subsumed and retained within the developing moment of consciousness. This activity *as* dialectic presupposes a state *which is experienced* but of which consciousness is not aware. The structure or logic of this dialectic presupposes a state *of which a concept cannot be formed*. The basic thrust of Hegel's phenomenological work is clearly evident, and in some sense elements of Hegel's work may frequently be found throughout Collingwood's later work as well.

Pure imagination is the minimum specification of his concept "art". Art is the minimum specification of his concept "knowledge".

Pure imagination is the conscious activity of forming an image or images without any consideration with respect to the truth of the images. Pure imagination is that activity of consciousness which deals with and is confronted by the immediacy of feeling, which is the sensuously given of experience. Collingwood follows the tradition begun with Locke, Berkeley and

Hume, rendered clear by Kant and put into an idealist form by Hegel, namely, that knowledge is based in experience of a sensuously given, and is constituted by the order of the mind and the activity of consciousness. For Collingwood, the image is the elemental form of the given *as conditioned by consciousness*. The question, "Of what is the image an image?" is a meaningless and non-directed question. It is meaningless because the structure built into the question presupposes that one could have *knowledge* of feeling or sensation *other than* the image, whereas Collingwood's point is that the image is itself the first act of knowing. It is the creation of knowledge by conscious attention to feeling. An image is consciousness of a sensuous whole, the form and content of which are interwoven such that the artistic consciousness does not separate them.[62] A complex of images may also be taken as a whole by artistic consciousness.[63]

> Collingwood clearly asserts that
>
> A work of art, like any work of the spirit, must be a complete and coherent whole. . .that is. . .as being imagined as a whole. . .The world of the imagination is a private world, inhabited solely by its author. His entire consciousness is simply awareness of the work of art which he is creating. Art, then, is pure imagination. The artist does not judge or assert. . .he simply imagines. . .The artist never transcribes facts `as they are'. He only transcribes them `as he sees them', and whenever the artist says see he means imagine. (**SM** 61-5)

And he goes on to say artistic consciousness is "a windowless monad".(**SM** 72) In artistic consciousness "[i]ntuition and thought are inseparable, being only the immediacy (actuality, positiveness) and mediation (reflection upon itself) of art experience." (**SM** 85) As an activity, artistic consciousness is the creative edge of knowledge, the bringing into thought of immediately sensuous experience. Throughout the **Essays** and **Speculum Mentis**, he characterizes art as the structure of a mode of consciousness *and* as the experience within that mode. And he goes on to posit that the artist is the person who typifies the artistic consciousness. One can glean part of what he takes imagination to be by certain references to artists themselves. They have no regard for truth, they take the world to be what they see or imagine. Artistic consciousness creates only from a feeling and not from understanding. Following Hegel's lead, Collingwood says that the *meaning* of the conscious imaginative experience is never *thought* by artistic consciousness per se; it is only *felt*. Only a form of consciousness which forms relations of ideas and makes judgments can think about what occurs in any form of knowing or consciousness, and pure imagination does not form relations of ideas.

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[62]There is an interesting point here that I will not pursue. The state or mode of consciousness does not separate form and content because they are not separate, i.e., the separation is an intellectual mode of operation. Later in my thesis I occasionally emphasize problems which arise from taking an abstract stance with respect to a subject. One of my criticisms of the work which Collingwood did in **Speculum Mentis** rests on this issue. There is a certain incoherence simply in talking about content and form with respect to artistic consciousness.

[63]This applies equally to beauty, a notion to which I shall return shortly. "Art, then, is pure imagination. The artist does not judge or assert. . .he simply imagines. . .The artist never transcribes facts `as they are'. He only transcribes them `as he sees them', and whenever the artist says see he means imagine."(**SM** 61) The work which the artist does by painting etc., is the form and structure giving activity; this structure gives the immediacy of pure imagination its `meaning'. A concrete work of art is one in which the classical and the romantic are unified.(**SM** 85) Pure imagination is abstract intuition and pure form or technique is abstract conception, and if either of them is taken as being `art' itself in the concrete, there is a fundamental error.(**SM** 101-02)

Unlike Croce, however, Collingwood does not restrict artistic consciousness to a non-assertive mode. For Collingwood, artistic consciousness, the artist, does things and performs actions, i.e., it asserts itself. Philosophically, this is what I take to be Collingwood's contribution to the expressive theory of art: namely, art is not entirely within itself and completely isolated, but it posits and affirms. This contribution I also take to be a weak link is his chain of dialectical reasoning. By positing assertion as an aspect of artistic consciousness, he tacitly acknowledges that art objects have an existence other than solely a *purely* imaginary one, but once he had done this, he was unable to make a significant connection to the bodily work of art.

Art is the creative edge of knowledge for Collingwood; it creates images from within feeling and these images are the whole of its world. In his early work, *beauty* is a fundamental motive force of the dialectic within this primal mode of consciousness. In the earlier work, he argued that within artistic consciousness itself beauty is felt by the artist and the consciousness of this feeling moved the artist to act. The philosopher who thinks about the various modes of consciousness is aware that beauty is the inner motive force for the artist.(**SM** 65-6) Images which the artist creates from feeling, one comes to know later, are the basic building blocks or elements of all knowledge.[64] It is often against this very dense characterization of artistic activity that I present my arguments.

3. Art as the Expression of Emotion

> When a man is said to express an emotion. . .All he is conscious of is a perturbation or excitement. . .of whose nature he is ignorant. [A]ll he can say about his emotion is : `I feel. . . I don't know what I feel.' From this helpless and oppressed condition he extricates himself by doing something which we call expressing himself. This activity has something to do with the thing we call language. . .It also has something to do with consciousness. . .It also has something to do with the way in which he feels the emotion. (**PA** 109-10)

Two significant changes occur in Collingwood's thought concerning art between his writing of **Speculum Mentis** and **The Essays**, and that of **The Principles**. Firstly, beauty is no longer treated as a motive force for art from either the artist's or the philosopher's point of view, nor is it a feature of the work of art. Secondly, while artistic consciousness is still the activity whereby knowledge is created in its most primitive form, the word `art' has the more restricted meaning of `the emotional side to all knowledge'.

The sequence of thought which Collingwood articulates in **The Principles** begins with what he sets out to negate. He proceeds from the denial of what he takes to be a commonly held view about art, and he then lays the ground upon which he hopes to build his positive thoughts on the modern concept of art. Expression of emotion is *not* arousal, not evocation, not reproduction, and not selection of emotion. He points out that if an emotion were selected, then it would have to have been chosen from a slate of many that were already known; reproduction is very similar because the artist would aim to bring a known specific emotion into existence, i.e., to reproduce it in someone; evocation of emotion on the other hand, would be the bringing into feeling of a certain type of emotion which people would already have experienced at one time or another, i.e., it calls back an emotion; and arousal of an emotion is the producing of a given emotion in someone by a set of actions and techniques. All these instances portray one significant trait by virtue of which Collingwood classifies them not as art but rather as craft, namely, that the emotion under consideration would already have been known and a preconceived set of actions undertaken in order

[64]Note also Bertram Morris, **The Aesthetic Process** (New York: AMS Press, 1943), 31-51.

to bring about some state. He distinguishes his view from what he considered to be a *commonly* held view of expression, namely, that artists know what feelings they want to express, and that their main task is opting for the proper means by which to do it. Collingwood's whole point is that `expression' in the true sense of the word, could not possibly entail foreknowledge because it *is the very process of discovering the emotion itself*.

For spectators of the arts, the presence of a painting etc., may engender aesthetic experience in them. A person looking at, touching, or hearing bodily works of art may come to know what the feelings are that were experienced. In Collingwood's language, the person could become conscious of the feelings which were expressed in the bodily work of art by *experiencing and imagining* the same emotions as the artist. He states that the artist and the spectator not only imagine the same feeling, but also that the spectator therein is an artist. His central point is not whether one could ever prove that the feelings were identical, but rather that the bodily work of art is *called* a work of art because the spectator expresses emotion in the same way that the artist does. In each case, however, it is the conscious expression which is *the* work of art.(**PA** 300-08)

> The aesthetic experience, or artistic activity, is the experience of expressing one's emotions; and that which expresses them is the total imaginative activity called indifferently language or art. This is art proper. . .Every genuine expression must be an original one.(**PA** 275)

To clarify what Collingwood thought about the structure of the conscious activity called `expression', I will summarize part of his theory of perception. My interest is not to deal with "sensa" and the content aspect of perception but only with the emotional aspect. "Of all the features which our experience presents when we reflect upon it, none is more familiar than the contrast between thinking and feeling." (**PA** 157) Collingwood follows a lengthy tradition of thinkers who have accepted that this distinction is a deep one; one that may reflect either different kinds of knowledge or processes of knowing, or different orders of thought, or of different realities. For Collingwood, feeling precedes and underpins thought in a fundamental, epistemological and logical sense. It provides the content -- sensation -- which allows thought to have the concrete meaning which the intellect gives it. As well as providing the ground upon which intellectual activity may rest, feeling presents the human mind with the reality of emotion, or affectation.

For Collingwood, aesthetic emotion is the emotional charge on sensation.[65] It is indeed a long way from this term `charge' to an explanation concerning art and what people usually think of as art objects, viz., paintings, pottery and poems. To pinpoint the meaning of the word `charge', he says

> First, we say that hot and cold, hard and soft, are things that we feel. . .[W]e describe the specialized activities of thus `feeling' colours, sounds, scents, and the like collectively as the senses, and the common activity which is specialized into them as **sensation**.
> Secondly, we speak of feeling pleasure or pain, anger, fear, and so forth. Here we also have a general activity of feeling specialized into various kinds, each with its proper specification of what we feel. It is not, quite clearly, of quite the same kind as sensation; to distinguish it, let us call it **emotion**.
> These two elements, sensuous and emotional, are not merely combined in the experience: they are combined according to a definite structural pattern. This pattern can be described by saying that the sensation takes precedence of the emotion. . .I shall refer to this precedence of sensation over emotion by describing the given emotion as the `emotional charge' on the corresponding sensation; or, since it is desirable to distinguish

[65]Although one should also direct attention to the emotions of the intellect, he does not openly discuss in what manner the terms `emotion' and `imagination' relate to the intellect as well as to sensation or feeling.

> the act of feeling from what we feel, and confine the term sensation to the act of feeling, the corresponding sensum.(**PA** 160-61)[66]

By depicting feeling as being analyzable in this fashion, Collingwood stays in the tradition of philosophers like Descartes, Spinoza, and Nietzsche who contended that knowledge is affective, or that all knowledge has an emotional face. This element is the way the human mind is affected by the acquisition of knowledge of any order. Collingwood bases his theory of expression on this premise.[67] As he indicated in **Speculum Mentis**, art is the creative edge of consciousness and "really no more than the aesthetic side of all knowledge".(**SM** 260-1)

The field of feeling to which consciousness attends is delimited by the act of attention, and this delimiting stabilizes an emotionally charged image, or idea. Feeling is focused in imagination as idea, and this imaginative act is expression. What was bare feeling and a perturbation is rendered concrete and stable; it is articulated and enunciated as emotionally charged idea. He summarizes by saying,

> We have, in effect, distinguished three stages in the life of a feeling. (1) First, as bare feeling, below the level of consciousness. (2) Secondly, as a feeling of which we have become conscious. (3) Thirdly, as a feeling, which, in addition to becoming conscious of it we have placed in its relation to others. . .Their essential relation is not temporal but logical.(**PA** 213)

The primary mode of experience is feeling; the primary conscious mode of experience is imagination; the primary conscious reasoning and judging mode of experience is intellect. All conscious activity has an emotional charge, that is, the mind is emotionally affected by the creation, acquisition, or use of knowledge.

In order to clarify my thoughts concerning the need for there to be an aesthetic object, a brief excursion is necessary into Collingwood's theory of perception and into the meaning of his phrase "object of art, properly so-called". Theories of perception play important roles in many aesthetic theories. The reasons for this seem to be twofold: one historical and the other mythic. The language of aesthetics itself was originally based in seventeenth century attempts to develop a perceptual counterpart to logic for thought. Just as the study of thought was exemplified by logic, so it was reasoned there must be a logic to sensation, and the study of perception would reveal this order. This logic was the order and account called `aesthetic'. By calling a reason `mythic', I mean that an explanation embodies a certain worldview, and an overall pattern by which thoughts and things are fundamentally understood. The assumption that there must be an aesthetic object for there to be knowledge, rests on the belief that acts of cognition *have* objects which are known in the act. This belief accepts that when there is knowledge, there is a *something* known. I think that this creed rests on the classical model of the world and has carried over into Collingwood's thinking as into most people's.

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[66]Two directions of thought should be noted here: first, knowledge is based on the building block model for Collingwood, in which the "image" is the element, and the activity of the intellect the bonding and building mortar; secondly, the word `image' appears to refer to a unit, and philosophically Collingwood was forced to think so because the mind does not acquire knowledge of the undefined or the ill-defined. It has knowledge of something and this is always at least "one" or a "whole". The dialectic led Collingwood to this point. If the mind attends to an aspect or segment of the field of feeling, the "segment" is one, and circumscribed. If it were not, what is known or "attended to" could not be known. This is typical of the Hegelian approach to dialectical reasoning.

[67]He also places the concept art as an aspect of his theory of knowledge. In this context, art is a form of knowledge, and intimately bound to the acquisition of knowledge.

For Collingwood, art is that experience of coming to know the emotional charge on the imaginative action of the human mind. One wonders what this has to do with paintings, pots and architecture which I do not normally consider to be experiences in the mind. In recounting his philosophy of art, Collingwood has identified the "object of art, properly so-called" and "aesthetic experience" with the "expression of emotion". This three-way identity is in great part what has provided so much deeply rooted criticism of his philosophy of art. To this I shall return in chapter five.

4. Art as Language

> His summary of the idea that art is language rests on his pronouncement that
> Bodily actions expressing certain emotions, insofar as they come under our control and are conceived by us, in our awareness of controlling them, as our way of expressing emotion, are language. The word `language' is here used not in its narrow and etymologically proper sense to denote activities of vocal organs, but in a wider sense in which it includes any activity of any organ which is expressive in the same way in which speech is expressive. In this wide sense, language is simply bodily expression, dominated by thought in its primitive form as consciousness.(**PA** 235)

Insofar as Collingwood thinks language is a pure activity, it is imaginative and expressive.(**PA** 275) As an integral aspect of consciousness, it seems to be the structuring or ordering mode of consciousness. Following once again in Hegel's steps, he asserts that language is the form which thought takes as the mind deals with the immediacy of feeling; as such, it is the rudimentary form of what is called the `concept', or meaning in experience. This places language at a deeper level of human life than words; language is an outer expression of thought and integral to the very functioning of consciousness at all.

The one caveat for Collingwood appears to be that language is that mode of expression in *bodily form*. For him, the activity of language is the source of sounds, sentences etc., which are the common or public domain of language. As expressive, language is not the sound and the words, but the conscious activity which gives rise to the sound and words.(**PA** 228) Insofar as language is expressive, it reveals features of its state (i.e., imaginative): it is a simple mode of action, and thereby non-symbolic, non-intellectual and non-relation forming.

> Language comes into existence with imagination, as a feature of experience at the conscious level. It is here that it receives its original characteristics, which it never altogether loses, however much it is modified in adapting itself to the requirements of the intellect.(**PA** 225)

In this form, language simply expresses emotion. But just as the intellectual activity of the mind forms relations of images provided by the activity of the imagination, so the intellect works with language to form the intellectual judgments into language. He does contend that although language may be used in different contexts to present intellectual judgments, it never actually loses its emotion-carrying or expressive nature.(**PA** 225) In language which is highly intellectualized, a distance from emotion is approached which he calls `symbolic', i.e., a manner in which the various terms used have a meaning and use to which all interested parties have agreed by some convention.

In order to get a sense of the role of language for him, one must bring certain distinctions to light. His example of "hattiaw!"(**PA** 225-51) does this for him. Children experience certain feelings to which they have automatic reactions, most or many of which never enter the realm of consciousness. These, Collingwood calls psychic expressions and they are the basic glandular and muscular reactions to feelings, most of which are so fleeting as to be almost not present at all.(**PA** 236) "Every kind and shade of emotion which occurs at the purely psychic level of experience has

its counterpart in some change of the muscular or circulatory or glandular system."(**PA** 230) As people become conscious of certain feelings, the tone or flavour of the expression is slightly different than previously. "The second cry is still a mere cry; it is not yet speech; but it is language."(**PA** 236) Although very unsophisticated, the physical or bodily expression of a feeling which is *identified*, is significantly richer and deeper than the psychic. The diversity and astronomical complexity of language is due to the dynamic and creative activity of consciousness in its unending attention to the wealth of human feeling. "Every kind of language is in this way a specialized form of bodily gesture, and in this sense it may be said that the dance is the mother of all languages."(**PA** 243-4)

In this context, language is not only speech and the written word. It is also that activity of structuring feeling into imagination. Language is the primitive form of imaginative expression in the body. From this point, it is not a long step for him to the idea that art is language. It is so on two accounts, namely, as the structuring mode of consciousness, it identifies and freezes the flux of feeling as image; and secondly, as conscious complex bodily expressive action, it gives rise to paintings, pots, and poems.

5. Art as Bodily Expression

I think that one of the more insightful and provocative notions that Collingwood articulated is the notion of *bodily* expression. I will deal with this point in the later chapters of my thesis. I think that one of the reasons he did not pursue this opinion further was that the dominant thrust of **The Principles** rested on the distinction between craft and art. My interest in the notion of bodily expression, however, suggests that there could be not only an overlap of craft and art, but a form of blending and fusion of them. Further to this, if one were to do a phenomenological account of this form of making, the place of the necessary but not sufficient relation of craft and art may disappear, and this thought was not a viable option in **The Principles**.

> All the different kinds of language have a relation of this kind to bodily gesture. The art of painting is intimately bound up with the expressiveness of the gestures made by the hand in drawing, and of the imaginary gestures through which a spectator of a painting appreciates its `tactile values'. (**PA** 243-4)
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> What our painter is saying then comes to this. The painted picture is not produced by a further activity upon which he embarks, when his aesthetic activity has already arrived at completion, in order to achieve by its means a non-aesthetic end. . .It is produced by an activity which is *somehow or another* [emphasis mine] bound up with the development of that experience itself. . .There are two experiences, an inward or imaginative one called seeing and an outward or bodily one called painting, which in the painter's life are inseparable, and form one single indivisible experience, an experience which may be described as painting imaginatively. (**PA** 304-5)

It was not within the scope of his world to make this relationship more precise. I do think, however, that these remarks indicate several crucial and problematic considerations for Collingwood. By placing these physical objects in an *indivisible relationship* with artistic consciousness, he demonstrates his recognition of the pivotal place of artifacts in his thinking about art.

What are commonly called works of art may also be "works of art, properly so-called" for Collingwood, if they are the bodily expressions of states of emotion. He wavers on this point and occasionally says that the bodily things themselves are not the real or proper works of art, but rather they are the *results* of expressive bodily actions which are the works of art.

6. Art

Paintings, pots and poems may be the result of *pure* activity for Collingwood. As such, they are not *fabricated* products. The word `result' does not entail that there need have been a preconceived plan. What is made follows from the activity and was not the reason for the activity. Indeed, in Collingwood's philosophy, artistic activity is not undertaken for a reason, it is the expression of emotion in a certain form. The form of the expression set the form of the thing made, and insofar as the activity now under discussion is expressive, the thing made is not of a type, it is necessarily unique.

Chapter three has drawn some of the central and well enunciated lines of thought which Collingwood espoused concerning art as the expression of emotion. The various subsections of this thesis illustrated the differing internal components of what he meant by this clear but highly contentious statement. Up to this point, my intention has been to expose Collingwood's theory and thereby lay the groundwork for my negative analysis of his notions on the one hand, and the breadth of the background for my own later and constructive thoughts on craft. The next two chapters are an investigation of negative aspects of the arguments and examples presented in chapters two and three.

Chapter Four

The function of this chapter is to offer criticism of the classical model of art, which is the basis of Collingwood's theory of craft. I will take a detailed look at the various features of the theory which have been linked to the classical idea and describe some of the metaphysical structures on which they depend. I also introduce examples which illustrate limits to the clarity and precision of his model. This is useful because it brings the aesthetic/non-aesthetic distinction into focus. I shall treat this subject briefly in the next chapter. My point in this chapter is to be negative. This should not be construed to mean that Collingwood's theory has no lasting value. I accept that it does and shall return to certain positive aspects of his theory in chapter eleven. For now, however, I take this negative slant and state it in strong language because it helps locate my specific contribution to this debate.

I would point out that there are aspects of other thinkers' work that will be affected as well by my critical remarks. When, for example, I dispute the claim that *only* craft involves intention, or that only art is creative or autonomous, or that craft is governed *exclusively by knowledge* held in a systematic way, etc., I am directing these criticisms through Collingwood at others as well.

1. Craft: The Technical Theory of Art

Dealing with the various relations of technology and culture, Lechtman has begun to develop a theory of technology and has remarked,

> One of the issues we see as uppermost in understanding the nature of technology within cultural settings is the integration of any technology or system of technologies with the cultural matrix in which it is manifest. The question of integration is concerned with the extent to which any technology has a life and a style of its own, bringing with it a set of inherent properties or characteristics that are inescapable and independent of specific cultural milieus.[68]

This issue is of course one which is present in my own thesis as well. The role and place of craft as the purveyor of the technical facets of human action is at the heart of my own interests.

The distinction between the classical and the expressive theories of art is variously called the `classical' and `romantic', the `traditional' and the `modern', the `technical' and the `aesthetic', the `formal' and the `expressive', etc. The specific reason for using one set of words rather than another is not fundamental to my thesis. The impact and import of these words are in great part contingent upon the integration into a context of the activity these words might designate. I am, however, developing a concept of craft which does not rest on this distinction, but it is in light of them that what I contend will make sense, in much the same way that Collingwood presented his concept of aesthetic art in the context of classical art. It is to provide a comparable backdrop for my own work that I want now to present detailed criticism of Collingwood's concept of craft.

In order to undertake this detailed criticism of Collingwood's idea of craft, I often refer to his idea of art, because his ideas of art and craft are so interwoven that it is practically impossible to deal with one and not the other. They get their breadth of meaning by being held as complementary antipodes. The notion and language of craft have come to represent the technical, non-aesthetic,

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[68]Heather Lechtman and Arthur Steinberg, *The History of Technology: An Anthropological Point of View*, **The History and Philosophy of Technology**, 137.

manageable, and intelligible component in the aesthetic and artistic enterprise by providing the negative penumbra for art. My work is an attempt to develop a new theory of craft and it tends to intertwine the roles played by the two universes of discourse. There have been several concepts of art other than the classical and the expressive. I have chosen to restrict myself to these, not only because they allow movement from Collingwood's theory of art to my theory of craft, but also because they cover the two widest ranging streams or lines of thought concerning the theory of art and the arts.[69]

Taken in its cleanest form, I would say there are two obvious problems with the classical notion of art as epitomized in the philosophy of Plato for example. First and foremost is the idea that things are defined by their Forms which have an overall hierarchical structure, and that knowledge is defined by knowledge of these Forms. Secondly, insofar as anyone acts with virtue, it is assumed that they must act knowingly and in keeping with the nature of their souls (*psyché*).[70] In human action, art is virtue, which is the following of the proper order for the production of a given thing. This integration of human action and thought with things in the world expresses a view of the human *psyché* which bonds the nature of the *psyché* to the world within which it lives. Under reason's guidance, the soul can achieve what it is best suited to do/be by following the rule of reason or knowledge. Plato affirms the fundamental authority of reason and knowledge in acting virtuously, and this appears to be the model of art which he espouses. This is exemplified in the artisan, the philosopher-king, and even the demiourgos. There is also a hierarchy in the social world which reflects the kind of knowledge a given soul may have. The philosopher-king has the capacity to know dramatically differently than the common artisan. The philosopher-king is characterized by a feature which is admirable, namely, having true knowledge of the Forms.

The ability of the philosopher-king to have this knowledge is conditioned, however, not only by art, but also by *mania* (philosophical madness).[71] To me, this intimates that even though Plato does clearly outline art as based in knowledge, the knowledge which he regards as the most admirable and true, requires a "spark" or "gift" -- *mania*.

Aristotle's position suggests that actions which follow from art are fundamentally rational or intelligible actions.[72] That is, the soul of the maker has the form of the thing to be made, and informs matter with this form through the application of the art appropriate to the thing to be made.

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[69]Sparshott, **Theory of the Arts**, 25-367.

[70]In this case, we see that action is based on knowledge, which is discernible by defining the Forms of things, and by a determinate capacity of a given soul to see the Forms of things. The assumption is that individuals may act virtuously if and only if their actions are based on a true knowledge of Forms. Individuals are defined by the type of knowledge they have and of which they are capable. There is a form of circular reasoning involved here which poses serious problems.

[71]**Phaedrus** 238c-49e, for example; R.E. Carter, *Plato and Inspiration*, **Journal of the History of Philosophy**, v, 1967, 111-21. J. Pieper, **Love and Inspiration**, R. and C. Winston, trans. (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), 47-50.

[72]An interesting insight into a less rigid way of looking at this is noted in Gayle L. Ormiston, *Techné, Art, and Translation: Technology and The Creation of Concepts*, paper presented to the **XIth International Congress of Aesthetics**, Nottingham, England, August 29 - September 2, 1988, 12. In a footnote reference to Heidegger she quotes *"techné* signifies neither craft nor art, and not at all the technical in our present-day sense; it never means a kind of practical performance ... The word *techné* denotes rather a mode of knowing. To know means to have been seen, in the widest sense of seeing, which means to apprehend what is present as such."

Matter is amenable to being shaped in conformity with thought; matter is inherently intelligible. This model of making is a question of mind over matter.

2. The Object

In contexts where the value of art was defined by the result it produced, and where its nature was defined by the logical and ontological relations of ideas and their counterparts, the *object* was the dominant consideration, as has been amusingly remarked by Sparshott, "[I]t is a mark of the classical line that the artist is no big deal. The line encourages us to define the artist as artificer, as one who produces a certain sort of product. . .He is defined by his having the ability to produce works of art."(**TA** 272)[73]

This is that form of thinking which held *beauty* as its *raison d'être*. It contended that beauty and other laudable things could be imitated or represented by the employment of skill. It is only in contrast to such a theory that the expressive line has any substantive thrust. In the expressive line, the *subject* became the pivotal fulcrum and the conscious apprehension of emotion the sole guiding principle. In part, this shift in manners of approaching notions like beauty and art is reflected simply in the increasing use of the word `aesthetics' in the post Baumgarten time frame.

For Collingwood, it is given that craft is a necessary but not sufficient condition for great art.(**PA** 26-9) My present question would therefore be, how could this be, if craft necessarily has features the very nature of which are contradictory in art?, or, if intention and skill are essential to craft and impossible in "art, properly so-called", how can they be necessary to art?[74]

3. Collingwood and Craft

In the following analysis of Collingwood's concept of craft, I restrict myself to actions which give rise to the fabrication of an artifact. My reason for doing this is that my prime example in later chapters of my thesis is the individual studio potter, and craft work within the artist-potter's studio. Not everything I say will be applicable *mutis mutandis* to craft as the activity of influencing emotion. This should be a study on its own and might go beyond what I call `craft'. I have chosen studio pottery because skill, material, form and means are integral characteristics of its history and doing. Much of what I say will pertain to activities and things which might be called `performances', and to some literature or painting, and some definitely applies to evoking emotion, but not everything which I say and argue is equally applicable to all fields of art.[75] According to Collingwood, the classical model is structured as follows: the *prototype* is given, the *steps* are delineated, the *standard* for success is available, and the *power to enact is operative*.

Collingwood's analysis was quasi-conceptual, quasi-historical and quasi-linguistic. That is, he looked about and used common usage as a starting point, coupling this with a general analysis of the concepts themselves. As Fethe noted,

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[73]A point reinforced by John Hospers, *The Concept of Artistic Expression*, **Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society**, 1954, 223.

[74]R. Kavanagh, *Collingwood, Craft, and Creativity*, **The Centenary Conference on The Thought of R.G. Collingwood**, 5-11.

[75]It is not at all clear to me why one should accept that the language of explanation connected to certain words, or activities described by complexes of words, should always have the same logical relationships, or identical meanings -- *just because the words themselves are the same*. In fact, one of my operating premises is that the meaning, impact, value and logic of language and explanation vary considerably according to the context, social value, objects, standards, and intentions -- *even though the words themselves may remain the same*.

> [W]e should note that Collingwood's aim is to describe the difference between art and craft, so both craft and art should fall under the same genus or category. . .[S]o when he takes up the difference. . .he often describes it as a difference in the way people make things,. . .[b]ut [he] follows a different approach and talks not about process but about products: craft and art then are differentiated on the basis of ontological characteristics.[76]

Collingwood held that craft was an activity of making. It is by no means clear what constitutes "activity" for him. His basic position is that any complex of actions comprehended by a common logic or concept is one activity. I will return to questions concerning the word `activity' in my analysis of the terms `doing', `making' and `creating' in chapter ten.

I will now discuss the terms `preconception', `skill', `means' and `technique', `form' and `matter', as well as `fabrication' in order to indicate that what someone may mean by this language is significantly variable depending on the specifics of the case and context under consideration. Secondly, I will show more clearly the division between `process', `product' and `emotion'.

3.1

Unlike Collingwood, Wittgenstein asserts that language concerned with preconception, or intention, expresses a whole situation, and I think we can garner insight from his work. Collingwood's central idea concerning preconception with respect to craft and matters of technique was that the mind held images, plans and courses of action in such a way that it could refer to them in the making process. I accept a position more in line with that expressed by Wittgenstein in the **Philosophical Investigations**,

> But didn't I already intend the whole construction of the sentence (for example) at its beginning? So surely it already existed in my mind before I said it aloud!. . .But here we are constructing a misleading picture of `intending', that is, of the use of this word. An intention is embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions. If the technique of the game of chess did not exist, I could not intend to play a game of chess.(PI 337)

Edgar Allen Poe, in articulating his notion of craft and its relation to creative inspiration, followed very much in the line of a rigid Collingwoodian stance about craft in writing.

> I prefer commencing with the consideration of an *effect*. Keeping originality *always* in view -- for he is false to himself who ventures to dispense with so obvious and so easily attainable a source of interest -- I say to myself, in the first place, "Of the innumerable effects, or impressions, of which the heart, the intellect, or (more generally) the soul is susceptible, what one shall I, on the present occasion, select?"[77]

Unlike Collingwood, however, Poe noted that one must always keep an eye on "originality".

What does it mean to say of a given activity or thing that it was preconceived and that a plan was followed to bring it about? The idea of a plan as outlined in **The Principles** is not the Hegelian idea of the Concept, but rather it is the notion of an image, a sequence of events, a set of rules, a course of action, a schema, blueprint, plan, etc., held within the individual's mind as a stable thought. Unlike the dialectical processes of consciousness, craft does not create new categories or things. It is an activity which follows given procedures and techniques, what Collingwood calls "a deposit of habits".(**PA** 275) The mind holds the image or plan as an *act*, and insofar as the mind sees this clearly, the technique of the craftworker *can come into play*, the plan can be followed, and the artifact created. I think that to follow this manner of thought, a person must envisage someone

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[76]Fethe, *Hand and Eye*, 38. I will return to the question of process and product later in the thesis.

[77]Edgar Allen Poe. *Creation as Craft* in **The Creativity Question**, 58-9.

referring to the mental image or plan as progress is made toward the completion of the task.[78] One must also imagine that technique is a component of activity which can be called into operation when necessary. This "calling technique into play" necessarily involves bodily action, otherwise objects will not get made, and of course Collingwood held that craft *does* form material. The activity which makes the artifact is *not* a mental activity, and unless Collingwood is simply saying that the order of consciousness which "accompanies" making is of a certain structure, then the link between preconception and object is ephemeral at best.

The general question of the relation of intention and art arises under considerations about preconception for Collingwood because craft is a form of "knowledge of" as well as "knowledge for" whatever it is that will be fabricated.[79] This is held as an opposite to art because there is no "knowledge of" anything prior to the imaginative act which creates the emotionally charged sensum. In order to indicate certain inherent problems in Collingwood's idea of preconception, I will outline a few examples which exemplify ambiguity, fuzziness, diversity of meaning etc., with respect to thoughts about the future which I take preconception to be. There is a further complication in his thinking because he appears to be doing a form of conceptual analysis. That is, he is analyzing the order of concepts and renders these concepts into quite an abstract form. This abstract form is often too extreme to be accommodated by concrete instances. I would add also that time also plays a role in all making, and that preconception has both logical and temporal components.[80]

Imagine a person travelling to a large metropolitan area for the first time to investigate the scope of its art galleries. This person has *no* memories of the city by which to guide herself, but she knows a great deal and has talked at great length about composition, style, history etc., with respect to art. What does it mean to say she has, or might have, a preconceived plan? Does she have the knowledge necessary to complete her task? Does she have a task? To get to the city she probably will develop a plan, unless she is the kind of person who likes to do things "on the wing".

She travels with her cousin who wants to see a contemporary ceramics exhibition in the vessels room of that city's museum of ceramics. The cousin had previously been to the city and knows where she wants to go and what she wants to see; she is directed by specific interests and has read about what is where and how to get there, and of course, she remembers, unlike *her* cousin who had never been there before. She may have checked a map, confirmed with acquaintances who had already visited the museum, and set out a rough schedule as to where she wanted to be when.

For an example of precise goals or effects, think of an archer whose practice has led him to Olympic level competition, or of the international Grand Prix car racer whose goal is clear. It appears that these two people are very similar because of the exact way in which their goals are identified. The archer aims for 600 out of 600 and the only way to get this is for every arrow to be within the yellow; there is only one condition to be met. The racer must come first in a given race;

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[78]This *is* reminiscent of the Hegelian idea that philosophical consciousness looks back over the moments of consciousness which gave rise to the philosophical consciousness, and discovers or posits the dialectic of its own development. It is a little bit like a forward-looking thinking that actually started at the end of a given thinking process, and then looked backwards to see what steps led to the position in which it finds itself, then enumerated the steps and then placed itself at the beginning of the process and looked forward through the steps it just outlined -- as if they were the steps that `should' be followed.

[79]T.J. Diffey, *Aesthetic Instrumentalism*, **British Journal of Aesthetics**, Vol. 22, #4 (Autumn, 82), 337-48; Jane Duran, *Collingwood and Intentionality*, **British Journal of Aesthetics**, vol. 27, #1, Winter 1987, 32-8; Peter Jones, *Works of Art and Their Availability-For-Use*, **British Journal of Aesthetics**, Vol. 11, #2, Spring 1971, 115-22.

[80]Denzil Hurley, *About Making*, **Perspecta: The Yale Architectural Journal**. vol. 19, 1982, 83-6.

there is only one condition to be met. Even if one were to consider all thirteen races in a given year there is only one way to win the title and that is to accumulate a minimum of one point more than the closest opponent. Both are very clear. It is also possible that in either of these cases the person might fail. Collingwood notes clearly that there is a "right way" of doing things for a craftworker. If a person fails to win the race are, we forced by the logic of Collingwood's thinking to suppose that the driver did not have the skill?

Consider another case in which a small manufacturing plant has received a request for 50 of its blue lamp bases as shown in its catalogue. In this instance, the company may already have 50 bases in storage, in which case its shipper ships. If they are not in stock, the various people in the plant know how to initiate action and produce the lamp bases; they refer to their catalogue and the numbers lead them to combine certain steps with certain steps, the end result of which will be 50 bases which are like the one in the catalogue. We even say that they *are* the one in the catalogue.

Imagine painters who have been commissioned to do paintings which express a sense of adventure and lively excitement.[81] They may have significant restrictions placed on what they are permitted to do. Patrons may want only a realist or only an abstract work, or they may want only certain colour tones and certain soft lines. Other patrons may not care in the least about these kinds of details. Painters paint and it is acceptable or not. The skill involved in any one of these courses of painterly/painter action is of a high order. The preconceived plan may or may not be clear, precise, detailed etc. Some painters will just paint even if there are significant restrictions, other painters will follow endlessly detailed drawings, drafts and experiments even if there are almost no restrictions. Both types of painters, and many others with radically different approaches, have the knowledge necessary to perform the task, namely, paint the painting.

Place yourself for a moment in the prayer cell of a monk in a humble stance before God. Here one finds ritual, practice, posture, and repetitive action, all geared to an end the precise nature of which could not be known until it would be achieved. This undertaking still has an "end" in view. For a monk to focus too precise an image in the mind or to wish too much that a definite state come to pass, is for the monk to have already missed the point of the prayerful state. There is direction yet waiting, ritual yet openness, repetition yet newness on each occasion. Yet, without preconception and planning as well as orderly work, the monk would never bother to enter the cell.

As a last example, but by no means concluding an exhaustive list, consider a potter who has been making bowls and exploring the interrelation of colour with form over a period of five years. During this five-year artistic journey this potter may make 5000 bowls, all different and special in their own way. Is there a clear and definitive image of all these bowls, or of *this* bowl which is being made right now? Often if one were to say to a potter, "Do you know what you are going to make before you make it?" the simple answer will be "Yes". But how specific and real is this preconception. Potters, as often as not, will know that they are going to make bowls or *a* bowl. But do they know that they are going to make *this* bowl? That is, once they have made the bowl and reflect on the question again, it would be perfectly legitimate to doubt that they had had a *precise* image of this bowl. Even in the highly controlled ceramics industry, the plasticity of clay and the vagaries of the fire restrict mechanical or mathematical control. An even more reasonable question is, "Do potters have a preconceived plan at *all*, and if so, do they also imagine *each and every* step along the way -- this clay today, wedging in this surface, pressing with this arm at this moment, pulling now, etc., to the endless mind-numbing complexity of the analyzed activity of the body in action?" As well as noting these, one must remember that the entire process may be a fast one if it

[81]Consider Marienne L. Quinet. *Food as Art: The Problem of Function*, **British Journal of Aesthetics**159-71., vol. 21, #2, Spring 1981, 159-171.

takes two or three weeks. Was the preconceived plan in mind *all* the time? How often and under what circumstances does this imagining and preconceiving go on? These questions are virtually impossible to answer because what it might mean to say that the potter had a precise image is itself part of the question that is being posed. One may reasonably ask further what this language itself means. In part, what is at issue here is a point which I recover in chapters six and seven, at which time I more fully discuss the industry, production, and studio models in comparison with one another. That is, the language of preconception, planning etc., has significantly different applications and uses for these three models and this is a point Collingwood never addressed.

These imaginary situations illustrate a problem for Collingwood because his way of thinking implies that all of these acts of preconception are in some sense alike, that there is a common element in them which typifies use of the term `preconception'. For him the term `act' in this context means that there is a logic or an idea which holds the diverse senses together. It is against this term that I render my first objection. For Collingwood, this act is an occurrence within the mind, and it is to this occurrence or configuration of images and ideas that he has recourse to explain the commonality in all these cases. In each case of craft there is a complex of images that the mind has which it seeks to bring about. That there is dramatic variation in clarity or specificity is not to the point for him; for me of course, the diversity is crucial. If one extends the meaning of the word `act' in cases like this, to cover every case in which one uses the language of forethought, intending, knowledge of, etc., and one assumes that *because* the language or words used is the same, there must be a common element in the total event, one enters a snare from which I think there is no escape. If, like Collingwood, one then places what one takes as the commonality of the diverse phenomena in a mental act, and has the language somehow referring to this act for its true meaning, one falls back to a form of idealism or mentalism with virtually no means of thereafter getting back to the physical world.

These matters are particularly awkward for those who deal with the question of craft, because as I shall often assert, craft objects all exist in space and time, have shape, colour and solid physical existence. There are serious philosophical and linguistic conundrums involved in relating language which deals with *mind*, and that which presents and outlines *body*. I note under my criticism of Collingwood's notion of art that a similar, and perhaps even more obscure problem arises. He did in fact reduce art to an ideal act, and thereby introduced a problem involving the relations of this "object of art" and "the bodily work of art". I return to this point as I discuss various aspects of studio work in chapters eight, nine and ten.

Collingwood espoused the view that all images form in the mind as the activity of the imagination focuses attention on the field of feeling; these images are simple wholes for which there is no truth value, but they may be combined into a multitude of relations by the intellect, or the thinking and reflective mind. The intellect always works with what is given by the imagination, and the thinking mind alone conceives of the plans and the means by virtue of which a given thing can be made which would render concrete the idea which the mind has.[82] The problem is that mental images are not necessarily clear and distinct and somehow transplantable into the physical world the way his model suggests. The few examples which I suggested above indicate that to preconceive is not simply having one clean, clear, picture in the mind. His model has the creative aspect of

[82]By this expression I mean simply that a thing gets made which conforms to the idea. *How do ideas get made as things?* The traditional mind-body distinction gives Collingwood problems very similar to those of Descartes. That is, if craftspeople have the idea, how can one imagine that they compare work in the world with the ideas in the mind -- with a set of mental callipers, or a ruler that fits through the pineal gland?

planning necessarily occurring *prior to* the implementation of skill. The priority can be either temporal or logical. His account of the origins of knowledge clearly implies that creation has logical priority over thought and that thought has priority over crafted artifacts.[83] In the process of making a thing, it is clear that the order of action is also temporal and his explanations do not deal with this fact. For Collingwood, the craftworker initiates action based on what is given. The image which the engineer formed was as clean as the drawing -- almost as if the mind were a modified tabula rasa onto which imaginative consciousness wrote sensa. The sensa are unified wholes for Collingwood, and readily put into complex patterns by the intellect in such a way that the mental product also has this clarity. In great part, he arrived at this common but preposterous idea by accepting, as a great deal of western thought has, the mind is significantly autonomous and forms ideas by itself.

On the other hand, I contend that the language of preconception does not get its meaning by reference to conscious mental acts. Language of this sort rests firstly in the setting of making 5000 bowls, shooting the arrows and going to another city.[84] Collingwood has assumed that because one can talk intelligently about personal, public, and social events with a language that is pregnant with intention words, planning words, and hope or expectation words, the minds of the participants *must* be ordered in a certain way, somehow representing the logical order of the language. He assumes that by using words that are specifically personal and emotive, or governed using language that alludes to or illustrates the mind, one is referring primarily to the mind and its states as the source of coherence and meaning. I will indicate in chapters six and ten my objection concerning the requirement that the mind cohere for the craftworker to make an artifact. I insist that words like `preconceive' or `plan' when used in the context of a potter's throwing pots, glean their preliminary meaning relative to events and experiences that are open to view and public. They are words used frequently in a general way to outline a whole process of action as set within the studio itself. In the setting in which a studio potter makes pots these words are best understood from the perspective of a spectator watching the potter work, and not from the experiential stance of the potter. The words would have a different slant again if one were to use a ceramic factory production system as the point of reference.

The other main criticism which I have against this way of thinking is that the language suggests that the mind is some sort of a repository of ideas and knowledge, like a bank vault into which one has access with the right code. While I do not find the language, he uses to be objectionable, I do deny the working premise concerning the nature of the mind and the world. This model accepts that a form of introspection or mental searching in the thinking mind guarantees integrity in action, and the final truth of what is produced.

These two points seem to me to be the weak crux from which he started: given that mind is taken as a form of repository, it can hold clean images of essential traits as prototypes and standards for action. My point is simply that when one talks about preconception, one is making a complex of judgments about courses and patterns of action which are available for everyone to see, and that our language about these actions does not necessarily refer to a mental world for integrity. Explanations of making actions do not need a *mental* referent, even though the language about feeling, imagination, etc., may enrich our grasp of the human world within which the making takes place.

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[83]The reader will no doubt have noted a stylistic peculiarity. I say `crafted artifact'. In Collingwood's language the word `crafted' is redundant; all fabricated, manufactured, fabricated things are crafted by definition. I will continue to use these words like this for emphasis and because I do not accept that these words are necessarily linked the way Collingwood asserted them to be.

[84]Michael H. Mitias, *Creativity and Aesthetic*, in Michael Mitias, ed., **Creativity in Art, Religion, and Culture** (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 1985), 53.

3.2

Edgar Allen Poe has certainly made a clear affirmation of the place of skill as knowledge necessary to production of results and asserts,

> It is my design to render it manifest that no one point in its composition is referable [to] the accident of intuition -- [but] that the work proceeded, step by step, to its completion with the precision and rigid consequence of a mathematical problem.[85]

In what sense is skill the "knowledge necessary to the completion of the end"? What is skill? Is skill a tool?

The order of fabrication which Collingwood holds in opposition to creation is very Aristotelian, but the *demiourgos* of Plato seems to provide the most fitting image for the copying facet of craft. For Collingwood's position, the idea or form of a thing is necessarily in the mind of the maker before the object is made, and it is then imposed onto material using technical knowledge. Knowledge is like a hammer; somehow one goes to the "skill toolbox" and finds the appropriate skill, sitting beside a "deft turn of phrase" and in between "form" and "hue". I think that we use tools skillfully, make skillfully, think skillfully etc., and only by using the word `tool' in some very stretched or distended fashion, would we say that knowledge is a tool. And even then, the *entire* meaning and locution of the expression `to use' and its related terms would be different than in the case of hammers and other actual tools.

As succinctly put by Howard,

> Craft, the handmaiden of Utility, poor sister of Art and Science, precursor of Technology, and alleged corruptor of aesthetic theories, stands in need of philosophical defence. More or less as a side effect of attempts to understand other matters with which craft is easily confused, craft has been misunderstood, underrated, and passed off as an inferior brand of "procedural knowledge", if knowledge at all.[86]

The classical model of art holds that craft, the user of skill, implements ideas or images into matter, and shapes the material world by its action. Craft is always end-dominated; one knows where one is going. In this context, skill is goal-directed knowledge and action. In my opinion, Collingwood was unable to form a bond between the concept of "skill as necessary" and "the end". This link can of course be formed after the fact, namely, since I made this thing and knew what I was doing, then I could be said to have had the knowledge necessary to the production of the thing. This type of logic could also, however, be applied to the language about "object of art, properly so called".[87] In saying that craft is simply a form of knowledge, Collingwood makes the role of the participating potter's hand and eye virtually unintelligible in the making process, because the "end" of craft is an artifact, and "skill", which is the "means", is a mental process. As a mode of consciousness, knowledge does not make pots; hands, clay and kilns make pots; people make pots --

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[85]Edgar Allen Poe. *Creation as Craft* in **The Creativity Question**, 58-9.

[86]Howard, **Artistry**, 5.

[87]I do not want what I am saying here to suggest that the "creative edge" of consciousness of which Collingwood speaks, and which he describes in a number of places, is not a real phenomenon. There are acts of consciousness in which one becomes aware of new images and ideas, and of the emotional components of these ideas; there are discoveries which come from intimately sensed or deeply felt experience, and which become clear and known as they are expressed as emotions or experiences. This I accept as a rich and important part of human life, of which some are more aware than others. I do not accept, however, that this and only this is art, or that art is only this. The problem is that Collingwood has made a conceptual distinction which separates this occurrence from all others, under all circumstances for all people at all times.

but minds do not. The only way for Collingwood to tie the artifact to his concept of knowledge, is to say that the bodily activity which shapes the object is a *conscious* bodily activity, and that the order or structure of *this* consciousness is characterized by the list of six conditions he has outlined. I will return to one further point on this issue in chapters nine and ten when I discuss making an artifact from the points of view of spectators and of agents, or makers. This concern has to do with the general notion of there being *one* conscious act related to the making of any thing at all. My contention is that at least from the *working experience of the agent* there is not just one act in the making; artistic making is not a coherent process, and craft is not necessarily sequential and structured the way an industrial plan might be imagined.

I will use examples, images and problem cases to illustrate that skill has a body base as well as a mental or knowledge base. Rather, let me say, that all of this has a *human* base. This notion of a human base is of utmost importance in all of my thinking about the craft/art distinction and certain related terms: `creativity', `imagination', `originality', `plan', `means', etc. One can only begin to gain insight into these making activities and the place and the value of the artifacts by placing them within a human context and its related social, community and individual notions. I will give names to the various forms of skill and not go into any significant analysis of the terms, which I take the examples adequately to articulate. In **Zen and The Art of Archery** we see an example of *methodic* skill, which is one of the most common forms. Here a person practices and does endless repetitions of certain actions to achieve excellence in archery -- to the point that certain actions can be successfully undertaken with the eyes closed (a rather interesting feat for archery). The role of bodily awareness, and sensitivity to feelings, diversions, surroundings, muscular tensions, fatigues, mental images, etc., is touched on briefly throughout this work, as it is in any case wherein one does endless repetitions in the process of training oneself. In the background is the idea that these practices are *really* being done to enhance self-mastery, and archery is only the field on which this other action is being played out.

And one is often reminded that there is no known path for self-mastery, a point that makes one think of the monk in prayer. In many art forms, this peculiarity of self-mastery arises in the development of skill. As the apprentice potter wedges the spirals of clay thousands upon thousands of times and begins to centre ball after ball of clay, and to repeat an innumerable number of pulls etc., the apprentice also learns about their body and personal energy levels and the directions which must be grasped, understood and confronted in order to carry on. If apprentices cannot develop a mastery of the human hand, then they can never shape clay; at this level, a skilled potter has learned to overcome and master aspects of the human body, and various shadings of the emotional, spiritual and mental aspects of human life. Is this skill? My point is that one breaks complex human activities down into categories called `emotional', `spiritual' and the like for certain reasons in given contexts, and one need not view them as faculties or independent sub-agents in the human being.[88] By looking at the Olympic biathlon one sees an example of *oppositional* skill; a person exerts intense energy in high order physical activity and immediately must become calm and steady, and then revert back to high energy output again, and so on. Mathematicians illustrate an interesting example of *intellectual* skill in performing very complex deductions, many of which they have never seen before and of a complexity that only a highly trained mathematical mind can follow. They may also form judgments about certain theorems based on a sense of harmony, yet these theorems must eventually be part of a proof. In 1987, Grand Prix race car driver Nigel Mansel dramatically illustrated a case of *body intuitive* skill: at 200 kilometers an hour his two rear tires blew to smithereens, and yet he maintained his car in a completely stable course until he safely exited the

[88]Best, **Feeling and Reason**, 90-138.

track. Perfect pitch is a simple case of *natural* skill. There are others that would indicate that the idea `natural' itself is variable. Highly creative poetry, literature or fantasy painting are clear examples of *imaginative* skill; painting, contemporary studio pottery, sculpture and architecture could readily give specific cases of *creative* skill. Olympic free-style skating demonstrates what is called `artistic' skill, while its complement "figures" shows what is called `technical' skill. Are eating and walking *forgotten* skills? Are breathing and feeling *primordial* skills? Attaching five nuts to a given bolt all day on an assembly line is clearly a *boring* skill, and most assuredly a waste of *human* skill.

If one takes Collingwood's type of stance with respect to definitions and stipulates that a given action must be either skilled or not, then one will look about for the one trait that will link all the above actions. The type of necessity which skill is, is decidedly unclear. I would argue that any attempt to use the notion of necessity to show that a given person must have had the knowledge necessary to the production of a given thing, except after the fact, will prove to be a fruitless task. Knowledge, skill, and human action are not linked to the creation of things in the manner of a syllogism, a linear argument, or a flow chart. It is more useful to regard the various links through a vision conditioned by notions like `growth', `incubation', `negotiation', `enrichment', `commitment', or `birth', for example. As I shall argue in chapters six, nine and ten, the various corridors down which one opts to walk set the very possibility of finding a way out of certain conceptual snares. In as much as the expressive theory of the arts posited *only* consciousness of feeling as necessary to art, and knowledge and plan as conditions *only* of craft, there is a rift between the mental and the physical which could not be traversed.

3.3

Craft is the means of making the thing; technique is a step or procedure in the craft process. Since craft is not a pure activity in Collingwood's philosophy, but rather it is an activity for the realization of a predetermined idea, all the intervening steps from idea to product are means. For Collingwood, another scenario must also be considered. He asserts that the object of art "falsely so-called" (e.g., the painting and the pot) is itself *only* the means for providing an opportunity for aesthetic experience. I deny the logic of the idea-to-product relationship, and thereby reject the formal structure of his concept `means'. Other than the problem noted above concerning the relations of mind and body, and of thoughts mirroring reality, I point out here that the word `means' would necessarily refer to *any* action, consequent, thought, moment etc., in the process of making in Collingwood's schema. There is an important twofold assumption which he makes, namely, that the logic of skilled making is akin to a practical syllogism and secondly, that the order of this logic is somehow a reflection of the structure of causality. The logic and order of making are assumed to be reflected in the order and structure of the artifacts. Given the knowledge, power and action, the object follows; and the cause of the object is that set of elements in the process without which the object would not have come to be. I find this one of the more interesting but insidious features of the classical model. In order to accept that the object is an artifact, i.e., fabricated with skill, one must assume that knowledge is the governing principle not only in explanation but also in manufacture. The assumption is that object can be made and can be understood by reference to the knowledge base of the maker, and in keeping with the thrust of Platonic thinking, the craftworker is defined by the knowledge which is necessary to produce the artifact. A corollary belief is that the material with which the worker works, is itself malleable in keeping with the constraints of this same knowledge. The object is produced by those conditions which were necessary to its production, and these

conditions were not only the order and structure of knowledge, but also of things and bodies. This I take to be a fundamental premise in any form of rationalism.[89]

In Collingwood's presentation, and in much traditional western thought, there is a disjunction of thought and things, and a significant aspect of western thought is devoted to finding out what the link between the two is -- generally, the issues are the questions of truth and epistemology, and the underlying problems of metaphysics. The idea which Collingwood espouses, that skill is the knowledge *necessary* to the completion of the preconceived end, stumbles on this lack of integration of these normally separated categories, i.e., mind and body, thought and reality, necessity and contingency in things, etc. My point is that the conscious body cannot reach into the mind as if it were a vessel and find the tools and images that the body might need to implement a plan or undertake action. As well, I contend that the mind is not a container, and it certainly cannot use the body.

For Collingwood, skill is a feature of human thought. This is so for him because he considered it to be a form of knowledge, and all knowledge finally was referred to the mind. By arguing that the word `skill' does not refer fundamentally or primarily to mind, I do not want to say, however, that there are no mental skills; there are, just as there are emotional, intellectual, artistic, physical, and imagination skills. But for the present, I am talking about skill in the context of making artifacts. This word is best accounted for by reference to patterns of human work in which one also discusses `accomplishment', `achievement', `completion' and many other `fabrication', `making', or `creation' words. In chapters nine, ten and eleven, I will discuss a distinction between `completion' as referring to a set order of steps for the attainment of an already established goal, and `completion' as referring to innovation and assertion. The word `skill' has different ranges of use and meaning in each of these cases. Depending on the particulars of a given case, words like `precise technique' might be used for talk about skill in one case, whereas in another, words like `talent' or `grasp' would be more appropriate. Looking at the work of Leach and Morris in chapter seven and the specifics of a case study in chapter nine will throw some light on this point.

3.4

The particularly strong emphasis on terms like `form' and `matter' places severe restrictions on what Collingwood can express within his philosophy of craft. The two most obvious questions to ask, given the importance of this form/matter differentiation to the craft/art distinction, are "What is matter?" and "What is form?" While it is true for Aristotle that the theoretical concept of matter is that of pure potentiality or possibility, in actual cases it is the principle of instantiation with respect to an essence. Neither of these notions is directly applicable to Collingwood's philosophy. The most obvious reasons that these ideas may not simply be transferred from Aristotle, are Collingwood's idealist stance and his subtle and detailed concept of consciousness.

Collingwood uses the term `matter' in common, polar/comparative, and negative ways. When he says of craft that it forms "matter", he uses wood, clay, stone and similar examples. This use of the term `matter' is common, and it indicates things or substances and materials which sit somewhere and take up space and endure. He contrasts matter in this common sense with the "material" of which art is made. He says that the "object of art, properly so-called" is *not* matter and must not be confused with it. In this way, the term `matter' does not have a positive meaning all by itself; it derives any meaning it may be given by being compared to and separated from something

[89]Clearly a reference to Spinoza is apt at this juncture. Consider his assertion that thought and extension were identical and fundamentally only attributes of God, thereby assuring that the order of being and the order of knowing would be inherently one.

else -- the aesthetic object. It is what Austin calls a "trouser" word.[90] Fundamentally, what Collingwood says is that aesthetic experience is not matter. This should surely surprise no one, since aesthetic experience is not "blue" either, nor is it "happiness", etc. By saying this, Collingwood jettisons a *process of explanation* when he says that aesthetic experience is not matter. He is simply reaffirming his stance that recourse to knowledge of things, and the relations of the ideas of them, will not lead inevitably to art.

By using the term `matter', he also brings about feelings and thoughts in his readers, and I contend that this comparative or polar use of the language carries with it significant ranges of value and emotion. This mass of feelings and thoughts is the amorphous aggregate of what many people in western culture sense about the value of the body, by contrast to mind; and matter, by contrast to spirit; and crude, by contrast to refinement; and base, by contrast to things which are elevated. The scope of emotional dispositions that come into play as certain language and terms enter arguments or proposals is often difficult, if not impossible, to delineate. I would contend that the value attributed to matter and language about matter and material things suffers almost irreparably when compared to "spirit". For example, when words such as `matter' are linked to the body and held in contrast to spirit, life, love and thought, they are is generally held in low esteem, as is their subject -- an idea which Plato in the **Phaedrus** expressed by saying that the dark horse of the chariot tended toward the more base desires of the body while the noble steed pursued the higher ranges of heaven under the guidance of thought. This belief is echoed in most Christian thought which places the "image of God" in the spirit of humanity as the helmsman of, and occasionally as the prisoner of, the "body". In these mythic beliefs, it is only the higher elements that are eternal or everlasting. Even in modern culture there are practical daily expectations that people must/should in some sense be reasonable or rational because it is in these domains that *true* human greatness lies, and not in our "material" existence. These forms of thought and imagery are interlaced in language and life and are what I would call `value carriers' in very important senses. In using the word `matter' as a polar correlative to the term `form', Collingwood relies on the mythical structures underlying western thought to divert value from it.

One must never forget the depth of Collingwood's commitment to holding that art was the activity by which human beings come to know themselves. Its denial, "corruption of consciousness", is the hub of spiritual failure and self-denial. In order to use language with this powerful a moral tone when discussing art, I think he judged it necessary to eliminate all the negative weight hanging about the neck of the word `matter'. He did so by dropping the word `matter' from his discussions of art. In a sense, Collingwood's idealism is a philosophic statement articulating his acceptance of this fundamental value distinction promulgated by western thinkers.

This type of intertwining of language, value, structure and meaning provides me with a specific problem of articulation later in the thesis in chapters ten and eleven. This is not uncommon when one works within the general parameters of a field but challenges its fundamental tenets, as has been neatly remarked by Skolimowski amongst others,

> Concepts and categories, and in general the language of a given metaphysic, are not incidental but intrinsic features of it, in the sense that they serve to articulate the world in a specific way, as the given metaphysic conceives of it. A given language is specific to a given metaphysics. If we accept the language, we inadvertently accept the world view embedded in this language. One reason for our difficulties in overcoming the

[90]J.L. Austin, **Sense and Sensibilia** reconstructed by G.J. Warnock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 62-77.

limitations of our present world view is that we use the language this world view has originated.[91]

The use of the word `matter' *negatively shifts the way people see and value things* and it is with this type of shift in mind that I undertake my case study in chapter nine and my considerations about the orientation of the maker or agent in chapter ten. The use Collingwood made of this negative value association is lodged within his language concerning the craft/art distinction and his examples which show what he means by the distinction.

In Collingwood's theory of craft, the formal element of fabricated things is that aspect of the thing which is governed by knowledge and which flows from thought-governed action about material things. For him all material things have form and shape -- a position I accept. As with many thinkers within the rationalist tradition, Collingwood accepts that the form of fabricated things is the result of the imposition of thought (form) onto matter -- a position I do not accept. In so doing, I reject the idea that thought is *the* agent of form and value in fabricated things. Since thought is a form of knowledge in Collingwood's philosophy, we are led to the belief that the formal element of manufactured things is fundamentally rational and intelligible -- in fact, simply knowledge instantiated in the world.[92] He uses these words `form' and `matter' as signposts, telling people where he does not want them to look. When he denies that the term `form' is directly applicable to "art proper", he asserts that a certain process of explanation is *meaningless* when applied to talk about `art', namely, any explanation which has recourse to knowledge as a necessary element. When he uses the word `matter' in this context, he reaffirms his stance that "art" may be simply "in the artist's head".

3.5

How do artifacts get fabricated? Depending on the use the word `how' has, this question may be answered very differently. In Collingwood's way of thinking, the thing gets made by craft *if* the pattern of knowledge shows "preconception", "plan", etc. The word `if' posits a relationship between knowledge and physical action, e.g., hands moving to shape clay. For Collingwood, this relationship can be of two types, namely: first, that the knowledge precedes action and gives rise to physical action or guides physical action under the appropriate conditions; or secondly, that the actions of making are actions of which the maker is conscious, and the order of conscious thought is of a certain kind, i.e., "non-aesthetic", or "craft". My claim is that in the former case, the whole issue of the relation of prior thought to later bodily action is at best tenuous. That is, the sequence of thought which gives rise to physical action is unintelligible. Equally importantly, one should recognize that the idea of using a mental image as a standard or criterion for physical action presupposes a fundamental identity of thought and material, in the style of Wittgenstein's **Tractatus** and similar theories of representation. In reducing craft to a structure of "knowledge of" and "knowledge necessary to", he has left one with a sense that something is missing in the explanation. Settling on the idea that craft is specifically a form of knowledge, and that this knowledge has a tightly coherent structure tying image, plan, method, criterion, form and matter, and artifact together in a certain

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[91]H. Skolimowski, *Philosophy of Technology as a Philosophy of Man*, **History and Philosophy of Technology**, 330.

[92]The language is not itself a problem; the belief system this language calls forth is.
"[E]ven though it may be clear enough that logical connections and causal connections are very different things the very fact that people can act on what they think (can be rational in any sense at all) must also show that they may in just those sorts of cases be connected. Indeed it seems obvious enough that the very fact that people can be rational agents at all is the fact of that connection." Andrew Harrison, **Making and Thinking: A Study of Intelligent Activity** (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1978), 38-9.

order, and positing this order and structure as a logical given, *I* have the sense that a *human* element is missing. Just the order of knowledge is not enough to make anything. This explanation describes a package which is too superficial to yield insight into the total operation which we call `making an artifact'. Collingwood incorrectly identifies an explanation with a phenomenological description of a process of thought. This embodies the problem already noted about the thought-world relationship, but perhaps more importantly, it completely misses the point that artifacts are made in human settings for endless reasons under innumerable conditions, using diverse means, and for occasionally incompatible reasons. The term `artifact' relies on there being human action within culture; it can be readily understood by seeing that artifacts are one kind of thing that human beings produce. They also produce other kinds of things like theatre, political and economic systems, religious states of mind, etc. Like artifacts, these other facets of human production can be most effortlessly understood when placed against a backdrop of human culture, not simply a backdrop of consciousness. As I have already said, my interest is the creation of artifacts.

On the previous page I said "things get made by craft if the pattern of knowledge shows preconception, plan, etc." This is part of the meaning of Collingwood's assertion that "craft is the knowledge necessary [for the production of a given thing]." For Collingwood, if a thing is (consciously) *fabricated*, then the mode of consciousness or the pattern of thought accompanying the making, has the characteristics outlined in section 2.1 above (preconception, means-to-end relationship). Given this statement of Collingwood's position, it seems clear to me that what are called the "bodily" actions which make the thing are called `craft' by analogy to a mode of thought. I think, however, that this is to get the process of accounting backwards; and I take this to be one of the fundamental weaknesses in Collingwood's account, namely, that he defines actions which take place as human beings make and shape things in the world by reference to modes of knowledge or consciousness. The distinction between *knowledge* as a form of consciousness, and *fabrication* as a form of bodily action leaves one unable to link the two in a process of explanation. They are concepts of different orders and only by committing a category mistake would one assume that they were logically or causally related.

Once again, by reference to certain insights of Wittgenstein, Cook draws attention to a possible way around this type of problem. "[W]e have already seen reason to reject the idea that Wittgenstein meant to answer the sceptic on his own terms and so thought of behaviour as `bodily movements'. Indeed, it is by rejecting this very notion of `body' and `bodily movement' that Wittgenstein undercuts the whole problem."[93] It seems to me that at this point it is worth wondering whether one needs recourse to the pattern of thought at all in order to explain the making of a thing, or whether one would not be just as well off by relating a variety of forms and particulars of human actions in differing contexts in order to offer an account of the making. Rather than taking *knowledge* as the base of explanation of craft, it seems to me that the term `human' or `person' is more useful.

A model that used the notion of a person as one of its central operatives would take tradition, practice, community values and influence, the interaction of people and the habits and patterns of daily life over an extended period of time would play a part in understanding what one might mean by terms like `plan', a `right' way, and the like. That is, one can account for both making and thinking if one predicates explanations on human beings, and if one looks at differing actions and undertakings as symptomatic expressions of humanity, and of individual, or collective and group ventures.

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[93]John W. Cook, *Human Beings*, in Peter Winch, ed., **Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein** (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), 131-2.

Chapter four has been a severely negative chapter directed against the salient points of Collingwood's notion of craft, as well as that which may be partially attributable to the classical philosophers. Its intent was to pose problems linked to the central aspects of Collingwood's six enunciated characteristics preconception, plan, form and matter, for example. It was also geared to bring to light difficulties which I think are inherent in notions such as "knowledge which is necessary to" the fabrication of an artifact. This analysis plays an important role in later chapters as I propose certain of my own beliefs concerning making and I use a language which is similar to that of Collingwood, but I want my words to be understood in a significantly different way that in **The Principles**. Chapter five is designed to provide a similar negative analysis for his concept of art as expression.

Chapter Five

The purpose of chapter five is to evaluate Collingwood's idea that art is the expression of emotion. This analysis is a companion to the previous chapter and contributes three elements for my purposes. It helps provide further insight into a way of thinking about the craft-art distinction which I reject. It focuses attention on conceptual problems related to the idea of a bodily work of art and its relation to emotion and knowledge. It clarifies a set of problems involved in thinking that there is or could be one set of necessary and sufficient conditions by which one could define art, and that this set links "expression" and "emotion" to "art, properly so-called".

1. The Object of Art Properly So-Called

In summary, Collingwood's position concerning art is that, as the expression of emotion, art has no technique. It is the creative edge of consciousness and should be viewed as the emotional side of all knowledge.

Although he starts his **Principles** with an analysis of the use and meanings of terms, his constant reference to examples of painting, music, pottery, architecture etc., demonstrates clearly that he considers these objects to be the things to which a great deal of the terminology is addressed. The words `art' and `object' as used in common speech may have been the place that Collingwood began, but his use is most assuredly not common. In his theory of art, the fabrication of *any* artifact requires craft, and the legitimate place to use the word `art' exclusively is with specific reference to states of consciousness. For Collingwood, what are commonly called works of art are so only if they in fact give rise to expressed emotions in actual individuals, and one then uses the word `art' because one has emotional and imaginative experience as the base for meaning.(**PA** 315) What it would mean for an object to "give rise" to emotions is by no means self-evident, and I think it cannot be clarified in Collingwood's manner of talking, beyond delineating his theory of perception. Referring once again to Cook's article *Human Beings*, I think one can begin to see one way in which such positions arise.

> Putting the matter another way, we can concentrate on the `silent' cases of thinking or understanding or remembering and `look into ourselves' for the essential element, i.e., take notice of feelings, images, words going through our head, and so on. In this way we come to assimilate concepts like *thinking, understanding, remembering*, and so on to sensation words.[94]

It is not clear how literature, music, dance, theatre or poetry could possibly enter Collingwood's theory of perception and remarks like this by Cook simply reinforce this problem.[95]

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[94]Cook, *Human Beings*, 139.

[95]One should note that frequently philosophers treat either objects and artifacts, or literature and dance as if they were necessarily part of one package. I take it that these "objects of art" are so different that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to deal with them under one theory, unless one clearly specifies the assigned reason for doing so. I suppose that this is part of what Dickie and Danto are trying to do with new theories of art as artworld-governed or as based in a certain status conferral.

2. The Necessary and The Sufficient

Although Collingwood often states that the "work of art, properly so-called" could be "only in the head", thereby most assuredly affirming and implying that art is an act of consciousness only, he does indicate that great works of art always use craft; craft is necessary but not sufficient for this art.(**PA** 27) The overall question of necessity and sufficiency is much too vast an issue for me to deal with in my thesis. As must now be clear, I take a stand significantly different than that of Collingwood, but one which is intentionally not as clearly spelled out. In general, I do accept that necessary and sufficient conditions can be articulated for a given purpose or reason. I do not thereby accept that using the notion of conditions is always, or even usually, the most encompassing and most enriching way to describe, outline, articulate, represent, or express a set of notions, experiences, or events.[96] This will become clearer as I outline my criticisms of Collingwood's position and as I present my description of the various activities of the studio potter in chapters ten. In this section of chapter five, I have in mind to analyze Collingwood's assertion that "great art always uses craft" and that "craft is a necessary but not sufficient condition for great art".

In this context, the words "use craft" have a possible twofold meaning: firstly, they can mean simply that in order to understand that someone confronted by a great work has had the *appropriate* aesthetic experience; secondly, they may mean that the *manipulation of material* is necessary for the production of the great "work of art". For the first meaning, one must postulate that the bodily work of art was the means or instrument by virtue of which this experience came to pass.(**PA** 307) The act of creative making by the artist is coupled with the act of aesthetic experience of the spectator by means of the physical work of art (i.e., the work of art improperly so-called). Insofar as the artist was an artist, then the object would be a "conscious bodily expression", i.e., art. Insofar as the spectator experienced an "art object properly so-called", the spectator would have the same experience as the artist and would be thereby an artist as well.(**PA** 305-15) Simply by being present, a given work of art may provide the opportunity for a person to become conscious of some feeling or perturbation of spirit. The presence of the object or performance is the means whereby someone does experience aesthetic emotion. In what could this *necessity* consist? For a pot to be a necessary condition of an aesthetic experience, then there must be some *necessary link between a given object and a given experience*. My point in saying this is simple: there is no way for Collingwood to establish that there is or could be a relation of necessity between an "object of art improperly so-called" and an "object of art properly so-called", i.e., between an artifact and aesthetic experience, i.e., between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic. If one were to take a sequential pattern to describe this relationship, a serious philosophical problem arises, as it has for many throughout the ages. For the artist there could be no necessary relationship between an artifact and aesthetic experience unless one accepts that bodily expression occurs with the precise technical meaning for these words which Collingwood stipulated. By definition, a spectator depends on an artifact for aesthetic experience relative to a specific emotion. According to Collingwood the linear order of this dependency is: artist expresses emotion in bodily expression which shapes (makes, creates) an artifact; the artifact is apprehended expressively by a spectator: emotion, artifact, emotion. In the ideal case, which I think for Collingwood is the only case, the emotion of the artist and the emotion

[96]This type of issue is the focal point of a number of philosophers' interest. One could note M. Weitz's article *Wittgenstein's Aesthetics* and George Dickies' article, *The Institutional Conception of Art*, in Tilghman's **Language and Aesthetics**, 7-20 and 21-30 respectively; Arthur C. Danto, **The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art** (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), for a revised way at looking at the necessary and sufficient conditions for art, but under a social concept of the "artworld".

of the spectator are identical. The reason for saying this is that he regards art as being identical with aesthetic emotion, which is nothing other than the expression itself. The work of art *is* the expression. I frankly find this manner of talking most convoluted and will return shortly to this point.

For the second meaning, these words `use craft' indicate that the manipulation of material, a goal-oriented activity, is necessary to produce the work of art, i.e., the artifact. But what does "the work of art improperly so-called" have to do with the "work of art proper" -- as necessary and constant condition or accompaniment? What I take him to be saying is that preconception, plan, skill, i.e., the non-aesthetic, are necessary or constant accompaniments to their opposite or negation. In order to expose the problematic structure of this thought, it is necessary to recall what I have said about craft thus far. Imagine the following case and the awkwardness of Collingwood's position becomes evident. To paint a painting or make a pot, the artist uses skill to achieve the result, the brush stroke, the balanced lip. The question which I ask is where could this possibly fit as a necessary condition of *any* art if we were to accept Collingwood's craft/art distinction?. As the artist puts hand to clay *in order to* shape it, or if the artist uses this brush to overlay this blue with that grey for this image relative to that image, one is compelled to recognize that these actions are deliberate and executed in a skilled fashion. In what sense can these actions be necessary to art? According to Collingwood's way of thinking, I believe they cannot. His analysis of representation is directly applicable to this situation and illustrates that these are fundamentally incompatible operational notions.[97] What would artists be doing, or in Collingwood's language, what would they be making? They must be making craft or they must be making art; the one is deliberate and skilled, the other is immediate and expressive. One could readily imagine a situation in which someone might feel certain feelings and express them as specific emotions when seeing a great work of art. The *artist*, however, makes the art in the first instance. Once he accepted that art was expressed emotion Collingwood implicitly accepted his other premises. The most obvious of these is hidden in the use of words like `fabricate' as opposed to `create', and `manufacture' as opposed to `imagine'. The former of these obliges one to recognize that they are properly used only in conjunction with `matter' and `form' and with other words like `preconception', etc. What disturbs me in all of this is that I find the articulation of the dependency relationship most unmanageable: the mediated and mediating are a necessary condition for the immediate to be immediate. Intentional and preconceived activity is necessary for simple awareness and creation to be simple. On the other hand, however, when Collingwood placed craft as a necessary but not sufficient condition of (great) art, he articulated the commonsense point of view that paintings and pots *are* art, and that these objects are actually central to the whole question of aesthetics as a theory of art. His philosophic stance, however, prohibited his being able to render this stance in a consistent manner. The more he pushed his thinking along the lines of essentialist thinking, which is simply to say that insofar as he held to the conviction that there was *one* determinate essence of art, and in as much as he held the essence (or necessary and sufficient condition) of art to be a determinate act of consciousness, the less he was able to deal with paintings and pots in a consistent manner. His position with respect to art put him in head-on conflict with the point from which he started and to which he indicated that he would return, namely, that which is commonly understood by the use of the terms `art' and `craft', insofar as they are put into a systematic order. Given his position, he cannot return to his starting point.

The fundamental reason for his being unable to return to his starting point is that he identified the object of art properly so-called with aesthetic experience, as well as with expression of emotion;

[97]Note also Morris, **The Aesthetic Process**, 74-76, for a very Collingwood-like analysis as well.

each of these in turn was "art". With this three-way identification, and with the radical separation of craft and art, the "making" of art and the "making" of craft are so removed from one another that Collingwood cannot account for the relations of physical works of art and art as expression. The words `object' and `art', and the divergent and opposite meanings of the word `making' had become so specialized by this time in his work that there was no way back to the beginning.

3. Mind and Body

To put this dilemma in more conventional language, I would say that in as much as the mind and the body are considered to be uniquely different and separate from one another, they will be seen in such a way that they can neither affect one another, nor can the process of explanation for one of them be taken as the process for the other.[98] Although Collingwood was well aware of the Cartesian dichotomy and even though he took a more contemporary approach to the mind-body distinction, he ended up with what I would call his counterpart of Descartes' "animal spirits" and "pineal gland", namely: "conscious bodily expression". If he had allotted certain rights to skill as an aspect of conscious bodily expression, he may have been able partially to bridge the gap which was left open. To do so would have entailed a different account of what both skill and expression were. That he accounted for both the *process of making* and the *status of things* by reference exclusively to states of consciousness or forms of knowledge, left him in the unenviable position of not being able then to deal with the paintings and pots which confront people and artists on a regular basis as things which exist independently of any particular state of consciousness. He recognized that these objects do have effects on spectators and artists themselves, and they are aspects of the interaction of creative individuals and the general population. He had defined art and craft in such a way, however, that in order to account for the well-recognized value attached to these objects, he was obliged to reduce their status as valued things to a means of experiencing value. Even given this reduction, as I indicated in the previous subsection, this account involves a contradiction.

4. Action

A painting, pot, sculpture or poem is art, says Collingwood, if someone expresses a conscious act in viewing it. This surely means if it *is* an expressive act. The word `act' is very enigmatic in the work of Collingwood, although his primary mode of reference is an undertaking of consciousness. A word like `activity' is often clarified by contrast to its traditional opposite `passivity'. He held that the mind was passive with respect to *presence* of feeling but that it was active with respect to imagination. Feeling is taken to be a form of datum; once it is present, the mind may deal with it, but not before. Given his general epistemology, the word `before' expresses logical priority. What happens with consciousness' becoming aware of feeling is set by the nature of consciousness itself, and not by some other thing.(**PA** 172-224) He considered both art and craft to be acts of consciousness, in the one case as imagination and in the other as judgment and intellect. The word

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[98]René Descartes, **The Philosophical Works of Descartes**, trans. Elizabeth Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). Note in particular *Meditations on First Philosophy*. Follow this by referring to Gilbert Ryle, **The Concept of Mind** (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1963). And as emphatically asserted by Mitcham, "In the later half of the seventeenth century, however, Western man's ontology of matter underwent a radical transformation . . .This trend is easily exemplified by the Cartesian theory of matter as pure, lifeless extension, in itself ordered toward nothing else, something to be done with as one pleases. . .Finally, it was on the basis of the modern hiatus that men began to imagine the possibility of a *logos* of *techné*, so that it made sense to use a term originally applied to the study of the manipulation of words to name the study of the manipulation of nature." Mitcham, **Philosophy and History of Technology**, 187.

`act' is thus generally used for any undertaking for which he has reference to a form of consciousness as the end point of explanation. But `act' is also a specifically referential word as well, and Collingwood often confounds the two uses. Each image is an act of consciousness; the emotional charge on the act of conscious attention to acts of the intellect is an act; language is a pure activity. Great works of art, and one can think of Dante's **Comedy** or the Sistine Chapel as awkward examples, are also acts of artistic consciousness. It was with thought of this sort in mind that I indicated earlier some of the problems inherent in saying that a given *physical* art object, like a painting or a pot, could be the *means* to aesthetic experience. The logic of such an affirmation is painfully cumbersome to say the least, viz., an act of the artist is the imaginative action of consciousness and the bodily action of the artist, and spectators act as artist in the presence of the object and are active insofar as they are imaginatively active. One swoons under the verbal assault. To top this confusion, I would point out that for works like the **Comedy** which took the good part of twenty years to write, the use of one singular word `act' obscures the diverse undertakings which do help make up works of art, because they suggest that one "act" did it all. I, of course, contend that this is simply not true.

Collingwood quite reasonably held that a work like the **Comedy** was one work, but I think one must always be reminded that the word `one' in this case does not restrict my thinking that there are many undertakings in the **Comedy,** or that it may be considered from an indefinite number of points of view. Further, I would add that by saying that a given work is one work, it does not follow that there is only one order of meaning, emotion or configuration of value with respect to it. To say it is `one' is primarily to say that it is not two or three by contrast to some other works that are compound works; or it may be to say that, unlike some other writer who wrote numerous works to present a series or aggregate of thoughts and feeling, Dante wrote one. There is no reason to assume that because we call a complex work of art `one', that it was *constituted* by one act of the human mind. This point is one to which I return in chapter eight where I deal with a case study, and the question of assumptions made about coherence and sequentiality of thought in chapters nine and ten. Briefly, I contend that we may consider an object to be one with respect to whether it deals with one subject, one theme, one pattern of thought, one complex of moral or spiritual issues, but it does not follow at all that the human being who created this work had either one image to cover the whole, or that the process of making such a work was itself sequential or deeply coherent. This is particularly evident in joint works, which may involve numerous artists, many media, or interactive discovery.

It is important at this point to indicate that the use of terms like `human' specifically alter how one might look at art. Insofar as one is restricted to analyzing the language and reality of art with notions like mind, sensation, emotion, images and consciousness for example, one may assume, as Collingwood has, that the "mind" is the one thing that holds these together in some coherent fashion. I contend that it is rather more in the vein observed by David Best,

> The crucial point is that we are not concerned, in either case, with *physical* objects in that sense. The symmetry between the two cases can be brought out by reference to the notion of the `given', mentioned above, for the given is not a physical body but a *human being*; the given is not a physical object but *a work of art*.[99]

When the setting is established by Collingwood, and *I* talk about human beings, I use this phrase as a contrast to his approach which I take to be like tunnel-vision. The term `human' allows me to emphasize aspects and features of things and the world from within a broad base. Reference to human persons pulls into play notions like society, culture, tradition, habits, language, behaviour patterns, etc. As suggested by Best, when we acknowledge that we are dealing with human beings

[99]David Best, **Feeling and Reason in the Arts**, 109.

and not simply "bodies", we are also able to grant that works of art need not be viewed simply as "physical objects". The diverse patterns of human life encompass notions such as craft and art in complex aggregates. In some parts of human life the concepts of mind, thought, knowledge might be held as distinct from other notions like body, habit, or artifact. In other facets of human life, these distinctions do not obtain.

5. Creativity

In keeping with other thinkers in the tradition, Collingwood holds that art is creative and free. "To create something is to make it non-technically, but consciously and voluntarily."(**PA** 128) It is free in that no prior knowledge or preconceived plan determines its course of action. The autonomy of art rests in the self-perpetuation of consciousness, and thereby in the furtherance of knowledge. At this point, I would indicate only two considerations to which I will return later in the work, namely, that although he distinguished artistic creation from divine creation by outlining limiting conditions for the former, he ascribed a hint of the value normally attached to divine creation to artistic creation, by using the expression "creating from nothing". Secondly, Collingwood's idea of freedom or autonomy is severely limited in his aesthetic theory and is counter-intuitive with respect to what is commonly thought to be freedom of art, namely, without influence and dealing with possibilities. That is, for him artistic expression is not an expression of possibilities, it is rather the expression of what is necessary.

> The work of art which on a given occasion a given artist creates is. . .created by him not merely because he **can** [emphasis mine] create it but because he **must** [emphasis mine]. . .He is creating it at a certain point in his life, and he could not have created it at any other point, nor any other at that point.(**PA** 286-7)

6. Forms of Expression

The word `expression' conveys the notion of action as an outward movement. The emphasis on the words `expression' and `emotion' relative to the arts has certainly captured one of the most pervasive thrusts in aesthetics in the twentieth century. I do think, however, that there are two reasons Collingwood's use of the terms has not been acceptable, namely that his use was too technical, and that it was too narrow. By "too technical", I mean that it was not balanced by common use and was thereby counter-intuitive. As he began his undertaking, he quite reasonably recognized that it was commonly acknowledged that paintings and pots were considered to be works of art, and then he went on to define art, emotion and expression by reference only to consciousness of emotion. It was thus and only thus that he managed to achieve a definition of the necessary and sufficient conditions for art. He could never adequately delineate the links between the experience of emotion and the painting, and in the end, he left the clear impression that paintings and pots were *not* works of art. In my opinion, this is clearly counter-intuitive to the Western mind. By "too narrow", I mean that he confined his use to one meaning, and that this meaning was defined by his theory of aesthetic perception. I would contend that the word `expression' has numerous diverse uses, many of which have rich and difficult nuances, and these uses are regularly available to people who speak the language and think about these things. There are, for example, meanings from fields such as psychiatry, theatre, literature, medicine, language theory, anthropology etc. Uses in these fields readily add breadth and depth to how one sees and uses words like `expression'. The difficulty I foresee in accepting a significant diversity of uses and meanings for the word `expression' is that complex explanations become awkward to maintain and to clarify.

My belief is that one is better off accepting what is complex and diverse even if elusive because it keeps one in touch with the ambiguity and fuzziness of actual cases. The most obvious of

these come from psychiatric practice with which Collingwood had some familiarity. One could see the phenomenon of acting out emotion as a form of expression, a case in which the feeling is partially unknown, or known and repressed. Acting out emotion cultivates a feeling as it comes into consciousness, and the person brings it to fruition -- even if it means recollecting what was previously known but rejected. There are hints of this in Collingwood's analysis of "corrupt consciousness". A contemporary use of the term `express' may derive from primal therapy for example, in which case one means that the emotion is felt and experienced and not *thought* about as the experience occurs. The emotion is pulled into action through practice with such experiences. Theatre provides another example for the use of terms like `expression' not adequately touched by Collingwood; the ability of actors and actresses to enter into the characters whom they portray almost to the point wherein the actor or actress feel what the character *would* feel, shows a form of expressing emotion which is very deeply bound to practice and to the development of character-expressing skill. We also commonly talk with good sense when we say that certain verbal expressions adequately express thought in a given case. Normally this has to do with *situations* in which it is not only unnecessary to articulate an idea in another phrase to be understood, but that other formulations of the thought in this case would be slightly less clear or less readily grasped.

7. The Non-Aesthetic and The Aesthetic

Lying behind Collingwood's craft/art distinction is a more fundamental one which he shares with many other thinkers, viz., the aesthetic/non-aesthetic.[100] This distinction is taken to be severe; the one side cannot give rise to, explain, or account for the other; they are viewed as separate conceptual categories.

As Collingwood has put it,

> The so-called aesthetic experience is either a name for all experience insofar as this element of spontaneity, questioning or supposal, enters into it, or else it is a name for something that does not exist at all, namely, the alleged life of art, a specific type of experience whose existence is asserted by philosophical error which abstracts the aesthetic from the logical function and erects them into separate experiences.(**SM** 100-02) [A]rt is really no more than the aesthetic side of all knowledge.(**SM** 260-61)

Collingwood maintained fundamentally one stance concerning the basic intention of aesthetics as a branch of philosophy, although his specific ideas about certain aspects of aesthetic experience changed significantly from his early work to his later work. In answering the question "What is art?", he developed a theory concerning its definition, which articulated his theory concerning perception, knowledge and mind. In the context of **The Principles**, the term `aesthetics' had two fundamental referents, namely: the theory or philosophic thought itself; and the form of experience which the theory was developed to explain. It is this latter meaning with which I am concerned in this subsection. The former, the theory itself, is normally held as distinct from explanations of other aspects of human undertakings, like ethics for example. The latter, a form of experience, is called `aesthetic experience'. This term is held in opposition to other types of experience like colour perception, reasoning and argument, or noting the length of a log, for example.

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[100]Joseph Margolis. **The Language of Art and Art Criticism**, 1-33; M.E. Brown **Neo-Idealistic Aesthetics** (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1966); H. Foster, ed., **The Anti-Aesthetic** (Bay Press: Port Townsend, 1983); Hungerland, *Once Again, Aesthetic and Non-Aesthetic*, 285-296; Roman Ingarden, *Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object*, **Philosophy and Phenomenological Research**, 21 (1961); Frank Sibley, *Aesthetic and Non-Aesthetic*, **Philosophical Review**, 74 (1965), 135-159, etc.

For Collingwood, the aesthetic is classified in the following ways: as *experience*, it is the immediately sensuous mode of awareness; it is the experience of imaginative consciousness as the mind attends to the immediately sensuous, i.e., to feeling; it is conscious action in feeling; it is the conscious experience of beauty as an imagined whole; it is the experience of coming to know the emotive aspect of any cognitive act. In a nutshell, aesthetic experience is the emotional experience of any act of cognition. As *object*, it is the act of imaginative experience as viewed by another mode of consciousness. As a *form of consciousness*, it is the whole which sees or holds this experience and object as identical. Non-aesthetic experience would be simply the hearing of a sound or the noting of a shape without simultaneously noting any emotional facet to the experience; a non-aesthetic object could be the planned and fabricated painting or the pot sitting in the hall way and described by reference to their shapes, forms, functions, representational properties, colours, etc.

A non-aesthetic form of consciousness would be any form of thought which invokes the rational, planning, or deliberative capacity of people.(**SM** 95, **PA** 275) What is particularly noteworthy is that while the object of non-aesthetic making might be an artifact (it could be simply a complex form of reasoning), even an artifact is not defined by any of its own particular features, but rather by the features of a form of consciousness. The basic criticism of this is obvious, namely, the words `experience', `object' and `consciousness' are used equivocally in each setting. The second level criticism is more damaging from the point of view of common comprehension, namely, the artifact is in the world of things and bodily actions, whereas in Collingwood's philosophy it is relegated to the subsidiary status of an epiphenomenon. For Collingwood, all making, all thinking, and all knowing could be divided on these lines: the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic.

Once one recognizes the depth of this distinction in **The Principles,** one can see that we have a serious problem: the aesthetic/non-aesthetic distinction is one which falls within consciousness itself. Given the severity of the distinction, I think it becomes clear that consciousness has two fundamentally incompatible modes of operation. Much of my criticism of his theoretical thinking rests on this point. At one level of thinking, it is clear that the aesthetic, art, has the non-aesthetic, craft, as a necessary but not sufficient condition for its existence, because they together constitute the full realm of conscious activity. Without the one, the other would itself be different. The other side of this affirmation would seem to me to be obvious, namely, that the aesthetic is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the non-aesthetic; art is necessary but not sufficient for craft. In many places he holds this to be true, but he never actually states it in this way -- one presumes because he wanted to draw attention to only one direction of the dependency in the relationship.

8. The Artist

In this early work, **Speculum Mentis**, beauty is the aesthetic virtue of artistic consciousness.(**SM** 65-6, 98) The feeling of beauty guides the work of the artist. By the time he had written **The Principles**, he had abandoned the idea that beauty is an integral aspect of art. Be that as it may, he did recognize even in **Speculum Mentis** that artists do work and have a form of discipline, the exercise of which functioned as a realizing principle. He acknowledged in this early work the seminal form of a later idea, namely, that artistic consciousness was not "pure" in the strict sense ascribed to Croce.(**SM** 84) That is to say, artistic consciousness expressed and asserted itself in "concrete" art, i.e., actually existing things like paintings and pots. The word `concrete' carries many of the Hegelian overtones with it, the most important of which I think is that the thing in question is an actually existing individual.

I agree that there must be technique in all concrete art as the element of mediation. Collingwood holds this position as well. From my point of view, however, it is most peculiar to say artists "use" this non-aesthetic element to attain their goals. This is particularly clear when one

realizes that for artists, as models of aesthetic consciousness, Collingwood argues that there is no awareness of either the concept of beauty, or of the activity they are undertaking. This dichotomy becomes even clearer when one delves into what Collingwood thinks the source of the "sense" or "feeling" is for artists as they make "concrete art". As he contends,

> Insofar as he is a real artist, his artistic creation is a self-critical creation, and the criticizing moment or concept -- the idea of structure or relevance -- is always in advance of the criticized moment, the flow of imaginations which it controls. (**SM** 97)

This quotation appears to indicate that the "concept" has logical precedence even for the artist. I think this point is generally one of the main stumbling blocks in efforts to render creative activity intelligible. Collingwood accepts, and is in reputable company all the way from Plato's theory of recollection through theories about innate ideas to Hegel's influence concerning the development of self-consciousness by the dialect of the Concept, that in order for some activity to be understood or for it to be truly intelligible, the activity *must* conform to a previous idea. For example, for artists or philosophers to be able to say that the artifact presently before them is the "right" or true one, they must already have had an idea of it -- in some way or another. Given this requirement of intelligibility, or rational accountability, the "idea" has logical precedence. If this were so, then the source of technique (the concept as the logical or mediating element) would precede imagination. For Collingwood, artistic consciousness never reconciles the concept and the imagination at a level of thought. It creates from a feeling. If a particular artist were to understand the meaning of concrete art, this would come about only because the artist is philosophizing; *qua* artist, this is not possible.

This point is one to which I shall return. In the interim I shall indicate various associated considerations. The question, "How does the artist know when the work of art is finished?" is the question hiding in the above paragraph. It is to answer this question that Collingwood's early work occasionally posited the concept "in advance of the criticized moment". Given his general approach to epistemology and metaphysics, if *he* were to ask the question, the only way he could give an answer would be to posit a logical precursor. In his later work, this question has virtually disappeared for the artist, but not for the craftworker. A phenomenological account of "expression" has taken the place of his previous knowledge-based and beauty-based account of artistic activity. I regard this prejudice about the need for a logical precursor to be of paramount importance in certain inadequate accounts of artistic making. As I shall argue in chapters six through ten, artists' "knowing" does not always or necessarily depend on their *already* knowing.

9. Abstractions

In his early work, Collingwood held that if an idea of something were held abstractly, i.e., if an idea of one aspect of a thing were held to be the idea of the entirety of the thing, then this idea is a form of error.(**SM** 80ff.) His way of saying this was to say that the idea was "abstract". I think that this makes sense in common language. The idea of the thing would obviously deal with only one aspect of the thing or one feature, quality, etc. He clearly delineated this position in **The Essays** and applied this rule to the classical/romantic distinction when discussing art objects. Once he had conceded that abstract ideas were forms of error, he would have done well to pursue an entirely different tack in **The Principles**. Having already seen that "pure imagination" and "pure meaning" were abstract terms, it seems most peculiar to me to think, as he did, that one can explain a complex of activities based on these terms. To suggest that one element of aesthetic consciousness uses another element of aesthetic consciousness to attain actual aesthetic consciousness, pushes this error even further.

One of the main difficulties that I have with the way Collingwood deals with art, and the language concerning it, is that he tries to define this term by minimal and necessary conditions.

These conditions are structured so that an actual artist, as distinct from the concept "artistic consciousness", is considered to *be* an artist by virtue of one condition. One of the main reasons for some of his peculiar remarks, e.g., that "for artists to be `true' artists, they must be more than artists"(**SM** 90-102), is that terms like `art' and `artist' are not definable by one condition of consciousness. This sort of term is so diverse in its actual use that a single simple definition of it cannot be formed. It is even more so when one recognizes that my reference point is that of the artist as a person -- a human being -- and not a primal mode of consciousness. I would suggest further that similar problems persist when one accepts that there is one essential meaning for words like `concept', `immediate', `pure', `create', `imagination', etc. Even if one were to systematize the various legitimate uses of these words and reduce their diversity to a few, it is an unwarranted step to assume that the world or the human mind reflects *this* linguistic structure. If one were claiming to be delineating necessary and sufficient conditions as Collingwood did, one should begin to suspect a concept which was defined in such a way that it contained its opposite, *while simultaneously denying interdependence*. If one follows Collingwood's attempts at defining notions like imagination and mediation, and realizes that considered by themselves they are abstract, or pseudo-concepts, then one must surely wonder, even on his own terms, how they could possibly be necessary conditions for art.

There have been other attempts to place the relationship of the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic; some have given rise to the following distinctions: perceptual objects as distinct from physical objects; technical objects as distinct from aesthetic objects; intuition as distinct from form; and abstract art as distinct from humanistic art. It is not my intention to set out to resolve this particular problem because I think that it is often poorly phrased as a question, and my particular interest is to explore the realm of craft and related terms like `craftsmanship'. When I say that the question is poorly phrased as a question, I harken back to Collingwood's question, "What is art?" or my question in the previous subsection, namely "How does the artist know when the work of art is finished?", with emphasis on the word `know'. Questions of this structure could lead one to look for one condition for the use of the word `art'. My contention is that there are numerous conditions and situations, some cultural, some institutional, some relative to human action, and others to human thought, which help outline the boundaries within which the question may be answered. The same applies to the "how" of the question concerning when the artist knows to stop work. The "how" is not exclusively epistemological. There are different "how's", and occasionally even when there is a question of knowledge involved, the question may be inappropriate. I shall return to this particular issue again as I discuss certain types of decisions, assertions, affirmations, etc., in the work of the studio potter in chapters ten and eleven.

10. Beauty and Emotion

> As Sparshott summarizes
> The term "aesthetic" marks out a large and vague domain, covering (roughly) whatever pertains to art, the beautiful, and human dispositions and responses akin to those typical of responses to beauty, art and the beautiful, or the like.(**TA** 467ff.)

As an adjective, the term `aesthetic' points to types of lines, forms, composition, experiences, attitudes, objects, points of view, judgments, emotions, etc. Traditionally and in the popular mind, aesthetics has to do with beauty. Objects are thought to be aesthetic if they are beautiful, and not so if they are ugly. In his early work, Collingwood originally held that the experience of beauty was the inner operative principle of artistic consciousness. That is, this primal consciousness moved toward this cohesive and integrated experience of unified imagination.

In the twentieth century, and certainly since the issuance of **The Principles**, this affirmation is decidedly less true of remarks in aesthetics and art theory. I think that one of the reasons that this change has occurred is reflected in the details of Collingwood's claim that insofar as art is expression, it has no technique, and is thereby distinct from *any* form of preconception or, as I would add, intention. Accepting, as his early work did, that beauty was essential to the pure immediacy of artistic consciousness, left him with a twofold problem, namely: that the immediacy of this consciousness was mediated through work toward beauty; and that beauty was an indicator or inherent guide that this consciousness rested on, such that it seemed actually to be piloted by a concept, and not solely a feeling.

His manoeuvre to circumvent this set of problems was proposed in **The Principles** when he advocated the expression of emotion as the essential core of artistic consciousness. My main criticism of this latter stand is that the objects which sit in galleries and people's homes and which are commonly accepted as being art objects, have no status of which to speak in his theory, except by reference to states of consciousness. Another objection is that terms like `beauty' do not necessarily rest on an epistemological base, as he suggested they do.

I contend that terms like this may articulate feelings, actions and assertions by artists. They may also be used while talking about objects as ciphers to new ways of looking at certain artifacts, or as indicators and value maps as to where to place these things in daily life, or as an instruction concerning how to take a particular design, hue, or whole piece relative to another set of artifacts. Beauty need not be an inherent idea which drives consciousness.

Chapter five has been a directed attack against the notion that art is primarily an act of consciousness. My main reason for this approach has been that I want to prepare the ground for my own contributions in chapters nine and ten where I emphasize the place of practices, regularity of work, and involvement with the human hand in studio settings. In chapter six, I begin a transition from an outlook which rests on the classical/aesthetic notions of art to attitudes which consider work practices, studio settings and the place of industry.

Chapter Six

Chapter six has two main parts. These two parts are designed as a transition from one way of looking at the craft/art distinction to a new orientation. The first deals primarily with Collingwood and presents global as well as specific comments on his philosophy of art. It summarizes certain negative and certain positive features of his overall stance with respect to craft and art. The second transfers modes of discourse from this one philosopher to an analysis of a broader context, what I call the `mythic' legacies. The first wraps up my fundamental comments on Collingwood, and the second provides an opportunity to shift thinking about craft and art and the various related notions I have been discussing, to a new set of models and contexts.

1. Making and Consciousness

In each account of action, Collingwood's fundamental explanatory model is that of the operation of the thinking mind. By *contrast* to it, art is the creative, emotional origin of thought; by practical *exemplification* of it, craft is practical and intelligible fabrication. This way of accounting for making is a form of phenomenological description. His account is based on the premise expressed in **Speculum Mentis**, namely, that reflective consciousness posits a concept by reference to which and by inclusion in which a set of occurrences is rendered intelligible. In that context, "making" would be rendered intelligible by reference to types and particulars of thought and knowledge. If the thing fabricated were a material thing, like a pottery vase, the account of the craft which made it would refer only to forms of thought which are said to accompany or guide the making. Needless to say, this idealist approach leaves one dealing not with physical things that get made. One is left with forms of consciousness which are said to account for the making of things, and which are taken as the referents for the language of explanation. What does this have to do with the makers and the things that get made? What does it mean to talk of a kind of making?

What Collingwood has done is something like the following: having begun with language about certain things and activities, he set out to portray the systematic use of that language in order thereby to reveal what these things are, how they come about and in what intelligible talk about them consists. For Collingwood, the analysis of language disclosed that craft and art are both subclasses of making, with craft being best described as action having the six features already noted in chapter two, section 2.1, and as explicable by a model which has recourse to a variety of preconceived sequential steps within consciousness. Art is explicable by outlining the logical structure and the dialectic of imaginative awareness of feeling. Insomuch as he holds that craft is an intelligible activity, he accepts that it displays the sequential logic of "necessary to the production" of a thing. Insofar as art is seen an intelligible activity, it exhibits the limit of the thinking mind with respect to feeling and immediacy. As Bertram Morris has put it,

> Finally, aesthetic principles lead us further to reflect that craft and machine work are not themselves [capable of] generation of emotionally acceptable order. . .[S]hould one affirm the intrinsic aesthetic character of craft work, he has a big task in explaining away monstrosities produced by craft. . .The problem to be solved by craft and industry alike is the overcoming of the abstract means to end relation, which is an almost purely intellectual relationship, and which does not become aesthetic by having "art" added to the product.[101]

[101]Bertram Morris, **The Aesthetic Process**, 50f.

Interestingly, it is not only what is said that gives rise to deep criticisms of Collingwood's thinking about this distinction, but it is what is shown by what he said. For him, the language of art can be rendered systematic *only* if it refers to a certain state of consciousness as its primary focus. I have several problems with this approach: first, one is bound on a windless tack if the central or solitary referent for language is a particular state of mind; secondly, the status and value of things with which the inquiry began are significantly diminished by reducing accounts of them to emotional "charges" on states of mind; thirdly, the public aspect of creative making and the value of lengthy traditions which rest on public presence and social relevance are lost or lessened. This criticism is also of course the main one lodged against Croce. Both of these thinkers were involved with a variety of art forms themselves, and it is an ironic fact that their theoretical stances undercut the value of the artifacts that great artists have produced, while at the same time they were declaring that the experience of art was most laudable. Fourthly, for practical purposes, the gap between the mind and the body so effectively placed in the western tradition by Descartes, remains in place under another guise. Once one has accepted that the model of a thinking mind is the appropriate one for explanations, or once one believes that reference to states of consciousness alone can explain activities, then the placement of time and space, of body and movement, of physical or social action, of practice, discipline, and learning, of exploration and discovery, and of the *whole person* or *human being* is rendered less relevant in accounts of action.

These notions which I regard as deeply problematic are in keeping with certain thrusts within western thought from the orientation of the Judeo-Christian tradition as well as that of the classical philosophers. The human body, matter, passion, reactive emotion, common human life experiences are denigrated relative to an ideal of some sort: either the vision of god, the creative act of imagination, a gift from the gods, and such language -- none of which is attainable by only a concerted planned human undertaking. And that which *is* attainable must first have been given from without. Even the path to attainment is given. I think that what this boils down to is the following summary, and I think it expresses why there is a fundamental problem with Collingwood's approach. For explanations concerning the making of art, one need not concern oneself with colour, shape, composition, texture, line, form, weight, shape, thought, hopes, judgment, societal place, function, visual, aural or tactile harmony, or its lack, surface, sound and quality of instrumentation, line, or for that matter with *any real or physical thing at all.* No reference to these matters whatsoever will help in any account concerning what art is. One is left with virtually nothing to discuss except specific emotions; but I contend that *even their specificity* is grounded in these other things, such as paintings and pots.

According to his idea of precarious margins, Collingwood specified that the essence of art is such that it *must* be *only* that part of experience or action which *could not* overlap with the concept of craft in any respect whatsoever. Although he makes a significant number of references to `works of art' as this phrase is commonly used, i.e., for paintings, pots and poems, his early and most affirmative examples orient readers away from any sympathy for the entire complexity of his position. He acknowledges that by far the great majority of artifacts displays both craft and art, but that "art properly so-called" was only that activity to which no application of the concept craft was possible.

Is the situation any more hopeful for the "technical theory of art", that is, for craft? With respect to the fabrication of an artifact there are three significant problems with this technical approach: firstly, insofar as his account simply describes certain mental activities or patterns of thought which are the counterparts of the bodily activities which give rise to the artifact, it is decidedly unclear in what sense this phenomenological account of an activity of thought *explains* the existence of a determinate thing in a specific place at a particular time. Secondly, if one views

the account of the pattern of thought as a description of a sequence of action, the end result of which is the existence of a thing which corresponds to the original thought, and the sequence is taken as that linear set of steps which begins with the thought and ends with the thing (e.g. engineer's bridge), there are two unanswerable questions, namely: "In what does the correspondence consist?" and "How can one conceive of the mental process affecting the body to make the artifact?" It seems to me that the best example of what he *is* portraying with this theory is to be found in industrial and mechanical production of goods and not in human action at all. This point is more fully exposed in the work on Leach, Morris and Read in chapter seven.

These making activities are somehow related to things which sit in galleries, bookstores, kitchens, museums, on roads, and in plazas. In a very simple sense, they exist in the world; we bump into some of them and break or lose others; still others we see in cinemas or read in books. My question is, "What, if anything, does an account of the intelligible aspects of human consciousness have to do with these things?" One aspect of Collingwood's thought which deserves attention is the idea of "fusing" which he mentions a number of times but never articulates. I shall discuss this type of subject in my analysis of the agent's experience in chapter ten although by that time, I shall have completely abandoned use of Collingwood's epistemology and metaphysic.

When we say that ideas do stop people in their tracks, or that they make potters undertake some actions and not others, I claim that this language can legitimately be used in a studio for example. This is not because ideas are located in a mind which can control and guide actions of the body which is something different than the mind. It has rather to do with the way language is used to describe complex human actions. Collingwood is a clear example of the form of philosophical thinking which posits opposites as having no possibility of intersection, interaction, or identity. This stance is one with which I take umbrage. Although this type of stance is quite common, not only in the history of philosophy, but also in daily life, my contention is that social place, money, politics, touch, love, pain and such diverse emotional, social, physical, intellectual, or psychological aspects of human life do play a role in what the aesthetic is; it is not pure. The distinction between craft and art, or of its deeper counterpart aesthetic and non-aesthetic, is not exhaustive and exclusive. There are situations in which it is an exclusive distinction and others in which it may be exhaustive. This is due in large part to the roles assigned to the language and the purposes for which a given differentiation is established. My contention is that polar distinctions like this help delineate and expose a field or range of objects, events, thoughts or experiences, but should not themselves be taken as reflecting essential differences. Rather than considering this language as illustrating essences, I prefer to see it as directing attention, influencing judgment, shifting focus, orienting perspective, highlighting nuances, etc. In part, what I am talking about is the language we use to discuss diverse human behaviour, interests, or undertakings for example, and in part I am talking about what goes on in a variety of activities and artifacts which we *call* `aesthetic'.

I take Collingwood at his word that notions like pure imagination, pure aesthetics, pure craft etc., are "abstract notions". If this language is taken as reflecting the world in itself, then these distinctions bifurcate concrete things and experience, and disorient attention away from a rich treasure of artifacts. He held that these notions were forms of error which the mind held as false ideas. I think that phrases like `abstract notion' in his work may be seen as ciphers by which a deeper problem may be decoded. That is, just as he argued that certain limited ideas are inherently false when the mind takes them as adequate representations of concrete things, I would argue that this kind of language, i.e., the kind that is assumed to be referring to the singular essences of things, is inherently misleading. If one accepts that the language which describes a given case is basically true, independently not only of *this* case but of cases generally, then one's language has become "abstract", i.e., fundamentally a form of error.

I will use the words `human' and `person' to focus attention away from the standard mind/body, conscious/unconscious, thought/matter, either/or orientation and point toward another set of ideas which encompass terms like `person' for example. My main reason for doing so is twofold: firstly, terms like `human' and `person' override the mind-body polarity and encompass diverse and occasionally paradoxical or contradictory notions; and secondly, it is not a clean and self-contained idea but rather one with ragged edges, occasionally no edges, and no necessary centre around which everything must revolve. Terms like these allow me to include as part of an explanation of action, diverse notions such as motive, distraction, desire, social place, skill, perspective, education, culture, and intuition, all as part of one explanation.

The limit to Collingwood's account of the craft/art distinction rests in his positing all his mutually exclusive distinctions within consciousness. This is compounded by his definition of art exclusively as "expression" and of craft by reference primarily to a preestablished sequence of thoughts. Once he has defined the classical idea of art in such a way that it presupposes a rationalist concept of reality, and consequently, that the definitions of the related ideas of technique, form and matter depend on the belief that reality is and may be made to be intelligible, he provides an account which gives craft a great deal of power with respect to fabrication, but renders it sterile with respect to innovation and originality.

I will summarize my concerns and criticisms about the interlocking relations of Collingwood's expressive theory of art. My remarks are general: firstly, since expression is defined as an act of consciousness which is taken to be a cognitive act, and since art is the emotional charge on this act, and since all craft is a form of cognitive act, all craft has the emotional charge appropriate to its action and to its knowledge. No crafted making is emotion-free; indeed, no human undertaking which has any cognitive element is emotion-free, a position Collingwood accepted. *Every* psychic, conscious, and intellectual reaction or undertaking has an emotional expression.(**PA** 230-68, 285, etc.) The role of the words `art', `expression' and `emotion' become so broadly used in this set-up that they lose virtually all their specificity of meaning. The strongest and consequently the most inane philosophical statement he makes on this openness is, "Every utterance and every gesture that each one of us makes is a work of art."(**PA** 285) Secondly, the main problems with the expressive theory of art as delineated by Collingwood are as follows: 1. that all persons are artists, which seems blatantly not true except by definition; 2. that art is solely a form of consciousness, which leaves one unable to grasp at all the vast tradition which accepts that paintings, pots and poems are art; 3. that imagination, while seeming to have only one simple function, is actually a complex of activities; 4. that bodily expression (i.e. the making of artifacts) is also simple, while it seems clear that it is complex; 5. that the intellect does not, by definition, contribute to art qua art; this implies that art has no meaning, since the intellect is the source of concepts and judgments; 6. that an expression, in particular the complex bodily actions, does not evoke, induce or contribute to the development of other expressions, when it seems obvious that the actual physical work which artists perform does shape what is expressed, how it is expressed, and what audiences experience.

Before moving on to my own thoughts, I will make a few remarks on the positive aspects of Collingwood's work for understanding both craft and art. My reason for doing so is that I accept that he made a very significant contribution to the contemporary world of aesthetics, even though his basic idealist stance is unacceptable. The language that he used, and the focal points of his work are quite insightful; the application of these notions, the showing how these ideas work, and in what way his theory might render his language intelligible, is the point of breakdown.

For example, he does also assert that artists work in social, political and specific historical times and places, and that these factors influence the form and specificity of emotion which an artist expresses, and which audiences may garner from and through artwork. There is recent work done in

aesthetic theory, most notably by Dickie and Danto, which richly exploits this approach to aesthetics. They do so in ways unlike Collingwood, but much of the importance of social institutions and the "conferring" of status was hinted at in Collingwood's work.

In some of his later work on epistemology, he also contends that the foundations of thought, those unassailable pillars on which argumentative thought rests, may themselves be subject to change. Had this been developed we might have seen a significant impact in the long run on his definitions.

His emphasis on the cleansing effect of artistic activity and on the resolution of problems related to the corruption of consciousness are certainly small doorways into the moral features inherent in deep human activity, and also into the present practices which art therapists undertake as they use the expressive features of art as one channel into the troubled minds of the emotionally and mentally disturbed patient.

His recognition of the activity of "fusing" and "conscious bodily expression", in which the creative aspects of consciousness, bodily activity and the bodily work of art are intermingled, is one facet of his work which I will discuss later, and it has some significant promise.

His profile of the features of craft is most helpful if one attempts to understand certain industrial modes of production, and to distinguish them from either the small shop or the studio artist/craftsperson.

On one last note of recognition of his contributions, and this is a point to which I shall return later in this work, I would say that the idea that there are *no* knowledge or structural preconditions for art has certainly seen significant growth within the production of art objects in this century. Moving from Duchamp's *Fountain* -- in which the urinal is not only *not* a copy or imitation of anything at all, it *is* the urinal. Its being and its appearance as a urinal are the same, yet this is not what makes it art -- through the seemingly innumerable types of expressionist, abstract, deconstructionist, minimalist, conceptualist, post-modern work, etc., one sees that Collingwood's insight was astute relative to what has happened in the formal and institutional movements of art.

It seems to me that if one were to take Collingwood's stance not as a definition or description of art per se, there may be even more to garner. For example, if one were to place his arguments about expression relative to the object-governed or imitative theories of art, one can see that his contribution to aesthetic theory lies in his positing "emotion" linked to "expression". One could take a stance similar to Tatarkiewicz when he suggests that extending the concept of art through a variety of steps more accurately portrays its full extent in human life. While Tatarkiewicz offers a definition, it is most assuredly variable in its application, and indicative of an approach I consider to be useful.[102]

2. Legacies

The first step in setting such a groundwork is to deal with mythic paradigms and models in order to illustrate the general and theoretical pictures I do not accept as the grounds for explanation for certain phenomena and categories. These are called `mythic' because they operate as global representations which offer what might be called the `sense' or `grounding' for many diverse explanations of experiences of broad cultural groups. Having portrayed what I take to be the overviews and orientations which I think do not do justice to classifying experience and artifacts, I find myself in the unenviable position of not having a particular world view or long-standing tradition within which what I do want to say can be said. I find myself with the words but without

[102]H. Tatartkiewicz, *What is Art? The Problem of Definition Today*, **British Journal of Aesthetics**, vol. 2, #2, Spring 1971, 134-53.

the ancestral and customary contexts that provide the various meanings and contact surfaces for the words. I shall refer to the writing of Leach and Rawson and to certain contemporary ceramics journals, and thereby posit a context which helps disclose language frameworks by which I can get at the assorted experiences I wish to discuss.

2.1

The three most evident statements concerning the nature of art which claim that it follows the classical pattern are: that art is the copying or mirroring of nature; that art is the imitation of, or that it has a mimetic relationship to, nature or reality; and that art is representational. These three statements state not only a theory of art; they also express a theory of knowledge and bring forth a theory of reality.[103] It is important to recognize that each of these statements assumes a relation of similitude between the two elements in the relationship. For something to imitate, copy or represent another thing, it is assumed that the one must resemble the other. In this form of art, the artist makes one thing which is like another. In epistemology, one can form thoughts of objects because something in the thought is like that of which it is the thought. In classical metaphysics, a thing achieves a level of perfection insofar as it is like that which is more real or perfect.

The basis of these ideas is expressed in Platonic ontology to the effect that individual things are not real, and that Forms are. Individual things participate in the Form of which they are members. This participation is variously called `imitation', `copying', or `*mimesis*', and serves as the pivotal image from which other meanings for this language might be derived. Judeo-Christian thought intimates a similar relationship between God and humanity, i.e., "man" is made in the image of God.[104] My point here is that both of these traditions have accepted and spread the idea that an individual attains increased reality or perfection by virtue of an imitative relationship with that which is most real. They have communicated throughout the history of western thought that there are degrees or levels of reality or perfection, and that imitating higher degrees of reality was more

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[103]For example, note Arthur O. Lovejoy. **The Great Chain of Being** (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1960), 24-66, 288-314.

[104]Eric Auerbach, **Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature**, trans. W.R. Trask (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), 23: "We have compared these two texts, and, with them, the two kinds of style they embody, in order to reach a starting point for an investigation into literary representation in European culture. The two styles in their opposition, represent basic types: on the one hand (Homeric - Greek) fully externalized description, uniform illumination, uninterrupted connection, free expression, all events in the foreground, displaying unmistakable meanings, few elements of historical development and of psychological perspective; on the other hand (Biblical - Old Testament), certain parts brought into high relief, others left obscure, abruptness, suggestive influence of the unexpressed, `background' quality, multiplicity of meanings and the need for interpretation, universal-historical claims, development of the concept of historical becoming, and pre-occupation with the problematic."

It is important to note two other difference between the traditions: in Christendom, God is conceived as having a *purpose* for the creation of all things, *telos*; in the ancient world the notion of matter as developed by Aristotle was such that it did not have to be created, but was coextensive with form. Note, "It is to be remembered that it was equally a part of orthodox religion and morals that man is to imitate God, to seek, so far as he may, even in this life, to reflect the divine attributes; and that it was not less a part if the classical tradition in aesthetics that art should imitate nature. . .[T]he human artist must copy not only the products but, in so far as he can, the methods of the Master Craftsman [God]". Lovejoy, **The Great Chain of Being**, 295.

laudable and inherently better than imitating lesser levels of reality, because the more perfect was inherently and objectively good.[105]

Thus, it was that a potter was slightly better off than certain painters or poets because the painters could only imitate the surfaces of things which themselves were mere appearances, and inadequate imitations of more real things. The potters *at least* were able to think about the objects they would make and the function these objects would have. Thus it was, that the rulers of states were deemed to be more laudable that those ruled. Some poets could affect emotions, but to do so might have to concoct a story that not only was false but also that might be of a degrading subject. On the other hand, some painters were able to vindicate their art by painting a more laudable subject, e.g., the life of the gods or of various saints or whatever beings were deemed to have high order reality. Poets of course could do likewise. One would thereby see that philosopher kings were more valuable than the potters, because the object of their art was the Form of the ideal state and their knowledge was of the Forms themselves and ultimately the Form of the Good itself. The various gods and the demiourgos himself were even more exemplary because they held the Forms as their object of desire and pursuit and acted accordingly. A similar hierarchy is available for the Christian period as well.[106] These doctrines located nature, artifacts, individuals, groups, classes, wars, etc., in a hierarchical schema.

I have elaborated slightly on these legacies for two reasons, namely: that the mythic paradigms which they had as their world view or structure are still prevalent today, and Collingwood amongst others has offered explanations of ideas, actions and things by implicit reference to them. These explanations are deemed to be good, rational or intelligible because in some sense they fit into the overview of these mythic views. Secondly, I think that both of these great traditions have shaped basic values, orientations, suppositions and certain world views. They have held a demeaning view toward the human body, to individual material things, and even to the very notion of matter itself. As a result, actions, or facets of life which encompass these realities have been kept low on the scale of religious, philosophical, cultural, emotional, spiritual, and moral values. As Lovejoy has put the matter, "I mean the belief that both the genuinely `real' and the truly good are radically antithetic in their essential characteristics to anything found in man's natural life, in the ordinary course of human experience."[107]

I shall refer to certain examples to exemplify Collingwood's use of these structures. His notion that classical art is the employment of skill in the service of a preconceived end sits firmly on the image of the demiourgos and the other gods. The *demiourgos* made the world by looking to an unchanging form or pattern, *paradeigmatos*, which is apprehended by reason, *logos*. "The demiurge works upon already existing material. The model for the structure made is as we have observed, the eternal world of ideas."[108] The Forms of things are eternal, they have been known by the *psyché* and forgotten upon entry into the human or material form. The first step in *recollection* is a given. It is in the form of an inspiration or spark which cannot be explained, especially by reference to learned practices (or arts). Steps which follow the given are determined by the nature of the subject thought and the knowledge of its nature. Collingwood accepts that the first step of craft is a given and that knowledge of the idea of that thing determines the steps to be followed to bring it about.

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[105]Lovejoy, **The Great Chain of Being**, 24-66.

[106]Nahm, Milton. **Genius and Creativity: An Essay in the History of Ideas**. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965. In particular note Section I, *The Great Analogy*, 1-209.

[107]Lovejoy, **The Great Chain of Being**, 25.

[108]Nahm, **Genius and Creativity**, 69.

Collingwood took an idealist rather than a realist approach to this relation. His point was that it is the form of thought or consciousness to which one has recourse in the explanation of a making which defines the nature of the activity, and which classifies the thing made. It is of course at exactly this point that I have one of my major difficulties with his theory. I contend that he is unable to account for the making of the artifact itself. He can only ever say that since a given artifact was made, it must be the case that skill, in his classical sense, was employed. He kept the logic but not the metaphysic of the classical period. My further point is that the logic of the term `art' of the classical period gains its meaning from the metaphysic and the culture within which it had its home. I think that words like `skill', `perfection' or `excellence' (*telos*, for example) have also changed their specific meaning, and the ranges of experience for which they might have been useful in the classical model have shifted, and the grounds on which they sat have shifted. Some of the impact of the industrial revolution as illustrated in chapter seven, for example, reveals that new dialogue is necessary in order to grasp the new points of contact for this language. In more contemporary literature about ceramics, like that of Rawson with his emphasis on the profound importance of tradition and continuity in daily life, one sees that the language has a new anchor and does not ground itself in a metaphysic at all. It is this grounding in traditions and practices of people that lies at the heart of the model I wish to propose for understanding creative craft. The recent work of Hopper tends to avoid the metaphysical considerations, and often successfully marries the elements of form and decoration.[109]

2.2

Quite apart from the questions I might have about the applicability of this traditional language to a very modern set of problems, there are deep concerns I have within this traditional picture itself. The demiourgos and all the other gods have embarked on an endless task, namely, an ongoing emulation of the eternal. Thus, this paradigm has two major flaws insofar as one might want to use it as an explanatory model for craft. The demiourgos and other gods make the world, and craftworkers always make only artifacts, and although one may use the one as a metaphor for the other, they are constitutionally different insofar as the former is endless, and the *whole point of the latter is to attain precise objectives*. With respect to the making of the world, both the form and the matter are given and known by the gods, whereas with respect to making artifacts there are clearly at least two orders of ideas each of which is inadequately known. That is, the ideas which potters and other Platonic artisans have are of things which *themselves* are only appearances. Secondly, the fact that the Forms are eternal and that things made by art are not is very important, because the former serve as the standard by virtue of which the latter are measured. The Forms of Plato and the natural forms of Aristotle are seen as the structural elements of the real world. Human beings live in a world of which they themselves are not the cause. Things made by *techné* are human products, and a great deal of confusion rests in the attempting to sort out the limits of the *real* relative to the *artifactual*. I think that the classical model for art was based on the metaphysical ratio: just as things imitate their Forms so also does making imitate thinking. What Collingwood proposed was that even without any reference to the metaphysic of Plato, the model of imitation could still operate for the making called `craft'. My contention is that once one has abandoned the metaphysic, the actual content of the ideas changes dramatically, and must be considered in another light which he did not do.[110] A similar set of problems arises relative to the Judeo-Christian model.

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[109]Hopper, **Functional Pottery**, chapters one, two, and the conclusion.

[110]The works of Morris, Leach, Read, Rawson, Danto, Dickie do just this very thing. They place social structures, work, and conventions of daily life and institutional life as integral loci for the content. Remarking on new trends in the study of art history for example, A.L. Rees and F. Borzello remark, "At

2.3

In his outline of the idea of "creating", Collingwood rode a very fine line.

> The creation which theologians ascribe to God is peculiar in one way and only one. The peculiarity of the act by which God is said to create the world is sometimes supposed to lie in this, that God is said to create the world `out of nothing', that is to say, without there being previously any matter upon which he imposes a new form. But that is a confusion of thought. In that sense, all creation is out of nothing. The peculiarity which is ascribed to God is that in the case of his act there lacks not only a prerequisite in the shape of a matter to be transformed, but any prerequisite of any kind whatsoever.(**PA** 128-9)[111]

For the present, I shall deal with only two aspects of this insightful passage, and discuss their place in Collingwood's theory of art. He is clear that "out of nothing" means "without matter" and "with no prerequisite of any kind whatsoever". His point was that human beings create in the former sense but not in the latter. It is no easy matter to determine precisely what Collingwood meant by the word `matter' in cases like this. He variously replaces it in other phrases by words like "real"',(**PA** 128-40) "embodied" (**PA** 132), "that which can be given form", "bodily"(**PA** 300-10). He occasionally uses it as a metaphorical reference for the relations of consciousness to the content of consciousness, or of the various components of consciousness itself.(**PA** 231-34) The thrust of its use, however, is to avert the reader from thinking that an artist's activity has anything whatsoever to do with it. Relative to the word `create', the word `matter' is a steering word; it guides the reader away from images and thoughts that the artist is working with things and stuff as crass and mundane or common as matter, the world, the "external to consciousness", etc. The impact of his emphasis is very much in keeping with the idealist tradition in which he is usually properly placed. The severity of the rejection of the notion of matter made it virtually impossible for him to coherently discuss paintings, sculpture, theatre, etc., from a philosophical perspective. His attempt to deal with the place of the audience and the spectator is but one example, and his abortive attempt to describe "bodily expression" and "fusion" are others. He was incapable of dealing with works of art except insofar as they are present with or gave rise to expressed emotion. His concept of art was distinct from the classical, and by rejecting the notion of matter as part of his notion of art he was of course rejecting the classical metaphysic, but he was replacing it with the idealist ideology. In the former, what could be thought was determined by what was real; in the latter, what was real was determined by the nature of thought.

In its most elemental form, Collingwood's concept of art requires only feeling and consciousness to be understood. In fact, for him, art requires only feeling and consciousness. If one were to set aside for a moment the extent of his arguments and descriptors concerning the dialectic in **Speculum Mentis** and recall his emphasis that "[t]he work of art proper is something not seen or heard, but something imagined"(**PA** 142) and that "[a] work of art need not be what we should call a real thing. . .a work of art may be completely created when it has been created as a thing whose only

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present, the two most distinctive trends in the new art history are the interest in social aspects of art and the stress on theory. The strand in mainstream art history which tried to place art in its social context began from the art and worked outwards; the new form reverses the procedure, and looks from the social fabric to the art it produces." **The New Art History**, 8.

[111]In the course of this section, one may consider it useful to read certain ancillary works to gain a more expansive outlook concerning the issue of creation ex nihilo or with no prerequisites whatsoever. Charles Hartshorne, **The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neo-Classical Metaphysics** (Lasalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1962), 118-32; Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, **Philosophers Speak of God** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

place is in the artist's mind",(**PA** 130) then one begins to see a serious problem with the manner in which he responded to the legacy of classical doctrine. Unlike the orientation toward the assertion that there is objective reality the nature of which is in some sense intelligible to humanity, his affirmation is not only a denial of that, but is an endorsement of its opposite: that fundamental human value lies in a pure consciousness and its honesty with respect to feeling.[112] As a result, he proceeded beyond the idea that art simply did not entail any action necessarily bound to matter to the notion that "art properly so-called" *could not* involve any knowledge, plan or skill whatsoever. It is clear, however, from certain uses he makes of the word `create', that there are instances of creation which do involve significant forethought and planning.(**PA** 128-35)

The second meaning of his expression "out of nothing" provides me with another set of ideas which I think plague Collingwood's philosophy. For him it also means that the expression "with no prerequisite whatsoever" was an intelligible idea, and I think that some influence of this idea is detectable in his philosophy of art. I shall discuss this shortly because I think this idea has a variety of expressions in the modern age. Further, certain aspects of Judeo-Christian thought would be at variance with his thinking, and I think these Judeo-Christian ideas are insightful given his use of the word `creation', and its obvious links in western thought to actions of God.

One aspect of creation which Collingwood neglected to discuss as he outlined its features was the place that the Judeo-Christian tradition accorded to God's purposes in and for creation. Unlike the classical deities, this god created for a purpose, and the idea of purpose is quite out of keeping with Collingwood's assertion that the notion of creation per se has no purposive component to it. My reason for saying this at this time is to point out that, just as the gods of classical Greece had an endless job to do as they artfully shaped chaos in accordance with the forms -- a trait clearly missing with artisan potters -- so also, the Judeo-Christian god, capable of creating with no prerequisites whatsoever, had a purpose in doing so, unlike the artist described by Collingwood. This point is made in a slightly different fashion by Ginsberg when he notes that

> The Jewish and Christian tradition of a Creator provides useful contrast to this view of human creators. The Creator is credited with making the world out of nothing or out of chaos, but the human creator is born into a world that is already made and that continues to be made during one's lifetime. . .While the Creator had no restraints upon the manipulation of things. . .we must first develop skills in making and improve upon techniques learned.[113]

One of Collingwood's contributions to theory of art was his dogged insistence on what art was not. In doing this he stated an aesthetic position which approximated no prerequisites whatsoever with respect to knowledge insofar as art was concerned. Given his persistent reiteration that art was the creative edge of conscious activity, he systematically eliminated what he thought traditional art theory had set as necessary and sufficient conditions. Once one has accepted that there are no knowledge conditions whatsoever for art, and that there could not be, the field is wide open concerning judgments whether any and every object, action, or event, is or is not a work of art. I think on this point Collingwood would be obliged to acknowledge that any and every event is or could be a work of art.(**PA** 280-85) This I take to be the most telling weakness of the romantic or idealist expressive theory of the arts.

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[112]Peter Lewis, *Art, Fantasy and Corruption of Consciousness in Collingwood's* ***Principles of Art***, paper delivered to the **XIth International Congress in Aesthetics**, Nottingham, England, August 29 - September 2, 1988.

[113]Robert Ginsberg, *Creativity and Culture*, in **Creativity in Art, Religion, and Culture**, 99-100.

Apart from the Platonic idea that things imitate or participate in their Ideal Form, the classical idea of art requires that the *subject* which is copied be known before the art can be practiced. Knowledge of the subject of art is the sine qua non to the practicing of art; this knowledge foreshadows the plan of action by which the art is practiced. The subject of the art is a significant element of what gives the art its value, and the subject exists independently of any particular person or artifact, i.e., it is objective. This is clearly the case in Platonic thought, in political art, religious art and such types.[114] In the case of artifacts made with a specific utility but no subject, such as pottery, steam engines, houses and shoes, the substance of the thing's value is given by the value of the utility which it was designed to fulfil.

The contrast to this traditional theory of art or beauty is that "art is expression". Collingwood's articulation of the theory is slightly different than Croce's in that Collingwood posited the notion of an internal dialectic within consciousness, and this dialectic moved consciousness from a "pure" intuition to "action" and "assertion". He did not go as far as someone like Tolstoy who held that art was a form of communication of feeling, nor did he go as far as someone like Langer who held that the form of the emotion was expressed in the form of the work of art, and he did not put any of the early psychiatric notions of expression to use in spite of his account of corrupt consciousness. These latter ideas could have provided some avenues of interpretation for him, but that is the subject of another work.

The classical idea of art was seemingly based on the Platonic doctrine of imitation, an idea which has played a significant place in theories of art and beauty throughout all ages. Things or particular objects, general ideas and mathematics, all were judged to be beautiful by virtue of their imitative participation in the ideal Form; given that one had true knowledge of the Forms of things, one would thereby have the standard by virtue of which the true or beautiful thing could be brought about or made. Art was that knowledge which allowed the artist to bring about the instance of imitation most truly. The fundamental orientation of such an outlook is object-oriented, objective-knowledge governed, and set in a world in which the Forms of things and the nature of Beauty itself exist independently of human beings, and await discovery (or rediscovery) -- basically through recollection, which itself is based on the premise that all that is being discovered has been known before. Collingwood's theory of craft and that of many others is based on this premise: that which is made is a form of reproduction of what has already been known. In general, the theories of art which are based on imitation, representation, reproduction, replication, duplication, copying and information communication, for example, have taken this very strict but simple model as their paradigm.

The operative relational idea of this mode of thought is similitude or likeness between the thought and the thing. This idea has governed not only thought about art, but also a significant range of reflection on knowledge and truth as well. This relational idea actually has two components, and they have been brought to light throughout the years by a number of philosophers: they are identity and difference. In the tradition of philosophy, I think the most prominent thinker to articulate this with respect to a theory of reality was Spinoza, and with respect to the contemporary age the most prominent thinker to articulate this with respect to a theory of language was Wittgenstein in his early work. Collingwood's claim about craft is based on a two-levelled assumption, namely, that action can reproduce a thought in the form of an object or a feeling in the world, which is similar to the thought itself; further, that below or behind that assumption is the belief or acceptance that in some

[114]This is Collingwood's well articulated point concerning politically oriented artists, for example.(**PA** 273-85)

significant sense the world is itself conformable or identical with thought, and thereby constitutionally intelligible.

The definition of art as a form of imitation or representation has proven to be unsatisfactory over the years and this is certainly not surprising. It is unsatisfactory because not all art is imitative or representational; and art is not *only* imitative or representational; and that art which is representational is not necessarily only so. Further to these obvious considerations, the whole question as to what it might mean to say of an object that it imitates another, or is a representation of another, is decidedly unclear. By saying that this is unclear I do not want to say that much art is not representational; I believe a great deal is so. It is simply that language about imitation and representation does not mean only what it may have meant in the Platonic world or as was very acutely articulated in the **Tractatus**. Collingwood and others have used what I consider to be tunnel vision when it comes to presenting the classical theory of art; he saw only certain significantly rational elements as pertinent to his considerations. The three obvious considerations which he neglected to mention which I take to be important contributions to the classical idea are, the cultural place of artifacts and the fact that they are classified by cultural action, design and social roles for example, rather than by rational definition; secondly, the notion of *mania* and its intimate bond to knowledge; and thirdly, the unending task of the *demiourgos*, that work of *logos* dealing with *chaos* even with a view to the eternal Forms.[115] These points are not readily intelligible if one holds, as Collingwood did, that classical art is fundamentally a rational or goal-oriented knowledge which has the finished product as its *raison d'être*.

My point here is simple: even though language derivative from terms like *techné* has proven to last in English in its various by-products like `technology', `technocrat', etc., the term originally covered a range of activities which often bears little resemblance to the ranges of activities, undertakings and things covered by either the term `craft' or the terms `technique', `technological', etc., in the twentieth century. There are many other terms that cover these ranges, although one *could* use only the craft/art distinction to cover them if one had a *special reason* for doing so. For Plato, medicine, poetry, pottery, statesmanship, the art of war, raising children were all forms of *techné, but cooking was not*; even the work of the gods and of the demiourgos was a form of art. My reason for pointing this out is fourfold: firstly, the core thinking from which Collingwood abstracted was a diverse and rich history, and he eliminated a number of irreducible components like the activity of the muse or the endless activity of the demiourgos; secondly, the whole life of the civilization itself played a crucial and formative role in the place, value, and meaning of the activities undertaken by classical artisans; thirdly, the transition from a classical to an expressive notion should not be imagined as a progression or as a logical step, if indeed it is a transition at all. His explication should be viewed simply as an attempt to formulate subtle differentiations within an already narrowed field of inquiry;[116] and fourthly, the language itself dramatically influences what people theorize about and the manner in which they do so.

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[115]"The Philosopher is possessed by love, inspired by love. Love, eros, forces a man to continue his search for knowledge, to come closer and closer to a vision and understanding of reality, almost, as though from the point of view of the ordinary man he were out of his mind. . .Such is the madness of the philosopher ... it is the highest and best kind of divine madness." R.E. Carter, *Plato and Inspiration*, **Journal of the History of Philosophy**, v (1967), 116. This madness has several forms, the most perplexing of which is the combined gift of eros and recollection; note J. Pieper, **Love and Inspiration**, trans. R. and C. Winston, (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), 47-50.

[116]Note also Dawn Ades, *Reviewing Art History*, **The New Art History**, 11-18.

The term `expression' has a history and diversity of places in varying cultural and social contexts, and it seems to me to appear in a very abstract and highly intellectualized manner in Collingwood's work. This word has been used to convey such radically different subjects as the expressive nature of God or Nature and its relations to modes of existence in the philosophy of Spinoza, or to the formulation of a proposition as an expression of thought in the early work of Wittgenstein; it is used in psychiatric, theatrical, musical, emotional, literary, mathematical, cultural, anthropological contexts with equal ease, and displays specific locutionary force depending on the particulars of the case under consideration. It can be used as a term to be the direct negation of the term `thought', or the term to show an articulation of thought; it can be the term to designate an eruptive and instantaneous act of an impetuous child, or the term to designate a fundamental and long-standing trait of a whole culture or civilization. The same is true of words like `art'. Words like `art' frequently designate diverse phenomena such as artifacts which are pleasing, well-crafted, aesthetic, or insightfully designed, and performances or scripts for example which are emotional or irrational, as well as some aspect of artistic labour which is perfectly known, or insightful; and they may signify an expert, a genius, or someone who is particularly competent. A similar list for the word `craft' could easily be established.

In a certain mode of thought all verbal distinctions are abstract. What I mean by this is very simple. Language is not isomorphically related to the world or thought; there is not a word or sign for each discrete event, thing or thought, and sentences or propositions do not ideally express thought which itself is a mirror of the world.[117] Distinctions are signals that the world and experience are being viewed in certain ways and given certain values and structures. They may also be seen as ciphers to the code of a given universe of discourse. Certain language functions to draw attention to specific aspects of the world for particular undertakings, and it serves to orient ways of thinking and talking concerning special ranges of events, actions or things. The more singular the event or locution, the more difficult it is to be assured that one will be understood. This I take to be the point of Wittgenstein's remarks on the ostensive use of language.(**PI** 6) Language is a social and public phenomenon and a form of action in life. In light of this, it seems clear to me human beings employ language in eclectic, diverse, and unknown ways and that many of these uses shape how one sees the world, understands the world, and influences others to see the world.

In this way of thinking, distinctions such as the aesthetic/non-aesthetic, classical/expressive or craft/art may readily be seen in a new way. They are not obviously descriptions either of what specific artists throughout the ages have done, or of what may be considered as integral aspects of the activities abstractly so designated. It would seem that if I deny, as I do, that the language of these distinctions reflects or even *could* reflect the true or essential nature of the situation, then *I* surely should not be able to talk about the "integral aspects of the activities", as if they were somehow real and I am able to discern them where Collingwood could not. I choose, however, not to accept that only a realist or idealist account of things is acceptable. I choose not to accept that if one's approach to language is not based in essentialism, one must thereby be a nominalist. That is, by denying essentialism one is not bound thereby to accept that the use of words is arbitrary. These distinctions themselves are part of what I choose to undercut in saying that distinctions do not rest solely in the world, nor do they rest in the mind. Simultaneously, I do not accept that the distinctions which human beings make in language are solely verbal distinctions, as if there were no other set of

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[117]I take it that this is the point of G.W.F.Hegel's analysis of the "this" and the "that", the "here" and "now", and such words in chapter one of **The Phenomenology of Mind**, trans. J.B. Bailie (New York: Torchbooks, 1967), 149-60; and of Wittgenstein's later work for example, "That is to say: an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in *every* case." (**PI** 28)

alternatives, e.g., those governed by cultural, social, political, sexual, and economic considerations. There are many sets of alternatives and one should try to enunciate them whenever possible. In general terms, I accept that language has cultural and historical bases which are significantly more permanent that any particular individual, and they shape what the broad parameters of acceptable usage of words might be, yet in any particular cases and contexts words have specific meanings and uses which partially conform to general use, influence and change general use, add depth to the cultural place and meanings of specific words, and may also have extremely individual impact, influence, and meaning.

Chapter six has outlined the mythic legacies which lie behind the positions and analyses of the previous five chapters. It has contoured the basic orientation of stances like that of Collingwood as well that of the classical ideas and points out certain accompanying beliefs and values inherent in these postures, especially as they are directed to the human body, thought and matter. Chapter seven begins a new tack and presents a dialogue based on notions other than those of consciousness, sensation, expression and the like.

Chapter Seven

In contrast with the model of the preceding chapters, which used thinking consciousness either as a contrast for the innovative reality of art, or as bodily exemplification in craft, I now propose to look briefly at models for art and craft which take into account the notions of work, social place, the human personality, and ways of life, different categories of making, and the ideas of practice and discipline. Mintzberg makes a point in **The Harvard Business Review** in a significantly different field of study which helps make the shift to new ways of looking at these matters.

> Imagine someone planning strategy. What likely springs to mind is an image of orderly thinking. . .formulating courses of action that everyone else will implement on schedule. . .Now imagine someone "crafting" strategy. . .What springs to mind is not so much thinking and reason, as involvement, a feeling of intimacy and harmony with the materials at hand, developed through long experience and commitment.[118]

1. Craft, Art, and the Community

The word `craft', and craft activity itself, as well as the products of this particular human enterprise and labour, have also undergone a metamorphosis analogous to that which Collingwood claimed for the term `art'. In part, this chapter is designed to introduce new models by which one may place what I call these new features relative to the classical model and relative to the modern world of craft. This chapter will begin to touch on the deeper and wider reaching potency in crafts, as complexes of human activities and as ranges of things. The language that I shall use is an elaboration of that introduced by Herbert Read with reference to what he called "abstract" art on the one hand and "humanistic" art on the other, and of that put forward by Bernard Leach in his recognition of what he called the "individual" craftsman. This and the next three chapters will illustrate a humanist concept of craft using the studio potter as the prototype.

The primary stake to which I shall lay claim in this chapter is designed to redirect attention from the "objective reality" or "self-conscious emotionalism" of the classical term `art' and the idealist term `art'. I am channeling thought into a new path. My focal point from this moment on, by avoiding the Scylla and Charybdis inherent in these two forms of essentialism, is to contribute to a theory of creative craft. I contend that by using the model of a modern studio-potter, one can see in what way this new idea makes sense. The notion of "creative craft" is contradictory for Collingwood and I think for the general concept of craft in much of post nineteenth century thought. It is not so for the extensive modern crafts communities in the west. As I reinforce the notion that craft may be creative, I deliberately set out to avoid the radical point of view stated by Poe and the Bauhaus for example, and occasionally by Morris, namely, that all art *is* simply craft and that thereby art is simply the following of the preconceived plan with a mathematical rigidity.[119] Modern western

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[118]Henry Mintzberg, *Crafting Strategies*, 66.

[119]"One day on one of my Saturday trips I landed in Weimar, visited the art school there, and ran across the Feininger wood-cut on the proclamation that Walter Gropius had pinned to the wall . . .`Architects, sculptors, painters, we must all turn to the crafts. Art is not a profession, there is no essential difference between the artist and the craftsman. In rare moments of inspiration, moments beyond the control of his will, the grace of heaven may cause his work to blossom into art. But proficiency in his craft is essential to every artist. Therein lies the source of creative imagination. Let us create a new guild of craftsmen

crafts communities have been struggling with the traditional distinction outlined by Collingwood. There is uncertainty about the relationships between the communities' concerns for excellence of craftsmanship and their desire to design freely. There is no clear notion about the relation of utility and beauty, and the role of intention in contemporary artifacts. The complex relations of tradition and innovation relative to practice, function, social place, techniques and artifacts are not defined.

It is not possible within the confines of this work to cover all aspects of the concerns and interests of this community. My dominant interest is to cultivate an enriched language about craft which typifies craft processes and products as a creative and imaginative venture.[120] By doing this, I hope to encourage an understanding of what the artistic aspect of modern crafts is, without simultaneously negating skill, functionalism, excellence, or the means-end relationship.

Bernard Leach, the foremost pioneer of modern pottery in the west, continued the spirit of and created a heart for the activities of the early Arts and Crafts Movement. His work with Hamada lead him to instantiate certain trends of the movement begun in the times of Morris, supported by Sir Herbert Read and implicitly by the Bauhaus, and carried on into the present age by the ongoing work of the local, national, and international crafts organizations. I shall briefly outline the work and considerations of these thinkers for three reasons: firstly, Morris, and before him Ruskin, formulated ideas about craftsmanship and industry at the crest of social conflict which was part of the cultural reaction to the industrial revolution, and they were also key intellectual players in the Arts and Crafts Movement of the late nineteenth century which promoted specific values and elaborated ideas about art, craft, industry and work as they fit into ways of life. These ideas and movements affect many modern artists and craftspeople, and they have their world-wide contemporary counterparts in the various national and international councils on crafts and craftsmanship. These values can be exemplified in part by the integrative aspects of Leach's thought. As well, there is the well-known link between the thinking of Ruskin and Collingwood. Collingwood accepted a great deal of Ruskin's thinking about imagination and creativity in the arts but did not follow Ruskin's moral and social stance on craftsmanship. Secondly, Read and certain traits of the Bauhaus movement display one significant way thinkers between the two world wars considered that potters, or craftspeople and artists generally, should adapt to the depth and extent of the industrial revolution. Read of course continued to write on these matters past the second world war, but the Bauhaus was eliminated by 1933. Thirdly, Leach has been most assuredly the dominant figure in the revival of studio pottery in the western world. I would define the beginning of the modern age of studio pottery in the English speaking world as beginning with Leach's studio in St. Ives in the shadow of the first world war, and

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without the class distinctions which raise an arrogant barrier between the craftsman and artist." Marguerite Wildenhain **The Invisible Core**, 21-2; Bob Barnard, *Craft in a Muddle*, private MS; John Perrault, *Craft is Art*, **Ceramics Monthly**, vol. 36, #3, March 1988, 40-43; John Perrault, *Fear of Clay*, **Soho News** (New York), March 5, 1980.

[120]Correspondence, **Ceramics Monthly**, vol. 36, #5, May, #7, September, 1988; #8, October, 1988, etc.; Steve Irvine, *The Ontario Potters Association Permanent Collection*, **Fusion**, vol. 9, #2, 1985; Bob Barnard, *Comment*, **American Craft**, vol. 48, #5, October/November, 1988, 18, 66; Tanya Harrod, *The Pot as Product*, **Crafts**, #96, September/October, 1988, 16; Saskia Baron, *A Classic Case*, **Crafts**, #96, September/October, 1988, 23-5; Ted Gooden, *Thunder and Lightning*, **Ontario Craft**, vol. 13, #4, December, 1988, 13-15; Garth Clark, ed., **Ceramic Art: Comment and Review 1882-1977** (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1978); Sylvie Girard, *Ratilly: Hommage à Jeanne et Norbet Pierlot, potiers*, **la revue de la céramique et du verre**, #41, Juillet/Août, 1988, 23-51; Edward Lebow, *A Sense of Line*, **American Craft**, vol. 48, #1, February/March, 1988, 24-32; note also the editor's article in the same issue, *Banking on Art*, 48-53.

as it found its poetic expression in **A Potter's Book**.[121] The most obvious difference in the approaches of all of these thinkers relative to Collingwood's type of thinking, is that all of them are concerned with ways of life, the social aspects of knowledge, the economic and rationalist impacts of the industrial revolution on creative human undertakings in the arts and aesthetics. Needless to say, this chapter only skims the highlights of these thinkers, but does so to orient the direction that I want my presentation to take later in the work.

This chapter presents a new outlook concerning craft in general and pottery in particular. A conflict between craft and art arises also in this context, but the sources and locations of conflict, differentiation, and support are unlike those of the classical/romantic distinction. The emphasis in this section centres on the place of certain activities in social, institutional, and cultural settings. This approach also finds certain contemporary supporters in aesthetics to whom I make occasional reference without invoking their full line of thought.

I shall refer to William Morris' work on the craft/art distinction, and then proceed to Read, discussing Leach last. Leach was thoroughly familiar with the work of Morris and Read and frequently acknowledged their influence on his thoughts. These three thinkers serve two purposes in my work. Firstly, they direct attention to the role and value of work, human needs, and function in a changing society under the impact of the industrial revolution, and to the nature of automated and machine production systems, and a certain way of looking at the terms `craft' and `art' in light of this. Secondly, by portraying the work routines of small studios and individual potters or textile designers, they introduced a different category of maker -- the studio-craftsperson, artist-craftsperson, designer-craftsperson, individual craftsperson -- and Leach in particular personified this new idea. By doing this, they constructed a new model to render the language of the classical and expressive distinction more concrete. They also posited a new concept of craftsmanship in the same general time frame as Collingwood's notion of expression.

2. William Morris

> Morris was affronted by much of the `civilization' about him; not the least by the division, the rupture of art from work, of artist from worker, of designer from builder. He believed that we all have it in us to be creative. Creativity, he held, is not the preserve of artists alone, "that talk of inspiration is sheer nonsense, I may tell you flat. . .there is no such thing, it is a mere matter of craftsmanship." For him, craftsmanship entails fellowship; expressly the collaborative making of Gothic architecture.[122]

The finely detailed fabrics and designs which Morris produced in the late nineteenth century revealed two characteristics of his notion of work that are relevant for my purposes. The first is that labour should be controlled within small work situations wherein individual human beings did not lose their sense of worth with respect to their own society and their productive place in it. The second is that objects which are made by these integrated craft production processes should be

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[121]Much of contemporary studio pottery, and ceramics generally, can be placed within or opposed to the Leach legacy; it is not my intention to deal with the contemporary scene, which for now I define as post 1970, with the resurgence of the crafts movements, the upsurge of ceramic artists like Autio and Voulkos on the one hand, and the reemergence of functional work in North America under the influence of Rhodes and Hopper.

[122]Teresa Newman et al., **William Morris Today: 1 March - 29 April 1984** (London: The Institute of Contemporary Arts, 1984), 45. Note also pages 88-97. This work is designated **Today** and references are in the text.

objects which fit into the needs of common or daily life.[123] "The thing which I understand by real art is the expression by man of his pleasure in work."(**AS** 50) He contended that labour was one of the basic sources of self-value for human beings and he asserted that individual control over a way of life which encompassed a limited means of production was morally uplifting and good for the human spirit. He attested further that the things produced by such an undertaking would naturally fall into the overall needs of the community of which the labourers were members, and the quality of the things made would enrich and ensure the furtherance of the community's way of life and its mutually supportive cooperation. Labour and art were integrated and fulfilled both the workers and the community of which they were members. His points of emphasis were not as much about the control of the means of production and the products made, as about the form, locale, and structure of the control. There should be control, yes, but more importantly the control should that of individuals integrated within the communities in which they lived.

Prior to Collingwood's having written **The Principles**, and in keeping with many of the moral demands in Ruskin's work, Morris elaborated a notion of crafts and craftsmanship which were dramatically opposed to the prevailing notion of industrial workmanship. With respect to the role of human labour in industry, Morris contended that the model for work that industry used was fundamentally demeaning to humanity because it was abstract. By this he meant something very straightforward; industrial labour was regarded as one functional element in a monolithic previously organized structure of the means of production. Individual human beings were viewed as factors within a larger productive process and serving only one function. The one function was an activity which forcibly fit into a system of production which was governed by automated processes which were governed by the use of machines. In this picture, the human labourer was regarded as comparable to a machine or even part of a machine. Each elemental part was taken as having one function, and the ideal case was that in which each element fit into a preestablished whole. The production of goods was automated, and the role of individual hand labour and unique daily human values were viewed as being irrelevant to the production of these goods.

> Whereas the incentive to labour is usually assumed to be the necessity of earning a livelihood, and whereas in our modern society this is really the only incentive amongst those of the working-class who produce wares of which some art is supposed to form a part, it is impossible that men working in this manner should produce genuine works of art.(**AS** 208)
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> Almost all goods are made apart from the life of those who use them; we are not responsible for them, our will has no part in their production, except so far as we form a part of the market on which they can be forced for the profit of the capitalist whose money is employed in producing them.(**AS** 221)

He contended that with the rise of industrial capitalism and a functional view of labour, art had become separated from common life, and the products of labour were fundamentally unrelated to basic needs that communities had.(**AS** 229-44) He argued that industrial labour and its products were rationalized to automated processes, and that these processes ran independently of the daily values and needs of common people. For him, because art was a form of human activity which gave rise to certain fundamental pleasures in both work and use, the industrial or commercial view of labour divorced art from work, and from daily life. With the advent of industrial means of production, what he called the "proper" place of individual labour and the satisfaction in it, had become displaced. He argued that art and labour had been separated by a fundamental chasm based

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[123]William Morris, **On Art and Socialism**, Introduction by Holbrook Jackson (London: John Lehman, 1947.) Hereafter this work is designated **AS** and references are to pages, unless otherwise noted.

on the alienating effect of the industrial revolution's production systems. Labour was no longer viewed by the culture of the time as local artistic handwork with the many imaginative idiosyncrasies that this entailed. He argued that labour was dominated by external commercial and industrial forces and was reduced to the value of money.[124]

> To the commercial producer the actual wares are nothing; their adventures in the market are everything. To the artist, the wares are everything; his market he need not trouble himself about; for he is asked by other artists to do what he does do.(**AS** 239)

No longer would the average person find pleasure and art in work; pleasure could only be pursued in avocations.

Morris claimed that art had become special and craft had become automated. His contention was that the term `craft' came to be used for that range of objects and techniques which were like the artifacts and procedures of industrial production. The prime focus for this shift was the belief that the *function* of an object defined the object. The function of an object was seen as determining the form and finish of the object and means of production were established reproduce that constant relationship between function, form, and finish. Because objects conceived for automated production were taken as having only one function, they were defined by that function. A standard means of manufacturing could thereby be devised. Many objects which performed certain common functions in the view of the industrialist, like water jugs, teapots, and buggy wheels, were standardized with respect to form, materials, design, and manufacture. For certain already existing objects which could be reproduced, like the now famous Wedgewood Portland vase, a manufacturing system was developed to reproduce it. This did not readily happen for painting and sculpture for example and the rift between the two categories -- the reproducible and the unique -- became irreparable. These latter artifacts were held as distinct from the industrial model of labour and they were viewed as having a unique value. Their uniqueness lay in the inability of the industrial manufacturing system to copy them. Morris contended that the industrial model served for *production* on the one hand, and for *explanation* on the other. Those objects which could be "explained" by reference to the industrial model could not be art by this new way of thinking. This is relevant to my interest in Collingwood because certain procedures *can* be standardized for producing "craft" objects. These craft artifacts are then judged to be unrelated to the production activities of the other range of artifacts, viz., art. Morris went on to argue that the separation of the types of work, one in leisure and the other for money, further polarized his society's grasp of the matter and made it less likely that people could gain an understanding of "true handicraft". The base of their work had itself been divided.

He further believed that with the industrial revolution a fundamental loss of a form of knowledge had occurred. He was emphatic about trying to revive it. This form of knowledge was art or handicraft. He did not accept, as Collingwood did, that the automated processes of industrial production were craft activities. He argued that craft was a form of knowledge which involved complex ways of life, local and individual work on items which fit into the intricate needs of the communities in which the workers lived. It was not solely a rational or automatic process which was "kicked into gear" for the production of a preconceived thing. It was a form of knowledge which expressed ways of life and the values inherent in them in the making of diverse things by hand or with very small scale means of production. This way of knowing was a social phenomenon and not reducible to a manufacturing or industrial model of commercial action. This stance is particularly important because it also did not refer to states of consciousness as the arbiter in such matters.

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[124]Bernard Leach, **A Potter's Book**, 1-27.

Insofar as art was deemed by Morris to be an individual expression in community,(**AS** 82-95) what he meant by the language he used has specific orientations. Even though the words themselves have an affinity to Collingwood's, their uses are radically different. When he argued that art should be (for him what it truly was) work that is free from external compulsion, a voluntary and individual undertaking, he was denying that the industrial model of automated labour and production adequately defined human life and artistry in community. Unlike Collingwood, he was not asserting that `craft' and `art' were polar notions, each of which could be explained by a reference to a certain state of consciousness; he was, rather, asserting that "art or handicraft" and the "industrial or capitalist" means of production were opposites. For him, "art/handicraft" was one activity, and was fundamentally opposed to the industrial means of production. He contended that the English culture had recently come to accept an inadequate idea of what art and industry were. The former had been relegated to describing either pleasurable productive activities which were separated from daily life(**AS** 215-18) or the objects of idle production which bore no integrated relationship with functional needs which common people had in the course of daily living.(**AS** 19ff.) In light of this, the notion of "art for art's sake" had a particular slant relative to his socialist ideology. It was not the complete autonomy of a particular form of consciousness, but rather it revealed a liberty with respect to economy or labour in the marketplace. "Handicraft", industrial craft, was reduced to the automated commercial reproduction of independently designed prototypes according to systematic means in which each part of the process had a function unique to itself. Each served only the over-all plan of fabrication. "Now, as the present system of production has transformed the handicraftsman into machine without will, so it turned the neighbour purchaser with good marketing faculties into a slave of the world-market -- a purse."(**AS** 214) The two aspects of Morris' ideal of art or handicraft which should be highlighted are firstly, that it is *pleasurable labour in production*, and secondly, it is the production of goods *useful to and integrated with the community* of which the artist is a member. He contends that these two facets of production have been increasingly divided between the end of the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries and that the epitome of their separation had brought about two distinct types of activities and production: the incidental production of beauty by an elite, and the mass production of objects conceived abstractly by their function.

In his own handicraft work, both with respect to design of work and with respect to work conditions themselves, he set out whenever possible to develop an integrated work system. Whether his own work exemplifies this harmony is not of immediate concern to me. I prefer to elaborate a little more fully what he viewed the desirable state of artistic production to be, and then to make comparisons with Collingwood.

Of his preferred art, Morris says,

> I have been speaking chiefly about architecture, because I look upon it, first as the foundation of all the arts, and next as an all-embracing art. All the furniture and ornament which goes to make up the complete unit of art, properly ornamented dwelling, is in some degree or other beset with the difficulties which hamper nowadays the satisfactory accomplishment of good and beautiful building. the decorative painter, the mosaicist, the window-artist, the cabinet-maker, the painter-hanging-maker, the potter, the weaver, all these have to fight with the traditional tendency of the epoch in their attempt to produce beauty rather than marketable finery, to put artistic finish on their work rather than trade finish.(**AS** 236-7)

Unlike Collingwood, he regarded aesthetics as integrated with social life and impossible to separate from social and economic conditions.(**AS** 96-114, 220-8) While it is true that he held that artistic labour was productive of a healthy society, and that this pleasurable labour was central to human well-being, he elaborated a subset of ideas which have played a significant role in post

nineteenth century theory of craft and the craft/art distinction. Some of these reflections are touched on by Collingwood, others are reacted to by Read and the Bauhaus, and some are instantiated by Leach's studio, and echoed from a different source in Yanagi's writing. His most operative idea around which others spin is that of a community and its needs. In what he deemed to be a wholesome society, artists/handworkers were members who helped to satisfy the diverse and many needs of the society. They did so in a lived and holistic sense, responding in their labour to the ongoing and commonly understood wishes, needs, aspirations, longings etc., of the society. In this picture, labour produced things responding to human concerns in society; with respect to objects which were produced, they were produced to satisfy a complex of needs -- these objects had a function, which was to do something for the members. They were not produced solely for one determinate and assigned function or utility as he contended the abstract objects of the manufacturers were. I will return to this point in chapters eight through ten because of my interest in function and the utilitarian aspects of pottery in the modern studio. They were also produced as an expression of the society itself, which is to say that the needs addressed by handicraft were also spiritual, moral, and generally fuller with respect to humanity than exemplified by a water jug, the sole possible function of which was to pour. For Morris, the notion of function is not governed by form, and vice versa. Rather, function embraces decoration, feel, balance, texture, and pleasure as well. He held an important distinction in this regard, namely, that the objects made by artists satisfied diverse exigencies which were expressed in the daily living of the society. *Unlike* the objects of industrial production, handicraft objects were *not* governed by a unitary function-profit relationship. The functions of the things made in such a fashion are considered only abstractly because the primary objective of the system was to produce objects for profit, and the object's function or utility was conceived only to serve this end. His claim was that function and utility should be viewed as diverse and essential to the daily life of the members of the community. The functions of such objects were conceived concretely, that is, from within the community itself to deal with the community itself, and not some other purpose. At first glance, this way of articulating the concept of art appears to be simply the classical model outlined by Collingwood and exemplified by ancient times. In any case, a study of the adequacy of Collingwood's theory of craft relative to the actual potters, stonemasons, painters etc., of the classical period is a separate issue and one which I choose to leave to another time. For Morris, the form of knowledge which the artist has is a way of acting, living, producing and expressing a relationship with society. "Each [artist/labourer] is conscious during his work of making a thing to be used by a man of like needs to himself."(**AS** 210) For Morris, handicraft is a way of life, an integral aspect of which is the production of useful things, an aspect of which is daily pleasure, and local individual participation in the collective life of the whole. Handicraft is not simply knowing how to do something, or to produce a preconceived and abstract object by following a set of steps.(**AS** 220-21)[125]

"For Morris `art' and `design' was not something that could be applied to or added to life and manufacture. Real art is inherent in the process and experience of making and living."(**Today** 88) Unlike Collingwood, he chose not to define `art' and `craft' by reference to specific forms of consciousness, or by opposing forms of consciousness, but rather he identified them within ways of life and widely based human needs, and opposed them to industrial modes of production, a capitalist concept of labour as a function of automation, and abstract functions.

> Now I say without hesitation that the purpose of applying art to articles of utility is twofold: first, to add beauty to the results of the work of man. . .secondly, to add pleasure to the work itself. . .[S]o I repeat again, if you dispense with applying art to

[125]Teresa Newman et al., **William Morris To-Day**, 129-36.

articles of utility, you will not have unnoticeable utilities, but utilities which bear with them the same sort of harm as blankets infected with the small-pox. . .(**AS** 229-30)

The point Morris makes time and again, which I take to be relevant in the late twentieth century for an understanding of craft, is that in the industrial model the term `craft' was relegated to automated procedures -- based on the machine model of labour and work -- and to objects which were defined by a function. This meant that the object was defined by its function and *if* there were any decoration for this object, it was "added". This was simply further evidence that beauty was considered to be unessential. For him, a major impact on society by the industrial workplace was that a split had been created between *function as utility* and *function as decoration or beauty*. We shall see that one of Leach's efforts was to overcome this distinction and to posit the idea of the artist/craftsperson. It is also a feature of certain contemporary studio potters.[126] Morris was clear in that he thought decoration on or in utilitarian objects was enriching to the human spirit. He could not establish the necessary link between a given utility and a given form of decoration. He thought that this link "arose" from within a wholesome society. I would go on to say that once this distinction (function/decoration) was made, and accepted as real by various communities, the modern crafts world has been hard pressed to show what the link is between the two poles.

As I shall indicate in chapters nine and ten, a better approach is not to look for the nature of the link between two separate and contrasting states, but rather to see how two ways of looking at one phenomenon reveal its depth and extent. Just as I deny the necessary link between a state of consciousness and a given artifact in Collingwood's theory of craft, so I also deny that one is obliged to try and find the link between utility and decoration. It is a little bit like asking a question about *the* relationship between colour and shape, or about the relationship between the frame of a painting and the subject of that same painting. Certain terms and concepts may be misapplied even when it may appear that they go hand in hand. In fact, Morris frequently noted that one of the problems with capitalist-produced objects was that their manufacturers would often add what was called "decoration" to an object designed to satisfy an abstract function. For him, since the function of the piece was conceived only abstractly, i.e., for profit and not for the daily needs of a given community in a given place, then any decoration that was added to the object would also have been conceived abstractly, and not aesthetically a part of the whole piece.

Try to understand what I mean: you want a ewer and basin, say: you go into a shop and buy one. . .Well, you look at several, and one interests you about as much as another -- that is, not at all; and at last in mere weariness you say, "Well, that will do";. . .[T]he said ornament gives you no pleasure, still less any idea; it only gives you an impression (a mighty dull one) of a bedroom.(**AS** 238)

For Morris, a *whole* piece is that one made by artistic labour in cooperative social settings. Objects which meet this social and practical need have aesthetic value in their artistic and social contribution. Because the object of automated capitalist production would not have been created in a unified society, one in which the members know the daily actual needs and aspirations of the other members, the object and the added decoration would have no *possibility* of unity, beauty or harmony. One must recognize that the language he used is not entirely suited to the purpose which I think he had in mind to express. His stance concerning decoration is that in the ideal social and

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[126]Christopher Frayling and Helen Snowdon, *Crafts: With or Without Arts?* **Crafts**, #55, March/April 1982, 24-5; Ann Duncan, *Flame of Inspiration Shapes Porcelain*, **The Gazette** (Montréal), D-6, Saturday, August 29, 1987; Astrid Brunner, *International Stained Glass Design Seminar*, **Fusion**, vol. 9, #2, 1985, 17-20.

economic structure, decoration enriches the particular life of the community in which the objects were made and is not simply added to a preexisting thing.

The distinction held here is one which plagues much thinking about the distinction between decoration and utility on the one hand, and the decorative arts and the fine arts on the other.[127] Suffice it to say for the present that Read's distinction discussed in the next section of this chapter reveals a problem in this form of thinking. This dichotomy has certain parallels in other debates in philosophical circles and I think is symptomatic of certain overriding philosophical legacies we have inherited. As Cook has remarked,

> The problem is rather like that of getting substance and quality to lie down together again: the separation has been so prolonged as now to be virtually in the nature of things. In each case the difficulty seems to be that we have saddled ourselves with a pair of spurious entities. In the latter case it is the `bare particular' and qualities designed to `clothe' it; in the former case it is the `body' and `private objects'.[128]

Distinctions like this have considerable force. The form/finish and function/decoration(beauty) distinctions are implicit in many discussions concerning the place of "finish" in what is called `functional' work in the potter's studio. One contribution I hope to make with this thesis is to get function-beauty and craft-art back into bed together again. Another is to show that they are not simply together as one plus one. One may use this distinction for a variety of reasons as illustrated by Morris' remarks on both the abstract nature of function in the industrial model, and his assertion that in this mode of production decoration is simply something that is "added".

3. Read: Industry and the Artist-Craftsman

> Or one might ask whether man can find in machine production sufficient exercise for his constructive faculties for that structural science which is one element in all art. Or from still another angle one might ask what is the function of the artist in the machine age?. . .Our discussion of the general nature of art has left us with two distinct types: *humanistic art*, which is concerned with the expression in plastic form of the human ideals or emotions; and *abstract art*, or nonfigurative art, which has no concern beyond making objects whose plastic form appeals to aesthetic sensibility.[129]

It is noteworthy that while Read used the language of the classical period and gave significant value to the idea of form, he clearly recognized that aesthetic sensibility was not restricted to the immediacy of consciousness. In fact, he argued that there was an aesthetic appreciation possible with respect to rational activity and objects produced by such activity, e.g., industrial manufacturing.

> Whenever the final product of the machine is designed or determined by anyone sensitive to formal values, that product can and does become an abstract work of art in the subtler sense of the term. It is only the general confusion between art and ornament and the general inability to see the distinction between humanistic and abstract art, and the further difference between rational abstraction and intuitional abstraction, that prevents us regarding many of the existing products of the machine age as works of art, and prevents us from conceiving the endless possibilities in machine art.(**AI** 38)

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[127]Steve Irvine, *Pattern and Surface Decoration*, **Fusion**, vol. 8, #2, 1984, 2-3; Nancy Solway, *Decoration*, **Fusion**, vol. 8, #2, 1984, 4.

[128]Cook, *Human Beings*, 150-1.

[129]Herbert Read, **Art and Industry: The Principles of Industrial Design** (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961) 35-6; hereafter this work is designated **AI**; Herbert Read, **The Meaning of Art** (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1931); hereafter this work is designated **MOA**.

In partial contrast to Morris and the movements which followed him, Read articulated an attempt to harmonize the effects and demands of the industrial revolution and traditional crafts and arts. Read correctly noted that the Bauhaus movement shared his general stand concerning these matters. Unlike Morris, the Bauhaus and Read did not oppose the over-all movements which are called the industrial revolution. Read sought to form links which would be profitable to the artists and to the social order at the same time. He accepted that the changes in the various means of production were not inherently evil or demeaning to humanity. Read did, however, agree with one fundamental idea of Morris' which was that the functional objects produced by the new modes of production should integrate fully with social and human needs, and that the means of production should not themselves control what society received as goods. His proposal was that craftspeople and artists should be placed as the designers of industrial goods and processes.

Read articulated and defended a position quite different from that of Morris, yet one which had a certain sympathy with Collingwood. Unlike Morris, he did not regard either the ability of industry to produce goods by automated procedures, or the division of art into two types to be a fundamental problem. Read did not, in a word, accept Morris' stance that art was *only* the communities self-determined pleasurable production of goods for its own use. He accepted that social usefulness in objects could be achieved by the industrial system. To be able to make this possible, he placed craftspeople as designers in the industrial context to ensure that usefulness was not simply formal, but that these useful objects enhanced sensibility.

Within his overview of a twofold function of art, he proposed: that goods made for use may appeal to aesthetic sensibility and could be made according to rational and mechanical means; and that certain things could be made specifically to express human feelings, values and aspirations, and that these items would be made by individual means of production and design. Read acknowledges explicitly that there are at least three modes of activity involved in art, one specifically related to industrial production, another covering the aspect of design in the production setting, and a third dealing with humanistic or individual making. With respect to aesthetic sensibility, he stipulated that good design was central in any form of production of these items, and that aesthetic sensibility was at the heart of design.

In **Art and Industry**, Read outlines the conflicts which have arisen between the art and industry mentalities. He makes certain constructive suggestions concerning possible relations and inderdependencies.

> [M]y contention is then that the utilitarian arts - that is to say, objects designed primarily for use - appeal to the aesthetic sensibility as *abstract art*. . .Since what I have called rational abstraction in art is measurable, and resolves into numerical laws, it is obvious that the machine, which works to adjustment and measure, can produce with unfailing and
> precision. . .The artist is the individual. . .who decides the proportions to which the machine works. His problem is to adapt the laws of symmetry and proportion to the functional form of the object being made.(**AI** 36-7)

What I will focus on here is his two-fold emphasis on the role of the artist, namely: 1. as the designer of form and grace; 2. the determiner of the aesthetic. He regards both of these as creative and imaginative activities which can and should be more fully integrated with industrial production. Both of these clearly exhibit the need for planning and intention. But it is not this side of the coin which concerns me; it is rather that the artist-designer in this context is governed by the rational mechanical model. This seems to me quite clearly the classical notion of craft at play. Read was clearly aware of this as he asserts,

> The abstract artist (who may often be identical with the engineer or the technician) must be given a place in all industries in which he is not already established, and his decision on all questions of design must be final. . .
> The Bauhaus accepted the machine as the essentially modern vehicle of form and sought to come to terms with it. Its workshops were really laboratories in which practical designs for present-day goods were conscientiously worked out as models for mass production, and were continually being improved upon.(**AI** 43)

A certain stance may be made clear which presents Read's and the Bauhaus' perspective on how art, craft and industry should and can relate most fully. Within the industrial production setting, an artist would be that *human* instigator of design, form, composition, colour, etc., that would establish in an unquestioned fashion the total range of design elements for the product to be made. That is, the object would have been conceived in the abstract in the first instance, and the artist would render the vague idea specific. This would entail three components: firstly, aesthetic sensibility concerning the place and value of design in human feeling; secondly, the ability to render this sensibility into a rational plan for production; and thirdly, a knowledge and familiarity with the materials and procedures of production. "[L]ike Gropius and Mendelssohn. . .these men are artists in the fullest sense of the term -- not humanistic artists of course, but practical and abstract artists."(**AI** 40) This model is in great part based on the traditional notion of apprenticeship in which the master had a clearly delineated authority relationship with apprentices. This model is still frequently used in the Scandinavian countries in middle-sized factories, in the orient in large numbers of large craft factories, occasionally in Great Britain in certain well-established factory settings, but very rarely in North America. One point that bears noting, however, is that utility has a certain dominance in both Read's and the Bauhaus' thinking This point also returns to plague contemporary studio potters quite frequently because they are easily identified with the abstract artist. As has been remarked by a contemporary knife maker, "I think that function is the most important task for a craftsman, and that the basic issues of creative design to solve utilitarian ends are only really well addressed by craftspeople."[130] I shall return to query the dominance of function and form in craftsmanship and studio work in chapters eight, nine, and eleven.

> The true kind of artist, the only kind of artist we want apart from the humanistic artist (painters of landscapes, portraits, modellers of war memorials, etc.), is merely the workman with the best aptitude for design. That has always been recognized in one industry -- building, where we call the designer by the special name of

[130]Adam Smith quoted in Anna Kohn et al., *Is Function Good Form?*, **Ontario Craft**, vol. 14, #2, June 1989, 15.

architect (i.e., literally, master builder, leading craftsman). What we need is the recognition of the architect in every industry.(**AI** 116)[131]

One assumption of this model is that the *master* has not only the capacity to do what rules permit, that the master knows how to do fundamentally anything which the medium and techniques permit, that the master has the overall capacity to control a large diverse production system in a general way and in particular, but also and for my purposes more importantly, that the *master* has the intuitive sensibility to grasp design, form, function, and their various interrelations. The master knows how they interweave with the sensibilities of the culture or people of which they form a part. *Mastery* is not simply control of technique and steps in a foreordained plan, it is also intuition and insight coupled with aesthetic sensibility.(**AI** 103-118, **MOA** 4-6, 14-23) In my opinion, however, Read's use of the word `merely' tends to ally the dominance of the manufacturing model with the classical notion of an artisan. *My* intention is to emphasize this facet of the individual craftsperson's achievements.

For Read, the artist, whether the abstract or the humanist, has aesthetic sensibility which is expressed in one of these two modes of presentation. This aesthetic sensibility is the given.

> Judge the art of a country, judge the fineness of its sensibility, by its pottery; it is a sure touchstone. Pottery is pure art; it is freed from any imitative intention. . .[P]ottery is plastic art in its most abstract essence. We must not be afraid of the word `abstract'. All art is primarily abstract. For what is aesthetic experience. . .but a response of the body and mind of man to invented or isolated harmonies. . .Art is an escape from chaos.(**MA** 23)

4. Bernard Leach

A major pioneering act in the literature of contemporary craft began with the publishing of Leach's now world famous **A Potter's Book**.[132]

> The potter is no longer a peasant or journeyman as in the past, nor can he be any longer described as an industrial worker: he is by force of circumstances an artist-craftsman.(**PB** 1)
>
> Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the reaction started by William Morris has been taking place mainly outside industry and has culminated in what I have called the individual, or artist, craftsman.(**PB** 14)

This work was a break with more than one tradition. It married interests of the west and of the east in the world of studio pottery. It placed studio pottery into the society of those concerned with art and dislodged its fixed position within the production mode as typified by Isaac Button and his tradition. It presented not only a study of work habits and rhythms of the studio, but also it revealed actual glaze and clay formulas and firing techniques, thereby precipitating the end of secret knowledge as guarded by centuries of practicing potters. It lauded the role of the insightful hand and eye and the place of intuition and practice in a world where form and function had governed thought for ages. It shifted the place of individual craft labour from the manufacturing model as suggested by Morris, while at the same time it did not accept the prevailing notion that art was an activity only for "after work" or for only a certain social class. The key to this new approach was the human

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[131]This is embodied in much of the work that Wildenhain did for the ceramics industry for example, even though she maintained her independent status as a studio potter.

[132]Refer to the introduction of this thesis for a fuller listing of his works. Lindsay Mosley, *The Leach Tradition*, **Ceramics Monthly**, vol. 36, #3, March, 1988, 22-32.

individual and the diverse hopes, capacities, imagination and drives, insight and hard work, discipline, practice and traditions within which such individuals live.(**PB** 257ff.)

> To the deadness of technique [governed by the machine age] to which I have called attention is added a further deadening of concept. Such pots have already been produced under its influence are not very inspiring. Good pottery imposes limitations of form and pattern which are themselves sufficiently abstract. What is needed is a humanizing influence, and it is being provided by growing appreciation of those qualities in Sung. . .Creative art invariably expresses the spirit of its age, and ours is one which despite its indecision is feeling toward a human synthesis.(**PB** 42)

Leach established the potter's studio as a small working community, based in part on traditional British and European patterns and with influence from Hamada and the Japanese tradition of the Kenzan master, but with three significant differences. Firstly, although there was a master potter in the studio, the master was also seen as a person who was growing, learning and developing imaginatively and creatively, unlike the pattern exemplified by the tradition in which Wedgewood and his successors worked. Secondly, although there was respect for the traditional forms and the functions assigned to specific artifacts, work was directed to new curves, emphasis on appropriate placing of handles, feet, bellies and extensions of certain curves, types and placement of decoration, and the imaginative movement of a hand that does not copy. There was a signaled interest in the approach to work shown in the orient in which he saw an organic and less rigid appreciation of irregularity in texture, colour and finish.[133] The artist-craftspeople were seen not only as masters in that they had mastered techniques and discipline, but they were seen as integral players in their tradition *and* as sources of innovation within traditions. Thirdly, his emphasis on the place of the potter in society had significant new themes, not the least of which was that potters could and should present their work in the finest galleries and to the international market. These points contributed significantly to the Arts and Crafts Movement, and they helped develop an awareness of pottery as having a new kind of social status.[134] His actions conferred this new status onto pottery and his presentation to both of these new markets began to place pottery into the institutional setting usually reserved for what had been called `fine art'. Actions as simple as signing his functional pottery broke the tradition of many generations. Efforts which place his bowls in exhibitions in notable galleries in England, Japan and North America realigned how devotees viewed not only his work but pottery more generally. His establishing a studio of a small group of workers at just that time when many traditional potteries were disappearing under production pressure from mass production established his endeavours as unique.

Equally importantly from my perspective is that, although Leach promoted the new aesthetic that pottery was an art form and not governed solely by preestablished patterns, he did not shy away from the place and importance of what is called the `functional' roots of pottery or from the demanding discipline of practice, repetition, and routine in the process of making. For him the value of repetition was not solely as it had been in the industrial model, namely, for the saving of money through efficient and economical movement.

> In the pots of the world that we consider the best -- Korean and the Yi dynasty and the Chinese Sung -- this quality of life comes out of what was essentially *repeat work*. . .I

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[133]Rawson, **Ceramics**. 64-133.

[134]A point that has been recently reinforced by the sale of Hans Copers candlesticks for $150,000 and by the upsurge in frantic buying of straightforward functional objects as if they were treasures.

have always said that by making a lot of similar pots by hand, an expansion of the true spirit at the expense of the lesser ego is bound to take place.[135]

He clearly made things which had a social and useful place, yet equally importantly he recognized that grace, balance and beauty were integral aspects of this work. In fact, beauty and function could be so welded together that they constituted one thing. He was not solely *reacting* to the power and indifference of the industrial revolution; he *declared* a positive and clear portrayal of what a potter could do. "Herein lies the significance of the artist-craftsman as distinct from the factory designer. Almost alone amongst workmen does he exercise the responsibility of making things for full human use -- objects which are projections of men -- alive in themselves."(**PB** 15) In this sense, he advances the cause of the status of pottery by separating his work form the industrial model without seeking, as did Morris, to return to a bygone era.

His significant admiration for Yanagi's **Unknown Craftsman**, certainly hinted at a strong affinity for the pottery traditions of Japan which completely eschewed the value of personalized work. Yet he clearly signed his work and marked it with the St. Ives stamp, thereby setting his work apart from others not only by style and vision, but by public signature as well. His praise for Hamada reflects his admiration for the place of the traditional potter as well, although it is clear from his extensive writing on these matters that his most profound respect for this potter's work was *not* for the peasant's ancestral stance but more deeply for the life and spirit which he felt in Hamada's work. Leach's stance emphasized the role of practice, ritual, small community and individual work in the creating of functionally beautiful artifacts. For him the craft and the art of pottery were one, in great part because the work in the studio was itself an interactive process of discovery and expression in the artifacts.

Leach's emphasis on the importance of the full human person played an important role over his long life. He recognized that people were involved in their traditions, that it was within them and because of them that many great advances were made. The practices and customs of the human world framed the context for his own creative work. By reference to **The Unknown Craftsman**, he acknowledged that a life of craftsmanship was able to enhance and engender rich human values which other aspects of human life might not. That is, he thought that the work which potters undertook in their studios encouraged values particular to what was learned and accomplished in that setting -- and these values were not simply about pottery. They were about human life, but they were conditioned by the traditions, culture, customs and practices inherent in the craft potter's community.[136]

While he revered the profound contributions of the Sung period of Chinese ceramics to history, and although he placed significant emphasis on the place of the anonymous potter in the span of the annals of clay, his own practice was a concrete step into the contemporary world. His predominant contribution was actually his pottery itself with his ongoing attempts at education and

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[135]While I have chosen not to pursue the place of his religious beliefs in his analysis of his work, and what he thought was the deeper source of creative energy, these ideas do play a role. They would be worth an independent study. This question of his religious beliefs raises an interest in his tacit belief that certain forms of repetition are much like meditation, and that it is in this fact that the way of life of craftsworkers finds diverse value. Note Bernard Leach, **Drawings, Verse and Belief** (Park Ridge, New Jersey: Noyes Press, 1974).

[136]Bernard Leach, **The Potter's Challenge** (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1975). One finds throughout his writings a wide variety of remarks and suggestions which signify that the deep active commitments involved in the practice of disciplined craftsmanship engender values which are uplifting to the human spirit.

spreading of the idea of the new ceramics. It was supplemented by his written work. There is no question that in the more recent past, the role of function and beauty have been called into question by those involved in the ceramic tradition. I use the word `ceramic' advisedly because it is important for me to separate the activities of someone like Leach from non-functional art ceramics, funk ceramics, installation, and environmental ceramics, or sculpture. I do so because my interest has to do with pottery and the relations of certain notions within it, i.e., creativity, function and imagination, craft, etc.

I choose pottery for four reasons: I have deep and prolonged experience with it as potter; some of the pieces I have made have been not only beautiful but have `held' life; I contend that the ideas of purpose, skill, function and imagination and intuition and creativity are not incompatible; the pottery community is a dynamic example of unresolved and unarticulated conflicts about the status and nature of craft in the modern age. Leach is the most well-known example of such a case in which notions are tied together, and he provides me with a certain amount of vocabulary with which to approach my areas of interest. Rawson's **Ceramics** is the most recent complete work that updates and replenishes the store of ceramic language, and he is careful to indicate the problems inherent in the tactile, daily-used, visually dominated world of ceramics and its relation to language and the dominance of the written word.[137]

A great deal of Leach's emphasis focused on the value of form because one of his preoccupations was function. Of comparable intensity was his preoccupation with beauty. One may easily consider a given pot, a jug or a bowl for example, from the point of view of its form only, and study whether and in what way the given form may serve and facilitate the function for which the culture normally uses this object. For Leach, this separation for purposes of analysis is fruitful because potters are forever creating form as the clay slips through their hands. But he is adamant that finish, grace, balance, visual and tactile features be recognized as integral aspects of the finished work because in the end the existing pot has these characteristics. These characteristics he posited clearly as anthropomorphic features of things: the pots had life, showed spirit, etc. As he put it,

> Aesthetically a pot may be analyzed for its abstract content or as a humanist expression; subjectively or objectively; for its relationships of pure form or. . .[for a] suggestion of source of emotional content. It may be coolly intellectual, or warmly emotional, or any combination of such opposite tendencies. Whatever school it belongs to, however, the shape and pattern must, I believe, conform to inner principles of growth which can be felt even if they cannot easily be fathomed by intellectual analysis. . .A single intuitive pressure on the spinning wet clay and the whole pot comes to life.[138]

5. The Place of Function

A certain general notion of pottery and of craft is that the objects made by craft activity are what we call functional or useful objects. They are readily distinguished from objects which are made or appreciated for their own sakes. That is, these other objects can be valued without reference to function or purpose; they may be appreciated aesthetically. This stance assumes that "for their own sakes" is inherently incompatible with "functional". We see this separation in the work of Collingwood by his use of the craft/art distinction for example, and in the work of other philosophers who distinguish between intentional work and art, or genius which is autonomous, and

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[137]Donald Kuspit, *Traditional Art History's Complaint Against the Linguistic Analysis of Visual Art*, **The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism**, vol. xlv. #4, Summer 1987, 345-9.

[138]Bernard Leach, **A Potter's Portfolio** (London: Lund Humphries, 1951); Carol Hogben, **The Art of Bernard Leach** (London: Faber and Faber, 1978), 37.

designed artifacts which are made for a some specific purpose. The whole point of the word `functional' in the context of Leach, Read and Morris, however, is to show the integration of the aesthetic and the useful, the "for a purpose" and "the aesthetic", and thereby to treat this separation as spurious.

> The phrase "production studio" can have a very broad meaning which I would like to narrow for purposes of this article. A production studio doing "art-glass" is to me essentially a contradiction in terms. Production glass usually implies function and design. . .[139]

The presentation of these different views of craft and art allow us to turn to a new set of considerations.

> The Arts and Crafts Movement founded in the 1860's was an attempt to deal with these and other issues. Since the Renaissance and Michaelangelo's declaration that the artist was a superior being, painters had cloistered themselves in the academy. . .The Industrial Revolution however brought about a confrontation that changed all that.[140]

The revolt of the Arts and Crafts Movement against the industrial revolution and its increasing use of automation, machine labour, highly routine and deadening repetitive work, the design of objects for the means of production with its consequent elimination of variety and innovation, was simultaneously a statement about the place and value of human participation in the creative making process.[141] Craftspeople and writers like Morris and Leach were also rejecting a romantic or idealist aesthetic and its metaphysic as well. They were quite unwilling to relegate either the making of things or the value of the things made to their emotional expression in consciousness. These were real things having impact and influence in a real world.

The role of an object's function, or of its utility in society, became highly standardized and rendered uniform in the industrial model and irrelevant in the romantic model. With an increased focus in industry on the idea of standardized function, the specific means of production also became standardized, and in order to ensure regular yield of uniform output, the steps in the production process were formalized to minimize deviation. This mode of production revealed an underlying manner of thinking against which there had been different forms of reaction. The underlying assumption of this means of production was that a minimum number of steps could be established to produce objects efficiently if their functions were known. What the objects would be used for determined the form they would have, and the minimum number of steps required to manufacture them. This highly formalized approach nullified interest in the specific particulars of any situation and reduced interest in the individual thing itself. The individual was only the product of the process. Each item was simply one amongst innumerable items: all ten million Denby saucers are the same. Coincidentally, the role of the individual worker as a person or as this particular human being became dramatically less relevant than previously. The role of labour did not entail knowledge in any rich, lived sense but it consisted rather in acquiring a specific technique to fit as one step among many in an automated process. Knowledge for the process of making was based on the place of the machine and not on cultural life. This point is made by Mumford as he claims,

> Most of the artists of the last two centuries -- and this has been equally true, I think, in music and poetry and painting, even in some degree in architecture -- have been in

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[139]Philip Baldwin, *Glass as Design: Production Studios in Europe*, **New Work**, #30, Summer 1987, 18. Note also, Barbara Miner, *Is a Craft Business for You?*, **Ceramics Monthly**, Vol. 37, #6, June/July/August, 1989, 47-52.

[140]Victoria Rosenwald, *The Guilded Academies*, **Harvard Review of Art**, Summer 1969, 8.

[141]Lewis Mumford, **Art and Technics** (New york: Columbia University Press, 1952), 58ff.

> revolt against the machine and have proclaimed the autonomy of the human spirit: its autonomy, its spontaneity, its inexhaustible creativeness.[142]

On the model of classical art, craft is an intentionally rational activity, one facet of which is the making of artifacts. With this concept being governed by the two sub concepts of intention and rationality there is no scope for innovation, imaginative or creative action, or genius for example. The sequence of steps from the image to the thing is coherent and governed by skill -- a form of knowledge. This is a concept which is itself closed, and the field it covers is an activity which is closed, and the objects which are classified as classical art objects, or objects of craft in Collingwood's language, are objects of which the function is deemed to be a closed set. When I say that the activity is closed, I mean that its beginning and its end and the means of getting from the one to the other are determined by some activity or consideration other than that of the thing itself. When I say that the functions of the objects are considered closed I mean simply that they are *assigned* functions or utility, which utility is taken to be their sole definition, and they are not appreciated for themselves, but rather *only* for what can be done with them.

It should be clear by now that the classical model is not an adequate one for what I call `craft'. I do not thereby accept the expressionist concept of art as the alternative. My deeper objective is to argue that there are models and contexts in which it makes sense to say of craft that it is creative and imaginative. My claim is that only by combining some of these traditionally opposed notions can one adequately understand what I call `humanist' or `individual' craft: the word `craft' in a contemporary sense.

Chapter seven has introduced new terms connected to, and biases toward, the craft/art distinction which have social, industrial, cultural, practice-based, studio-oriented and individual control as aspects of their overview. These new directions help me direct the rest of the thesis toward what I would call `modern' or `contemporary' craft -- craft which one may view as creative and imaginative. Chapter eight pinpoints a number of distinctions which accept this more contemporary perspective. These new bearings introduced in chapter seven help delineate the cultural perspective which lies within the distinctions of chapter eight.

[142]Lewis Mumford, **Art Technics**, 7.

Chapter Eight

This chapter recalls the manner in which I deal with the relationships between the two sides of a polar distinction; it posits my basic orientation concerning the roles language might play in discussions about aesthetics, making, and work for example. It begins to touch on the different ways in which one may address the terms `creative making', `skill', `art', `craft', `imagination' and similar words by the use of a finer set of distinctions relative to the studio perspective. This chapter is the beginning of a theory of creative craft.

In order to continue, therefore, I will delineate some of the detailed distinctions that are alive and operative in a studio craftsperson's workplace, each one of which draws attention to different aspects of the process of making artifacts, or to different features of the artifacts themselves, and on the place and role that many of these artifacts or processes play in different social and intellectual contexts. I will thereby provide new orientations for the terms `craft' and `art'. I expect to articulate new facets of the craft/art distinction as I wish to show it, and to provide original insights into the making and value of artifacts. Exploring these finer distinctions is in keeping with my belief that the distinctive and living meaning of the language about skilled artistry is to be found in the locale where the work is done, and where substance can be given to this language.

1. Process and Product: Process or Product

Imagine a potter gracefully caressing clay as it spins on the potter's wheel. Just off to one side of the potter are the many balls of clay about to fall beneath the fascinating spell of those masterful hands.

The clay passes through a lengthy process which begins with the round moist ball and which finishes as the stonelike yet colourful bowl sitting full of salad on someone's dining table. The process of making this bowl ended long before it landed on the dining table. From the potter's point of view, it ended when the bowl exited the arduous ordeal of the kiln. When did the process begin? From the potter's point of view, there could have been a number of starting points, depending on what one wanted to know and to what extent the *entire* enterprise was to be considered. From the point of view of a neophyte standing in the potter's studio, the process begins as the ball slams into the spinning head of the wheel. For the neophyte, the process may end when the deft hand of the potter steals the pot from the head and sets it to one side before moving on to another. The neophyte has seen the magical moment of creation of the form and that may end the story. The potter may think of having begun the process many months before, or only moments before, or not at all before the instant the hand touched the spinning clay. It would depend on what one meant by `began' or `make' or `process' and what one wanted to know by posing a certain question. For example, if the potter were making bowls, one set of considerations would apply; if the potter were making a *production* bowl, another set would; if the potter were making a salad bowl as distinct from a soup bowl, another would; if the potter were exploring form, colour and texture in the making of this particular bowl, another. For the cloudy area concerning the place and part of the hand's ability to feel endless subtle pressures and moves, another set of notions will come into play. How vision, intuition, feel, or guess shape the myriad moments of potting requires a different perspective again, etc. Is what one calls `preparation' a part of the process of making? Is the process which the neophyte sees a set of techniques? Can the neophyte imagine that the potter simply created this bowl, without having previously imagined it? What is the difference between making a beautiful bowl of striking visual life, and simply making a bowl? Is all of this craft? Is any of it art?

The finished product -- a pot -- seems to be less ambiguously designated than the process, and it is readily separated from the steps or stages of the process. After all, it can be and usually is removed from the studio, the potter, the kiln, and dust. It is sold, traded, broken, enjoyed, and treasured or scorned in more contexts than one would care to think about. The process of making the artifact is never traded, used, etc. It appears from this distinction of process and product, that process is the more complex or intrinsically diverse.

The word `artifact' is an isolating word, and when used in contexts like this appears to be designating only *objects* made by human beings. It intimates that there is a set of object-oriented words which can somehow totally encompass the thing's existence. It is possible to stay within a set of object words and treat artifacts simply as things, i.e., as having no inherent value for human beings. The limits of such discourse rest in the various parameters of the term `objectivity' and the various purposes one may have in so delimiting the meaning of the term. For the present, I see no difficulty in accepting that artifacts are simply human *fabrications* as long as we accept that they are *human* fabrications. Once one recognizes the role of the word `human' in such a designation, and the place of human beings, rather than minds and bodies in such enterprises, the slant on words about making become more interesting. When I point out that the making of such things is a human undertaking, I want to alert the reader to other considerations which I will pursue throughout the rest of my thesis. The daily practices which generate these human fabrications, i.e., the arts, take place in complex, living traditions, which support, nourish, and partially condition what goes on, what is acceptable, and the various directions, practices, and habits which are at play. This larger context is the life behind the language, customs, and general patterns within which any genuinely intelligible discussion about artistry should take place.

2. Making: The Studio

There is an indefinite number of types of making. For certain purposes one may choose to say, as Collingwood did, that there are fundamentally two. This distinction rests in the physical/mental distinction and is quite respectable in its own way. It is evidently severely limited and unacceptable, not because it is false, but because it allows for so few fine discriminations and because its language is too crude and mechanistic to shed a probing light when confronted by living examples. For the present, I am restricting myself to the making of things as the central activity of craft, and not to the broader aspects of performance such as music, theatre, animation, play, or literature.

It is difficult to think of a substance which more exemplifies the idea of matter than does clay. It is naturally inert. Its natural form is determined by its place and the forces of the geological process which placed it where it is. It is forever changing as atmospheric forces move it about. It does nothing by itself. It can become rock after having been sedimentary mud after having been mountainous rock, etc.

From the lifeless mud to the vibrant bowl many steps, stages, plans, hopes, traditions, practices, skill, expertise, styles, visions, contact, feeling, sensation, labour etc., have had their place, but not in any necessary order, nor all of them of necessity. There is *some* order and there are many actions, and much of the problem is how these are classified, viewed, verbalized and permitted to determine other distinctions.

Without human intervention, plans, customs, motivation, inspiration, and labour, clay is mud. These customs for example are part of the nest within which individuals work with the clay and bring about the innumerable and exciting artifacts. The diverse conventions, procedures, and methods which have been part of the whole legacy bequeathed to working potters envelopes their daily work and routines. It does not determine the work; it nurtures it.

Setting aside the finishing flourish of an aesthetically enhancing glaze or even the searing heat of the kiln which alters formed mud into volcanic rock, the bowl is not only *of* the same material as that with which the potter started, it still *is* the same material. To be of the same material it need only be what we call clay, even though the fire does transform mud into stone. The material and the medium of this particular art are the same; and unlike portraiture it need not have a subject, although there are innumerable cases in which it has one.

Considering a material like clay as a subject for discussion is rather perplexing if one wants simplicity and clarity. This substance has played such profound roles in human history that one must first demarcate the boundaries for purposes of sane dialogue. I will return to questions relating ceramic sculpture, environmental ceramics, high-tech modular ceramics, and items like porcelain dolls or laughing Buddhas in my later remarks on function, ritual, and life patterns, and their varying places in the world of skilled artistry.[143] Pottery has been with humanity for such a long time that people generally have a basic sense of its place and have many vivid images to sustain their grasp. Given the scope of pottery's history, this imagery is almost constitutional, and in part I will use it for support of my arguments. I will also indicate in what ways this earthy familiarity breeds subtle misconceptions.

To the late twentieth century potter working in the West, clay is presented to hand in a significantly different manner than that of bygone times, some as recent as that of Leach's early work, and some as ancient as the potters of Greece or Babylon. In the contemporary studio, clay itself is a refined and highly processed product, set in proportion by a well-designed recipe or formula. This is not universally so, nor has it been so throughout the history of pottery. My point in saying this is to argue against the belief that only the final product or thing is a subject that could possibly play a role in deliberations of aesthetics. The material itself influences what is made and alters patterns of work which bring about these very objects. Work and the intentions related to the work are positioned in a human setting, and part of that human setting is the way materials are presented to hand, their quality, type, or the work and effort connected to having some materials and not others. Even when one argues that the particular intention of some vanished potter is irrelevant to an object as an aesthetic object, I believe that when we affirm aesthetic remarks about these ancient works, we tacitly take into account the conditions of life and production of bygone times and people, and thereby implicitly acknowledge that human intention was an aspect of the work and that it plays a role in our considerations.

Artifacts show human design and they fit into historical places. Clay, and the state in which it arrives in the studio, influence what the artisan thinks, the concrete instances which are imagined, and those objects which can or will be made. It by no means follows that such forms of influence restrict creative ideas and work, or determine form, finish, and flourish. They do, however, affect, shift, influence, hold sway, inspire or motivate many actions which are part of creative making. Just as customs, traditional standards, mores and practices contribute to our understanding of notions like `excellence', and `creativity', they also contribute to the process of imaginatively making pots by providing the material with which potters work.

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[143]Bill Hunt, ed., *Nino Caruso: Modular Ceramics*, **Ceramics Monthly**, vol. 23, #6, June 1975, 40-8; Stan Bitters, **Environmental Ceramics** (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1975); Rhodes discusses the notion that pottery is a marriage of sculpture and painting tied to function, in **Pottery Form** (Radnor, Pennsylvania: Chilton Book Company, 1976), and in **Stoneware and Porcelain** (Radnor, Pennsylvania: Chilton Book Company, 1959); Howard, **Artistry**; or any one of many works on folk art, The Asian Society, **The Art of the Korean Potter** (New York: Asia House Gallery, 1968); Shoya Yoshida, **Folk Art** (Osaka: Hoikusha, 1971).

"To-day I'll make those bowls that have been on my mind for the last two weeks!" These words, or others very like them, express what is commonly on a potter's mind upon beginning or planning work in the studio. Words like this could easily apply to many instances of making and fabrication from the sculptor's studio to the writer's studio, or to Spode in Stoke-Upon-Trent, or to the plant floor manager charged with the production of a million compact disks, or to the cowboy's making hard tack. The impact of these words will differ according to the specific context within which they are uttered, and for good cause. How one talks about plans and purposes, and what the language about them is taken to mean, varies in part because the specifics of what one wishes to enunciate may change. These specifics are not the same from case to case, yet the *language* may be very much alike from case to case.

The potter frequently makes without particular thinking at all. In other instances, what the potter thinks about may not be the work that is actually being made, but something entirely unrelated, like next summer's picnic, or the nail in the floor that keeps snagging socks. In the case in which potters *do* think about what they are making, there are many variations on what one might mean by saying this. One could discuss purposes, motives, intention, and planned action for example. By describing the world of actions within which artifacts are produced, one could describe simply by comparing the actions of the potter in one situation with those of another, or the objects made in one context with those made in another, or with artifacts sanctioned by one social or cultural world, with those of another.

The most straightforward way to maintain a sense of a plan is to see how it shows itself in a linear pattern and a repeatable undertaking. Work is most simply understood by using the beginning-to-end relationship clearly expressed by Aristotle concerning the process of making. Most assuredly the vast majority of creative work is not encompassed by it, although creative work also has a beginning and an end. Collingwood is quite correct on this point. He errs in assuming that all planned work necessarily follows only one pattern, and that all planned work was previously known. He was further mistaken in thinking that simply because human work and accomplishments *may* be categorized in this beginning-to-end relationship, that this relationship is the essential character of craft making. Work on a project begins at a certain point and terminates at another. In the rational or industrial model both of these termini are known or at least established. In fact, this work of production is defined by the numeric pattern and the work is simply the addition of all the steps taken in the proper order, no more and no less, *when viewed from the point of view of the end of production*.

All work that falls under the general category of action which produces artifacts can be *viewed* from this terminus. Not all artifacts, however, get made by *following* this pattern. There are patterns of work which also consider significant variability in order, or different rates of constancy and change. Other classes of work are local, open and fluid. Some tolerate high levels of interruption, and still others are able to accommodate innovation and new vision.

Potters often work in what one calls series, limited production, standard wares, one of a kind, or functional classes, for example. Some of these categories overlap with others under certain circumstances. The works which are characterized as "production" are the closest in work pattern to the industrial model insofar as they emulate the prototype-imitation picture. When this work is done by an individual's hand there are obviously minor but real variations from piece to piece. One should not assume, however, that the human hand is incapable of a machine-like precision in reproduction. Much of the traditional pottery business of the past relied on both speed and the capacity of replication.

Work patterns that give rise to what are called `one-of-a-kind' pieces have many similarities with those of the reproduction kind, but there are subtle and many differences. Prototypes are

missing, although occasionally drawings or sketched lines may serve as reminders of previous visions or hinted directions of investigation. An adventurous pattern of work is quite common, with changes to simple routines, the introduction of new brush or glaze patterns and techniques, for example. Functional or standard wares may be produced by patterns that appear almost indistinguishable from the production model, but one can point out fine differences. A curve suddenly goes one way and not another, new tools are used to force a swelling in the belly of a vase, slips are layered in variations that defy verbal description and account. A particular jug may require a specific technique to contour it to the needs set by the function one may give to it.

When we say that a thing is made with either a function in mind or to function in a certain way, what are we doing? This instrumentalist question touches objects, artists' work, and culture in different ways. It seems a straightforward matter that a potter, or craftspeople generally, make things according to the function the object itself is envisaged having. What is it for? What do we do with it? Teapots are for tea and casseroles for cooking, urns are for plants or the ashes of the dearly departed. Function is here designated as specific utility. The general parameters of what a functional object is, are defined by intricate patterns of tradition and culture, and the specificity of function may change according as the habits and customs change. And of course, no one is under any moral, epistemological, logical or political obligation to use a teapot for tea; they may use it for coffee or juice. The Japanese tea ceremony provides a setting in which such tea related items are used in a profound ritual of meditative and social importance. When, however, a teapot is used as a door jam or as decoration in a fish tank, then members of the culture are amused, puzzled, pleased, or angry depending on any number of variables. Certain functional objects cease being made because the place and need they satisfied have themselves ceased to exist, or one form of the object ceases while another form takes precedence according to practices and routines within a social order. They are not, however, unique in this respect. One has only to consider dead languages or surpassed religions to appreciate that cultures change as well, and that humanity sheds many layers of its ever-changing skin.

What role does the fact of a thing's being made for a specific utility have to do with the making process itself? On the simplified and rational presentation of the classical or technical model, the maker has an idea of the thing to be made, and whether one takes the thing to be an individual item or a member of a class of items, it is does not matter. As outlined in my earlier chapters this picture shows that the maker employs the body to engage skill and manipulate the matter and to impose the form onto it. The body does the dirty work, so to speak. As remarked above in chapter six, I question the intelligibility of this way of speaking if one takes this language at face value or as literally true. The language for the mind and the language for the body are not analogues for one another, and the one is not necessarily appropriately structured to govern the other.

In order to deal with this question in some detail I will outline very specific examples of functional objects and analyze what role this function may play in the making process. Let me set four such objects in order of specificity of function: spark plugs, urinals, tea pots and bowls. In the first two examples, I assume an industrial model of production, nothing is made either by hand or by the work of one person or small work unit. This could be so also for the last two, but for purposes of this discussion I assume that they are made within an individual studio in the model Leach set out, and which is exemplified in the professional journal publication **Studio Potter**.[144]

[144]Peter Sabin and Gerry Williams eds., **Studio Potter**, (Goffstown, New Hampshire: Daniel Clark Foundation, first issue 1977).

Spark plugs are made with an extremely small margin allowed for error or deviation from standards established throughout the automotive industry. They are designed for one functional purpose; their structure, form and materials are also designed and manufactured for this precise objective. The actual use of these objects is clearly set by practice within a highly controlled market and related industries. With developing technologies, it may come to pass for a functional need presently satisfied by a given form and materials that a new object be invented to replace the present. In this case, electronic firing and ignition systems have begun to do just that. New systems replace the old if the functional requirement can be met by another more acceptable means. According to a functionalist logic, there must be a specifiable need which can be met by a given object, the essence and form of which are determined by the particularity of the need or the specificity of the function. It is in this light that one easily understands the Bauhaus motto that form follows function, and Morris' concern that as the industrialist approach to production became dominant, the value of the object and the place of the human person were reduced to the value of an abstract function. One delineates the talk about function by noting the exactness of the various activities related to the production of things and the definite and explicit patterns of use of the things made. The urinal is placed here as being similar to spark plugs in so far as they each are designed for one function and one function only.

There are assorted intricacies related to the idea of *one function*. I am not talking only about what members of the society do with well-designed objects, but also how the society views these commodities, as well as what it means to say that a given artifact has a function or is utilitarian. There is no essential link between the function which a thing has and the use to which it may be put. There are, however, substantive conventions and routines surrounding certain ranges of things, which in practice restrict the actual uses to which definite artifacts are put. One does not eat from a urinal. Some of the reasons for this are based in the tradition which provides another range of artifacts from which one does eat, namely, plates. One should not, however, assume that that is all there is to it. Just as there are non-aesthetic factors which affect aesthetic judgment, perception and experience, so also there are non-functional considerations which affect the use to which things are put. It is not only because there are dinner plates that one does not eat out of urinal; this is particularly true if the urinal has already been used for that purpose for which it was originally designed and fabricated. When we say that an object has a utility, we mean that there is a range of actions and jobs that one can do with it, and the place which it has in this set is understood within the practice of various communities. This practice and the communities' habits and history help set the parameters of what functions given artifacts are deemed to have -- and indeed what function itself is taken to be.[145] When we say a thing is functional, we indicate that it was designed with a certain serviceability in view and we can follow the sequence of undertakings around this function. Language about function is often oriented toward what are thought of as "rational" or "objective" considerations, and they are dominated by the inclination to see things as having only one unambiguous utility which can in fact determine the formal structure which the object must have. This kind of conversation is very form/matter governed in an Aristotelian sense. A strong functionalist approach to the making of artifacts uses the dominance of the notion of form as its primary means of explanation as expressed by the popular motto "form follows function": the less ambiguous the function, the more relevant the form.

Morris' argument that the industrial model provided only an "abstract" object is a suggestion worth examining. Fundamentally, what he says about the abstract object is true, and I would account

[145]One is reminded of the Quaker's intense concern for integrity of function and design in such matters; the museum of the Hancock Shaker Village in Pittsfield, Massachusetts is a prime example.

for it in the following manner. The spark plug or urinal is not produced for a local, particular, or individual case. They are designed and manufactured for all individual cases regardless or any idiosyncratic features. He claimed that the production of such things was alienating with respect to integrated labour and that the actual human motive for making the thing was not to fulfil a gap in the need system of the society, but rather to render profit to the maker. What he did not take into account was the fact that the larger social whole also produces a number of other objects which themselves can make use of some particular abstract object, as a car makes use of the spark plug. He also neglected to recognize that not all human actions are governed only by particular needs, in particular times or places. For certain undertakings people do not take into account, need to take into account, or want to take into account the local and particular considerations which he regarded as crucial.[146] There are many artifacts made in this abstract fashion and employed by individuals in the contexts within which they operate. The function as conceived is precise, and the object is said to have only one function, but the function is not unique to a given situation, nor is such an object fabricated to deal with a fixed and concrete need. It readily satisfies a generic need. That is, it fulfils needs within a whole society, or in situations where a particular individual is not the prime variable.

I think that this manufacturing model for the term `function' is the dominant one in western culture generally. With respect to industrial production systems, it is intelligible; with respect to what I call `craft', it is useful only as a limiting notion. I call it a limiting notion because it is the term which sets limits on discourse about the place of function in aesthetic artifacts. That is, as the idea of form is discussed with respect to what are called functional objects, any other consideration with respect to the object is deemed unessential or extraneous. It also provides a polar example for considerations about highly individualized functions.

Collingwood followed suit with Croce on the role and place of technique in aesthetics. They asserted that technique had nothing to do with aesthetics and art. I do not accept that the employment of skill is simply the implementation of technique, and that technique should be viewed solely as a step in the means of production. Nor do I accept that skill is solely the knowledge of these steps. I also do not accept that skill is knowledge in the rigid sense that it is hereby presented as a "knowing how" by "knowing that". When we employ the word `technique' we often buttress our conversation against certain other terms like `disorder', `random', `indiscriminate', and `uncontrolled'. We thereby also encourage a language of accomplishment like `mastery', `procedure', and `structured'. It is, however, important to recognize that many contemporary words maintain a strong affinity with their ancient counterparts even though the culture and contexts have changed significantly. A technique is a specific ability acquired through experience and practice. It may also be seen simply as an integrated step in a procedure, a step which moves the procedure forward. As a mode of action, it is a definite undertaking to resolve a problem or to continue a pattern of action. As an ability, it is the capacity to incorporate change and the unforeseen in a course of action, and it not only the following of a rule. Simply because a person is able to adapt to new and slightly unpredictable events in a studio, however, it does not follow that this person using these techniques is creative. Being creative is different than simply adjusting to the unforeseen.

When Collingwood asserts that there could be no technique for the creative act of imagination, what is he denying? I think he denies, firstly, that there is knowledge which necessarily will create new knowledge; that there is a logical or preconceived step by which consciousness can move from

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[146]One can understand his orientation better by recognizing that he had a very specific moral conviction with respect to labour and his notion of the whole person, two ideals he inherited from Ruskin. For them, *every* action undertaken by a human being should be directed to the fulfilment of the person as a moral being.

what it knows to what it does not know; and that the birth of aesthetic emotions can be determined by planned human action. I would most assuredly agree with all of this. My problem is that it is trivial in one very important respect: nothing can do these things. It is not a shortcoming of technique or techniques that this is so. Consequently, I think one must place the role and value of this and related terms and ideas into concrete settings. In the simplest negative sense, I would say that even with a highly controlled technical process, the issue of guarantee with respect to the future is futile. One must be careful at this point because the inability to predict or guarantee results and the *failure* of a given procedure to produce a result it should produce, are most assuredly not in the same class of problem as the inability to know the future at all under any circumstance. Nor is it of the same order as the discovery of something entirely new, the invention of something new, the acknowledgement or realization of something new, or the creation of something. Unlike Collingwood, however, I recognize this set of distinctions but do not thereby conclude that technique has nothing to do with creation of works of art.

The notion of technique as espoused by Collingwood is delineated within his concept of the technical theory of art, i.e., his concept of craft. While I agree that there are certain expressions and a moderately discernible universe of discourse intimately bound to this term `technique', I do not accept that what they describe is essentially incompatible with terms like `create' or `imagine'. I accept, rather, that technique and techniques influence, shape, alter, condition, and sway what people do imagine, and the range of things they can create. I want to articulate the diversity of these relationships in terms other than those determined by "necessary and sufficient conditions". I think that these modes of accounting are too limited for the richness inherent in the creative process and many human undertakings. Words like `influence', `sway' and `shift' are also legitimate words in explanations. Their parameters are not as rigid, nor has the history of philosophic thought so restricted them by centuries of analysis as it has terms linked to causality and necessity.

I contend that people are able to learn what we call `techniques', and that with much prodding and pushing, one may even teach them.[147] But words like `technique' are best understood in a distance relationship. What I mean by this can be made clear by three examples: describing, explaining, and teaching techniques. Techniques are often best described by assuming an observer's stance with respect to the actions being discussed. Even if master potter were describing the technique in question, it is prudent for them to assume a stance *as if* they were onlookers. Describing techniques from the orientation of a spectator, portrays them in a beginning-to-end relationship. This relationship is what allows people to understand what is being said in the account. Otherwise they are simply actions and movements with no rationale or sense of integration. Discussion involving the beginning-to-end relationship will frequently use already finished pots as part of its reference. The word `describe' may suggest that one should be able simply to give the contours, lines, positions, colours, and configurations of certain actions and objects and thereby draw a picture of what is happening. To describe a "technique" is already to alert the listener that what is being described fits into a human-plan situation, a pattern of movement of which this "technique" is only one part or aspect. In my opinion, any account which bypasses the role of the human actor in the explanation is not actually an account of a "technique".

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[147]Howard, **Artistry**. This point is eloquently made on numerous occasions in this pointed work and it is itself worth more attention than I have chosen to give it. Also, as Mitcham argues, "Finally, it was on the basis of the modern hiatus that men began to imagine the possibility of *logos* of *techné*, so that it made sense to use a term originally applied to the study and manipulation of words to name the study of the manipulation of nature." Carl Mitcham, *Philosophy and the History of Technology*, 187.

Once one has engaged oneself in discussing techniques, one has entered the realm of human action and human situations. What this means is that discussions about techniques and creativity for example, make sense only in the context of concerted human action, or of traditions which contour the basic arrangement of daily life and patterns of work. Teaching techniques and learning techniques involves complex procedures and sets of actions from which one hopes that the apprentice may glean a clue or a hint as to what to do to get the knack. These procedures do not happen in an historical or social vacuum.[148] Certain actions may be set aside from a whole process and broken into parts or segments to facilitate the showing. One may describe the actions of master craftspeople as employing such and such a technique, and this language makes sense. Part of what it means to *be* a master, however, is to be independent of such thinking and planning. In the course of teaching, however, masters do not simply describe what they might call techniques, they *show* them, they *force* them onto their apprentices, they *prod* them, they *entice* them, they *cajole* them with whatever it takes to get the job done. This teaching of skill and technique may be considered not so much as a teaching, as a hoped-for learning. It is not as smooth and straightforward as the language may suggest. As Howard astutely remarks,

> Enter now the legions of voice trainers with their theories, techniques, precepts, rules, and exercises promising to alleviate in one way or another the singer's predicament. To the surprise only of beginners at singing, the various accounts of the voice and advice proffered present a bewildering (and depressing) spectacle of conflicting opinion -- for instance, that voices are born and not made; that though born, they can at least be made over; that one should sing as little children scream, or as an adult whispers, or as a dog yawns; that a refined "technique" is the singer's salvation; that speech and singing are the same and should be developed coordinately, or one "from" the other; that the two are entirely different and must be developed separately; that the singer must "drive" the voice by a great effort of muscle and breath; that singing should be totally effortless and free of all tension. Simultaneously, the voices of the great singers are often invoked to "prove" the wisdom of this of that way of singing.[149]

Describing a course of events according to a set of units called `techniques' is only one way of delimiting what is going on.

Technique and function are easily allied in explanations of work. Traditionally, the link between them has been seen as quasi-mathematical or logical. I say `quasi' to set my own thinking about craft further apart from that of Collingwood, or from Morris' notion of industry. I believe that models like Collingwood's "craft" or Morris' "industry" accept that there could be a set of steps (technique `a' through technique `n') which for all practical purposes necessarily will produce a given preconceived artifact. The assumption is that by reducing the variables inherent in human action and work to an idealized form of action, *and* by idealizing (or mentally reducing to one) the function of the artifact, one can imagine that the set of steps must give rise to the artifact. I believe, on the other hand, that with human action the sequence is not logical, strictly causal, or rational, but rather that it is based in effort, insight, creative, and birth-like work. When there is a set of human

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[148]As poignantly remarked by Heather Dawkins while referring to what she calls "modernism in general and formalism in particular", "It is this type of thinking that has informed much of contemporary ceramics. What is unselfconsciously missing from these descriptions is reference to economic, social, political, domestic, or technological influences, which either inform or restrict the production or reception of objects. For many artists and critics, independence from sociological determinants mean a transcendence of social values." *From the Ground of Daily Experience*, **American Ceramics**, vol. 2, #4, 1984, 34.

[149]Howard, **Artistry**, 33.

actions and undertakings involved in making a functional thing, the undertaking is not wholly intelligible by a model governed by the rational approach. My point here is that the western tradition has generally accepted that an object which is functional is defined by the one function which it best serves. This is certainly part of the Greek contribution to the idea of *techné*. This tradition rests in the belief that essences are the definitive description of the one feature which distinguishes one item or species from any other, or from all others. With respect to fabrication, it suggests that there is a specific pattern and sequence of steps which can produce the object with the function because the steps are "integrated" with the essence of the thing to be manufactured. This type of belief was exemplified in Collingwood's theory of craft. In a modified form it may be partially applicable to the industrial model of production, and with further modifications applicable even to certain types of production workshops where the word `production' is held in contrast to "one-of-a-kind", "potter-generated", "studio", "innovative", etc.

I consider that a common understanding of functional objects is such that if one takes a thing to have only one function, this function is also taken to be the "real" or "primary" feature or "essence" of the thing. My preoccupation with this point is that those features other than this "real" or central one are deemed to be incidental or not necessary, and therein of less inherent value. It is helpful to remind oneself from time to time how influential certain language relationships are. This set of words `real' or `essence' for example, may call to mind a picture of a relationship which portrays the ontological, logical, value, or epistemological "priority" of one part or aspect of a thing to other aspects of that same thing. Certain words like these are like signposts, flags, or traffic lights. Part of their meaning is what happens when they are used, or how it is that contexts change in their use. To take this line of thought back to my interest in "technique" and "function", I would counsel a detailed look at specific cases. In part, that is the purpose of chapters nine and ten. What difference does it make what colour the jug is, what visual or tactile texture its surface has, whether it is glazed or not? After all, it pours! This of course harkens back to my concerns expressed in chapters six and seven where I indicate that the substance-quality relationship and the function-decoration relationship are problematic *if* taken as having logical force. We will arrive at a more abundant account if we blend these kinds of accounts with those that posit full human life as a crucial element.

I think that this nexus of function-decoration (sometimes seen as beauty-utility) is the most difficult conceptual problem for understanding the value of crafted functional objects. By common consent and by philosophical argument, artifacts which are *valued only for themselves* and for which no extrinsic considerations need arise are not deemed to have utility. The unspoken assumption in this assertion is that objects which do have a function or utility are not valued for themselves, but rather for their utility. My contention, however, is that functional objects may readily be esteemed "for themselves" by simply placing them into the practices which the people using them have. The whole point of being functional *is* the use.

Of course, it is not with respect only to functional objects that one may readily query the place of decoration, composition, internal visual or tactile relations, etc., when one deals with the question of necessity. When one studies Klee's *Villas Florentines* or Dusseault's *Qui l'envoûte*, one recognizes that there is nothing *necessary* about the precise placement of this line, that colour, or that shape in this particular place. They are the way they are and not some other way. If one talks about them, then one must discuss them as they are, and not as if they were some other way, or as if they could be some other way. There is no necessity for them to be the way they are. One may have a particular reason for approaching certain paintings, sculptures, religious artifacts, buildings, literature, musical compositions, hardware, etc., by asking whether a given item, curve, line, other compositional or structural feature, is necessary to a whole piece. I think that when one poses a

general counterfactual question about an artifact, there is frequently a hidden assumption that somehow the artifact "expresses" some other state, and that thereby the artifact itself is unessential.

As soon as one raises the question about the relationship between the precise configuration of shape, form, hue, texture, composition, etc., within *any* artifact, a plethora of interesting problems arise. Collingwood attempts to maintain the tradition in which there is a certain form of necessity in the world, yet within which world there is a form of freedom or indeterminacy. The domain of craft was one of the areas within which he posited a form of operational necessity. The objective of the craft undertaking accompanied by the skill of the craftsman provided the structure of necessity, and the creative act of the expressive imagination provided the place for autonomy.

The contention that there is no necessary relation between the specific configuration of nonfunctional aspects of an artifact and the function of that artifact, or between the different compositional elements (e.g., line, form, texture, hue, space, etc.) of non-utilitarian artifacts like sculpture or painting, poses a range of problems which are too complex to expose fully at this time. They require an independent study of their own. I will, however, make a few general remarks in order to outline patterns which may be relevant to this thesis. For the first of these considerations, I think Morris presented a thought which is still operative today, namely, that industrial production and systems based on this model of "making", separated function from specific social location and need. Equally importantly, they eliminated the integration of what he called `decoration' from the product of work. In my opinion, the industrial model conforms to what Collingwood claimed was classical art, namely, that the nature of the object conceived determined the process which gave rise to its fabrication, and only those elements essential to its specific purpose were deemed to be part of the thing itself. There are of course cases where this is true, and things like spark plugs and silicone chips provide quite clear examples. One of the unfortunate latent assumptions in this stance is that the decorative aspects of a finished work were deemed to be unessential and thereby expendable, trite, or gratuitous relative to the *true* value of the artifact itself.

That there was no necessary relation between any of the compositional elements of works of art had previously been articulated in other guises, namely: that the "work of art" was autonomous and that "genius" followed no rule (i.e., no process of reasoning governed the aesthetic judgment and no intention or plan governed the action of genius).[150] I think it would be useful to study the deeper and broader suggestions hidden by the words `follow' and `governed'. I will not do so in this work although certain suggestions may be drawn from my later analysis of doing, making and creating. I am of the opinion that terms like `genius' are intimately bound to other words like `inspired' and `*mania*' for example, and they are themselves rich in meaning, but obscured by the metaphysics and legacies of the past. These words are interdependent in many settings, but they are interdependent not only with one another. They too are tied into broader social contexts and different language networks. Their meanings are interwoven with what we might call `standard' or `normal' situations as well as the eccentric. They may be affiliated as well with patterns of high order -- the precisely technical for example -- and it may frequently be only in light of certain order, that words like `genius' get their value and impact. I contend further there often is an intimate link

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[150]This is a further mistake of traditional aesthetics, which in part rests on the mistake which W.E. Kennick outlines in *Does Traditional Aesthetics Rest on a Mistake?*, in **Collected Papers on Aesthetics**, Cyril Barrett, ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), 1-21. For an acute criticism of Kennick's, article note Guy Sircello, *Arguing about "Art"*, in Tilghman's **Language and Aesthetics**, 65-86. One also recalls the popular tales about the musical genius Mozart, whom we are told, simply copied onto paper what appeared unbidden to his mind. Certainly the popular conception of "expressionism" since the turn of the twentieth century is such that the work of these artists is seen as somehow free from rules.

between genius and craftsmanship and directed human labour. I think one has only to look at the proper context to make sense of this, and for me this context is the potter's studio.

It is clear to me that even if one were to assign an essential function to a preconceived thing, and produce objects solely for that purpose, there is *no* necessary form which that thing must take. This belies that fundamental stance of the Bauhaus and certain considerations of Read, and it questions the thrust of Collingwood's position. Rawson's marvelous book is simply one among many that clearly illustrates the futility of looking for the perfect form for any given function.[151] There is no unambiguous form that any artifact must take in order to guarantee that the sole function it may be assigned will in fact be served. I believe that many traditions of craftsmanship in the West do not readily accept the strict line separating the function of a thing from its decoration, nor indeed does the modern studio potter, and this is emphatically illustrated by the work and ideas of Leach, and as so vividly demonstrated by the work of even more contemporary studio potters.[152] This does not mean that someone may not do so for a special purpose, but the special purpose sets reasons, values, and limits on the undertaking.

In his early work, Collingwood held that beauty was the implicit goal of artistic consciousness. I think this is still accepted by the popular viewpoint in the West, and even for certain approaches to aesthetics, although it is dramatically less common than previously. Although there are many variations on the theme, I want to indicate the orientation of the two fundamental views about beauty: in the classical view it is a Form of things, existing independently of them; and in the romantic view it is an element of human experience, experience of a certain kind having a definite value in itself. By reference to the former, artifacts were deemed to be beautiful if they participated in some way in the objective Form of the Beautiful. By reference to the latter, artifacts were deemed to be beautiful by virtue of the fact that people "had" specific experience and attributed the value and mode of that experience to the artifact. In his later work, it is clear that Collingwood was trying to be consistent when he jettisoned the idea of beauty as the implicit goal of consciousness. In the later work, and this is at once a strength and a weakness, whether the idea of beauty had objective reality or was solely the concept which activated the dialectic of consciousness, there could be no idea at all before art was born. The flip side of this coin was that craft assumed the function of working *from* the preconceived idea.

My disagreement is fundamental on this point. His stance implies that for a potter to be able to say of a given work "This is now finished, and I know that it is", the potter must have had a preconceived idea according to which this judgment is made. Not so! This is a statement about knowledge on the one hand and about affirmation and decision in the process of creating on the other. Language about what potters are thinking may readily be a way of articulating the process of invention, discovery and creation. Work makes the object and the idea as it goes along.

I want to approach the notion of beauty three ways: from the way language is used, from the way objects are classified, and from the way beauty is often experienced. I will discuss these three orientations relative to beautiful pots but not necessarily in a sequence. Implicit in my approach to each of these orientations is my commitment which states that they are most fruitfully considered if they are seen in social and cultural frameworks and traditions. I reject the view that beauty exists in an ideal world independently of things and people, awaiting discovery by the appropriately *mania* inspired soul, and I reject the idea that things are judged to be beautiful only because of some

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[151]Rawson, **Ceramics**, 64ff.

[152]Potters such as Wayne Cardinalli, Jean Cartier, Enid Legros, Robin Hopper, and Harlan House, are popular examples, but even Garth Clark, the dominant proponent of the "vessel-aesthetic" metaphor of non-functional ceramics, recognizes this.

specific experience a person may have. I do accept, however, that we cannot simply deny categorically that beauty has no objective status at all, and that it has no subjective status at all. I would also claim that beauty is not solely the way we use the word `beauty', or that beauty is simply a linguistic convenience. In these claims I am well aware that I have added provisos with the words `at all', `solely' and `simply'. My reason for doing so is obvious, I believe that each of these approaches to beauty is intelligible depending on the specific context within which we think and talk about beauty itself. But by `beauty itself' I am not herewith implying a metaphysic which holds that beauty exists independently of what I call the context. If one were to articulate the diverse nuances involved in understanding what it might mean to say that a given pot was beautiful, I think one would be obliged to use at least these three categories -- objective, subjective, linguistic -- to do justice to the claim and to the object within its tradition. I would argue that simply because one may acknowledge, as I do, that judgments about beauty are an integral facet of culture and society, one need not deny they are also objective. The obverse claim is true about the subjective as well, namely, that because claims are about the object, i.e., the pot, it certainly does *not* follow that no image, emotion, personal, idiosyncratic, or subjective aspect is involved in the declaration. The operative concept which I think best holds these normally distinct categories together, is that of the *human person*.

People live in many and diverse social and cultural settings and aggregates. When I say that the notion "human person" should be the operative concept in such accounts I am pointing to a wide variety of considerations. My primary interest is to emphasize that by using terms like `human', `society', `culture', and `person' for example, I accept that there are patterns of beliefs, hopes, expectations, commitments, and practices, as well as mixtures and composites of standards of excellence, guiding models of education, training, and inculcation, linguistic means of dealing with deviation, normalized configurations, patterns of diverse kinds of work, and other such notions. These deep and enriching practices provide settings in which people work. They have forged contexts within which standards are understood, and patterns of action and differing ideals are recognized and appreciated. They help posit boundaries by which people are able to gauge their success, their objectives, and the like. This is important for me because I deny that we must go to either a simple realist, idealist, or nominalist picture in our accounts of craft, art, beauty, imagination, excellence, creating and making.

By referring to the place of traditions, the practices of peoples and their various histories, I think that we achieve a form of stability for our explanations without pretending to have fixed this stability in a non-human objective reality. By referring to the concrete lives of cultures and people, their work, their endlessly complex patterns of behaviour, and to their traditions and practices, I think we remove the specific value of what I want to say from the particular feeling of some individual. We manage to rest on an historical and cultural base which provides contexts. By talking about the *human person* as a basic term and notion in offering accounts of artistry, I am referring to these broad phenomena. In light of certain diverse customs, traditions and practices for example, we can begin to understand why potters work the way they do, how they achieve what they do, what it means for them to be creative, what technical accomplishment is, and the role and place of work in the studio. Under the spectrum of these notions, we can understand what the potter does from the potter's perspective, from the spectator's orientation, as a member of a contemporary crafts' community, or as a person who creates useful and beautiful artifacts.[153]

[153]Note Alasdair MacIntyre's analysis of "practice" in his work on virtue, **After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory** 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Indiana Press, 1984), 187-93.

In his article *Kitsch*, Kulka reminds the reader that there is a tradition which values art objects for the subject-matter which they portray, a point made on several occasions by Collingwood as well.[154] He aptly points out the manner in which this mode of thought is inadequate for an appreciation of the richness available in "good art". He fittingly remarks that both the weakness of kitsch and the strength of good art, rests in how they integrate with, and are distinct from, traditions like that of portraiture. Without casting the entirety of portraiture into the abyss because kitsch is simple-minded portraiture, he points out how it is that some portraiture has the capacity to enrich emotion and cultural life as well as further one's capacity to evaluate aesthetic experience, while other portraiture *is* kitsch.

This context-based and practice-based notion helps understand a craft-oriented idea of beauty. As Fethe remarked,

> It [the technical theory of art] both distorts and disvalues much of the work which craftsmen perform. Some craftsmen can work only when they have a specific aim laid out before them, but it is argued there is no reason to believe this is typical of craftwork or to set it up as a paradigm. A model of craft must take into account the finest examples of the field, and here, in crafts such as pottery, jewellery-making or silver-smithing, we see opportunities for the exercise of creativity and imagination.[155]

What could it mean to say that a bowl is beautiful? The bowl is not fully described by telling someone what colour and shape it is. Besides, there are beautiful bowls for which it is impossible to describe the subtlety and rich medley of variegated hues and tones, the precise shape or line. The individual artifact often easily surpasses the capacity of language to encompass it. The word `beautiful' is a descriptor, but not of shape or colour. To outline this descriptor somewhat, one may use other words to clarify, words like `graceful', `harmonious', `balanced' and the like. This language indicates that the bowl under consideration is being seen in a larger context, a context of work that is artful. I remind the reader that I do not accept that all things we call `object' are described fully by words about their measurable three-dimensionality, colour on a spectrum, or density, for example. I am saying that what objects *are* is only partially defined in this way. For certain purposes and in certain contexts the simple-minded language of space is all the language one needs to articulate what the object under consideration is. There are innumerable other settings, however, in which the objects under discussions need different descriptors. Things we call `art objects' are what I have in mind, but one could consider other categories such as `animal', `living things', `building', `organizations', etc.

To grasp what human beings mean when they discuss these assorted aspects of their lives, one must acknowledge that it is human beings that are dealing with these objects; and what an object is, is set in great part by this fact. For example, part of what it may mean to say of a given bowl that it is beautiful is to say something about its functioning in daily life with respect to, say, the pleasure and value enhancement of simple daily acts by its presence. In another context, these words may assert a comparison with other objects, either other bowls, chairs, or industrial products. In these kinds of considerations, objects are cultural and social artifacts, just as they are physical, functional, admired, or coloured artifacts. There are certain contexts in which to say of the same bowl that it is beautiful, may be to bring up the fact that a person has experienced a certain specific emotion, or range of emotions, because of this bowl's presence. In another framework, this expression may have the effect of helping someone to recognize that other work was ugly, rough, or chunky -- but not necessarily thereby to say that rough or chunky work could never be "beautiful".

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[154]Toma Kulka. *Kitsch*, **British Journal of Aesthetics**. vol. 28. #1, Winter 1988, 18-27.

[155]Fethe, *Hand and Eye*, 41-2.

Before moving on to the next chapter, I would like to shed some light on the thought that art has no utility and beauty no use. This is simply one variation on a theme which may be elucidated in different guises. One of the variations on this assumption is that insofar as an artifact *has* utility or *is* a functional object, it cannot be art because of its utilitarian orientation. That is, the autonomy of art is taken as contradicting the purpose-governed aspect of utility. Another variation is that insofar as an object is beautiful, it is so not because of its function, but rather because of some "aesthetic" addition. One of the functions of my thesis is to undercut these beliefs. Leach directed his energies in such a way that his work married the functional and the aesthetic. My primary interest in chapter eight has been to show that although the rich linking of function and aesthetic is rare, and that although the current tendency to dissociate function and creativity is common, craft is most fully valued if its products are grounded in daily use. This value has sundry dimensions, some in use, some aesthetic, some sensual, some social, etc. As a process, if craft is placed within the scope of human life and values, rather than designated simply as a rational mental structure, or as Howard neatly says, only "as Faithful Servant of Higher Ends", then one readily can see its imaginative, sensual, and experiential base.[156] One can see that the actual work which potters do in their studios encompasses creative searching and exploring, yet it dwells within parameters of tradition -- even though the world is superficially a radically different place than it may have been one or two hundred years ago. The distinctions used and presented in this chapter open the way a little more for the introduction of a case study in chapter nine. This case study will serve as an illustration, it will show my underlying interests and commitments; it will also posit a set of values and partially exemplify a new way of trying to explain phenomena. This form of explanation does not rest simply on first principles which are abstract. Its sits, rather, within sets of practices and culturally or socially based patterns of acceptance. The distinctions revealed and discussed in chapter eight are a part of the process by which I present my boundaries of the model I will use as an explanatory tool.

[156]Howard, **Artistry**, 5.

Chapter Nine

The purpose of chapter nine is to present a case study for consideration. The case will be that of the potter's studio with an individual, humanist, or artist-potter making functional ware using the traditional potter's wheel. The case study is presented for two reasons, one negative and the other positive. I will show in what respects the theoretical distinctions presented by Collingwood are inadequate as one gets closer to an artistic process. On the positive side, I will present a specific context which adds a richness and specificity to the philosophical language of aesthetics. One of my major complaints about much of the language and thought in aesthetics is its lack of orientation to individual concreteness.[157]

Collingwood's craft/art distinction is my case in point. This is easily demonstrated in studio work and Leach has mentioned just such an illustration. He poses a question after having made about twenty jugs and having made them all in the style of repeat work, which is to say that only a highly trained eye can distinguish them from one another. He notes that one of them has "life" and the others do not. How or why is this so? Rather than try to answer the question I refer back to my interest in conceptual analysis. Once one has accepted, as I do, that one of the jugs *is* imbued with life and the others not, one must exercise the utmost caution in offering explanations. My focal point here is of course the role of the concept `technique' and related notions. If one accepts that the jugs were made simply by the automatic implementation of sequential steps, then there could be no accounting for a difference. In order to talk about the jug that is different, and about making and valuing it, one needs to use a more delicate language than a building block or numerical sequence pattern allows. As remarked by MacIntyre,

> The discussion so far I hope makes it clear that a practice, in the sense intended, is never just a set of technical skills, even when directed towards some unified purpose. . .What is distinctive in a practice is in part the way in which conceptions of the relevant goods and ends which the technical skills serve -- and every practice does require the exercise of technical skills -- are transformed and enriched by these extensions of human powers and by that regard for its own internal goods. . .[158]

If one were to take the variation on the long interview technique used by Giopolous and Jordan in their research, or the concrete ethnography of Jacobson in hers, and indifferently use Collingwood's craft/art aesthetic theoretical distinction, one would quickly enter a labyrinth. And even though my work is `applied' in the common sense meaning of this word, the use of language is modally different than theirs. My "case" is not only this one potter doing this one thing at this one

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[157]And in the theses of Giopolous, Jordan, and Jacobson, there is virtually no analysis of the distinctions made. They accurately recount the physical, imaginative, organizational, judgmental, etc. actions of the potters but have no theoretical base into which to fit their data. The individuality of their studies are at once the strength and weakness. But they certainly provide detailed records of the imaginative and creative actions of the potters. Peter Giopolous, **Potting as a Phenomenon: Movement and Choice Stimulate Transformation** (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Pennsylvania, 1984); Rachelle A. Jacobson, **A Master Potter's Dialogue With Clay, Glazes and Fire: A Study in The Creative Process** (Ph.D. Dissertation, The State University of New Jersey, 1985); Lawrence Jordan, **On The Journey of Claying** (Ph.D. Dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1980).

[158]MacIntyre, **After Virtue**, 193.

time. It has a more generic orientation to it. It uses a number of potters over a number of years, and it includes my personal experience as well. As such, there are traces of ethnography and of long interview methods in it.

Collingwood held that art is the primal source and activity of self-discovery and self-knowledge. I contend that once one has accepted this alignment of thought and value with the language of art, then one is disposed to regard its opposites, or those things held in contradistinction to it, as less significant, not inherently valuable, lower in a merit and worth, etc.[159]

I will first approach the case study from the orientation of a spectator. How precisely to define what a spectator is has certain problems, but as Berleant suggests

> In an analysis of the aesthetic situation, painting must surely offer the clearest paradigm. The presence of a specific object that can usually be located with reasonable clarity, of a viewer who attends to it, and both in a setting that encourages focused experience -- these three elements in combination seem to provide a model condition under which aesthetic perception can take place.[160]

As is clear from not only this article but other sources as well, the clear and distinct idea of a spectator and an object in the right place at the right time, is often tenuous and frequently confused or vague. This lack of clarity and precision will occur often in the next two chapters as I expose the working situation in the studio. I never deny, however, that there are spectators. I only suggest that the contexts within which the analysis takes place significantly alter the roles and interaction of the spectator with the phenomenon being examined.

1. The Case

I will present a case study so that I can determine in what ways the ideas and distinctions which Collingwood espoused are workable, and have limits not only with respect to conceptual or linguistic analysis, and how they might be made to help understand studio art in general, but also relative to specific instances, individual artifacts, and personal labour and aesthetic judgment. The language which I will use, and often it will consist of the same words as Collingwood, is frequently bound to and formed within local settings. It may seem restricted to specific individual things, events, or states. In another place of my case study, I will use these very same words with normative, prescriptive, abstract, complex or theoretical influences or meanings.

The case is set in the time after the establishment of Leach's pottery at St. Ives 1918-19. **A Potter's Book** illustrates his studio, its work, commitment, struggles, technical and aesthetic adventures and conflicts. Other works that deal with potters' work tend to be much more dominated by the object or artifact as finished product, an item to be esteemed, held, placed into museums etc. The role of the object is important in a case study, but I limit myself to the various actions, observations and judgments of the observer in this chapter. My discourse is geared to uncover some of the workings of certain language, such as the words `craft', `art', `plan/preconceived', `create', `feeling', `knowledge/skill', and the like in a creative studio setting.

> To make a pot you need clay. Having obtained your clay, it has to be prepared to a suitable condition to be shaped. Shaped into the required form and dried, it can be

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[159]Bernard Smith, **The Death of the Artist as Hero: Essays in History and Culture** (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988), in particular chapters three and four.

[160]Arnold Berleant, *Does Art Have a Spectator?*, **The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism**, vol. xlv, #4, Summer 1987, 411.

`fired', that is to say the clay is converted into pottery. These are the four main stages facing the potter of any period.[161]

As has become clear from my negative analysis of Collingwood's craft/art distinction, I approach the craft/art distinction and some related distinctions from an orientation which centers on the human person and the work of this person in the studio. In order to study a case, certain core terms and points of reference should be drafted by which the case can be investigated. I take it that even with my negative analysis of Collingwood's philosophical stance in chapters four and five, we may proceed with a functional understanding of the distinctions to be used and the possible ranges of activity to be covered by them. That is, the terms `craft' and `art' and the complexes of related terms `plan', `preconceived', `form', `imaginative', `beauty', `expressive', etc., are common enough words which have uses that allow conversation and argument to go on, even with disagreement and ambiguity as to precise demarcations. Not only that, I start with pottery and the potter's studio as a paradigm for my interest in craft, and work from that grounded context for the rest of this thesis. It is from within and about this sphere that my study continues.

1.1

The domain selected for study is that of pottery. As noted in the introduction to the thesis, I could not cover the entire field of ceramics, and as it will become clear in this case presentation, I will not deal with all of functional ceramics either. In my final chapter I will make brief reference to limits of my thinking on these problems, not the least of which has to do with the fact that in the late 1980's the word `craft' and the word `pottery' have become less clearly defined by skill related to function, and occasionally allied with terms like `clay', `maker', `vessel', `metaphor/aesthetic', `ceramics', etc. These associations present another possible approach to the idea of craft which could itself be the subject of another study, especially one related to what are now called `post-modern' considerations. There are numerous common elements in the making processes between the industrial models and the studio, as indeed there are between the sculptor's studio and the potter's, but they do not warrant using the one as an exclusive model for the other.[162]

Imagine that one were an aesthetic accountant ready and able to study and audit the books. What would the books be books of? An accountant cannot audit the oil business, educational undertakings in Canada, or the ceramics industry; an accountant is able only to do that analysis for a given business, company or comparable legal and financial entity. This very accountant can only audit this particular pottery studio or that specific pottery industry, and even then only if there are proper books kept, the mass of receipts tallied (whether in shoe boxes or safety deposit boxes) and the exact orientation of the audit is known, e.g., financial statement, current debt, income tax averaging, etc. In order to know what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a good audit, the accountant must be assigned the appropriate standards of measure. It is only relative to clearly established purposes, objectives or reasons that one may expect to be able to determine the necessary and sufficient conditions by virtue of which one may properly judge when the accountant's enterprise is fully accomplished. Our aesthetic accountant has a comparable set of problems, but they are undoubtedly less well defined insofar as they relate to a very distinctive example: this potter in this studio making this pot; that pot in that gallery under scrutiny by that aesthete. My interest cannot be simply that of an aesthetic accountant because the study would be

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[161]K.J. Barton, **Pottery in England: From 3500 BC - AD 1750** (South Brunswick: A.S. Barnes and Company, 1975), 13.

[162]In particular note both Sir Herbert Read, **The Art of Sculpture** (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956); and Daniel Rhodes, **Pottery Form** (Radnor, Pennsylvania: Chilton Book Co., 1976); Henry Mintzberg, *Crafting Strategies*, 66-75.

too confined and possibly too idiosyncratic. This is the main reason I frequently talk of tradition and its place in the use of this language about imagination and creative making, etc. Perhaps, one should balance the slant of the accountant with that of an aesthetic ethnographer who examines the culture and practices of studio potters. And in light of this further slant, I would add the philosophical which I assume from within my experience as a studio potter. At the end of this chapter and in the final chapter, I will discuss a general theory about the craft/art distinction and will use this chapter's distinctive case analysis as an aid to new vision and insight.

Let me point to five possible approaches to the case to set up avenues of entry: 1. the work of the potter as described by an observer in the studio; 2. the phenomenological account of the work based in the experience of the potter; 3. the judgment by the discriminating buyer and aesthete that a given pot is good, or beautiful; 4. the assertion by the potter that the pot is good or perfect; 5. an attempt to deal with the questions, "Is this bowl craft or art? and "Is it beautiful?" Each of these alignments guides consideration and thought into different channels and the check points are slightly different for each one, although there is frequently overlap. There could easily be a longer list and my actual interest will focus only on the first two, although I touch on the others as I move along. I select only representative segments of what could constitute the entire field of inquiry. In the first place, aesthetics is so vast that a thesis could not encompass it; the same is true of ceramics.

To say that the case is studio pottery is to be imprecise, and hopefully these five dispositions direct attention to important considerations. For the present, I do not want to undertake a general discussion about what potters do, what they make, whether what they make is aesthetic or functional, what potters might think or feel as they work, etc. For the present, I will deal with quite concrete cases and examples of individual actions, techniques, pots, potters and the like, and if possible, make more general remarks after a brief synopsis of the case.

For the present study, imagine that the master potter makes an exquisite, reduction, high-fired, translucent, porcelain bowl with deep, luxuriant and active colour, with a smooth and continuous line, and a form that is true. For now we need not consider whether this potter or this pot is also what one may call imaginative, creative, innovative, traditional, or production-oriented, etc., because in part we are trying to see in what sense this language is or is not applicable to the case we set out to study.

In order to make this bowl, the potter worked, and this work may have extended over a period of many days or even weeks depending on the particular setting. With this backdrop, I strive within the rest of this chapter and the bulk of the next, to offer richer perspectives and interpretations of various actions and language, than have been traditionally accorded the working studio and the crafts in general.

The first observer whom I have chosen is not fully acquainted with the diverse and many steps in the process of making a bowl. Walking into the working studio, one is confronted by the magic of throwing in the first instance, by the awesome power of the glost firing in the second, and the cornucopia-like offerings of the unloading of the kiln in the third. The work may be described in a manner akin to that in which one would describe chopping wood, adjusting the idle on a car, conducting a symphony, writing a short story, doing a finger painting, performing dance, or building a sand castle. The clay is deftly thrown into the centre of the spinning wheel head, water is meted out, and the reassuringly authoritative grip of the potter's hands caress the moist and spinning clay; in what seems like an instant the ball of clay has been teased into an open shaped, smooth lined,

well-balanced bowl.[163] Since my example involves the application of layered slips and engobes, line marking with brush and fettling knife, another type of activity could also be described involving the use of these other techniques. To potters, the labour of the potter is often waiting and being patient under just the right circumstances. For the potter, throwing could easily be described as the art of release; for the observer, describing this activity would suggest control, power, and assertion. In order fully to describe the making of this bowl, the spectator would be obliged to return when the leather hard clay can be trimmed and turned in the style and precise manner which the potter undertakes. To observe the carving of the foot involves understanding steps which may simply be described as cutting away clay from a solid mass, as the bowl spins in the opposite direction than that in which it did for the throwing. The bowl may then be set aside to dry. Is this part of the making? Let us further assume the bisque firing has taken place and the spectator was present for that. It does not have as much flash as throwing and so is easily overlooked. We could bypass the many small steps between the bisque and the glaze fire and say simply that the observer saw the glazing process itself -- assuredly a process more secretive to the lay person than anything else the potter does. And then the firing takes place; here the mystery of the fire completely escapes the lay person. If the observer has the patience to sit through the ten to thirty hours of careful tending to the firing dragon, as potters often affectionately regard their kilns, this onlooker may see an action or set of actions that alter the appearance, intensity, colour, murkiness, and smell of the fire, and that somehow teases the fire to its peak. Not that they comprehend "peak" or its related notion of "maturity" as the potter does. This surely is the end to the making. But not quite, as the potter unloads the cornucopia, some pots are treasured, some enjoyed, some sold and some smashed to smithereens. They too were finished: both with respect to the making and with respect to the potter's judgment or taste.

Certain distinctions may be made within the manner in which the observer notes what goes on in the studio. The observer is not simply an "eye", and the world being examined is not simply a configuration of visual signals. Observers *see* in a broad human sense as well, which means that they note, query, admire, understand, feel, etc. For certain purposes or on specific occasions, they may make distinctions and thereby draw attention to diverse facets of what is going on in the world and in their experience.

When one is watching a potter make this bowl, there is no confusion as to what the potter is doing: the potter is making this bowl with this clay at this time in this studio. The onlooker frequently cannot foresee what the potter may shape at any given instant. If, however, the observer were familiar with the work of the potter, patterns of work would become clear, curves would become known, and a measure of predictability would arise. The observer could learn to anticipate shape, curve, and line, for example. Our onlooker is immediately aware that the potter is masterful, i.e., displays a command over the material, has high order skill with respect to the materials, the tools, the steps and procedures in the shaping of this plastic and elusive substance. Observers can see that potters know what they are doing. By `knows' in this case, observers wish to convey a variety of notions. Perhaps they mean simply that not just anyone can perform these acts because it requires training, talent and practice to do so; or perhaps they mean that they themselves could not begin to undertake such a thing; or further, that they have a sense of amazement that it can be done at all, which they cannot comprehend but which they can see.

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[163]If this observer were well experienced, then numerous other qualifiers would also be added about finger movements, moisture levels, use of tools, placement of finger tips as distinct from thumbs, edges of fingers and balls of the palm, elbow positions and overall bodily stance.

The observer would also discern consistency in success and progression from ball to bowl. The more cognizant the onlooker is of the traditions of pottery and of this potter, the more precise, yet the more fluid, would be the meaning of the term `success'. It would be more precise because the limits to acceptable thickness, stability, and manageability would be more defined. It could be more fluid because it may be defined also by what might be called its opposite, failure. For example, the language of success would not always mean that actions conformed to preconceived images or plans. It could mean, rather, that there were certainty and deftness, and economy of movement in the determination of *any* line, or curve, whatsoever. It is equally clear to the observer that the shape the potter is forming by the hand and body coordination is individual, it has never existed before. That is, the observer is a witness to the creation of a bowl in its primary form. `Creation' in this case means simply that the pot comes to be and had not been before, and that it comes to be by the direct action and intervention of the potter with respect to the clay. This word may express the surprise and inspiration the observer feels as the lifeless ball of inert clay is almost instantaneously transformed into a bowl. The spectator has seen the whirling clay grow and change as if by some hidden force. The hands, and occasionally only the slightest part of fingertips, make contact with this gyrating plasticity at only one spot, yet the whole of the mass shifts, sprouts and flourishes apparently independently of hand contact.

`Creation' may simply be a word for making a comparison with other types of common human activities like walking, writing letters, driving a car, or changing diapers. It would not follow for any observer that no writing is ever a creation. It could simply be a different application of the term. The observer sees the control the potter has over the clay, a moist material close to consistency of liquid mud, and recognizes many occasions on which the potter makes decisions: now the potter stops *this* lip, shifts *that* curve, angles *the* foot, smooths *that* surface, applies only *this* thickness of a given slip before integrating another slip in just *this* layering, etc. These words indicate that numerous judgments are made with ease within the process of making. There are even those cases where the word `judgment' is inapplicable; the potter simply makes, decorates, and proceeds.

To virtually any observer, the kiln's fire is the enigmatic and baffling heart of the potter's art. What the onlooker sees going into the kiln is intensely different from what anyone sees coming out. The kiln, with its fire-breathing dragon-like characteristics, seems inherently uncontrollable to the uninitiated. Colour, texture, images, representational lines, balance of hues, form, weight of shading, etc., all become evident after the fire. Previously delicate clay becomes stone and stone-like with an intermingling of glaze and clay that may be so intimate that they are one. In studio pottery this is the place where one sees the unpredictability of the potter's art. Here, it seems that the creative process ends.

At this juncture, the term `creative' orients differently than the earlier use of the word `creation'. In this instance, `creative' refers to the entire process of making and rests on the assumption that something was created. It is not a substantive word. It indicates, rather, that there is a whole process which simultaneously involves newness, originality, the unforeseen, and the valuable. The transformation of the common and uncoloured, visually unappealing, sensibly fragile, and indistinguishable surfaces into bright, sedate, intense, calm, rough, smooth, rich, compositionally balanced, etc., pots, is frequently staggering in its profusion. When observers remark that "the creative process has surely come to an end", these words are not directed to the set of events of unloading a kiln, or of great pleasure at the appreciation of the best of those made. They are an attempt to articulate the metamorphosis from mud to beauty, and they display the feeling or belief that all processes begin and end. The power of the creative process may be *attributed* to the potter but these words draw attention to the complex of activities, the end result of which is placed before the observer at the door of the kiln. Even to the relatively uninitiated, the bowl is the end of

an operation *of making* -- of making what? well, of making *the bowl*. This operation began with wedging or perhaps throwing, depending on the extent of the onlooker's familiarity with the studio activities. A less experienced spectator will have thought that the making had ended with the striking creation of the form on the wheel.[164]

Of course, viewers are not simply recording through the eyes, to paraphrase Collingwood's distinction being "seeing" and "looking". When I present the viewer as outside, I am saying simply that this person does not know from personal experience as a potter does, the *whole* undertaking called `making the bowl'.[165] For certain purposes, the observer may describe these actions in emotion-free or value-free language in contrast to some other mode of talking, such as admiring a deft movement as distinct from an uncertain one, or as a pull made with conviction compared to an extension made too hastily and with little care.

Suppose for a moment that such onlookers were to describe these processes and products of throwing, glazing, firing, etc., in light of the terms `craft', `art', `imagination', `expression', `aesthetic', and the like. Knowledgeable observers would readily identify segments of the whole process of making into patterns of action which could be called techniques, technical feats, imaginative or inventive movements, exciting results, immediate responses or effects, artistic flairs, accomplishments, etc. These "segments" may be set apart from others by an individual, a tradition, a sub-culture, an interest group, philosophers, ethnographers, potters, visual interest, sculptors, etc., in any number of contexts and for different reasons and purposes. The settings within which the language of `craft' and `art' occur are quite diverse. It would be rare indeed that the substantive forms of these words would be used in the studio itself. Is *this* craft or is *that* art? Other than the fact that one scarcely uses this language in the studio, if one were to, then the questions arise concerning what one is indicating by the words `this' and `that'. Our observer could stand back from the studio and the specific work and say of the whole setting and fabrication that *it*, namely pottery, is craft or art. One simply does not say of "throwing" that it is `craft' or *a* craft, although there are circumstances in which one could say that it is *an* art. This is the case because "a" craft is a whole complex of activities and objects while "an" art may be either the complex or a specific aspect of a complex. That is, our observer would not *describe* the individual elements or units of the "segments" by using the word `craft', unless there were a larger domain and the individual actions were referred to it as if they were part of it. It would be the "craft". But observers might describe some of the particular movements or actions as `imaginative' insofar as they would be striking, flashy, or flamboyant for example. They may cite the *potter* as imaginative in the making process or by virtue of the scope of pots produced. That is, `imaginative' expresses that notion of the potter's ability to act consistently relative to the future and to ensure production of the thing. The comparative use of `imaginative' has a few variations of which the following two seem relevant: the finished bowl may

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[164]This is not unreasonable; it is only immature. The form has dominance for a number of reasons: a profile or silhouette displays the cross cut view, the geometrical slice of the bowl and can be appreciated, noted, catalogued etc. independently of other considerations; it occurs prior in time to all colour, texture, motifs etc., and has what one may call precedence, i.e., since no pot has hue or shading without form, the form is necessary. This of course is simply to say that the *clay* is formed from its original indifferent mass by human action. In other words our concern for form in this instance is preset by the aesthetician's concern that *conditions* be established which classify the object and the activities viewed as giving rise to it.

[165]Peter K. Manning, **Semiotics and Fieldwork** (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1987). One could do an independent study on the potter's work and creative life based on the combined work of thinkers like Harper in **Working Knowledge**; Lawrence Jordan's **On The Journey of Claying**; and Grant McCracken, **The Long Interview** (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1988).

be imaginative relative to the other work of the potter, not only in this firing but over a wide range of work during an extended period of time. And some particular bowl or the overall work of this particular potter is taken to be imaginative compared to the pottery of the age or culture. A given bowl may be seen as imaginative insofar as it opens new vistas in the potter's work; the other work in this particular firing may seem dull by comparison, or it may be too similar to the rest of the work which the potter has done in the past, whereas this particular bowl is not. The originality of this particular piece is more striking, it commands attention and may inspire much thought or even awe.

Observers could also use a word like `aesthetic' quite readily in the studio, but virtually never with allusion to an action or segment of work, because the word `aesthetic' would be reserved for the object being made. When this object is pleasing, balanced, well-structured and the like, they may describe *it* as aesthetic or as aesthetically pleasing. The word `expression' and its related language is conspicuous by its absence in the studio and production process. Observers may say of a given work, say, one that is massive, that it expresses the potter's power or personality, or they could recognize that a series of dark, subtlely coloured pots expresses a given mood. But in this case, they may not at all mean that the potter felt this way. There are settings in which they may also say that the potter was expressive, but normally that would simply mean that the diversity, intensity and imaginative aspects of the potter's work were dominant relative to other potters' work.

1.2

The suggestion that the potter may be an observer, even if viewed as intimately involved, has certain serious limits. The main reason is not that the potter is not one, the problem is that the word `observer' is dominated by the idea that there is a distance between the observer and the events being observed, and that observation is a form of looking. Both of these conditions are not barriers if one does not restrict the meaning of the terms like `distance' and `looking' to physical space only. Potters can and do watch themselves throw, and not only by using mirrors to gauge curves. They watch by remembering, seeing, feeling, smelling, touching, seeing in their mind's eye, guessing, imagining, wondering, thinking, concluding, etc., in much the same way as people watch themselves walk or cook, or as athletes watch themselves train. And I call this group `watching' because one may express what is going on in such a case only by gathering a significant and diverse complex of activities under one word. If one were to study only the role of the hand as seen by a spectator in the studio, it would not be a potter doing the seeing. The potter is an involved, participating actor in the field, and as such has interests and influences that alter the breadth and depth of the observation. While reflecting on a firing, Leach remarked,

> The colours and textures were particularly fine and we were in a high state of excitement in spite of the fact that. . .some pots on the left side of the kiln were underdone on one side. . .The first good impression was confirmed during the day. All the iron glazes had come out very well, and the celadons were good this time although not quite as restrained as the best we have had. A few of the blues were overdone and the cobalt in its horrible purple intensity had triumphed over iron, but others, including the olive-blue teapot, were lovely.(**PB** 254-5)

When one accepts the potter as a participating observer, one should recognize that the point of view articulated is neither object-dominated nor subject-oriented. Under some conditions it shows shades of each. As with many operations in life, there may be no particular stance or position at all. I will wait until the next chapter to deal more specifically with the loss of a point of view.

Years of practice and doing the work itself so enhance the memory, touch, and vision of the master potter, that significant amounts of making are what we call `automatic', like walking, noting something in the far distance, or arguing about one's favourite political or culinary subject. But the automatic must neither be overlooked nor be presumed to rest on some unconscious but organized

mental phenomenon. What does the potter do and see insofar as one might take the potter as spectator?

In handling the balls of clay, their weight, state of moisture, firmness, internal alignments, full roundness or odd shape are immediately apparent simply to the touch of the hand. Without effort, but not without work and attention, the ball is hurled toward the spinning wheel and moistened, compressed and centered, while the fingers feel their way to the center of the centered mass, muscles pull and fingers open the clay and the transformation of the mud into growing form begins; this palm forces *there*, fingertip touches *here*, stomach muscles move the mass like *that*. The master potter sees the curve grow and appear from the extended clay. This seeing is from an irregular position, namely, that of a person bent over on the right side, from the proximity of inches instead or feet. This situation is one in which an interesting feature of artistic skill is couched. Like many artists, potters are able to function as if they saw their pots from afar while they are actually in close physical contact with them. Judgments about curve, line, balance, etc., are made *as if* the potter were standing at a distance and comparing two bowls, vases etc. But they actually determine the curve by the use of fingers, palms, throwing sticks, knuckles, ribs, or scrapers, all the while knowing by touch what is happening to moisture, stability, truth of the curve, and extension of clay. This "touching" is highly informative and by no means to be confused with the notion that touch can only give information about extension in space. On many occasions there is the observation that a given curve is "just right" and the activity stops in that direction while other actions change some other facet of the bowl, e.g., the inner surface of the pot is toned, varied and finished by hand, the undercut for a foot is properly placed, the lip is compressed and smoothed to its final finish. Many of these actions are stopped simply when they seem to be right. Some are what was wanted, others come to an end because going further would be a mistake, and yet other actions are ended with no thought or particular awareness at all, and then there are those actions which one stops simply because of certainty.

Insofar as I would see the potter as an observer, these actions are felt or seen, where `felt' indicates not only the touch of the hand, but also muscular sense throughout the body, emotional blocks, satisfaction, or disturbance. Feeling in this form of activity is a type of body thinking and seeing.

The potter feels the thickness of the walls, knows that the moisture level is too high or too low, compensates for internal irregularities in the clay, balances the object in the proper way as it is removed from the wheel, feels the leather hardness of the clay for trimming and further turning, holds the tools with the right pressure and at the proper angle. Although there are innumerable options for the type, shape, angles and stability of the foot, each action the potter undertakes is precise and goes only so far, until the over-all balance, structure etc., are exact. The slips of the right viscosity are applied in proper thicknesses and overlapping or intermixing. This aggregate of actions and undertakings all occur before the glazing and firing. Glazing and firing are also densely laden with judgments, decisions, intuitions, guesses, hopes, and the automatic as well. Well before the final touches of glaze and firing, the potter *may* have noted a certain pot which seems to have promise, that from its inception has drawn attention; many of the others do not have this apparent feature. *It* bears watching!

Upon opening a kiln, the potter sees the work genuinely differently than the distanced observer, and is in a deeply ambivalent and unenviable state: "Altogether it was one of those days which make a potter's existence worthwhile, nevertheless at the end of it, when the pots were out

and the best of them assembled in a group, I experienced a sudden depression."(**PB** 255)[166] At this point, the participation aspect of the potter as observer is usually overwhelming; the work is now finished with respect to the actual making itself. There is nowhere else for the work to go in the creative process. It is now rejected or sent on to other worlds. Sometimes the pot is rejected because it does not pour properly; sometimes because it is ugly; sometimes because it is lifeless. Sometimes a pot is kept for diverse reasons as well; it pours just right, it is stunning and full of life, it is beautiful; sometimes it is kept because it did not violate any of the limits too severely.

2. The Object

I will place the finished object into contexts in order to carry on. We may see the bowl in different ways: firstly, the bowl as one of many pots which were fired at this time; secondly, the bowl as one object by a given potter relative to other objects by the same potter over an extended period of time; thirdly, this bowl relative to other bowls in the general tradition within which one judges it to fall; fourthly, this bowl relative to the general state of objects made within an industrial or machine mode of production; fifthly, this bowl relative to non-functional artifacts, like paintings, sculpture, etc.; sixthly, this bowl as an expression; and seventhly, this bowl as classified within a given institutional structure, or cultural orientation. These settings and comparisons provide opportunities to see affinity and contrast.

In the first instance, one must imagine the following case for certain types of judgments to make sense. In general, the work of the potter must be fairly consistent: there must be a style, an order and regular production of things for there to be the possibility of judging that one piece. This one may be better than another which, as the spectator would say, for all intents and purposes received the same treatment. If one were to assume a strict adherence to the classical mode of fabrication according to Collingwood, one pot would not be, indeed could not be, richer and livelier than another because it had not been so designed. This diversity and qualitative difference I take to be the first indicator that the classical model is incomplete with respect to what actual craftspeople do. To say that his philosophical theory is designed only to deal with conceptual types is to beg the issue.[167] Actual potters are not conceptual types, they are potters and what they make is variable with respect to quality as well as form. Using Leach as the most noteworthy example but supplemented by the actual experience of my own work, I contend that the beautiful pots are fabricated by *skilled* potters: success with respect to this is not guaranteed. That is, even when potters set out to make beautiful work it does not follow that they accomplish what they set out to do; and further, many a striking, beautiful, or luxuriantly deep bowl has been made, but never

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[166]This brief quotation from Leach's work pinpoints a most intriguing and complex aspect of much artistry. What is this sudden depression? One might naturally think that his work was twisted, or the glaze had crawled and the clay sintered, and that he was simply upset at these flaws. In some cases this is true. There is, however, another aspect of artistry which is more subtle. Quite frequently the potter feels depressed not at what went wrong, but with what has not yet happened. Potters build up deep experience in their individual work which rests on, and is an aspect of, the traditional enterprise of pottery. Internal to the culture of this traditional enterprise there are standards of excellence, hints of greatness, and clues about the most exciting; there are demands and prods which provoke searching and highly directed energy, and which the actively participating members of this craft world understand and accept as they practice their craft. As in many ventures where excellence is simply a practical daily requirement, and internal value patterns inspire committed members always to reach beyond what they have achieved, what may be called `success' frequently induces "a sudden depression". There is something "great", "better", "richer" yet to come -- but not this time.

[167]Fethe, *Hand and Eye*, 43-49.

planned in the way it actually came to be. And equally frequently, when beauty is sought it is not known in advance of its being created in a given situation.[168] Even in this case I think a good case can be made to argue that the skill of the potter was basic, but not in the sense that the classical model suggests by its being the "knowledge necessary to production". Rather than a form of logic or knowledge being the paradigm, I suggest that one consider skill as a form of midwifery in the birth process. With this type of comparison, skill has the characteristics of appreciation of circumstance, supportive effort, and involved participation.

On top of these more assertive claims about beauty and depth, certain bowls or other pots have a more pedestrian characteristic which also gives rise to laudatory remarks. They may simply feel wonderful in the hand, they may suit the movements of a person's body in the course of cooking, putting flowers in a vase, etc., or they may add emotional warmth to the meal someone is eating. To return then to the issue at hand: what is being asserted when one says of this particular bowl that it is creative, imaginative, or aesthetically pleasing, and more so than the others to which it is compared? In any particular firing, a given bowl may overshadow all the others. This may be due to a gentleness of colour, relative to a garish hue of most others; it may be due to the strength of a curve, relative to an unevenness, or inconsistency in others; it may lie in the uplifting grace given by the balance of foot to outer lip when the others are heavy, too broad, etc. In each case, however, the judgment is made relative to the other pots in this firing, and not by reference to a mental ideal type, or an ideal individual.

Secondly, relative to a fuller spectrum of a potter's work, any given bowl may be outstanding and rich. This form of assertion has a slightly less limited context and places the striking object into a longer, fuller, and more diverse set of objects for comparison. In the larger context, the work is judged relative to growth, maturity, and the overall creative output of the potter. I use the word `creative' advisedly in this context to indicate the capacity to regenerate ideas, to continuously produce from within the confines of a small individual studio where the resources are limited and personal, depending on one human being rather than on a larger industrial complex or a highly schematized system of production.

The third placement of the bowl centres consideration on the power and influence of tradition in judgments concerning work.[169] By the time a judgment is made about a single object or small set of objects relative to a tradition, it seems to me that prior decisions and judgments have already played their roles. That is, the output of the individual has already been taken as contributing to the tradition of which it is judged to be a part. If the tradition were highly variable, as distinct from conservative, or visually sedate instead of vibrant, etc. then the precise value and meaning of a given judgment about this particular bowl would have a broader influence and would imply more circumstances than just one potter's studio. Leach's work, for example, dramatically altered the course of modern pottery in the West by affirming certain traditional values, such as beauty, function, discipline, and practice, while at the same time it introduced new ideas and inspiration. These were: individual studio control; new aesthetics in the form of the Sung ideal; association of

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[168]Soetsu Yanagi, **The Unknown Craftsman** (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1972), in particular the chapter on beauty.

[169]Goran Hemeren, *Tradition, Influence and Innovation*. Paper delivered at the **XIth International Congress in Aesthetics**, in Nottingham, England, August 29 - September 2, 1988. Alicja Kucz_ska, *Tradition as Innovation*. Paper delivered at the **XIth International Congress in Aesthetics**, in Nottingham, England, August 29 - September 2, 1988; Dragon Zunic, *Tradition as Innovation*, paper delivered at the **XIth International Congress in Aesthetics, in Nottingham**, England, August 29 - September 2, 1988.

his work with that of gallery artists rather than in the vein of Isaac Button and the industrial pattern; cooperation of a small team of workers working only from their own resources including the finding, cleaning and preparing of all raw materials; and placing a high worth on integrating his work with the overall needs of a human being, amongst others. This latter feature was particularly important because it removed the actions of the potter from the models that one sees Collingwood articulate for the classical artist and the industrial model. Leach has the whole human being in view as he makes his pots.

Leach proposed a picture akin to the working model further developed by Wildenhain in later years at her California studio, that the inventive and imaginative diversity of the human hand is one of the predominant features that distinguishes art pottery from industrial work and places it into the modern world. One recognizes that this work is characterized by dedication to functional beauty.[170] As presented by Collingwood, the industrial model serves to standardize routines and patterns of work and material for the specific purpose of fabricating objects the order, structure and finish of which are predetermined. Compared to this picture of craft, as the rational system of production and reproduction, the work of an individual studio potter is indeed slightly anomalous. To compare the bowl with which I started this discussion to the industrial model, I would state that any work by hand will have a variability and uniqueness unattainable in the machine context; and that beauty and aesthetic sensibility readily appear as features in the studio context, whereas, unless there is an appropriate designer in the industry, the issue of sensibility is irrelevant. Relative to the industrial model of craft in which product is taken as a reproduction of a prototype, and to industrial ceramics where the prototype is governed by an idealized function, the word `craft' indicates a form of rationality and coherence not only of product but of production systems. In this context `craft' is knowledge and control of the means of production. This is the case even in innovative factory settings like Dansk where the design of the industry's products is set by what Read calls the "abstract" artist potter. Once again, with Collingwood in mind, one is reminded that relative to the word `art', the word `craft' is used to communicate certain pictures and values. The word `craft' is used to say *not* imaginative, original, unique, special and the like; it portrays a picture in which copying is a standard of making and in which discrete units of labour or knowledge can be ordered into a systematic whole. With Leach and the upsurge of the Arts and Crafts Movement, these words have a different relationship to one another.

The activity of making and the products made in the potter's studio may be compared to other artifacts and to processes other than the industrial one, viz., painting and sculpture. These other comparisons often call the craft/art distinction into play. It is by no means clear to me that a comparison and contrast of pottery and, say, film or painting, has any specific inherent validity. The word `art' may be used a classifying word, and some people may think that this is an adequate reason to undertake a comparison of pottery and painting or sculpture -- all of which are art. Certain bowls and pots have painted motifs on them and the general terms `design', `decoration', `form' and `imaginative' may be used with respect to them, but the use of the same words with respect to different domains (pots and painting) is not an adequate reason for certain types of value comparison, or to assume that the words will have the same power, locutions and meaning in both cases. Since I have rejected the idea that these words designate essential natures of things, a new

[170]Although I will mention the following item in passing, I would suggest that it is worth a study of its own. The affinity of the Bauhaus' philosophy to that of Read and how they both incorporate the relation of form or structure to function, is in itself worth study. For a hint of this issue note chapter eight, in Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, **Wittgenstein's Vienna** (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), and Johannes Itten, **Design and Form: The Basic Course at the Bauhaus** (New York: Reinhold Publishers, 1964).

approach to the language is necessary. Rather than see these words as designating natures I view them as value carriers and attention directors and it seems appropriate to present this notion under the rubric of a comparison of painting and pottery. When one says, for example, of a given painting that it is a masterpiece, a true work of art, and that its full impact is not to be explained by reference only to technique and craft, what is one doing? Amongst other things, one is placing the object into a quasi-sacred territory and beyond the realm of practical analysis, or as an unteachable secret and insight. One is diverting channels of thought and discourse away from a certain form of accountability and placing the object and discourse related to it, into a less accessible category. One is alerting the community that rules of disputation and analysis about practice and technique are not applicable in their normal manner. One is declaring that the subject under scrutiny is of higher and unique value, relative to the daily lived affairs of people. One can see the declarative, directive and value channeling impact of the language by seeing what the use of the word `art' does to people's attitudes for example. It is akin to looking at the architecture of the great museums and traditional art galleries and the moods insinuated by it: the haloed halls, the inspirational height of ceilings, the cathedral like settings and quiet inspiration, the untouchability restriction relative to the objects, and the perfectly dimmed lights of the show space all enhance a reverential setting within which the object is placed. They show beyond doubt that it is a treasure to be valued. The word `art' may serve to invoke such feelings of reverence. In contexts like this, the word `craft' could easily be utilized as an antipodal limiting word. That is, once one has delimited the extent of knowledge of means available, the term `craft' shows the limit of explanations of a certain kind relative to an object assigned a certain value.

A much simpler comparison than this can be made between the bowl or pots and the artifacts of painting or sculpture, for example. If one were to consider only the pictorial aspect of painting or the role of form in space in sculpture, one would see obvious lines for comparison and contrast. Italian and Spanish majolica ceramic plates and vases from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries, or Chinese vase and plate work from the thirteenth century onward would provide more than ample opportunity to compare composition, the place of perspective, line, colour, subject matter, etc., if one were to study ceramics as if it were a pictorial or representational art form -- and one can legitimately do this. The recent work of Hopper between 1975 and 1985 is a clear example of this in the Canadian setting, and one has only to examine his enameled "moon" bottles and plates, or his vases with anthropomorphic shapes after his Mexico trips, or his neriage bowls following his move to the west coast of Canada, to grasp immediately that this is so. Although it is rarely done in academic circles, illustrations of this sort figure prominently in historical and encyclopedic work. A similar set of comparisons would readily be construed between pottery and sculpture with respect to value, mass and touch for example, and even with some reference to sculpture as a representational art form.[171] This is obvious in the forms of salt-glaze potter Don Reitz, for example, or shown precisely with the "iris" vase products of Harlan House. My interest in specifying these cases is to remind the reader that I accept that the comparative use of linked words like `craft' and `art', `imagination' and `skill', is rendered clearer and richer by the precision and distinctiveness of the setting.

There are a number of settings within which one can discuss the expressive qualities of the pot under consideration, and I will briefly touch some of them. A pot, like any other art object, can be viewed as expressive. In order for this to be so, one would be obliged to see the pot as a facet of cultural life, an artifact made by human work and inventiveness. That is, if one did not appreciate

[171]Herbert Read, **The Art of Sculpture** (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1954); the overall work of Rhodes deals with this as well.

the social, functional, historical, value, and cultural roles of the artifacts in question, or if one failed to appreciate that they are an offshoot of human labour and design, one would never understand that they can be seen as "expressive".[172] The bowl under discussion was described as "an exquisite, reduction, high fired, translucent, porcelain bowl with deep, luxuriant and active colour, smooth and continuous line with a form that is true". I used this language when I opened my inspection of the case because it is value-laden, and it requires that one exercise imagination and tolerance to grasp what I mean. Words like `exquisite', `deep', and `luxuriant' gain significance only within backgrounds that assume familiarity with, influence by, and involvement with certain ranges of aesthetic value and comprehensive outlooks. `Expression' may mean the becoming conscious of an emotion in the vein of Collingwood's theory, but this specialized use is somewhat idiosyncratic and too narrow to be accepted as an exclusive definition. In any case, I am not as inclined to offer an exclusive and exhaustive definition as I am to depict my meaning through nuanced distinctions and examples. I would say that pottery may be expressive in at least the following ways: by its style, shape, colour, function, popularity, etc., it expresses or exemplifies a culture's interest in its culinary utensils; by its restricted or religious use it expresses the spiritual or symbolic values a people may have; by its being in the common and daily use of beautiful objects, it shows the emotional and aesthetic habits of a people. Any particular pot may be called `expressive' according to other conditions. One is not obliged to think that calling a pot `expressive' must be somehow a subtle metaphoric reference to some particular emotion.

When I state that the language of expression is not necessarily metaphorical when used to refer to bowls, I am claiming that as this language is used in a set of traditions or settings it, has a primary meaning for *that* context. It does not rely on another more primitive setting or meaning for its validity. When I say this, part of what I am also saying is that *not only* people are expressive. Much language about expression, and much expressive language, does not refer exclusively to human emotions, sensations, or perception. When we say that a given plate expresses a certain mood, we do not mean this only as a metaphor. We do not simply refer to someone's feeling a certain emotion to make sense of the language of expressiveness; the *plate* is expressive. Of course, the plate is not expressive completely independently of human life; my point is that the language about the plate does not individually refer to some particular person's feeling something. By saying that human life plays an important role in this language, its value, and its scope, I am thereby saying that not *only* particular emotions or perceptions are at play in the adventure of aesthetic dialogue. The language designating the plate as expressive is a legitimate universe of discourse in itself. An immense backdrop of human life is at play in this as in other language games. This play allows for object language, theatre language, astronomers' language, love language, knowledge language, description language, literary language, and so on almost indefinitely.

Collingwood was participating in a lengthy history of philosophical thought when he accepted the claim that all knowledge was affective, which meant that the accumulation and having of ideas or concepts affected the human mind or spirit in an emotional way. I would say that even if this were true, a topic I choose to leave entirely to one side, it would not compel me to think that all knowledge-oriented or aesthetically value-oriented language would necessarily derive its primary meaning and impact from specific human emotions or perceptions. Let me return to my bowl and its luxuriant forest-like engobes and celadon. One may see this bowl in a number of different ways and

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[172]While this point is made by others, Tilghman's reflections on this are very insightful; note **The Expression of Emotion in the Visual Arts**, and **But is it Art?** In this thesis, I have neither space nor expertise to treat of the extensive diversity of disciplines which many view pottery artifacts as expressive in their own way, viz., anthropology, archeology, ethnography, religious history, etc.

each may be as valid as the others. In saying that it is luxuriant I may simply be inspired by its visual aura; I may be attempting to draw someone's attention to its similarity to certain other plates, bowls, paintings, or other scenes with which that person is familiar; I may be saying that this bowl has visual depth unlike the other six we have recently examined, which are flat and uninspired. By doing this, I hope to shift the way someone may see the present bowl. It may be saying that this bowl was made by traditional techniques most of which are readily understood, yet there is some facet of this bowl which escapes a technical analysis. I may be saying that with careful attention one can sense tranquility in the bowl. I could perhaps be saying that one will feel tranquil within one's self by contemplating it. I may be using the notion of "aspects" which has been so touted as a result of Wittgenstein's insightful analysis in Part II of the **Philosophical Investigations**. And simply because I assert that this language is not necessarily metaphorical, it does not follow that I may not use this language metaphorically to make a comparison between the visual impact of this bowl and the dark regions of the Everglades or a tropical forest.

These various uses of language may be deemed "expressive". This could happen by the calling certain emotional features of human life into play. We might say that the bowl makes us feel a certain way, or that it seems to be very much like certain emotions we experience. We could set up a contrast to a simple visual aspect of the bowl and point out that such and such a feature is expressive, unlike another feature which has unique visual properties. There may be another circumstance in which, by comparison to the form and structure of the bowl, we say that a given bowl should be viewed primarily from an emotional aspect rather than a form aspect. In some other setting, one may contrast the expressive features of a bowl with its role as a functional artifact. There could even be a further circumstance in which one would use expressive language as a means of admonishing someone for taking a superficial approach to beauty and use on the one hand, and too metaphysical or mystical a view of simple human labour and work, on the other.

This pot which I have made and which I use for discussion, may be placed into different cultural settings to reflect different slants again. This imaginative placing must be handled with some care. As Leach says when he promotes the Sung "ideal", one should not look to another cultural context for a model to copy, or for a world to convert. I want to point to two items worth noting as I raise the question concerning what might happen if one were to put his bowl into a different setting. The first has to do with the materials used, patterns of work undertaken, techniques and equipment used and structures of studios themselves. The second has to do with the social and practical roles of objects like this one in a given place and time.

One would normally associate the words `celadon' and `porcelain' with the early Korean and Chinese ceramics of the fourteenth to eighteenth centuries and with more recent traditional Japanese pottery, if one were to place the bowl into an historical setting, because that is where they originated. But even if one were to envisage doing such a thing, one should recognize what contemporary master studio potters know already. They know that contemporary celadons and porcelains are visually and tactilely different from the ancient ones; they sense the place of the dramatically different raw materials. Craftspeople, master studio potters, know that even *if* they wanted to "copy" the Sung ideal, they could not, given today's clay, materials, kilns, tools, combustibles, etc. Nor indeed could the copying be done in the opposite direction.

A much more interesting but obscure issue arises if one were to envisage placing the contemporary pot into the social and aesthetic context of the Sung period. Contemporary celadons do not imitate the much sought-after jade, which their early ceramic ancestors did, and they would certainly be an oddity of form and refinement of material if they did. If this contemporary bowl were put into a pottery village of that period, this contemporary pot would have none of the commonness and rugged stability which would have been necessary for peasant life, and then one would be

obliged to shift to the royal court. Simply because the Gardiner Museum of Ceramics and the Victoria and Albert have collected, catalogued, organized by type, glaze finish, time, place, dynasty, etc., the artifacts of a given era, it in no way follows that those delicate or aesthetically enriching bowls of today would have a comparable enhanced position in that other culture or time. Imagine the ancient Greeks, those who might inhabit Plato's republic and, in whose world, classical artisans were at work; what *could* they do with House's "iris" vase or Hopper's neriage bowls. Such colours and specific forms simply were not within the visual and tactile pottery experience of this people. What a museum mentality does with ancient and historically rare work is not necessarily what that people did, nor does it express *the* primary way to regard contemporary work that appears to have comparable functional, visual, and tactile values in the modern age.

All of this is simply to say that the work and artifacts of the contemporary studio potter have a place and value which is established by events in a post-classical, post-industrial, non-standard artistic world in which the extremes of objectivity and subjectivity have been explored and found wanting in many respects. There is no question that scrutiny and probes arise based on the traditions within which one lives, and such is clearly true of inquiries about craft, art, creativity and imagination. To return to the question of the "object" and its place in a cultural or social setting, I am establishing such a context by using the products, work, style, studio type and ideology of someone like Leach. The object is valued differently, seen differently, discussed differently, and handled differently depending on the broad or specific settings and backgrounds within which it is placed. With respect to my case study, the context has become somewhat clearer by looking at the object through these separate lenses, and this set of contexts permits me once again to illustrate that the idealist stance of Collingwood concerning craft and art, and the classical position he outlined for craft, are embedded in an outlook which are inherently ill-equipped to enrich our appreciation and understanding of craft in the modern sense -- a sense that has come to life in the twentieth century in the individual studio and contemporary crafts world.

3. Is The Pot Finished?

The observer of all of this work and production, whether naive or sophisticated, frequently cannot resist the conclusion that the potter had a mental image by which all the diverse actions were coordinated and the object brought into existence. Habits of thought like this are harder than granite. These stoneware and porcelain pottery bowls are prime examples of solid objects that cohere; each one is obviously one. They are a form of vitreous rock, albeit beautiful and of human design. How can it be that potters can fabricate such items with a significant measure of consistency and constancy? And how do new forms get generated and become part of a style and system? It is for observers like this that it seems evident that there must have been an image present as the guide or plan. This naive assumption is certainly couched in our common language.

This assumption shows itself in the manner in which the observer, and I now would regard Collingwood as one for these purposes, answers the question, "How does the potter know when to stop; how does the potter know when the work is finished?" This type of question has its counterpart in the question. "Do potters know what they will make when they sit down to work?" Does the end conform to the beginning? The source of the problem is the manner in which one treats the phrase "how does the potter know" and the two operative terms are `how' and `know'. In the case of artifacts made by individual studio potters, there is a set of considerations which pinpoint some of the conceptual problems that gave Collingwood difficulty. Part of what I will do in the next chapter is to reveal manners in which one might otherwise approach these issues.

4. New Wine Skins

In order to delve more fully into these matters, I think we need a variety of models which shift the focal point from questions about "knowledge" and "verification", i.e., the "how", from a conceptual picture which has full images resting in consciousness, from thinking that "skill" is somehow a cross-checking procedure within the mind, from accepting the ancient myth that creating is *ex nihilo* or always "without prerequisites", from seeing that "originality" is somehow metaphysical and that new artifacts and ideas are distinct in a quasi-cartesian sense, and so on. Whereas I readily accept that there are many contexts within which deep distinctions should be made and will be useful, and I would heartily agree that knowledgeable action is often meritorious, I am under no obligation to acquiesce in the metaphysical beliefs that are couched in this language. My inclination is to view the doing, making, and creating in the studio as being grounded by more open roots.

I suggest that different images be generated that help present new slants and aspects of the making and creative processes, rather than staying with those that tend to use only knowledge, theories of perception, or forms of consciousness as their roots. For example, let us envision the moving portrayal of potters struggling and creating at the wheel, or interacting with the dragon of the kiln, as illustrations which will enhance or understanding of the concrete work of creative making.

I do not want to limit this discussion solely to what traditional aesthetics may accept, because I think that much of the basis of aesthetics rests on too narrow a guy wire. When I speak about the public aspect of judgments and processes relative to objects and the skills involved in their being made, I include a vast array of considerations, viz., language, bodily expressions, vibrant colour, conferences, arguments, local insights, intellectual influences, tones and shades in hue, or in voice intonations, intensity of debates, prolonged experience in certain fields, the diverse histories of the various media, types of artistic undertakings, social and labour relations etc. In other words, culture in its broad sense.

As noted earlier, I do not accept the view that aesthetics or aesthetic experience is pure. Certain traits of Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblances are useful here although I choose not to get involved in the theory itself. Perhaps one should use the idea of an adoptive family as the ground for such an analogy, wherein one recognizes that the actions that make the family itself are legal, social, choice and cooperation, governed/sprinkled with a dash of love.

Chapter nine has partially provided the periphery for what I take to be limits on my own dialogue. Because my thesis is substantially of an illustrative nature, it rests on recognizing practices and using concrete instances to provide nourishment for an ongoing dialogue. Chapter ten rests on the distinctions introduced in chapter eight and made somewhat more specific in chapter nine. In chapter ten, the language of making and creating becomes more detailed, and it opens a window into aspects of studio work that provide a basis for acknowledging the creative aspect of contemporary craft.

Chapter Ten

My objective in this chapter is to tie a number of loose strands together and to weave a richer understanding of creative making in the studio. One of these strands is that studio pottery (as object, observed phenomenon, and experience) exemplifies creative craft while *also* exhibiting high order skill. In part my interest is also to touch more fully on that sphere of human artistry which Howard partially describes by saying "[it is] the area of critical judgment and understanding inhabited by the artist or artisan as one committed to the refined execution of a performance or task."[173] Another thread is that the process of making may be viewed as fitting into a means-end relationship and still actively *invoke* imagination, intuition, sensibility, feeling and preconception-free affirmation. Still another has to do with the role and nature of contemporary potters relative to the pre-twentieth century place of potters, and therein the general question of the craft/art distinction. I believe that these concerns converge and are addressed by the modern concept of individual, humanist, or creative craft. Although he does not deal specifically only with these matters, when Howard discusses "knowing and understanding" *singing* he says

> The question is of interest philosophically chiefly for the way traditional lore constitutes and may at the same time be used to cultivate a refined practical judgment governing action. That craft of any kind involves judgment and continuous adjustment to changing conditions in ways often imaginative and creative seems to have escaped the notice of those who would *reduce* craft to rote means to fixed ends, as if all that were invoked was a "running off" of mindless routines.[174]

With respect to the activities of the potter, my point is that they show skill and conform to the means-end pattern and yet they instantiate creative doing. I use the studio craftsperson and the individual or designer craftsperson as the model for this unity. I do not deny that there are distinctions between the uses of the words `craft' and `art' within the model itself, or between craft and art in the studio or in culture generally. Part of the purpose of this chapter is to align a new way of looking at this language, and to present a new perspective for this distinction.

This chapter studies a fabric into which many issues are woven. Unlike the previous chapter, which was governed by an observer stance, this chapter enters somewhat into the experience of potters themselves in order to proffer an account of making, doing, and creating in the potter's studio. This account will be based in a potter's experience, but not resting solely on only one individual's experience at a given time, place and studio. I will reflect on factors other than simply fabrication, although that is itself an extensive subject. I will address factors that potters themselves deal with as they assess, think about, and appreciate pottery artifacts as they make them and as they exit the kiln. This analysis has ties to the account of the difference between learning the trade and techniques of pottery, and masterful execution in creative making. I perforce tether some of these considerations to the language Collingwood used, but I posit the idea of creative making as being elemental in contemporary craft.

In the considerations which follow, one should bear in mind my brief remarks from chapter six onward about the roles of the words `person' and `human being' relative to processes of explanation of creative human making. When I discuss potters, their actions and their artifacts, I

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[173]Howard, **Artistry**, 6.

[174]Howard, **Artistry**, 52.

contend that they, and therewith their studio production, cannot be fully defined by allusion to a system of knowledge or acquired techniques. Craft is not this specific or limited. I will refer to knowledge and techniques but recognize that a full understanding of the undertakings of potters is best served if one acknowledges that potters are human beings, and individual members of a variety of communities. Consequently, certain explanations of their actions fall back to the types and shadings of enterprises of which human beings are capable, viz., imagining, asserting, searching, discovery, working, wondering, building, planning, playing, creating, guessing, defining, and involuntary, automatic, unconscious actions, etc.

1. Contemporary Craft and Community Identity

I am concerned to render a fuller idea of studio work and creative making, but this is not my sole interest. I will attempt also to articulate a set of concerns which have found an eclectic, non-systematic expression in contemporary ceramics literature. This pertains to the craft community's attempt, and in particular to the pottery community's efforts to place itself with respect to the importance of function, craft, art, imagination, and creativity in the aesthetic interests of contemporary society.[175] This community, especially that of North America, but most assuredly including western Europe as well, is presently grappling with its identity.[176] It is clear to the community that it is radically different from the traditional peasant potters who inherited form, clay, social place, and cultural function from a long ancestral line. It is equally clear that plastic milk jugs are perfectly suited for holding plastic milk containers. Everyone is cognizant of the fact that ceramic factories can jigger and jolley more plates and bowls in a day than the entire studio pottery community could in a year. What then is the role of handmade functional ware in such a post-industrial revolution society? Why does society need this means of production? What does this range of questions illustrate about contemporary society? What can we learn about human wants and

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[175]Thomas W. Brunk, *Painting With Fire*, **American Craft**, vol. 48, # 6, December 1988/January 1989, 56-69; correspondence, **Ceramics Monthly**, vol. 36, #9, November 1988; correspondence, **Ceramic Review**, #56, March/April 1979; #57, May/June 1979; *Fourth International Ceramics Symposium*, **Fusion**, vol. 10, #2, Winter 1987. This entire volume relates significantly to a number of issues addressed in this thesis. **The Gazette** (Montreal), *Flame of Inspiration Shapes Porcelain*, Saturday August 7, 1987, D-6; **The Gazette** (Montreal), *Beyond Craft: Shattering the Myth about Glass*, Saturday November 21, 1987, C-6; William Hunt, *A Brave New World for Craft*, **Ceramics Monthly,** vol. 36, #1, January 1988, 19-21; Donald Kuspit, *Ceramic Considerations*, **NCECA Conference Closing Address**, 1988; Angela Marcus, *A Glimpse of Craft's Future at the Canadian Museum of Civilization*, **Ontario Craft**, vol. 12, #2, June 1987, 13-15; John Perrault, *Craft is Art*, Ceramics Monthly, vol. 36, #3, March 1988, 40-43; John Perrault, *Fear of Clay*, **Soho News** (New York), March 5, 1980; Gilles Racette, *Louise Doucet: La Terre Comme Rythme*, **Vie des arts**, vol. 18, #74, 14-17; Larry Richards, *The Search for Form*, **Ontario Craft**, vol. 12, #4, December, 1987, 8-36; Akio Takamori with Peter Ferris, *Vessel Concepts*, **Ceramics Monthly**, vol. 36, #2, February, 1988, 27-30.

[176]David Baird, *Craft Ethos*, **Ceramics Monthly**, vol. 36, #3, March, 1988, 20-1; correspondence, **Ceramics Monthly**, vol. 26, #10, December, 1978; Editor, *Twelve Arizona Potters*, **Studio Potter**, vol. 8, #2, 1980; Jun Kaneko, *On Being an Artist*, vol. 36, #6, June/July/August, 1988, 51-8; Matthew Kangas, *Robin Hopper*, **Ceramics Monthly**, vol. 36, #6, June/July/August, 1988, 48-9; Peter Lane. **Studio Ceramics**, (Radnor, Pennsylvania: Chilton Book Company, 1983); Peter Lane, **Studio Porcelain: Contemporary Designs and Techniques** (Radnor, Pennsylvania: Chilton Book Company, 1980); Ron Lang, *NCECA/Supermud Conference*, **Ceramics Monthly**, vol. 27, #6, June, 1979, 27-37; Elaine Levin, *Laura Anderson, Edwin and Mary Scheier*, **Ceramics Monthly**, vol. 24, #5, May, 1976, 30-36.

about human making by furthering our understanding of this work? These questions may be posed in a general form concerning the role and place of craft in this society.

Leach's assertion about the non-traditional aspect of the new studio is quite true. Once one recognizes the separation from the folk, peasant, and traditional potter orientation, and embraces the aesthetic aspect of functional work in contemporary terms, a series of identification problems occur. They express confusion within the community concerning the value it should place on function, technique, form, colour, aesthetics and the like. It is obvious that contemporary potters are not painters, sculptors, graphic artists, cinematographers, etc., and that they have never been and are still not called `fine artists'. The language and understanding of the arts seem not to have caught up to this new phenomenon. Although I am not in a position to formulate a full picture of this identity, my thesis will shine a light further into the grey zones of the language of the craft/art distinction and will thereby contribute somewhat to formulating a fuller answer. The queries of this thesis come out of personal and community demands for clearer statements on the role, place, function, work, and value of the studio-potter.

For my purposes in this thesis, the word `pottery' points to the activity of making artifacts, and to the artifacts which are made. One "does" pottery (i.e., one "pots"), and the artifacts or products made are called `pottery'. In part, what I outlined in chapter nine was the process and product from the perspective of observers, whether novices, connoisseurs, or potters themselves. I did so to indicate an external orientation toward potters' work. I wanted to provide a contrast for the present chapter in which I will approach these matters from within the experience and interests of the community which does this work and makes these things. In part, chapter nine was written with the observer in mind because I needed a bias which intimated distance or otherness in its outlook. The previous chapter took what one might call an outsider's look while the present takes what I could call an insider's look. They are not mutually exclusive. This is an aspect of what I mean when I remind the reader that potters are human beings and not simply pockets of knowledge and technique. A person is more than a "knowledge factory" or a "skill toolbox".

In this work, I have restricted myself for the most part to potters, pottery, and potters' studios as the bases for my own philosophic remarks. I will continue to do so and not venture into the work of ceramists like Voulkos, Fafard, or Richard Gill. My main reason for maintaining this restriction is that I want to deal with functional work that bonds specific utility to harmony, beauty, and aesthetic sensibility. Work that is ceramic sculpture, installation art, environmental ceramic, or super-realist work like Marilyn Levine, or the California funk of David Gilhoully, provides a more radical set of considerations than that which I approach.[177] The stipulation that functional or utilitarian

[177]There is even a movement in contemporary ceramics which denies that there is any distinction between craft and art at all in ceramics, and another which assimilates all work with clay to work in ceramics and thus overrides the very idea of pottery. These movements skirt around the notion of function as not being important in work with *clay*. I will not deal with the details of these matters. Some of these concerns are quite interesting when one considers the place of "training" in the educational systems, or the value placed on "clay" or "ceramic" as distinct from "pottery" in something as fundamental as how "fine arts" is classified in college and university teaching structures. They belong to another study dealing with the contemporary categories within ceramics itself as the entire field of the human hand and clay. For example, not all work in clay is pottery and not all is executed by the human hand, and certainly not all is craft in the sense that I am presently discussing.

As one surveys and scrutinizes popular literature one sees an attitudinal approach akin to that taken by certain philosophers, namely, segments of the broader community still believe that a given bowl *must* be *either* craft *or* art. They accept that if an artifact is art, then it could not be "functional", etc. The ceramics industry is not surveyed in the popular crafts literature, yet certain facets of radical post-modern ceramic

considerations remain in full view acknowledges Morris' position that the industrial manufacturers' division between function and decoration has been very influential in the popular appreciation of pottery. The net impact of that separation is that many contemporary potters and the larger crafts community itself still hold that *the* primary obligation of craftspeople is to provide form for function.[178] This conforms superficially to Collingwood's technical theory of art. I want to enrich and enlarge these parameters and pose problems within them and solutions using them. Nothing in what I say should be construed to suggest that I deny the elemental importance of form to function -- that is not what I am saying. Nothing in what I say should be construed to conclude that I think that repeat work, as Leach calls, is unimportant in generating new images, visions, forms, of aesthetic units. I think quite the opposite. Doing repeat work is one dynamic aspect of the tradition or practice of the craft of pottery. It is the touchstone for growth. My interest is to develop a theory of craft which directs attention to significant aspects of craft, viz., amongst others, the aesthetic, the creative, the inventive, the assertive and declarative, and the social, or daily use considerations, etc. One of the reasons for doing this is that I think that a shift in the fundamental basis of work in the contemporary craft studio has taken place, and that this change is not unlike what Collingwood called the "modern" sense of the word `art'. That is, craft now encompasses what we call `aesthetic'.

It is important in both this chapter and throughout this work that the reader remember that the importance of utility in functional pottery is fundamental to my interests. I see no inherent conflict between this aspect of my work and my concern for the place of beauty and aesthetic sensibility. In fact, they highlight problems which are relevant to the craft/art distinction and related notions in a richer understanding of this work. In all of what I say, one of my unswerving points is that functional beauty is central to the task of creative and imaginative individual potters. Having

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art are featured, as is certain non-functional "vessel" aesthetic work. A study to determine more precisely where one might draw the lines to demarcate these differing aspects of work with clay, is badly needed. There is a growing lack of clarity in discussions dealing with post-modern craft and art. One finds the increasing use of words like `ceramic' and `clay' to cover this ambiguity and the lack of clear focus in the literature of the late twentieth century. This use allows journals, magazines, competitions, exhibitions, books, even college and university curricula to carry on without any attempt at subject demarcation, or as being considered exclusive, or snobbish, which may cost on the advertising and subscription fronts, or oblige the writers and jurors to give accounts as to why some objects are included and other rejected a priori. The value of such unfettered openness is worth examining to see whether it is possible to establish any limits to the operating notions at all. It may be that ideas like "no prerequisites" which Collingwood espoused would have a place in these settings. In any case, the extreme opposites of industrial reproduction of porcelain hydro-electric insulators, and "found" clay installations disintegrating in the rain, provide the distant horizons for my study, even if they should be investigated in their own right. These queries are occasionally touched in the popular literature, but seldom probed. I will leave these somewhat abstruse subjects to one side for the present, although I hope to return to them in a later study.

Elizabeth Garber, *Live From Canada*, **Ceramics Monthly**, vol. 37, #6, June/July/August, 1989, 54-7; Barbara Tipton, *Symbolic Clay*, **Ceramics Monthly**, vol. 35, #10, December, 1987, 30-5; Lorne Falk, *The Ceramic Bridge: Discourse and Divorce*, **Contact: Special Canadian Clay Conference '84**, No. 58, Summer, 1984, 59-60. This entire publication deals with a variety of debatable concerns on the subject of classifications for clay, clay as a medium, ceramic art, clay productions, clay as pottery, clay as functional ceramic, etc. Joseph Hubbard, *Ceramic Form, Social Content, and Art Context*, **Fusion**, vol. 7, #4, 1983, 18-22.

[178]Hunter Drohojowska, *The Playground of Modern Desire*, vol. 37, #1, January 1989, 50-3; Tanya Harrod and Peter Dormer, *Allison Britton: New Work*, **Crafts**, #90, January/February 1988, 38-9; Bennett Welsh, *Specific Gravity and Glaze Poise*, **Ceramics Monthly**, vol. 36, #10, December 1988, 32-40.

"prerequisites" is not necessarily a limit on creativity in the studio. Examples of common prerequisites would be: using the potter's wheel; having certain wooden tools; mixing refined raw materials; having a spectrum of shapes, functions, standards of practice, etc. There are many contexts in which having these practical prerequisites enhances intense imaginative activity and creative solutions to almost unseen problems.

2. Doing, Making, Creating

Imagine yourself standing in a potter's studio, wondering about what is going on. Suppose that you pose two questions to the potter: "What are you doing?" and "What are you making?". The answers could be simply, "making a bowl", "making bowls", or "a bowl", depending on the manner in which the words `doing', and `making' are taken. "Making *a* bowl" is an expression which suggests that the potter is involved in *one* activity called `making'. Even the answer "making bowls" conforms to the belief that there is one "doing", which is an activity called `making'. The answer "a bowl" confirms the object-slant of the question by positing that the product of making is an artifact, an object, a thing. These simple answers are common and truthful. They characterize what potters do and make, although they do not cover the entirety of the enterprise. In straightforward answers like these, making is seen as that type of undertaking which produces objects.

In the course of making a bowl, potters do many and diverse things not all of which are geared to or directed by the observed actions which we call `making the bowl'. Only under scrutiny within a narrowly defined path could one legitimately assert that all of a certain complex of actions was undertaken in order to make the bowl. That is, to say that a specific set of actions are *the* means by which the bowl is made obliges one to circumscribe a permissible logic of the making/object relationship. An account of this type begins with the fact that the bowl exists and accepts that there must have been *a* process that brought it into being. In any case, all talk about distinctions like the craft/art distinction presupposes the existence of the objects and activities under discussion. Talk and theory about creative craft, about craft objects like beautiful bowls and compelling cathedrals, or art such as expressionist paintings, representational portraiture, realist or abstract sculpture, and even the emotional elements of the art object and the social phenomenon of the "artworld", all take the existence of such objects and our human interaction with them as their seminal origin. The objects have primacy but they are not all there is to the issue. The web of human life, the depth and scope of our history, and an intimate involvement with our seemingly endlessly complex world and traditions, play their roles in the assumptions we make, in the meaning we take and assign, and in the values we accept and reject as we deal with these objects. The language and theories which we use to help us understand them also rest in this context.

Talking about making and doing as if they were simply or strictly one act or activity is a significant weakness in theoretical thinking like Collingwood's. Because the *object* made is one thing, say this bowl or this vase, he postulated that the *process* of making and the *skill* used for its fabrication were also one.

My thesis alleges that the language we use for the activities of a master potter might be similar to the language that Collingwood used, but that one does not need to assume either a coherent mental state, or the existence of only one pattern of actions for products to be manufactured. It also contributes the belief that skill, and creativity as a human enterprise, may readily be seen as intertwined. It questions what it might mean to say "patterns of action" for making, such as those patterns which the spectator of the previous chapter so readily identified. I know that when I choose not to further subdivide human beings into categories for purposes of explanation, e.g., mind, action, consciousness, body, intellect, imagination, etc., I simultaneously accept that the investigation of doing, making, and creating as aspects of human work has a certain murkiness and lack of categorial

precision to it. Human doing, making, and creating are best understood by a primary reference to human categories. I think they are most appreciated and comprehended in light of human society, anatomy, culture, wishes, history, tradition, needs, speculations, use, aspirations, etc. The main difficulty in this type of account is that each element rests on other elements which themselves may return to rest on the first element in the discussion. This is one facet of what I mean by "murkiness". That I have no guaranteed reference to an objective reality, or a self-certain assurance by reference solely to actions of self-consciousness, is simply one strand of the Gordian knot of theorizing about creative craft in the late twentieth century.

2.1 Doing

First, I propose to answer question number one which asks, "What are you doing?" The language about doing provides access to a deep and diverse complex of human action which is often a different territory than what the language of making describes. It will also afford an opportunity later to deal with the language of creating. The language used in all of these phases of human work may also hint at realms of human undertaking and experience which cannot be adequately circumscribed by language at all. For the duration of this chapter I will direct my attention to the place and importance of artifacts in answering the various questions asked. I do so in part for clarity, in part for ease of accounting, in part because Collingwood used them as the prime example of the technical theory of art, and in part because I regard questions about feeling, aesthetics, imagination, etc., as most intriguing in light of existing art objects, i.e., artifacts.

A simple answer to question number one is "making a bowl". This may point to the fact that the potter is not making a vase or plate and is not wedging or fluting. At any particular instant, the potter is not necessarily thinking, imagining, or planning any action concerning this particular bowl. In pottery studios, the workers are usually involved in the process of making something which has begun, and which will eventually be finished. Even when the thing being made is unique in the sense that *this* curve, *this* colour, *this* configuration has never been made before, we designate the artifact by words that are not exclusive to that individual artifact. The word `bowl' is used indifferently for *this* one or *that* one. It serves to indicate not just this one bowl, but also a category of objects, or it may deflect attention from one class of artifacts to another.

When answering the question, "What are you doing?" by saying "making a bowl", the word `bowl' responds to the substantive "what" in the question. I will return to a set of considerations related to this substantive element later in this chapter when I touch briefly on the dominance of some substance words over certain experience words used in describing making. The word `doing' appeared in the question but not in the answer "making a bowl", because the word `making' took over the full meaning of the word `doing'. A more specific reference could also have been made in response to the question about doing. For example, if the question had come from an apprentice rather than a novice or a less involved onlooker, the answer could easily have been "using my index finger", "using the shadow to get the curve", or "remembering the yellow of the last firing's flame". When answering the question from an apprentice, the master is teaching as well as describing, and the precision of the answer varies by the particularity of the context. Masters are not strictly doing *only* what they *say*, even when they truthfully answer the question and satisfy a questioner. As Howard remarks when he discusses "showing and telling",

> "`The' demonstration may of course consist of several illustrative actions or a single action illustrating several aspects. Each action or aspect may have its own appropriate clue and covering explanation where enough is known. . .to correlate the two. . .From the standpoint of the learner, the demonstration is *of* whatever is described in the cue-expression, the explicitly evoked rule, rather than the covering physical explanation. .

.[T]he coach's task is to `translate' such results and covering rules into cue-expressions. . .[179]

Unlike apprentices, master potters do not continually need to remind themselves about any particular action they must undertake to make a bowl. The term `master' indicates not only that the various techniques, patterns of work, practice sessions, and exercises have been done and surpassed, but also that the person who is the master, has a command of the work within the studio and within the broader tradition. The total experience and working life of the master are not fully described only by reference to a set of "segments" of the making process. For the term `master' to have a rich sense, it must be placed into a broad historical context, yet one which also covers the work the person may currently be doing. Within the extensive parameters of pottery traditions, mastery is understood from within the tradition itself somewhat differently than from outside of the tradition. By this I mean something fairly simple. As potters work, as they acquire expertise, as they develop imaginative abilities and forceful energy, they also share the standards of excellence and the aspirations of the community, and they contribute to them as practicing members. These traditions provide opportunities and support for those participating in them. When we say that someone is a master, we place that person in this broad setting. We acknowledge that those values which come from active involvement in the practice are concretized and instantiated by that person. The person serves as a model for novices, and as a reference point for what may be new and exciting in the practice, as well as what may be traditional and stable.

I do not accept that there are only two ways to account for a doing or a making. What I reject is that "material" aspects of making are explained by "skilled fabrication", that "aesthetic" aspects of making are explained by "conscious expression", and further that the two are necessarily exclusive. Making a bowl may be characterized by and put into the language of a narrative for example, which could hold these normally opposing explanations in one account. What we may now call `techniques' or `physical skill' are like food, and once ingested contribute to the whole but are not directly recoverable.[180] There is an insight and strength not measured solely by the repetition of exercises. For the master potter, doing is not necessarily the invoking of a technique, although what gets made illustrates that skilled work was most assuredly involved. This is particularly noteworthy in series work because working in series takes on a life of its own. I think of it analogously to characters created in literature when the character takes on a personality which the author may not just change at will, and still be "true" to the character the reader has come to know.

There is a rhythm to certain kinds of work and doing that has a ritual character to it. It provides a form of life of its own within which the potter simply carries on. When potters do imagine, there is an interactive dialogue going on by which they themselves are trying to settle on the colour, form, function, and texture of the whole pot. Their imagining is a search which cooperates with the shaping of clay in an effort to come to the right piece. The word `right' calls to mind the traditional notion that certain actions are done in accordance with a plan, guide, or criterion by virtue of which one is entitled to say that whatever is done is right, or in what Collingwood called "the best way". His stance and those like it assume that this language is appropriate only if there were a clearly conceived criterion by virtue of which one could make this judgment. I will return to this point later in the present chapter and elaborate somewhat on the term `right' apart from contexts within which there *must* be a criterion for certain judgments. In particular, I am interested in presenting a contrast to two such contexts. Firstly, I am opposed to situations in which it is simply a

[179]Howard, **Artistry**, 99.

[180]Marienne L. Quinet, *Food as Art: The Problem of Function*, **British Journal of Aesthetics**, vol. 21, #2, Spring (1981), 159-71.

philosophical prejudice to assume that in order to *know* when a pot is finished or right, the potter must have a preconceived idea, i.e., *already know*. Secondly, I will consider cases in which it appears to an observer that certain actions, procedures, techniques, or steps must have been followed and that it is the following of such steps which authenticates the rightness. I do not deny that these types of accounts have their places, e.g., in situations where one is obliged to discuss industrial jiggering, production studios, apprenticeship work, some training and teaching, and the like. My point is that the work, experience and artifacts of the studio-potter are not those places.

Up to this point in my account, the answer "making a bowl" has been based on the assumption that the question about doing was posed as the potter was throwing a pot, and not during the wedging, kneading, glazing, firing, or thinking about other various moments in the making process. The answer to the question about doing might have been "wedging", "firing", or "thinking" if the question had been posed at another moment in the process of making the *same* bowl. Not only the words `what' and `doing', but also the timing of the question have a dramatic influence on the form of the answer.

Let me presume that the question "What are you doing?" were posed during the throwing and then again at the peak of the firing, and that the question were answered by the potter actively involved in the process. With respect to throwing, the answer could be "testing the thickness", "making the curve true", "thinking about the slips", "imagining the glaze application", "deciding about the curve and balance of the foot", etc. In all of these cases, the word `doing' focused attention on the entire process of making the bowl and the answer was geared to that premise. It would be an error to think, as Collingwood's notion of craft obliges one to do, that the potter was actually doing *only* and *all* of these things and doing them in *sequence*. As an aside, I think there is a latent belief in work like Collingwood's that *mind* somehow holds all of the learned sequences together in one pattern, even if one were not aware of it. This would be akin to what is called the `subconscious' mind in popular language: a mind below the mind which holds the building blocks of technique as elements constituting the real knowledge necessary for the fabrication of the preconceived end. This is the ghost in the machine twice removed.[181] This form of thinking is based in the classical model, namely, that in order to say that an undertaking is a skilled one, one assumes that there *must* be a specific knowledge, and that somehow this knowledge sits in the mind awaiting recall under the appropriate circumstances. If one frees oneself from this classical picture, then a wide variety of answers is possible. I opt to release my thinking from the superstructure which strangles explanations by allowing only knowledge-based (i.e., growing from the *techné* root), rationalist (i.e., allowing the form to govern), and preconception-oriented idealism to give accounts of the making of artifacts.

The potter, like any other human being, sees, feels, notes, touches, thinks, is happy, angry, excited, quiet, etc., during the course of daily lived life. Sometimes these other activities disrupt the overt actions of making and sometimes they do not. One advantage of using the notion of a human being to render the potters' activities more comprehensible is that inconsistency and irregularity are aspects of human behaviour and daily life. Such a less well-defined picture defies the rigidity of the traditional grasp of these matters. I do not accept the assumption that if a set of steps can be delimited by an observer watching a potter pot, then these steps must somehow be present in the mind of the potter. Further, I do not accept that this set of steps is the only *explanation* for the existence of the artifact. It may be one explanation amongst others. The imaginative and mental activities of potters are diverse, occasionally random, frequently unpredictable, often orderly, highly regimented, etc. They are more like a story than an explanation, and they are *called* `plan-governed'

[181]Gilbert Ryle. **The Concept of Mind**, 13-60.

by reference to overt undertakings in the studio and to other completely unrelated but planned activities in life generally. *Some* of the undertakings are called `planned' solely because potters make pots on a regular basis; *others* because bowls are not made with feet on their lips, or teapots with their spouts in the lids; or *still others* because they all have glazes in the general style of any given potter or tradition. They are not all called `planned' because potters have images in their minds to which they refer for guidance. In making any particular bowl, or in making a series of bowls, the visible actions of the potter may belie the state of the potter's mind or conscious experience. Occasionally, in making a series of bowls, the potter may do almost the entire process of throwing and removing without paying any particular attention to an individual case. This inattentive attention, as I would call it, is an aspect of being a master potter as distinct from being an apprentice or a novice.

In quite a different and I would say a more focused instance, one could also say that the potter and the clay are at one with one another. This description is of a different mental or emotional experience than what I have just called `inattentive attention', which is akin to making without thinking. When potters are said to be at one with the clay, it is not simply that they are not thinking about what they are doing while they are doing it. They are neither distracted nor working automatically. This action is a non-reflective making. The word `non-reflective' implies that potters are not aware of any distance between themselves and the clay with which they are working. It is best described by a series of negatives. My reason for uncovering this aspect of a potter's experience in making pots is that it provides a partial fundament for understanding how, within the context of practice, ritual, techniques, and material, one may gain insight into human action and involvement as an element for a fuller understanding of creative making. Talented people are able to incorporate specifics of learning which are then not separate within their experience. There are significant portions of daily work in the studio which are simply done. There need not be plan, decision, direction, or even effort within some experience of the studio master. This is not necessarily the same as that in which an *observer* remarks that the potter and the clay appear to be one. In that instance, someone may be expressing amazement at the ease with which a pot is made, or at graceful movements that defy and surpass analysis by reference to mechanical devices or steps. When certain actions are observed, they are best described with the language of fluidity, or of growth, and not by the language of mechanical, sequential, or building-block models. In the case of the experience of oneness between potter and clay, potters do not feel any distance between themselves and the clay which they are shaping at any particular moment. Upon reflection, they note that the making or shaping *just happened*, and the more practiced and mature the potter the more such effortless, or what I might also call `intuitive' making, occurs. In this case, `intuitive' indicates that the potters simply do what they are doing and do not simultaneously reflect on it, even though they are aware of it as they do it. They do not have to place thoughts and actions into a schema. The more masterful the potter, the more such actions are also right.

There are other facets of doing in the studio which require high order attention and the intense riveting of energy. These are quite unlike inattentive attention, non-reflective making, or planned studio work. They may require a play within consciousness itself or they may not. By a "play within consciousness itself", I mean that potters release themselves from certain distractions, diversions, or imaginative and mental clutter and disarray, and from an overly strong attachment to the particulars of their work, the money from sales, conformity to norms, and the like. This facet of doing is different than habit, ritual, and idle making, but it is not thereby reflective or mentally planned either. There are moments in creative making in which the potter's full focus of energy saturates certain actions, bodily stances, forms, points of release, speed, and smoothness of movement. The coordination of this focus shows the skill of the potter; and although the potter may be able to

verbalize some of what is going on in such adventures and tasks, I would caution the reader not to confuse the words with the reality of the doing-making. The word `skill' masks an aspect of doing and making which is only remotely sensed in the language. To an observer, these moments appear as a form of supreme control, good judgment, and right decisions. To potters, these moments may be awareness of movement, the life of the clay, the channeling of personal energy to a point of density in the fingertips, release of tension, accepting the vagaries of a natural material, creating a curve, etc. This intensity of focus is important in understanding part of the notion of *creating* from the potter's perspective, and the reader should recall this in section 2.3 of the current chapter. The reader should also recollect that in operations which capture and employ highly focused energy, the notions of output of energy, the generation and rejuvenation of energy, the deployment of work through a time sequence, the propulsion of an artifact through the fabrication process, the expression and capturing of exciting and important symbols in objects, etc., may be called `doing' only if speakers are at some distance from the undertaking itself, or if they slightly remove themselves from an intimate immersion in the doing. That is, the language is somewhat abstract.

Life and work in the studio are also often tedious, habitual, boring, repetitive, sequential, stress-governed, etc. One should not lose sight of facts which I think most artists know, namely: rare indeed is the exceptional piece; rare indeed is that moment of titillation in seeing the creation of a "great" piece; rarely indeed does one know exactly how such unique pieces come to be; and common indeed is the weight of labour and the blocks to forward movement. Not knowing "how" pieces of a unique stature come to be, is not in itself a problem to studio potters. Although they need elements of control, knowledge, the ability to reproduce certain effects, the assurance of predictability and the like, this "how" is not mechanical, sequential or rule-following. It is more akin to "how" one may fall in love, or "how" someone may learn to forgive It may also be compared to "how" people might set out to improve their lives.

I should make a brief side remark at this point concerning the differing languages we use to discuss and classify artifacts, artistry, and labour. When one says of a given bowl that we do not know "how" such an artful, aesthetic, or masterful piece comes to be, there is a double game being played. One set of considerations orients toward the doing-making, the studio work, what the potter does, what the potter experiences and sees, or what the observer notes and records in the process of watching the production of the artifact. The other set of considerations is geared to the place and role of the artifact itself once it has been produced, i.e., what society and people do with it, how they value it, talk about it, etc. For instance, the work of creative and imaginative potters is judged to be so by groups, sub-cultures and various interest groups; they are used as illustrations of innovation, beauty, a particular aesthetic orientation, or as examples for teaching and inspiration. This latter perspective has to do with the general patterns of classification, and with social and public assertions about individual pots compared to other individual pots, or groups compared to groups and traditions. It is legitimate to wonder about why the object has come to be classified, used, and perceived within both of these contexts. But the orders of explanation and accounting vary from one setting to another.

In the studio context, one may offer the plan-governed, preconception-oriented account based on the industrial model; one can offer a visionary account based in the complex of human activities which the potter undertakes; one may offer a metaphorical account of innovative and unique work based in an organic model; one may offer a phenomenological account outlining the experience of discovery or invention which the potter may undergo, amongst others.

In the broader social setting, one may wonder about why it is that some particular work is designated as a masterpiece, a great work of art, a work of art, as having life, as being insightful, enviable, etc. This designation is not based in the experience of artistic `doing' or `making'. It is,

rather, founded in the various approaches to classifying and categorizing, or placing and evaluating within philosophical, social, cultural, linguistic, and ranking operations. It will be clear that my present interest has to do with the former mode of thought, although I think that our language is such that a pure and absolute separation of these modes is ultimately untenable. I would contend that we legitimately maintain these classes of accounting because of specific needs, purposes, situations, and orientations. I would caution, however, that the language within each mode may be very much like that of others, and in order not to return to Babel, my rule is to try and specify the context, orientation, and setting for the language I use.

One may reasonably ask, do potters never plan, and if they do not, how on earth do they get things done? Surely, they are not like Collingwood's imaginary artists who simply make by conscious bodily expression. Of course, they plan and coordinate their diverse and occasionally conflicting patterns of action to unified goals and objectives. They even use their imaginative abilities to help them in their work. In this respect they are like most human beings who undertake directed action. In undercutting Collingwood's portrayal of the classical artist, I did not deny that potters plan and carry out technical, skilled, coordinated and somewhat predictable patterns of work. Rather, I shift the explanation of this fact from the mental referent which had automatic reproduction. I shift it to: firstly, various other actions undertaken in the studio with which any given action can be compared; secondly, the diverse and somewhat disparate experiences of the artists themselves as human beings; thirdly, the complex of activities that people tackle in the course of daily life and which help us render many other actions, accounts and thoughts intelligible; and fourthly, the general language we use to discuss art and craft as broad social, historical, and cultural phenomena.

What then *is* the answer to the question, "What are you doing?", posed as the potter is throwing? From the experiential orientation of potters' working experience, there is no definite answer that need be given. The answer could be "imagining cone 10", "debating about microcrystalline surface structure and the impact on colour diffusion", "getting the curve right", "checking clay consistency for trimming". And all of *these* answers presume that the potter was thinking only about things that the observer takes to be integral facets of the making of pots. Answers like "determining the thickness of the clay" or "getting the curve *right*" do not specifically refer to mental images or plans. The former is gauged by the touch of the trained hand which creates the curve and thereby sets the proper thickness. The latter is asserted as such when the potter takes it to be so. These statements are ciphers concerning masterful action.

This "right" is a form of assertion and decision; it is not the answer to a search for something which already exists. It is the constitutive action of establishing shape, weight, form, colour, etc., and not the cross checking with a picture. It is a constitutive action within the tradition of the potter, an action which contributes to, and shifts the practice of, the community.

If the question "What are you doing?" were posed at the peak of a firing, the sense of touch and the involvement of hands are dramatically less involved. Discriminating smell, subtle sight, the presence of heat, and blinding, piercing light, and a certain fearful, anxious exhilaration play roles that novices, amateurs, and apprentices can only dimly grasp. Often the master potter risks every moment of many weeks work on an intuitive judgment at some moment not even fully grasped or understood. In work that is regular or consistent, the range of ambiguity of judgment is less than in those cases where the adventuresome spirit of the potter risks all work for some wisp-like intimation of a new beauty not yet seen. Often, the answer to the question may be "waiting" or "watching", and occasionally "smelling". The high-risk factor of the studio-potters' fire reveals an image which helps one comprehend the openness of the work undertaken. It has been known by potters of all ages that the fire was the "maker or breaker" of all pottery; it occasionally may be so for potters themselves as

witnessed by two famous fires: the one that destroyed Leach's studio, and the one Palissy stoked with his household furniture. Often it is the challenge of this high-risk factor which separates adventurers from followers, or fools that rush in from more rationalist-controlled workers. This is partially true of the ceramics industry although in that setting an astonishing amount of time, energy, money and expertise has been channeled into reducing variables, purifying materials, standardizing procedures, and eliminating the creative on the workshop floor where the tradesperson works. In both the traditional settings and the modern factory, the vagaries of the fire have been reduced to a minimum by setting up consistent materials, regular patterns and non-variable steps. In the case of the studio-potter, however, the fire is treated as a respected dragon, an uncertain friend, feared and used, and always carefully watched.

The potter uses the fire also as part of the creative process of making, although in the senses outlined above, the fire does not "do" anything. One should remember that observers are hard-pressed to comprehend and understand what potters may being doing with the fire. The fire and the kiln, however, are aspects of the production process, as well as of the transformative process. When potters indicate that they are "waiting and watching", in part what they are doing is expressing uncertainty, hope, and confidence in their being able to determine that moment when they must do this or that action relative to the kiln, or when they should close it down and in what manner. When they sense that they must act, the action is the affirmation of a dialectic of action involving the fire, the imagination, the overall grasp they have of how and what may be happening with their wares, the heat, glazes, etc. It may also simply be that they can no longer tolerate the indecision of waiting, or the fear of destruction. Many a decision based on anxiety also gives rise to what later will be called the right action or the ideal pot. It is also the case that "waiting and watching" may be deemed to be an "inactive action". In this case, the potter is not waiting for something already known, or necessarily watching for a preestablished signal. Out of this inactive anticipation, action can come, even if occasionally it is only a form of acquiescence to what seems to be just right.

The object language, which is so helpful with the language of making, fabricating, or constructing should not have dominance over the diversity of the language about people and human action and doing. There are many social, cultural, economic, political, etc., settings which orient the specificity of meaning of these terms, and by being attuned to the setting, one may gain further insight relative to what I would call the concrete situation, i.e., in a given studio, with determinate work, with particular objects, colours, shapes, etc., and not simply to a generic notion, or abstract possible case.

Although the word `making' occasionally fills in for the word `doing', as in the expression "making a bowl", it could not fill in for "getting the curve right", "wondering about the fire", "judging", "imagining", or "nothing in particular". Making is not a subset of doing, along with imagining, affirming, digesting, praying, or vomiting, etc. All of these may answer the question about doing, but do not thereby share a common element called `doing'. They are not subsets of "human" either.

2.2 Making

The second question "What are you making?", deals specifically with making and related issues. The word `what' manifests an interest in and involvement with objects, and a slant toward substantive entities, and artifacts. The use of the word `what' in such a question steers discussion away from processes, feelings, thoughts, and emotions, especially when it is used in conjunction with the term `making'. When a studio-potter is asked "What are you making?", a reasonable answer is "a bowl" or "bowls", etc. In this context, having recourse to the fact that a designer-craftsperson is a human being capable of imagining and organizing, is not particularly helpful. The reason is that

the question has to do with the object, or its shape, or a part of the object. The question is not "What are you?" or "What are bowls?" or "What is a thing?"

When the word `making' is used in potter's studio, its scope is different than if it were used in either a urinal factory, a writer's study, a painter's workshop, the outdoor garden, or a stain glass worker's studio. For example, in a urinal factory, workers may be only peripherally making anything. They may be soaping moulds, cleaning the tunnel kiln, or designing new flow patterns -- for either urine, or slip. The form and types of participation in the manufacturing process determine the extent to which we say of workers that they are makers. The value of Leach's argument that the studio provides the setting within which individuals control the overall production from design to finished product lies just in this point. One would be hard pressed to make a rich and extended analogue of writing to conform to the logic of making artifacts, and this is surely one of Collingwood's points about the differences between craft and art. Writers are not said to make. They write stories and poems, or they create characters and plots. This is one practical weakness in Collingwood's using the simple poem as his model as the primitive paradigm for art done "solely in the head". Paintings are not made, although frames and canvas are. When a painting is finished it is most assuredly an artifact, but hue, composition, form and structure, or perhaps even subject matter, are not aspects of the work to which one normally joins the word `making'. This is relevant because paintings are finished products at a certain point. But the language of and about *products* is not only one language which has `to make' as its essential verb. Paintings are painted. As products, they may be seen in different ways. Stained glass workers can make a panel as part of a mural which itself is also made, or they can make a bead as they join the panels. They may "do" beads but they "make" or assemble murals. They may "do" an installation, but they do not make one, although it seems that they may construct one.[182] Gardens are the result of design, labour, planning, and the "doing" of many different actions. They are a product of work, but this work is not necessarily called a `making', yet they may easily be called "works of art".[183]

I want to underscore the idea that although the term `making' appears to be governed by the logic of objects, the specificity of this logic is set by the precise context within which the question is posed and what are taken to be the subjects under discussion. The range of ambiguity in a potter's studio is quite restricted, i.e., bowls, vases, dinner sets, etc. are objects. The word `making' serves as a close companion to `what' and severs certain items from the investigation. `Making' is *not* `thinking', `wondering', `hoping', `doing', `planning', etc.

My contention is that Collingwood was stuck within the substantive aspect of language. To answer the question "What is art?" or "What is craft?", he was obliged to give a substantive answer, i.e., a term like `activity', or `act' of consciousness. In giving substantive answers, he frequently fell into what I would call the "grammar or thought reflects reality" syndrome, a prime feature of the classical mode of thought. This is a not uncommon fault in aesthetics, and philosophers are not alone in having made judgments, aesthetic language, experiences and conscious actions into object-like realities. Collingwood's statement clearly identified "aesthetic experience" with the "object of

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[182]One is reminded of Wittgenstein's thinking in the **Investigations**. One of his contentions which I accept concerns the point at which a word is no longer used to describe a situation. His assertion is that it is *not* because the logic of the reality and the logic of language reflect one another, and that since a reality has changed the word is no longer applicable. Words are no longer applicable in some particular situation because that is not how this specific language is used. This is not a problem of logic or metaphysics, it is a fact of life.

[183]Mara Miller, *Gardens as Works of Art: The Problem of Uniqueness*, **British Journal of Aesthetics**, vol. 20, #3, Summer 1986, 252-6.

art properly so-called". In general, I think that once one has accepted that the product of making is an artifact or is to be *viewed as if* it were an object, then a determinate logic comes into play. The principle is that an object-logic has precedence in theory. It is as if there were a stuff, a matter, substance, a "whatness" which is altered, shaped, configured, manipulated by human effort, and that each change, alteration or determination of this stuff has a specific human intervention, technique, physical movement, or knowledge as its proximate cause and explanation. This is the ground of form and matter inherited from Aristotelian thinking and incorporated into a technical theory of craft. This product logic is governed by a principle which is instantiated in two modes in his thought.

The first mode is that of perception, and the other mode is that of production. With respect to art, this logic is shown in Collingwood's work as he developed a theory of perception to account for the "object of art properly so-called". His theory of perception was designed to account for both what art was, and how it came to be. With respect to craft, this logic is shown by his theory of the production of the "end", which he took to be an account of the existence of the object. The second mode outlines the production of objects and the place of object-language in the process. Its underlying assumption appears to be that because there is *a* fabricated object, then there must be *a* production process which makes it. I, of course, agree that the artifacts are made by human beings involved in the production process. I disagree that there is one independent or self-contained actually existing process which somehow mirrors the logic of the object made, and which is governed solely by the primitive categories of form and matter.

Because my orientation in this chapter is from within the experience of the potter, I could perhaps rephrase the question by asking "What is `making a bowl' like?", or "What does it feel like to make something?", or "What constitutes making a bowl?", or "What are potters doing while they are making?", "What are potters doing in order to produce something?", etc. Once one has softened the substantive force of the question by using metaphoric allusion, by redirecting attention to a constitutional order of thought, or to structural questions relative to the experience of making, then one is freer to use the notion of a person again, and make mention of imagination, feeling, etc. If one only follows the narrow path in answering the question and holds fast to artifact-language with its traditional affiliation with technique, mental image, a practical syllogism, etc., then one's account will be logically discrete.

My interest is to deal with the object and with the object as a product, and as a creation, but as generated by a human artificer. One way I expect to be able to do this is by intermingling accounts of making and accounts of experience in making, by separating certain language which seems to be a language about classes of objects from other language which is about objects. For example, to discuss art and craft as both categories of production processes and products, *and* as the processes and the products themselves, can give rise to a confusion between the classification use and the individual use of language. One may easily confuse this category or class with a particular bowl or plate, which clearly *is* a thing. This confusion is exhibited in the following ways. there is a confusion about how words work and about what an explanation is. That is to say, in the generic use of the term `craft', one designates the broad spectrum of activities of craft and the diverse ranges of artifacts commonly known as craft. Language about specific beautiful and graceful bowls, the human action which wrought them and the evaluative judgments concerning them, has different ranges of use and impact than language about craft as a whole.

A number of differences between doing and making are important if one wishes to understand a potter's actions. Potters make bowls and teapots; this is what potters do. It is not all that they do, either as potters or as people. Nor, indeed, are potters defined by all of what they do, or make. "Making" language *can* be held apart from language about evaluating, feeling, seeing, experiencing

and thinking, although an abundant appreciation of what a studio potter is doing would thereby be foregone. As is clear from what I have said above, I do not accept that all language bound to the term `making' must be governed only by language which expresses and articulates fabrication when `fabrication' is taken to mean `form imposed on matter', or similar words. When potters reply that they are making bowls, their words are simply expressions which conform to the object orientation of substantive language.

Suppose that the potter were making a dinner set. This seems like a case of individual control over a system of regular production. There are eight plates, bowls, cups and saucers, wine goblets, etc. Surely, this conforms to Collingwood's notion of the preconceived idea, and planned sequence of steps and answers the making question directly the way he suggests it must be answered. From a spectator's perspective, the most obvious contrast to Collingwood's theory is that the studio potter is the *designer-maker* and not simply the automatic reproducer of the given. In the course of making, there is an indefinite number of specific determinations as potters sort out what constitutes an acceptable dinner set. Collingwood's point is that as these determinations are established, all of the actions of the potter can be described relative to the upcoming finished product and within the context of a studio in which artifacts are always being made. From the potter's perspective, the main points of reference are the work within the studio, the habits, practices, the growing and changing yet stable standards that are one part of being a member of a larger community.

My point has to do with two concerns. The first focuses on how one views the product, and the second reflects on how one views the actions of the potter. For the former, I regard the product, the artifact, as a human issue. As such, it cannot be fully described by reference solely to form and matter, skill and manipulation, and the like. An enriched understanding of artifacts will perforce accept their human origin and incorporate human life into the account. It invokes traditions, current practices, cultural issues, and the like.[184]

Leach's contribution to this discussion comes in the form of his wondering about the imbuing of pots with life and the integration of this notion within the studio system of production.

> In the work of the potter-artist, who throws his own pots, there is a unity of design and execution, a co-operation of hand and undivided personality, for designer and craftsman are one, that has no counterpart in the work of the designer for mass-production. . .The art of the craftsman, to use Herbert Read's terminology, is intuitive and humanistic.(**PB** 2)

When potters make dinner sets which exhibit life, are beautiful, graceful, and richly coloured, and are highly valued for the pleasure and visual satisfaction they give to users, what have they made? What does technique, skill, and the local means of production of artifacts have to do with *these* features and characteristics of the pots? This is simply a variation on Bosanquet's query about the origin of "feeling in the object".[185] We are not mistaken when we say that a given potter made a beautiful, expressive, satisfying, functional bowl. I am not addressing only the use of words and

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[184]Bill Holms and Bill Reid, **Indian Art of the Northwest Coast: A Dialogue on Craftsmanship and Aesthetics** (Vancouver: Institute for the Arts, 1975). This work focuses very clearly on the place of concrete and lengthy traditions in the daily and artistic work of the contemporary craftsperson.

[185]Bernard Bosanquet, **Three Lectures on Aesthetic** (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1915), 5. Note also B. R. Tilghman, **The Expression of Emotion in the Visual Arts** (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), in particular chapters four and five; for example he remarks, "A notable feature of the logic of the kind of aesthetic concepts that have concerned me is that it stands somewhere between the logic of such `objective' properties as dimension and concepts of such `subjective' reactions as liking and disliking and shares certain features of both." (73)

language, although I accept that how words and language are used does influence judgment, perception, and the texture of the world. There is a temptation to separate studio making and doing from beauty and grace in this sort of context. In my opinion, the main reason for this is that one appears unable to render an explanation concerning *how* anyone could make things of this order. That is, on the traditional accounts of making based in a knowledge system, one is hard-pressed to say how one could make a beautiful bowl, or what the techniques would be that one would use to produce an emotionally stirring and visually alive vase. In subjects like this, one of the underlying beliefs is that one could not have the same means of production for these apparently disparate phenomena, i.e., the physical dinner set, and the aesthetic dinner set. This belief arises because there may be and often is disagreement about whether a particular object is beautiful, or is art, and that there is virtually no disagreement about whether this self-same artifact is a dinner set with this curve and colour, etc.

While it should be clear to the reader that I do not have the definitive answer to such a bifurcation of making, I will certainly point out the direction in which I think one should look in order to get a more adequate account of making. To begin, there appears to be a confusion between two modes of thought, and a propensity to accept that since the language which expresses them is similar, one and only one of them may be correct if taken as an explanation. For example, while it seems clear to me that the potter is the actual creator of this new and innovative work, it is equally clear to me that certain individuals or cultures may not regard any particular dinner set or bowl as beautiful, aesthetically rich, or even as art at all.

The language of beauty, balance, and aesthetics may readily and properly be used to describe a given artwork, the features of groups of work, certain characteristics of thought itself, and of theoretical thinking, and many other diverse spheres of human ingenuity. When this language is used in these different settings, we may be casting a type; we may be outlining a set of features which some groups of objects or people, or thought, may have in common; we may be categorizing for evaluation; or we may be classifying forms of human expression, depicting facets of human life which are mist-like, exciting, insightful. We may be indirectly commanding someone to find certain work laudable or cajoling others into accepting an unusual approach to new work. We could be teaching our children to appreciate art galleries, museums, and what we call great potters, etc. But what we tend not to do in these contexts, is to ask about "means of production" and "techniques".

If one were extolling the aspect of colour insight bestowed by, and aesthetic pleasure taken in this dinner set, or the bowl of chapter nine, and were to answer the question "How did you make this?", there are diverse approaches one could take. The use of the word `how', bears watching. In most circumstances in which the potter would deal with either other potters, novices, apprentices, or amateurs, the question is directed to uncover steps, materials, secret formulas, special techniques, firing procedures, etc. But the more diverse and demanding the question, the less these considerations enter the answer. Sometimes a question like this is geared to stir up thought about how one developed a new form, colour, or texture; that is, what was the source of the inspiration for the newness? Sometimes a question like this is thrown in to ask what the actual or original source of inspiration for the ongoing changing work is. And occasionally it expresses envy and a desire to copy. And sometimes this type of question simply expresses amazement that after all the appropriate answers have been given to all the questioners inquiries, neither the potter nor the questioner can go any further to explain, even though the potter can consistently make and produce work that is beautiful and considered to be works of art. The words `how' and `make' are shifted between modes of accounting, describing, gesticulating, and discourse according to a number of variables. The answers may be equally diverse as the application of the question.

To answer a question about how a beautiful bowl was made, a master potter may say simply, that after much searching and meandering the colours and texture slowly grew from one firing to the next. The potter may say that it came as the result of endless practice sessions, or that the kiln had been acting a certain way recently, and the potter had learned to move in the direction the kiln appeared to be going. Potters may explain the richness of the work by saying that there had been hints in the beginning, and that they pursued these hints. My point is that each of these *is* an explanation.

From my perspective, it is important for the reader to realize that a significant aspect of what I want to say is best illustrated by partial negation of what I want *not* to say. The making is not simply of the bowl, or the beautiful bowl, or the beautiful blue bowl, or the beautiful functional blue and balanced bowl. The making is all of this. And what we mean by `make' varies from context to context. I am not saying that potters make a dinner set, and that they *also* make beauty, balance and grace, as well as a true foot to lip relationship, as if there were a few processes going on. There is not a number of products; nor in all circumstances is there only one product. What the product is may not be described or defined simply and completely by one pattern of explanation, or one picture and model. There may be special reasons and wishes for doing so, and these reasons are taken to justify the limits. As the setting varies and the questions become subtle, what the word `making' and its various semi-dependents mean will transfer from one locus to another.

In order to articulate the intuitive and humanistic aspect of potters' work into a language about the artifacts, I will suggest certain stipulations. One may use the language of the experience of masterful making which involves reference to imagination, wishes, affirmation, touch, feel, judgment, assertion, etc., as a way of embodying a certain felt texture of the intuitive and the humanistic doing. One may use certain delicate adjectives as signposts to the new slant, such as `a beautiful bowl', `a balanced bowl', `a visually active, or sensuously rich bowl'. Words of this sort defy a simple object delineation, but they do not defy the human contribution. In fact, without the role of the human participant and the supporting structure of traditions, communities, etc., they make no sense at all.

These crafted products are the result of human work and it this human involvement which *provides* the settings, norms, and wealth for the language. It is not necessary to view them solely and invariably as objects taking up space and perceived by the senses, and produced by a technical and mechanical means, *or* solely as aesthetic objects or aesthetic qualities. There are differences between the aesthetic and the physical, the artifact and the evaluation of it, or craft and art, but I think ground for these differences lie in human customs and practice -- in daily human life -- and not exclusively in a set of concepts.

It is important not to assume that we are involved in either a contradiction, or that there must be a special category of object, which we call `art', simply because in one context the word `art' may not be used to discuss artifacts and making, and that in another it may. This is one of Danto's contributions in his extremely thorough and occasionally comic treatment of Duchamp's **Fountain**, and similar "perceptually indistinguishable objects".[186]

What is at issue here is that not all making has the same logical and existential structure, nor is it expressed solely by one language. One is not restricted to only one mode of language, viz., object or aesthetic. The assumption which I deny has interlocking modes. One is the belief that the object aspect (i.e., the bowl) of the beautiful bowl may be discussed as the *product* of skill, but that the aesthetic aspect (i.e., the beautiful) may not. I believe, rather, that when one discusses the participation of human effort in making and designing artifacts, there will be an enriched overlap of

[186]Arthur Danto, 90-114.

traditionally distinct and opposing notions. Skill is not simply a form of structured knowledge which is implanted in a plan. As I pointed out earlier, it is a form of living knowledge. Its home is the studio, but its larger dwelling place is the human community. It is appropriate to mix language which articulates emotion, perception, hope, imaginative and physical skill, as well as freedom to act in diverse ways, while being seen as on a path which may be significantly predictable. It is appropriate to recognize that there may be no identifiable technique for the invention of ideas and visions, while simultaneously acknowledging that the life of practice and the development of artistic skill is well described as engendering, generating, inculcating pristine originality. I am setting up a variety of categories and language parameters which foster further empathy and acumen in the field of understanding creative human action. I choose words like `engendering' or `inculcating' because they do not constrain me to think of cause and effect, deduction, practical necessity, addition, or necessity and sufficiency. This use of what I would call `enriched language' overrides rigid lines of definition, but they *are* facets of explanations.

One of the reasons I have regularly emphasized the place of notions like "human", "person", and "individual", is that what we are calling `making' is a human phenomenon. It is not simply an object-governed occurrence, or a state of consciousness. One may offer an account of the experience of making art objects in the studio, but to do so one accepts, as I do, that one begins with the recognition that a given object *is* an art object. An insight into the experience of the maker of art objects would clearly reveal that the experience itself is not specifically the reason something is *called* art. It is, however, a significant contributor to the breadth and richness of the language.

Language about the experiential, mental and imaginative aspects of human action does illuminate different aspects of creative products as well as the process. One can also be actively creative in one's imagination and have this human activity influence the products made. If one were to ask "How?", the route to be followed will not be that of outlining techniques and adding up a sequence of mechanical steps. It is in light of this thought that I refer the reader back to words like `inculcate' etc. I accept that innovative work in the making of products affects the ability of workers to be imaginatively inventive. That is, work within the studio and with raw materials, work that is interwoven with practice, discipline, and the regular production of artifacts, fosters a fertile imagination, may deepen the nuanced values noted and organized, and may imbue the doing of work with authority and insight. It is only by reference to a new mode of organizing notions that one can begin to answer a question like the one which asks about how imagination and making affect one another. The reference focus is human action. And one may cross refer language about human action, in its detailed diversity, to the labour, doing, and making in the artisan's workplace, and to discussions involving the artist's experience in craftsmanship.

While making a bowl in the studio, a multitude of undertakings are ongoing, even if one considers only those actions that are more intimately secured to what the spectator might call `making the bowl'. The sense of touch and its intimacy to the human body and our attentive presence, the distance of a hand from the lip while shaping a curve, the firmness of fingertips guiding this curve to a unity and balance, the wrapping of fingers over the lip to ensure compacted roundness, the surges of power in centering and opening, and the certain vigour inherent in the upward thrust of a pull, these are all actions seen by the spectator and keenly felt by the involved artisan. They are the actions which make the form, establish the balance, set the vision, stabilize the base, render the malleable clay into a beautiful vessel.

Imagine yourself walking; imagine the experience of walking; imagine what the experience of walking is like. Imagine the experience of concentrating on an inventive and original idea; imagine what designing a museum is like; imagine learning a completely unfamiliar language; imagine what a monk is doing while in prayer. Quite frankly, I believe that each of these imaginary constructs

could involve the writing of a book or the telling of a tale. We do manage to talk about these phenomena by delimiting specific contours and borders, and certain main lines of common assent. We do not always need an isomorphic relationship between either an imagining and the occurrence itself, or a detailed and so-called `complete' account of an event or result to understand what is going on. So to it is with grasping the place of experience in doing, making and creating in the potter's studio. We establish our settings and set out to render accounts of events within the setting, consequences of the settings, beliefs within them, their impacts on other locations, and depict various interpretations of what we take to be going on in this and other settings. The various orientation modes we take in our approaches provide opportunities for certain kinds of insight and clarity, but therein also restrict our open freedom to explain in whatever way we wish.

2.3 Creating

I think that judgments about the imaginative and creative aspects of pottery processes and those concerned with asserting that a given bowl or artifact is creative, imaginative, innovative, or unique, have their touchstone in the comparison of artifacts within a community of persons. Mitias has stated one facet of this point clearly, albeit dogmatically, by asserting,

> The word `creativity', and consequently, words like `graceful', `imaginative'. . .etc., applies mainly to the art work, not to the mental, or imaginative activity of the artist who has produced the work. . .Indeed, an artist is judged as creative if, and only if, his product, viz., the art work, is itself creative. That is, one is not said to be creative because he feels he is. . .[O]ne has to prove that he is creative and the proof is his ability to produce creative work.[187]

In other contexts, he mollifies this tone by saying ". . .but we should not at all forget that the work is what it is, that it was creatively produced, only because its author is creative."[188] When I say that we may call certain artifacts imaginative, etc., by comparison with other artifacts in a community of persons, I intend to cover a wide field of judgments and assertions. My most fundamental point on this, however, is that our claims that a given bowl is beautiful, innovative, feels harmonious, or is an *objet d'art*, or demonstrates an imaginative mind, etc., are most intelligible when we consider other objects, artifacts, performances, the overall work and products of artists, industrial design, or occurrences and settings with which they are being compared, and within which the traditional, symbolic, historical and cultural drama of the terms is played out.

From my perspective, the general parameters of language which talks about creating are first and foremost understood in the public acknowledgement and social assertion that such and such work is creative, and not in the private imaginative and personal experience of creating. I do think that a great deal of insight into the richness of this language can be had by appreciating what creative people experience and undergo as they create. I add this dimension because I think that people are not simply the public expression of their humanity and the words that describe this public face. One should not thereby think that I would invent an inaccessible box into which I will place my thoughts. When I say that the public dimension is not the whole expression, I want to emphasize that when we deal with people it is important to remember a wide scope of human reality: wishes, work and labour, wants, feelings and thoughts, insights and habits, visions and rituals, needs, yearnings, amusement, and tedium, etc. One may elect to limit one's interests in some particular phase of human life for some particular reason, as I think Collingwood did with respect to conscious experience and the development of knowledge itself, but the specificity of the reasons delimit the

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[187]Michael H. Mitias, *Creativity and Aesthetics*, in **Creativity in Art, Religion, and Culture**, 53.

[188]Michael H. Mitias, *Creativity and Aesthetics*, 59.

impact of the study. There are also those instances in which neither `public' nor `private' is the only legitimate terminology as the numerous angles taken within this case study amply illustrate.

There appears to be no obvious question for creating an artifact comparable to the one there was for doing and making. One would be taxing the common, non-specialized use of language to ask of the potter in the studio, "What are you creating?" For such a question to arise I think one would already have been in a dialogue on creating, unlike in the cases of making and doing. Many artists, potters included, are often asked, "How do you create these things?", or "What is creating like?", or "How are you able to be continually creative?", and "What is creative making?", or "Where do you get all your ideas?", etc. Substantive questions like "What are you creating?" are reserved for situations in which one is talking to entities like God.

Although I accept that the direct question "What are you creating?" would be infrequent, bizarre, or anomalous in most studio settings, there are many variations on this question and such uses of language have their place. Each of them reveals an attitude of language, and nuances within the making process. For instance, if the question, "What are you doing *now*?" were posed while the potter is shaping the responsive clay, a perfectly natural reply could be "creating the form", or "creating the belly". The form is created in clay; all of the things which the potter creates on the wheel are clay things. This answer could be offered whether the form being created were unique, i.e., made only this one time, or whether the form were a repeat of a preestablished form, i.e., a copy of a model. On the other hand, if the question were posed while slips were being applied or the kiln's fire were being rendered clean, the answer would not be "creating the colour". At these moments one might reply, "trying to create an impression of movement", or "trying to create a unique texture", or "setting the ground for new work"". If the question were posed while making a handle, slip casting, trimming to a paper-thin wall, or spraying a glaze, one would be hard pressed to designate these actions simply or automatically as `creating'. One could say while carving the porcelain wall to paper thinness, "creating a passageway for light!". Although one might not describe certain actions like carving, dipping, or fettling as creative in some particular instance, it does not follow that under no circumstance would one. For example, if one were to account for the various studio operations which rendered a pot imaginative or creative compared to some other pot, one may easily say that the trimming to a paper thin wall, and the perfectly nuanced glaze were integral facets of creating the beautiful pot. That is, they *helped* create an effect, or an object.

One readily uses the word `create' for creating a curve; one uses this language less easily about making the foot of the very same bowl. One more readily says that one is carving or trimming the foot. I think that it may be that the use of the trimming tool makes this manoeuvre more a trimming than a creating, even though the action *is* bringing about a form which never existed before. It could be that since the clay has already been formed by human intervention, the second action is seen as only a reconciliation of subsidiary human actions on previous human action.

When we say that any particular action, undertaking, fabrication process, etc., is creative, we are not thereby using our word in only one way, or as if there were one harmonious and complete meaning for the word, and that we are presently engaging one facet. Let us imagine what this might mean by assuming that artifacts taken as creative are necessarily unique, original, without prerequisites, singular, prototypical, valuable, and authentic. It would seem to follow from such a stance that each action, each manoeuvre, each step would itself be unique, etc. Such an orientation is inherent in Collingwood's position and should be vigilantly eyed with suspicion. His stance asserts the belief that each image or expression is itself the creation of an element of knowledge, a new knowing of a particular emotion in a here and now -- unique, valuable, new, etc. I would add that a further consideration is that, when potters manufacture their myriad bowls each one is slightly different from all the others. This appears to be a simple result of *human* action, and in this trivial

sense all the bowls and pots are unique and original. This is true even of repeat work, to use Leach's expression. I think that to accept an idea similar to the one suggested by Collingwood, namely, that each action, emotion, and image involved in art must be unique because art is unique, is to be led down the proverbial garden path by a picture which has a form of thought leading reality around by the nose.

Questions which ask what it might mean to say that a given object was created, or that a complex of human action is what created the artifact, require an extra edge of prudence. To return to the general thrust of Mitias' remarks, I propose to reconsider how one might take the work of studio potters as creative. I use the word `work' advisedly because it permits an analysis of the process, either as a studio process, an imaginative process, a human process, a production process, etc. It also allows a variety of comparisons about finished products within the specific crafts community itself as well as in larger social contexts. For the present, I accept his point that if there were no products, events, or undertakings in the public domain which people call `creative' and `artistic', that there would be no intelligible way to deal with the notion that *people* themselves might be creative, whether they be artists or not. On the other hand, if we do not include the fact that we *are* dealing with human enterprises, then notions like "artistic" become empty very quickly, and terms like `creative' are reduced to talk about entities like God, and this language is unfortunately rife with absolutes like "no prerequisites whatsoever". By suggesting in all of this that there is an interactive relationship between the public aspects of language about creating, and the individual human contribution to this enterprise, I am also affirming that language about artistic creativity may be properly applied to human action or thought, or to visionary imagination. The language of creative imaginative activity can actually render certain aspects of language about products and studio processes somewhat clearer; the reverse comparison of imagination and studio work can have similar impact.

Let me take an instance in which the artisan *is* creating and return to the as yet unanswered question, "What are you creating?" My suggestion is that to understand what `creating' means in this setting, one would better ask, "What is going on as you create?", "What are you doing that is `creative' now?", "Did you create this?", and other similar questions that come at the issue from the side, so to speak. (For example, an even more peculiar question would be for potters to ask themselves, "What am I going to create today when I work in the studio?") In the previous chapter, the onlookers' questions and considerations about creating, would have been dominated by comparisons between objects, techniques, patterns of action, the obvious place of function, colour variations, or forms for example. We use the word `create' and its related terms most easily when there is distance between the language user and the things which are being discussed, and I think that vision is one of the primary separating factors. An onlooker can more easily designate events, objects, colours, etc., as `creative' because they see the undertaking on a horizon with a background which is significantly different from the immersed participant. Such distance from the actual involvement renders the discussion more general. An intimately immersed maker who is bound to touch, the feeling of form and density, the texture and sensual facet of manipulating plastic and responsive clay, does not use the language about creating to describe what is going on. This intimacy and involvement erect a barrier to the use of certain language. I do think, however, that it is only within this active participation in the practice of the art itself that potters will be seen as creative -- even if they might not use the word for themselves.

From the grounded perspective of the working potter, experiencing what is called `creating' may be and be seen to be very profound, amazingly simply, occasionally boring, and other similar normally incompatible characteristics. For example, let us take the thrust of Mitias' remarks and say that the potter is called creative because of the range of creative artifacts produced. That is, having

called products `creative' does not entail any particular process in the studio or any specific experience by the creator. In such an instance the word `creative' is asserted from a classification perspective. In another instance, a spectator may be mesmerized by the inspiring actions of throwing and correctly call such fascinating actions the creating of the bowl. The potter, on the other hand, may simply be guiding clay, shaping a contour, setting a lip, establishing a base, etc. The potter may regard this undertaking simply as throwing. Another case might muddy the waters a little. The potter will often generate new ideas as the work goes on. The language we have to talk about such generation is laden with images tied to the mythic pictures I described previously, and care must be taken not to fall into the logic of these pictures. The language is acceptable if one maintains a vigil.

There are two such cases which I will briefly outline. The first has to do with the experience of working with the earth and fire, with water, tools and the entirety of the making process. The second has to do with the elusive imaginative interplay of the person's non-verbal and non-manual skills with this making process. As work goes on, potters often have intimations of new and exciting work that is coming to the fore. Certain pieces attract the eye and the care of touch which others do not. We say that the potters have an intimation with respect to the future. There are clues, hints, cues, and suggestions in the work itself that trigger this attentive gaze. But these cues and hints make sense only in the balance of the entirety of studio work. There is no clue when there is not regularity of work, if curves do stay as they are set, if fire does not transform, and if potters cannot rely on their experience to guide them from the past into the future. But this guiding is not simply remembering what has been, and it is by no means merely a clear and distinct image in the mind. The shapes, textures, viscosity of slip and clay, weight and density, etc., of certain pieces attract the potter and encourage deeper attention. These are moments not of systematic knowledge and plan; these are moments of determination, hope, confidence and anxiety. The master potter is different than the apprentice and amateur in these types of settings, not so much because the master can control and perpetuate new and innovative work, but because the incidence of generating new work within the structured studio system increases with discipline and practice, with effort and struggle. The advanced execution of the craft has its internal rewards. This point is stated by Sparshott's recognition concerning beginner's luck and masterful inventiveness. As Sparshott has correctly indicated when discussing a number of issues related to creating, we are not simply at liberty to assume that, since there is a tangible uncertainty concerning results in creating, there are only random or doubtful futures,

> It is when we think of the unique aspects that we speak of "creation". However, though there is such a thing as beginner's luck, it almost never happens that an artist does his best work, or even his most original work, at the very start of his career. Objections that art cannot be thought of in terms of arts (in our sense) tend to founder on this fact.[189]

The other aspect of creative making which bears some discussion is the generation of new visions and what is called `mental' energy. It will be obvious to the reader that I do not think that images reside in the mind as groceries do in a shopping basket. The language we have to express what goes on as artisans create imaginatively, and as they work in the studio interactively with the imagination, is not an easy language to use. I think it is fair to say that my interest in this case is not like Collingwood's. He was concerned with the origin of knowledge per se while I am interested in the development and creation of new visions for the studio potter. His interest focused on the emotive aspect of knowledge whereas my interest has to do with the overall content and contribution of images, as well as with their origination. Collingwood's contention that one cannot know in advance what images might specifically come to mind is quite true. It is not as simple, however, as the words

[189]Sparshott, **Theory of the Arts**, 28.

`cannot know' suggest. Working artists are immersed in concrete settings and they generate images and visions from within this whole. But they do not generate from within, in the sense that the images are already there and all they do is go and get them; nor do they create simply by fiat "with no prerequisites whatsoever". The relationship is neither specifically logical and epistemological as Collingwood's notion of craft suggests, nor completely blind as his theory of perception intimates. The notion of prerequisites inclines one to think of logical dependencies and antecedent to consequent relationships. A richer picture would recognize that the prerequisites are existential and common; the studio, the clay, the trained and masterful potter, the constancy of fire even as it changes, daily life's contribution to human strength and ingenuity, human input and effort, etc.

The artist potter knows a great deal, but creative work does not follow from this knowledge as a logical truth. In order to appreciate the place of knowledge in studio work one would do well to see knowledge as akin to soil, water, an environment, or nourishment. It provides the ground, the strength, the energy and context for human action. The active imagination of potters is interwoven with the depth and breadth of their experience and praxis in the studio. These two aspects of the person are mutually interactive. Occasionally, the potter spends significant amounts of energy focusing on precise images to trace down a hope, a glimmer of newness, etc.; occasionally, the hands trace in clay what the potters' imagination is generating. In other settings, the clues and hints of wonder and newness which a potter sees in pots as they move through the studio are simply hopes and imagination allied in the human effort to break through a new barrier or discover and make that which has been slightly intimated in feeling and imagination.

Take a simple question about sources of inspiration, and consider the type of answer given by Wayne Higby when he refers to a common but well-made western saddle, an oriental landscape, and his watching a lawyer in action, as sources of inspiration and influence.[190] In some complex ways, he regards these as instrumental and conducive to deepening the meaning and impact of his work. They contribute at the level of the origin of his visions. This variety of explanation does not rely on the artist's copying the source of inspiration.

I use the word `inspiration' advisedly. To be inspired is to be induced to action, to have new energies kindled, to be animated and enlivened. These words are used to encapsulate understandings, actions, undertakings, work, etc., the details of which we do not comprehend in their particularity -- and sometimes there is no particularity.

When the potter's sure and focused finger movements, sense of smell, clay memory and careful judgment are at play in studio operations, other language is more appropriate to articulate what is going on from within the experience of the potter. Language about making and doing, language about deciding, imagining, releasing and relaxing, pushing, bending, dipping, straining and forcing, contemplating or focusing, lifting and wedging, acquiescing and accepting, smelling, feeling and groping, thinking, estimating, asserting, etc., is more appropriate with respect to actions and work that is deemed `creative' by someone else, or even for potters when they are less immersed in the actions. The reason that other language may be more suitable and aptly employed about creative work, from the orientation of the working studio potter is not solely that the potter is following a plan or preconceived idea, or that the making is not creating; it lies rather in the way language about creating is used and the orientation which this use may reasonably have. When one describes the course of action, the complex of events, the myriad angles on the process of making the beautiful bowl from the creator's experience itself, one rarely uses the actual language of creation. The sure application of slips to appropriate form, coupled with firing patterns, etc. are parts

[190]Wayne Higby, *A Search for Form and Place*, **Ceramics Monthly**, vol. 37, #10, December 1989, 27-37.

of the creative process in making this set of objects, but *potters* would say in these settings that they were getting the thickness right, the best brush in hand, the line movement of the arm as smooth as possible, the edge of a fluting or carving with the right angle, balance, and depth, etc.

The "what" of such a question poses problems specific to the potter which do not arise for spectators, or when one wonders about doing and making. Even when taken in the substantive sense, the potter is not free simply to answer the question. On this point, Collingwood's general statements have much to contribute if we can detach them from the severe constraints he imposed. I think that much of what he said on this subject is more important than his theory allowed. I take the thrust of his notion that craftwork could not affect art products was that craftspeople know what they are setting out to make and artistic activity *could not know*. His further point was that to fabricate something was a technical enterprise and that no creating was a technical activity. In this setting, therefore, it was inconceivable that creative activity has constitutive knowledge. Resting in this inconceivability were lack of preconception and unpredictability as pivotal elements of art. Working artists are very aware that as they move into untried, more adventurous, inventive, and slightly volatile enterprises, there is often significant uncertainty with respect to precisely what might come out of the undertaking. And it is also quite clear to them that they do have no clearly prescribed goals which must be attained. On the other hand, enterprises, adventures, and risks in the studio may readily fit as part of regular work, special projects, diversions, etc., and are often simply aspects of working in the studio. The answer is normally governed by a recognition that something in the process is dramatically less predictable than in other parts of studio work. It is partially for this reason that potters talk of "trying" to create, or an impression, or an effect when they discuss the entirety of their enterprise. But one reason I suggested that the question about creating is anomalous in the studio setting is that artists do not normally set out to create. In establishing new undertakings, they seek, explore, investigate, pursue visions, hunt down notions and images, test and try feelings in form and colour, and other such carryings on.

In saying these things, I am also asserting that the question about how artifacts are created is most adequately answered by reference to this overall human involvement. From my perspective, the involvement of the human hand may quite rightly be called *the* creative source of this bowl, at this place and time. This does not imply that there are no other contributing factors, orientations, or slants which require a significantly different account if the question about sources is directed to another mode of thought. It also still allows for non-trivial discussions about human imagination being a source as well.

In that apparently magical operation of throwing, or that intense and elusive venture of firing, potters themselves are intimately involved in the obvious acts of creation of the bowl or the dinner set. An amorphous blob of lifeless spinning mud is transformed into a stable, clear, and powerful volume by the bidding and commanding touch of their hands and the coordinated energy of their bodies. In that fire, the initially bland and sterile, slightly fragile, silhouetted form undergoes a morphology akin to that wrought by minor volcanoes: colour comes to light, hardness to bisque ware, granular texture to smooth and integrated surface, the tactile and visual beauty to the concrete functional form. But one would have been enthralled by the wizardry of these mysterious and puzzling operations and manoeuvres, if one were to assume that they *alone* were the creative process. Their capacity to captivate spectators, mesmerize amateurs, excite masters themselves, and fascinate apprentices may induce us to use the language of `creating' with respect to the potter's work, but the master discerns the myriad details and paths that supplement these, the most public of potters' procedures. I think that it may be this fuller grasp of and engagement in the whole fabrication process which restricts the use of words like `create' as the artist potter is actually working.

I bring these considerations to light in chapter ten, because I want to de-emphasize the notion that creating in potter's studio is basically a phenomenon of consciousness of feeling, intuiting, or instantaneous fiat, and nothing more. But I do not want to deny these features as facets of certain ways of looking at artistic creating. As the potter's hands caress and follow the clay, the potter is often simply shaping clay; the hands bring about the actual form in a primitive precursor of its future shape. The present actual shape is new, it is being engendered as the clay slips through the grip. It neither comes out of nothing, nor does it follow a preestablished pattern. The clay is guided and channeled; there is not nothing, there is clay, there are hands, there is a human setting. There is no necessary preconceived form; the form is brought into being at the moment of contact and shaping. As has been clearly argued by Rawson in **Ceramics** (64-127), the most minute variations in shape, overall form, balance of lip to foot, etc., all concrete phenomena, are rendered what they are *as* the potter works with the clay and *by* that work. This work may be described as labour, effort, making, shaping, creating, manipulating, doing, forming, etc., and each of these terms would designate a slightly different slant on the operation being described. Each of them adds breadth to the terms `do', `create', and `make' when they are used to designate the fashioning being discussed. They need not be seen as a replacement for words like `create'. Indeed, when we say of certain work which the potter is doing that it is creative, in *this* given case we may mean specifically that clay is being formed into a bowl, that the particular curve is unusual, perhaps exciting, delicately smooth, and the like. In some other case, we say that potters' work is creative because *the potters themselves* seem to interact with the fire and thereby invoke its transformative power.

Chapter ten has depicted the immense diversity and local complexity of the actual work of the studio potter. The more one approaches the work that potters actually do, the more concrete the language becomes and the less easily one may hold the craft/art distinction as clearly exclusive and exhaustive. For my interests, the more one recognizes that potters work in small communities within settings that encapsulate and show their traditions and practices, their patterns of work and beliefs, the more readily may one see the work they do as creative making. The parameters of what creative making is and how we may talk about it rest within the practices of the various groups of which the potters are members and may be taken as aspects of the traditions within which they work and live. These practices and patterns are themselves in turn fostered and enriched through the potters' work. The rituals and conventions are the nourishing base of this work; the individual human input, development, innovation, discovery, and affirmation portray the sphere from within which the potters' creative actions may be understood.

Chapter Eleven

The purpose of chapter eleven is to present final considerations which have been at play throughout the thesis. I will pinpoint the fundamental assertions of the thesis, articulate some of its limits, and illustrate studies which might readily follow from it.

1. Final Considerations and Comparisons

When a craftsperson undertakes to make artifacts, this enterprise and these artifacts are often properly described as `creating' and `creative', even though they may be `making' and `thing' to the artisan. This may be so, *not* because the craftsperson thinks more crudely than an observer or a philosopher, and not because the studio potter only *makes* bowls and does not *create* beauty. Craftspeople do create; the language articulating this point, however, does not have its home base in the creative process itself as executed by the craftsperson. The language of making tends to concretize to objects, substances and means whenever the questions about it are governed by curiosity about the "what". The examination of creating indicated that such weight is not as readily accorded to the substantive aspect of this activity. In studio craftsmanship, such languages are often simply about facets of the whole studio activity and its products. The various undertakings may readily be seen as employing techniques and taken as a means-to-end procedure, while simultaneously they may be recognized as the result of human ingenuity, innovation, and adventure. Making a beautiful and imaginative bowl is still making a bowl and doing the appropriate actions to bring it about. This doubling up of language for beauty and bowls does not imply that there are two processes going on, or that there are two kinds of objects brought into existence. It is indeed fortunate that there need not be processes, objects, levels of reality, or attributes and characteristics for each and every distinction and use we have for language. Thus it is with doing, making, and creating within the studio of the contemporary individual, or humanist potter; and thus it is in our differing classifications of artifacts made by such artist craftspeople.

I want to illuminate the following items as considerations and then return to studio craftsmanship and craft: first, repeat making; second, production pottery and industrial reproduction; third, innovative making in the studio; fourth, designating any particular artifact as `creative' or `artistic' both within and without the workplace and the gallery; fifth, developing a new idea or vision in studio work; sixth; innovation by accident; seventh, determining what is good about a pot; eighth, experiencing newness; ninth, the relations of touch and vision in shaping the world. Quite clearly, I will not deal fully with all of these issues, each one of which merits investigation in its own right. Further study will follow, but in what remains of this work I will touch on them simply to expose a little of the diversity of human involvement in creative making, imaginative innovation, and repetition, etc.

1.1

For Leach, repeat throwing was the functional core of the potter's studio. One makes bowls, jugs, tea sets, dinner sets, etc., in series with highly specialized actions and patterns. To make meant to design, shape, throw, trim, glaze, fire and finish. The word `repeat' is used in its common sense of duplicate, rerun, redo, reproduce, reiterate, replicate. To do repeat work is to make pots which are like one another, often of astounding similarity considering that the human hand and eye are the factors of determination, and not precise machine or laser calipers. Even though there is a significant similarity between the many objects made, master potters know that each one is different from the

others and they can readily be identified as unique by an experienced person. The differences are normally not significant enough to remark, and the system of repeat throwing is generally designed for efficiency, effectiveness, and economy with respect to money, energy, strength, and focus. But within the similarity of repetition there may arise unusual or delightful differences -- and then there are those that are disastrous.

I use Leach as the example because of the authority of his life in such matters, although this phenomenon arises indifferently in master potters' studios. If, in such an instance, one were to question how it could be that such an interesting, exciting, or subtle pot could come into existence, one should remember that the question arises in a context of repeat throwing, and not in a situation of one-of-a-kind production. If one were to accept that "repetition" were the governing pattern of production *and* of explanation then one would be unable to account for the more subtle, or lively piece. This strikes me as part of what Collingwood was saying in claiming that craft could not fully explain a work of art. That is, repetition does not account for uniqueness.

On the other hand, if one keeps the notion of a master potter as one of the operating notions in the explanation, then this different order of interpretation puts the subtle object into perspective. One readily acknowledges variable input, changing conditions, intimately detailed and delicate discrimination in judgment and action. By using the master as the hub of activity and explanation, one may offer an account of the life of the striking pot by pinpointing the creative input of a master. One does not refer to a specific technique, a particular movement, a given engobe overlap, etc., to account for the object. One reverts to discussion about the accomplished capabilities of the potters themselves, and this puts the entire discussion into a community setting. Such settings encompass diverse traditions, cultural and sub-cultural orientations, and patterns of talented achievements, all of which are operative in our understanding of mastery; and our notions about mastery contribute to the explanations.

1.2

There are many similarities between a small production pottery and an industrial colossus like Kaiser or Spode. I will indicate four and illustrate how these features contribute to certain kinds of explanations of production, and equally how they allow for an element of mystery and ignorance in certain facets of production. Production potteries are geared to manufacture from prototypes, a prime feature of industrial systems. Production potteries have a designer to establish the basis of the prototype which apprentices fabricate, a model which is assumed on a grand scale by forms of specialization in the large commercial manufacturer. The process of manufacture is divided into explicit and well-defined modes of operation each one of which has an assigned and fundamentally unvarying function. Fourthly, vagaries of natural materials and processes, like clay and flame, are reduced systematically to minimal conditions.

This set-up in the means of production serves not only as the efficiency factor in production, but it constitutes the basis of authoritative explanation as well. In such patterned and self-conscious modes of fabrication, the specialized units or steps are deemed to be the cause of a particular existence. What this means in concrete terms is that a given operation of a machine is dedicated to a counterpart in the object to be created. The jiggering or jollying establishes form, the decal contributes to decoration, the prototype provides the plan, the regulated firing schedule contributes to a given texture or colour, etc. It is in light of this that I frequently have referred to just such a picture as the exemplar of Collingwood's technical theory of art, and it is in partial contradistinction to it that I posit the notion of contemporary creative, or humanist and individual, craft. The reader will recognize that some language which describes industrial manufacture is also used to describe the artist potter's studio. It could hardly be otherwise given that we are talking about studios, making, producing, processes, the same materials, etc. One of the prime differences lies in the active

role of the individual potter in the whole process of fabrication as opposed to the role of the order, machinery, and regulated systems of a large-scale production system.

1.3

Whereas the prime operative in the industrial and production manufacturing contexts is the efficient reproduction of a prototype, this is most clearly not the case for innovative making and production in the studio of the humanist craftsperson. To bring about innovative artifacts is not thereby to eschew order and structure in the process of fabrication; it is not to act as if there were no material or plan, and to think that there were no basis in mastery and knowledge. It is to invent and create new and usually valued artifacts from *within* a base of accomplishment. It is by reference to the ability of people to bring about such newness, and *not* by reference to the ineffectiveness of an automated industrial manufacturer to do so, that we begin to account for innovation. The studio setting offers such a picture because it is readily grasped. It consists of an individual or a very small group at work and in dialogue, working out a variety of problems and notions, whether they are technical, general, elemental, design-oriented, function-governed, adventure-directed, etc. It also takes into account an element which played a role in Collingwood's thinking about such matters, viz., the somewhat unforeseeable impact of the individual in affairs dealing with aesthetics.

1.4

It is rare indeed that studio potters, and I think artists generally, know in advance of finishing their work, that a given product will be beautiful, insightful, innovative, aesthetically exciting, etc. There are a number of reasons for this. The simplest reason is that they do not call the future any more than anyone else. Another reason akin to Collingwood's thinking is that studio craftspeople do not plan insight or innovation any more than other people do. Rather, artifacts are most commonly called innovative or insightful for reasons that are pregnant with cultural, artistic, social, aesthetic, visual, and practical considerations after the artifact exists. When we consider the parts of the process as innovative, imaginative and the like, we compare them with other facets of the production process, although we may also say such things because we consider the artifacts to be creative and imaginative, and attribute this to a change in the means of production. Leach attributed one of the major shifts in the work that was being made in the immediate post-war era to the contributions of individual artisans as distinct from the larger impersonal manufacturing systems. That is, the individuals invented new methods and techniques as part of the development of new designs and visions.

Language about the finished artifacts has a somewhat different set of practices and precepts than language about artisans and processes, even though many of the words are the same. One may choose to discuss the upcoming bowl as it is being created, or from the experience of the working craftsperson, and these orientations significantly alter what one means by certain language of creativity. In one instance, one may use the language of making and doing, and one would see that specificity of words is quite eclectic: throwing, pulling, coaxing, smoothing, thinking, arguing with one's self, forcing, guessing, hoping, controlling, etc. Language of this order is customarily used while talking in the studio itself. Language which is rich in the use of creativity words or imagination words falls into place, once one has *already* asserted that a given artisan, a given class of work , a given tradition, style, method, etc., are creative, innovative, and the like. And I think that generally such judgments occur within traditions where there are fairly regular patterns as their supporting structure. As noted in a series of papers at the XIth International Congress for Aesthetics in Nottingham England in 1988, innovation occurs as an aspect of and a redirection within traditions, and as inventive or creative change within configurations and systems. It is equally the case that what is new and innovative in one setting may readily serve as the agent of redirection and

the establishment of a prototype for a new tradition on the one hand, or as the expression of significant change which may already have been imminent within tradition, on the other.

Within the studio itself, work is frequently seen as innovative but only in reference to other work already completed. A whole undertaking within a studio may be an adventure in glaze or form discovery, but this undertaking does not necessarily give rise to artifacts or procedures which are innovative. Like any quest, this adventure may end in failure or despair; it may also end with products which are boring and dull.

By the time artifacts have been placed in galleries and before the public eye, myriad decisions, judgments, social patterns and plotting have taken place. Language using words like `creative', `innovative', `colourful', `harmonious', `balanced', `beautiful', etc., are very much in evidence after the artifacts have left the studio. But one must remember that galleries, traditional writings about such matters, craft organizations and societies, art history considerations, etc., each have their own game rules even though they weave into the rest of the social fabric. Even if the gallery and studio were on the same street, many of their interests are in different worlds. The orientation of the languages they employ illustrates this.

When artifacts are described as being unique, imaginative, creative, and valuable, they are designated as such in structured settings. Such settings may include: traditional pottery; use within the home in which functional ware is being compared to the abstract industrial products; gallery setups in which pots are being compared to paintings or sculpture; a museum culture; the experience people have in using these beautiful utilitarian objects, etc. In slightly more specialized contexts, those in which people knowledgeable in the aesthetics and history of pottery are engaged in discussion, the comparison may be between the production of one *artisan* whose work maintains lively public interest over an extended period of time, and someone else's work which may be fashionable in the short term, but not secure satisfaction over time and use. There are other settings in which such language is used specifically with respect to the functional aspect of the work. In my opinion, the general business of function and utility and their places in questions of aesthetics could benefit significantly from further study. One reason I discussed the limits of the belief that function could be necessarily bound by form, is that I accept that function has a broad base in human experience and daily life which has been frequently overlooked.[191] These would be settings in which a studio potter has created a novel and satisfying new relation between, say, handle and lip, or between belly, lip, balance, pouring feel, etc., and other facets of the work such as texture, colour, pleasure to the touch and the like. Sometimes this type of assertion may rely primarily on the visual or formal features of the artifact, whereas in other circumstances such an assertion may rest in the

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[191]As observed by Rawson, "It is unfortunately true that many modern potters, studio and artist, have been led to believe - and work accordingly - that pots should be made for exactly that [museum/pedestal] kind of distant untouchable appreciation. An air of complete-in-itself visual self-sufficiency, especially when radiating from a `vase' which never contains anything, has become one of the status characteristics, associating ceramics with `noble treasures' that many modern patrons look for." **Ceramics**, 64; note also, Heather Dawkins, *From the Ground of Daily Experience*, **American Ceramics**, vol. 2, #4, 1984, 32-5.

As further noted by Fethe, "The word `*Lebenswelt*' or `life-world' refers to the world as experienced in everyday living. . .A consideration of these characteristics of the life-world will show that they include the features which the philosophers we considered earlier attributed to craft. When Collingwood argues that craft involves planning and goals, when Martland tells us that craft is part of the familiar and everyday, when Waidenhaim (sic) limits craft within the sphere of the functional, all are showing the need to explicate craft by means of a concept like that of the life-world, a concept which incorporates each of these suggestions under a broader, richer and more unified vision." Fethe, *Craft and Art: A Phenomenological Distinction*, 132-3.

participation of the artifact in daily life of the user. These latter types of consideration are probably the least understood and intellectually appreciated facets of functional ware.[192]

Rawson's contention that the most minor of variations, even only in form, has often figured importantly in the evaluation of pottery artifacts by various cultures and individuals, is a notion that is certainly worth some investigation. Certain forms harmonize with categories of decoration, textures, uses, and religious or daily life patterns, and minor variations in any of the elements shifts the role and merit or esteem some individual pieces might be accorded. In this respect, Collingwood's point that the emotional impact of such work is basically unknown is true. My argument, however, is that this class of unpredictability is not a limit on the innovative capacity of the skilled craftsperson. I would also contend, although it is too large a subject to undertake in the present thesis, that simply because certain precise emotional impacts may be formally unknown, it by no means follows that members of the community at large, or of the arts oriented community in particular, are completely unfamiliar with the ranges of reaction and evaluation in their culture or social life.

1.5

Simply because some studio potters do not envisage their upcoming output as creative by no means suggests that it is not so. It seems to me perfectly intelligible to attribute new ideas to the phenomenon of human work and labour within the studio context. This type of account alters the role one might envisage for the word `how' in questions which ask how new things are generated and how new artistic visions are born. It shifts from a mechanical picture to a human and living picture. When Collingwood avoided the mechanical picture in his theory of art by using his theory of perception, he posited another value and structure for the `how' than that permitted in his classical model. His shift had already reoriented the ways in which the word `how' must be understood in such a question, and his phenomenological account illustrates that a description may serve as an explanation in certain instances.

There could not be an answer to the question about how innovation occurs and how new visions come to be if one were to demand assurance *in advance* that the work undertaken and the artifact produced be innovative. There is equally no answer to the more general query concerning how one would develop a technique for inventing new visions and images. Collingwood's argument that this would entail prior knowledge is fundamentally correct; I think, however, that it is clearly the case as well that working artisans do not look for techniques or patterns of work that will ensure imaginative or innovative processes or products. It does not follow, as Collingwood suggests, that craft has nothing whatsoever to do with this innovation per se. One face of craft may be taken as only a specialized form of knowledge. If this facet were taken as the whole of the enterprise, one would have a superficial concept to which other fragments would have to be added to be able to deal with actual artifacts, as I think is amply illustrated in my remarks on abstract language. Craft should be taken as variable and complex forms of action and doing, with the action generally being described as being governed, influenced, impelled, provoked, and produced by effort, decisions, assertions, judgments, work and the like. When innovative masters execute their craft in the studio, it is different from a tight system of goal-directed knowledge. It is a kind of living-in-action knowledge, some facets of which may be set into instructions, some into system, some into propositions, but by far the richest facet of it is understood by examining the results of the craft through an extended period of time in diverse settings.

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[192]Rawson, **Ceramics**, 191-2; Wildenhain, **Form and Expression**, 12-21; Dawkins, *From the Ground of Daily Experience.*

In discussing why and how it might be that the colour blue in an existing configuration seems to cause so much excitement in viewers, one may have different explanations. To account for how one may have *achieved* a particular shade of blue in a particular pot at a particular time -- even though there may not be an account that unfailingly permits of reproduction -- may account for the presence of the blue, but not the presence of the human excitement with it. One may then be obliged to have recourse to descriptions of the bowl's form, balance, utility, weight, etc., to connect the blue to the excitement. That is, one may use one consideration about the artifact to explain one type of reaction to it, and yet still be unable to account for the precise presence of that facet itself. Or, one may be able in general to account for the facet, but not in particular. And there are other instances in which one may describe all of these concerns, and yet not be able to explain why it is or how it is that the artisan in question came up with the innovative notion or artifact in the first place.

The development of new visions in the studio is often an ongoing process with some order, some disorder, certain intuitive jumps, many sequential steps, grasping at matters neither understood, nor seen or valued, much after the fact speculation, shades of hope and titillation, intimations of feelings and images, seemingly endless avenues of work and attempts, and some energies directed in manners which defy any account at all.

I think we begin to make some overall sense of this elusive configuration by establishing different kinds of distances from the various scenarios we may want to describe, and for which we want to offer an account. It was for this reason that I outlined a variety of studio and material-influenced distinctions in chapter eight, and the spectators stance in chapter nine, and the more direct input of the craftsperson in chapter ten. My central point, however, is quite simple, namely, that it is by reference to these complexes as human undertakings that we can begin to make sense of them, and even when we use some of these distinctions to explain certain phenomena, the explanations themselves can easily be skewed if taken abstractly -- as if they had no connection whatsoever to human enterprises, goals, and investments.

1.6

There are many instances of innovation and valued originality which arise by accident within the studio. This is most fortunate for artisans generally, especially those who work regularly with unrefined, naturally complex and basic materials such as clay, and with primal forces such as fire. Even after millennia of human industry with earth's basic mud and the intervention of fire, the number of variables is clearly unknown, and in the individual's studio not readily controllable. Artists and artisans frequently seek, as do their human counterparts in many and most enterprises, to establish limits on the (radically) unpredictable. One of the obvious ways they do this is the rhythm of the studio, the apprenticeship systems of learning, the endless practice and repetition in sequence, the regularity of production and the like. It is not only in light of patterns of regularity and systematic work, however, that notion like innovation by accident have a place. The craftsperson must also be able to recognize the possible contributions of such an occurrence and undertake to act on it. The master craftworkers do this with some ease because of the overall grasp they have of what they are doing. And this grasp is partially ordered in the rational mechanical model way, partially intuitive and without prior input, and partially held together by the strength of their personal visions and energy.

1.7

Once the contemporary craftsperson has assumed the responsibility of individually managing and running the studio and the execution of the entirety of its tasks, the question concerning the determination of what a good bowl is comes to rest with that person. This is true of those judgments about what pots to keep, which ones to discard, why one does these things, etc. The individual potter is neither responsible for, nor able to ensure that, nor in a position to explain why some particular

artifacts may be deemed works of art, expressions of genius, highly imaginative etc., in diverse cultural and social settings. One could profitably undertake a study which would elaborate more fully the interplay between cultural views, general patterns of classification by social structures, and the individual work of designer craftspeople. Such an ethnographic study is beyond the scope of my thesis but of interest in any case. As I have mentioned a number of times throughout my thesis, the master potter does the whole range of studio undertakings. This includes the diversity of work and labour that is boring, repetitious, intensely physical, planning, systematizing, imaginative, demanding, innovative, regular, technical, formal, experimental, etc.[193]

In answer to the question, "How does the potter know that the work is finished?", the diversity of answers throws light onto the making process itself. It also provides a further contact point for the notion of craft as creative. There are many settings in which reproducing an artifact from a prototype is the pattern of work. In cases like this, one compares the finished product with the artifact by using established criteria of acceptability. In the creation of a work which was not set out in advance, there are no highly defined designs to help make such a judgment. But one must not assume that in such particular cases the potter comes up with some object just out of the blue. Even work which is highly innovative and uniquely decorated has been brought into existence by work which follows certain means to end relationships in the studio. These designer craftspeople use clay, water, kidneys, brushes, wheels, fire, oxides, slips. slabs, etc. They start their work and they finish it. When they take a certain piece as being aesthetically exciting, visually stimulating, functionally rich and other such value assertions, they do so in a very specific context and occasionally on very minor changes and variations from other work. A certain curve will add balance and fineness to function or a sense of grace in the hand; the cut of a foot may lift the bowl high enough to enhance its visual lightness or create an aura of being suspended in air. Such minor shifts in shape, colour, and functionality *are* the features which make one particular pot better and richer than another. In creative making, there is no prototype, no outline of directions, no authority to check.

The potter does not know, and there is no `how', because the situation has a different structure to it than that posed by either the classical model or a picture of consciousness. The potter posits the value of the artifact and asserts at a given time that the artifact is finished. This assertion is not random; it fits within the context of a studio and its heritage. Assertion and declaration, or determination and acceptance, are perhaps better ways to understand what potters, do as they claim and present certain original work as ready, or finished. This determination is akin to taste, but no more idiosyncratic that the wine taster's art, or the orchestra conductor's ability to hear. And one would do well to remember that idiosyncratic affirmations about value are not simply random. The constraints of function, custom, present value attributed to various artifacts and artistic performances, and other similar broad-spectrum influences play roles and interpose themselves as variables in both the assertions of artists and the judgments of connoisseurs. There are often limits that one does not appreciate on simple assertions about artifacts. When I say that a vase is imaginative and innovative for example, the word `vase' tells us certain things. We are assured that there is something akin to a foot or base, and something corresponding to a lip or opening, and that in this setting it is made from clay, etc. Innovation and imagination show themselves in colour-form configurations, newness in balance, weight, belly formation, internal form relations, texture to

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[193]With respect to the question of simple ordinary work in the artist-potters' studio, Harry Davis notes the following, "In all of this, I have deliberately sought to eliminate the romantic picture of the artist at work. Instead I have brought together a group of methods involving extremely little capital outlay. . ." **Harry and May Davis: Potters - The Potter's Alternative**, VHS Videocassette (Ridgecrest, California: Auld Film Distribution, 1989).

colour to form harmonies or lack of harmonies, etc. When potters assert that a given pot is good or just right in this imaginative setting, their assertion *is* the positing of a certain value in the world. This assertion is not simply a deistic-like fiat; it enters the social world of the artist, whether it is local to the craft, or broader in Danto's sense of the artworld, or more specialized in the case of international crafts exhibitions and journals. There is a variety of types of confirmation of value within these various worlds. One could do well to study the various interplays of such a value confirmation system. To do so is of course beyond the scope of this thesis, but certainly worth doing.

1.8

As Collingwood developed his theory of art, he gave what I would call a phenomenological account of the affective aspect of the creation of knowledge. I think that one facet of what he was doing in this regard is helpful to understanding some of what goes on when one creates new things. One should keep in mind his contention that in the making of art (i.e., creating), one simply does not know in advance what it is that is being made. By analogy to the potter who creates new and original artifacts, one could reasonably argue that the "what" of his assertion is "knowledge of emotion", and that just as one may not know the exact result of creative undertakings in the studio neither does one know (i.e., understand or experience) the precise emotion which is coming to the fore in the phenomenological venture. I have touched briefly on the doing, making and creating in the studio to posit certain contours for a further phenomenological undertaking with respect to the fabrication of artifacts. There is much that I have not done, and such further investigation is part of what I will undertake in another work. My core interest, however, has been to direct the reader to the experience of the artisan, and to the labour and products within the studio as overall parameters within which one would do well to stay, if one wants to account for the manufacture of newness within a structured setting. I have tried to remain within the realm of the master worker because masters are taken to be those with a deeper grasp of the overall process, with richer insight into generating new work, and yet as exemplars of control over technique, knowledge, and systems of production.

Unlike Collingwood's artist who may have the certainty of knowing because of what "expressing emotion" is, the working potter has such certainty only occasionally. Unlike the abstract artist, the designer craftsperson deals not only with "becoming conscious" of "I know not what". The designer craftsperson deals not only with the uncertainty and unhappiness of unexpressed emotion and feeling, but also with raw natural materials, uncertain technical difficulties, constraints of function, economic obstacles, the imposition of social acceptability, etc. I take it that these toiling artisans settle such deep unresolved feelings by work within the studio itself, and not simply as an adventure in self-consciousness.

1.9

Potters are craftspeople with their hands immersed in mud. As Rawson has reminded us, based in his thirty years of work in museums and writing, this physical touching is not readily appreciated in the arts in general, and by no means understood in the creative making process. As he remarks,

> [O]ne element in both the making and appreciation of ceramics, as hinted above, which plays a crucial part in. . .ceramic traditions: tactility and the sense of touch [is missing]. . .We westerners are not allowed to handle things in our museums; we have been brought up in a culture dominated overwhelmingly by graphic images addressed solely to the eye. . .We live in a state of divorce from an entire *world* of sensation.[194]

[194]Rawson, **Ceramics**, 19-20.

Its place in the appreciation of functional pottery is significantly underplayed and I think it is overshadowed by the visual orientation of contemporary society. Colour and form are frequently dominant elements in judging the value of much ceramic work.[195] The hands, the energy of shoulders and abdomen, and the delicacy of finger tips shape clay; in daily use, the hands again touch and carry such work in its place on tables, etc. I think that one significant aspect of making and appreciating functional pottery which needs an enriched explanation is the integration of the role of touch and of handling, and their complementary roles connected to sight, etc. In this respect I think that accounts which encompass the experience of the artisan and the user of the artifacts will prove to be most fruitful.

2. Collingwood

These general remarks are directed to Collingwood's claim that craft and art are forms of making and that they are acts of consciousness. For him, craft has the idea of its object as a given and its activity as simply the following of a plan. I think it is fair to say that the language philosophers use should apply to those cases which often best instantiate the subject under discussion, as pottery does of the word `craft'. As Leach and others have remarked since that time, the term `craft' itself has taken on a new dimension of meaning in the twentieth century by having individual craftspeople and workers within the context of their studio work as its main referent. It is true, as Fethe has remarked, that Collingwood is doing philosophy and not sociology.[196] But this sort of a remark may simply be a defence against the intrusion of facts into theory and must be regarded with deep skepticism. Work of artists and products of this work come into the world first, and the theories about them and the language concerning them come later. As Bosanquet indicated at the beginning of the present century,

> Aesthetic theory is a branch of philosophy and exists for the sake of knowledge and not as a guide to practice. The present work is, therefore, addressed to those who may find a philosophical interest in understanding the place and value of beauty in the system of human life.[197]

This is not to say that certain theories or beliefs do not affect content or action. They do. But in a case such as the one under discussion, one should always remind oneself that the primary foci of curiosity derives from the place of these artifacts in human social life, the actions that generated them, their value to people, and the language about them. Collingwood clarified a number of features of the craft/art distinction which had not previously been recognized. When he carved out the place of aesthetic emotion in his concept of art, he shed light on a broad range of features of craft as well as providing a certain insight into general questions about art. He polarized his thinking on the term `craft' by using the classical model, which I think could more intelligibly be applied to the industrial manufacturing context than to the craft context. Clearly, there is no practical possibility of

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[195]A point easily recognized in Lang's two books, suggested occasionally in Hopper's work **Functional Pottery**, although Hopper is much more careful in his analysis of function as a whole. It is quite clearly the case as well as evidenced by the increasing number of articles in **Ceramics Monthly**, **American Craft**, and **Crafts**, in the last decade that extol the virtues of form and colour as the distinguishing features of "art pottery". The intimacy of touch, use, and common handling have fallen into the background as aspects of the value of functional work. Wayne Higby has touched on this point in many of his public talks and most recently in the article in **Ceramics Monthly**.

[196]Fethe, *Hand and Eye*, 37-51.

[197]Bernard Bosanquet. **A History of Aesthetic** (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966, original date of publication, 1892), ix.

using forms of consciousness in an account of industrialized production. That more limited model of industry is helpful in understanding some aspect of certain kinds of studio work, but one must recognize its limits. This is emphatically so of what I am here calling the individual, studio, or humanist crafts studios and the workers in them. By presenting the work of Leach for example, or the undertakings of certain workers and movements since the early twentieth century, I want to shift orientation from the reproduction model to a generation model for craft. One may see that the activities of craft began to encompass aesthetic considerations, involvement with innovation, discovery, invention and creation, as well as those of design.

The use of the term `craft' had changed significantly by the time the Crafts Exhibition of 1888 was held in London.[198] Leach was one of the early potters of the twentieth century to help articulate the differences. This is a significant contribution to the breadth of the word's use and it separated this class of activities and its artifacts from the strictly classical model, the industrial reproduction model, and even from the picture portrayed by Yanagi's **The Unknown Craftsman**. The thrust of my general remarks that the imaginative work of studio-potters is not governed necessarily by either a given image or by conscious attention to a sequence of steps even while the master makes the pot, is to indicate that it is not the state of the conscious mind of the potter which either makes the pot or which characterizes the work as craft. I want to indicate, however, that simply by *not* being bound by consciousness of steps or a sequence is not the ground by which I would call the work of the studio-potter creative or creative making. Understanding certain facets of conscious imaginative work is helpful to an enriched understanding of what they do, and in what some aspects of their creativity consists. I believe that they are frequently conscious in very useful ways, and that understanding some of the imaginative activities of these artisans sheds light on other aspects of their work.

The recent question "What is craft?" and its umbrella question "What is art?", as articulated by Collingwood, are perfectly legitimate questions but they are expressed in a form which creates a number of obstacles, and the net which they cast might ensnare only those notions which their grid and latticework have foreseen. Some of these hindrances and conceptual entanglements have been rendered more tangible in chapters six, seven, eight, and nine in which I touched briefly on legacies, the specificity of the studio undertaking, the spectator's stance; and the concrete experience of the working studio potter in chapter ten, not to mention the chapters four and five where my eroding of Collingwood's specific ideas about craft and art does this work for me. If, however, one were to accept that the latticework hidden within such questions may be somewhat variable and shaded by setting and local conditions, then new options are open to us.

The question "What is craft?" was hidden in Collingwood's question about art, and he used his answer to the former to provide the negative model against which he framed his philosophy of the latter. He had made it clear in **The Principles of Art** that negative analysis could readily serve not only as a catalyst to affirmative positions, but also that such analyses cleared away cluttering debris,

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[198]As other writers also have noted, "The day of the true studio potter did not come until after World War I when Bernard Leach and William Staite Murray pioneered a new movement, spreading their philosophy that the artist craftsman could do his best work only by controlling the whole process from clay to decorated pot, working alone or with a few chosen helpers or apprentices." "The term `art pottery' was first widely used in late Victorian times. In this book it is used to describe pottery that owes its design and general appearance to the artistry of an individual or a small team working together on an agreed plan." A.W. Coysh, **British Art Pottery 1870-1940** (Charles E. Tuttle Company Publishers Vermont, 1976), 17, 47. References to the work of Ohr would push such notions further into the nineteenth century. Note Garth Clark et al., **The Mad Potter of Biloxi: The Art and Life of George E. Ohr** (New York: Abbeville Press, Inc., 1989.

thereby removing impediments to understanding his affirmative position. This method or approach is quite fruitful not only for him but for me as well, and I have often used his "affirmation after negation" pattern. The main reason I have returned so frequently to his notions is that his position serves as a negative penumbra for my own assertions; it serves as a house in which I do not want to live, but one that could be on the same street.

I have rendered Collingwood's position into a fairly rigid form. My reason for doing so was to outline a position concerning craft which was a clear extreme against which I could parry. It is no mean feat simply to articulate a concept, and Collingwood exposed a fairly full-blown notion that provided rich soil and opportunity for development.

One feature of Collingwood's theory of art which is both a strength and a weakness is the place and contribution of the individual artist or human being. I think it may reasonably be argued that his theory of art as expression may be reducible to aesthetic individualism or even a form of aesthetic solipsism unless one very carefully draws lines of demarcation within the theory itself. It was in chapter fourteen of **The Principles** that he attempted to incorporate the artist as a person in community. This attempt was too little too late, as the saying goes. It does reveal that he was aware that his concept of expressive or imaginative consciousness was most emphatically instantiated in the experience of individuals, as they come to identify the elements of their feelings, as these feelings are part of the community's emotional life.

3. Contemporary Craft

My simplest contention is that contemporary studio craft is as different from its preindustrial revolution tradition as expressive art is from representational art. This contention is designed to use the notion of the individual person in community as a pivotal hook for a notion of contemporary craft. Leach articulated this point by combining the words `artist' and `craftsman' into one designation; he emphasized the role of the studio as a small community and the place of the individual in such operations and production. His position was readily allied with Read's notion of humanist artistry and the varying relations of craftspeople to industry. These positions profiled the belief that craftspeople had aesthetic sensibility and that this sensibility was shown in the work they produced; that craftspeople were governed by their own inventive and personal energies rather than by someone else's whim and instruction, or by the model of craft as reproduction. I add to this that contemporary craftspeople are more self-governing than were their traditional precursors and that the work they undertake is best understood with the use of variable models depending on the specificity of the inquiry. In each of the varying contexts, it should always be remembered, however, that we are dealing with social undertakings, and that explanations quickly become either vacuous or severely skewed if we separate our explanation from this fact.

By using the studio potter's work, workplace, and production as a case around which my thinking hovers, I consider that there is ample testimony to the effect that a simple relation of necessity and sufficiency is obviously inadequate to appreciate fully the relation of craft and art. There is equally solid confirmation that in order to have an enriched concept of making, for example, one should opt for more diverse and intricate patterns of explanation than those governed primarily by limiting polar concepts like form and matter, or reproduction and preconception. There are many settings in which it is unquestionable that craft and art are forms of making, just as there are settings in which this is not as obviously true. They may equally be adventures, performances, staged enactments, or explorations, as one might imagine in film, theatre, writing or photography for example. In some of these contexts, it is not difficult to grant that the making which craft is, is not coincidental with the making that art is. My analysis of the many distinctions which are operative in the crafts sphere directs light from varying perspectives onto technique, doing, skill, patterns of

work, regularity and invention, etc. These changing orientations try to fill in some of the idiosyncratic details and cement that might hold this aggregate together. I am not simply trying to ferret out a central idea which permits me to distinguish traditional craft, or industrial manufacture, from contemporary studio work. Neither am I arguing that because the lines of demarcation which Collingwood espoused as separating craft from art are inadequate, then art and craft are identical. I am interested in exposing the myriad, intimate aspects of work in the studio to show some of the ways in which craft activity is creative, imaginative, a specifically social undertaking, and not necessarily determined by a quasi-mathematical stricture. This opening to more public scrutiny of the goings-on in the studio operations plainly reveals the import of my thought that innovative studio work is the result of, or the manifest expression of, *human* effort, work, plan, direction, decision, assertion, etc.

4. The Working Studio

As I draw this thesis to an end, I have the distinct impression that what I have said somehow floats above what I mean to say. The labour and workmanship in the studio, the artifact, the social and cultural environments within which all this occurs -- their traditions, language, and future -- and the philosophical legacies which have been inherited are very concrete and specific on the one hand, and quite general and abstract on the other. Getting an adequate bond to link these diverse phenomena is most elusive.

There are three mutually exclusive beliefs and orientations which I do not accept as definitive in trying to answer questions about creativity in studio work or about creativity with respect to the classifications of artifacts. They are: first, the belief that the creative work of the artist shows the creative energy of the artist, i.e., expresses a creative aspect or trait of the potter, when this belief is bound to its partner belief that *this* trait is the *sole* origin of the creative work. I take this to be the thrust of the expressive or romantic theories. Second, the belief which accepts that artifacts have beauty or aesthetic qualities as features of them independently of the role of any human enterprise is a belief which unduly objectifies the role of these notions and is a simple version of the classical doctrine. Third, to think that only institutionally sanctioned work is art displays a concept of the human community which is itself inadequate for appreciating the full scope of creative human making. For my present purposes I take these beliefs as mutually exclusive: the first places the real reason for calling some artifact `art' in the creative worker; the second accepts that beauty, for instance, has a status quite apart from the individual and from humanity; and the third places this reason solely in a social convention.

My stance, on the other hand, sets out to contour these three positions as *integrated* with one another in something like the following fashion. The origin of the individual work does lie in the creative human maker, but what is made is not simply some expression of this maker. It is an independent yet interdependent artifact just as the craftsperson is an independent yet interdependent human being. The word `expression' in cases like this allows us to refer to the overall activities of a *person* of which creative making is only one facet. I contend that the aesthetic features of this artifact are features of the artifact, and not simply some emotional projection onto the artifact or reaction to it. Further to this and drawing on the role of social considerations, I accept that there is a partial confirmation of the aesthetic features of the artifact in cultural settings, and these same social complexes also affirm and corroborate that the given makers are creative and innovative. They also provide a ground for the maker. These beliefs are rendered richer when they are taken as fibres within and constituting a fabric, and not simply viewed as independent strands.

My ongoing premise in all talk about artifacts, works of art, performances, artistic enterprises, and the like, is that they are rendered what they are by human action. Chapters nine and ten are my

attempts to delineate what it might mean to say "rendered" and "human action" in light of doing, making, and creating. One of the least well understood areas of creative and artistic doing rests in this configuration of thought. One may want to know "how" innovative work is generated when compared with work which is simply in a style, or repetitive. One may wonder what the "origin" of the pot is, and queries like this are often designed to skirt an answer which simply lists clay, glaze, water, wheels, kiln and the like as the answer. One may wonder "where" all the ideas come from and "how" the artist continually generates new ones. There are also many situations in which all a person wants to know is how to make a bowl at all! This could be a query posed by an apprentice, student, child, or anyone who seems slightly stupefied at the apparent mystery of throwing and firing. And simply because the potter may be able to show and explain a variety of steps in any specific making, it does not follow that the "how" which potters *do* explain is all that they *can* explain. And one should always keep in mind that all that potters can *explain* is by no means all that they can *do*, *make*, or *create*.

The general stance which I take towards creative action and artistry when I use the model of the studio potter has in part been stated by Ginsberg when he says, "Making principally occurs through the exercise of hands and words. In creative expression, one lays one's hands upon things and transforms them. We take the world into our hands."[199] He goes on to talk about this transforming in a manner which shows some influence of the classical model of art, whereas my point is that the words `art', `artistry', and `creative' get their most concrete meaning not by reference to an inward vision, but through concerted interaction with settings in which one finds media like clay, wood, pigment, plastic, or voice, i.e., settings which demonstrate and involve considerable skill, affirmation, assertion, and decisions.

From the working potter's perspective, language about making and doing, language about deciding, imagining, pushing, bending, dipping, straining and forcing, lifting and wedging, acquiescing and accepting, smelling, feeling and groping, thinking, estimating, asserting, etc., is frequently more appropriate in the studio, than language about creating. But the reason that other language may be more suitable and aptly employed about creative work from the orientation of the working studio potter, is not that the potter is following a plan or preconceived idea, or that the making is not creating. It lies rather in the way language about creating is used and the orientation which this use may reasonably have, and of course what it is that the potter is doing. The appropriate use of language does not establish what is going on; if anything, the reverse is true.

Chapters nine and ten point to queries which can be posed in many and diverse ways concerning the *origin* of images, ideas, creative energy, visions and the like, in the working potter's studio. As the reader will readily recognize, this thesis has not given the definitive account of these phenomena. It was, I think, to deal with such a set of questions that Collingwood spent such detailed and inventive time within his philosophy of art on his theory of perception. It was, I think, very clearly for these types of queries that he asserted with no hesitation that the technical theory of art could offer no answers. On this latter point, he was correct. I simply remind the reader that when one makes contact with some of the challenges and difficulties brought to hand by wondering how it is that inventive artist potters are able continually to generate new images, forms, colours, etc., and what guises their deeper sources of such inspiration, energy and images might take, one may be brought back to the type of query Collingwood posed to look for new answers.

This reminder of Collingwood's interest directs one's thought to potters as they work and as they generate new forms, new themes, new styles and often new values in the process. How do they do this? What is the wellspring of such new vision? My simple answer to this is that there is no

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[199]Robert Ginsberg, *Creativity and Culture*, in **Creativity in Art, Religion, and Culture**, 99.

answer to the "how", if by `how' one takes the question to ask for a method, a system, or a guaranteed path. In this respect, Collingwood's contention is correct that classical art could not generate new ideas and art per se, nor be accepted as an explanation of this newness. But as I contend, no theory, no path, no thought is able to offer such a "how". I think Collingwood was well aware of this in spite of his offerings in the **Speculum Mentis** concerning the dialect itself. His theory of perception as delineated in **The Principles of Art** offers an account of a different type of "how" than a methodological or implementation one. His theory describes phenomenologically how he thinks knowledge does originate, not how one *would* create new knowledge.

5. The Craftsperson and Community

The notion of the human person in community, in a setting of tradition and practices, has played an important role in the later parts of my thesis. I have used it generally as a contrast to notions like consciousness, mind, and body, but I have also relied on it to clarify other limited notions like skill, knowledge, making, excellence, etc. The concept of a person derives explanatory power in undertakings like my thesis because it operates within a domain extensive enough to cover both the individual and the community. Language about craft, art, the arts, creativity, innovation, and aesthetic sensibility secures its validity by being used to describe people, their actions, their aspirations, their products, cultures and offshoots, their feelings, their interplay with others and with themselves.

6. Limits, Strengths and The Future

In order to bring this thesis to an end, but certainly not a definitive conclusion, I will indicate what I take to be its obvious strengths and I hope to point out some limits to the applicability of its notions, as well as some future study that should follow from it.

6.1

The limits of my thesis are divided into two categories: lack of clarity due to my own premises, and constraints with respect to other fields than pottery. I will briefly indicate three components in my thesis which need further theoretical considerations to shore them up. Firstly, the methodological limits of what an application is have not been adequately spelled out. When one asks, does Collingwood's theory of art "fit" the studio setting, certain theoretical problems arise. That is, what are the limits, methods of verification, modes of association, etc., by which one may determine whether a set of concepts has been appropriately applied to a detailed case. Secondly, it may be possible to argue that the base of my work is too particular to allow for extensive claims about contemporary craft. My contentions that major distinctions and the thrust of certain language are context driven imposes significant limits on my own right to broad spectrum remarks. Certainly, more constructive work could be done to reinforce the place of custom, practice, tradition, and historical roots in my thoughts about excellence and creativity. This effort would clarify how these phenomena help provide a solid footing for generalizations about creative making. It would indicate, I believe, that the foundations of my notions do not shift at random. Thirdly, what it means specifically to say that having recourse to the concept of a person may constitute an explanation, should be expanded.

What I have presented is not applicable to all fields or activities which are commonly called `craft' in the late twentieth century, and this is a limit to my inquiry. With such a strong emphasis on the role of studios, the individuals and groups within them, the concrete work with earth and fire and the like, a certain slant has been cast. It is not clear to me that such a slant would be readily applicable to certain other fields without further analysis of what it might mean `to apply' concepts to human undertakings. Where, for example, would film and cinematography fit into such an

enterprise; or how would one incorporate the highly developed and creative craft of theatre and dance; what is the place of highly structured sumi painting or traditional fibre work? What is the limit of my idea of humanist craft relative to quilt making on the one hand and the radically inventive work which exemplifies the vessel aesthetic as noted by Clark for example? Although I am certain that aspects of what I say would be applicable to a great deal of painting, sculpture, architecture, wood carving and glass-blowing, I am equally clear that activities like action art, radical expressionism, improvisation, and much of post-modern clay installation work would not be accommodated by my concept. But I would add, there is no particular reason that it should. My thinking about craft does not seek to encompass all human doing, making, and creating. I seek rather to use these notions to enunciate a concept of creative or studio craft

6.2

It may sound unusual but I think that the very issue which may be seen as a vulnerability in my notion of craft is also its strength. Specificity of context and concreteness of example render general and abstract language clear and rich. The richness which comes from experience within the artistic enterprise and from the community of workers restricts unwarranted flights of fancy which make certain theories seem like hot air balloons. The local and determinate settings which have persons living and acting in their common daily lives acknowledges what I think we know, namely, that the skillful and insightful work of human beings is the genesis of artifacts, and that in order adequately to grasp the pivotal point in assertions about aesthetic sensibility, in judgments concerning beauty, works of art, and the place of craftsmanship, we must assume that persons and concepts of persons are operative. The second strength comes from the belief posited in numerous places throughout the thesis, namely, that philosophical aesthetics gains immeasurably by incorporating common, regular, broadly based and masterful experience in the field under discussion.

6.3

Several studies are nestled within this thesis in an embryonic form. I have mentioned some as I moved along and I shall not repeat them at this time. The main methodological work yet to be done pertains to defining more fully what conditions might constitute an application. Clearly phenomenological studies of the various links between creating, order, and intention are appropriate; so also are analyses of the judgments and assertions operative when the artisan claims that a given innovative work is finished; a further conceptual analysis of the notion of creating in the context of beginning to end relationships (i.e., a setting which takes human creating as the base and not theistic creating as the base). The study which I myself will undertake has to do with the interweaving of mastery, the authority of skill, and the openness of creative enterprise.

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